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ABSTRACT

This comparative analysis was derived from 12 case study reports, each devoted to policymaking for the public schools in a particular State. The nine chapters were prepared by a number of persons involved in the case studies. First, the framework and methodology used in the study are explained. Next, the authors discuss the major actors in the 12-State education policy systems--State boards of education, the chief State school officer, State department of education personnel, governors and governors' offices, and leaders of education interest groups. In a subsequent section, the focus is on the politics of school finance reform in four States where governors and legislative leaders apparently play major roles. The report concludes with an interpretive treatment of State education policy systems and a set of recommendations. (Author/JF)

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STATE POLICY MAKING FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Edited by

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Prepared for
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FOREWORD

This Comparative Analysis is one of two major reports prepared by the Educational Governance Project. The other major report is State Governance Models for the Public Schools. In addition, there are twelve case study reports, each devoted to policy making for the public schools in a particular state. The Governance Project began in January, 1972 and was completed in August, 1974. The work was funded by the U. S. Office of Education under Title V (Section 505) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (OEG-0-73-0499). The Policy Board for the Project was composed of three chief state school officers, with the State of Ohio serving as fiscal agent. An Advisory Committee composed of eleven persons concerned with general and educational governance also served the project. Contract for the work was let to the College of Education, The Ohio State University Names of principal participants are shown in the preceding directory.

The major purposes of the Educational Governance Project were two in number:

1. To expand our knowledge of how states determine policies for the public schools.
2. To develop alternative models of state educational governance for consideration by policy makers and others.

This report, we believe, will make a contribution to the first purpose.

Before such a document could be written, a number of other tasks had to be undertaken. It was necessary to develop a conceptual framework for the examination of the state governance of education, to recruit and train a group of researchers, to collect some information on all 50 states and much more on the 12 selected states, to develop data-gathering instruments to be used in the states, to establish categories and coding procedures for analysis, to interview appropriate respondents in each of the 12 states, and to complete the case studies. Other activities, focused more on the Models but of some help to this report, included a survey of preferences regarding governance options and four regional conferences where possible models were considered. For those who wish to move beyond findings and conclusions and consider actual changes in the state governance structure for a particular state, we suggest that they also consult the companion report on Models where alternative structures are presented.

It is our hope that this report will contribute to a meager but growing body of literature on the state governance of education and will prompt other scholars to pursue related investigations. The nine chapters which follow have been prepared by a number of persons. At the same time all of these chapters have been scrutinized by the editors and an attempt has been made to provide a unified treatment of the study conducted over the past 32 months. In Chapter I the framework and methodology used in the study are explicated. Chapters II - VI deal with the major actors in the 12 state education policy systems: state boards of education, chief state school officers, state department of education personnel, governors and governors' offices, and leaders of education interest groups. In Chapter VII the focus is on the politics of school finance reform in four states where governors and legislative leaders obviously play major roles. The report is concluded with an interpretive treatment of state education policy systems, Chapter VIII; and a set of recommendations, Chapter IX.

A great many people have given assistance to the Project. While complete acknowledgement is impossible, we do wish to make some specific acknowledgements. David J. Kirby, Memorial University of Newfoundland, helped with the initial proposal submitted to the U. S. Office of Education and with the early planning of the Project. Also in the planning stage, David L. Colton, Washington University; and Walter Hack, Roy Larmee, and Frederick Staub, all colleagues at Ohio State University, gave help and encouragement. Sven Lundstedt, Professor of Public Administration at Ohio State University, and William A. Harrison, Jr., Fellow, Academy for Contemporary Problems, Ohio State University, gave valued assistance with instrumentation. A number of scholars across the nation provided thoughtful criticism of plans, proposed activities, and many segments of writing. Of particular help were Joseph M. Cronin, Secretary of Educational Affairs in Massachusetts; Kenneth H. Hansen, formerly of Washington State University and now Superintendent of Public Instruction in Nevada; Sam P. Harris, the U. S. Office of Education; Lawrence D. Haskew, University of Texas; Gerald R. Sroufe, Nova University; and Michael D. Usdan, City University of New York.

The Advisory Committee of the Project was helpful, particularly in the planning stage of the work. In addition, members of the Committee reviewed the preference survey instrument, assisted with the regional conferences, and offered suggestions on some of the reports. Members of the Policy Board of the Project have given generously of their time, have helped provide the general direction of the Project, have offered constructive criticism at every stage, and have been supportive of the purpose and thrust of the work. We also acknowledge the assistance of literally hundreds of persons who provided us with their judgments by responding to interviews, questionnaires, or by participating in conferences.

Grateful as we are for the suggestions of all these persons and more, we and the authors of the signed chapters take responsibility for what appears in this report.

As a final word of appreciation we also wish to acknowledge the dedicated and skillful secretarial assistance provided by Norma Elliott, Bonnie Williams, and Jeanne Gunter.

Roald F. Campbell
Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr.

CHAPTER I

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr.

Introduction

Like many other American institutions, those that govern the country's schools have been subject to widespread questioning and challenge. Despite an elaborate structure involving thousands of public officials, there are signs indicating deficiencies in both process and performance. Deficiencies in process are most clearly revealed in demands from citizens, parents, teachers, and students for a larger voice in education decision making. And indicators of performance inadequacy are to be seen in everything from the inequitable allocation of fiscal resources and the erosion of taxpayer support, to the popular movement for schools to be held "accountable" for results. Issues arising from these and other discontents simultaneously confront existing political systems; together they constitute a severe test of the viability of these systems.

States occupy a pivotal position in the arrangements that have evolved for educational governance in the United States. They are constitutionally responsible for the establishment, support, and supervision of the public schools. Much of this authority has been delegated to local districts. Yet, as recent court decisions have emphasized, this does not divest the states of responsibility. In fact, major education policies have always been set at the state level. This is true whether one looks at basic fiscal determinations or at areas such as teacher certification, curriculum standards, and school boundaries. Additionally, even more than national agencies or local boards, states can make federalism work. They can provide appropriate feedback to Congress and executive branch; they also can give close scrutiny to the problems of school districts. Both responsibility and opportunity dictate, therefore, that it must be the states which take the lead in meeting the challenges to educational governance.

Accepting the validity of this assessment, the Educational Governance Project (EGF), from the outset, had as its primary objective the development and appraisal of alternative models of state educational governance. We soon discovered that while there was a surfeit of proposals and recommendations, little empirical research had been done on the actual workings of different governance arrangements. Adequate descriptions were not to be discovered in the literature, much less had the causes and consequences of structural variations been systematically examined. Given this situation, our chief research task, as we came to conceive it, was to describe and to analyze the process by which the states currently determine policy for their public schools. We believed that such an endeavor not only would produce evidence relevant to a consideration of models, but also would extend knowledge of a crucial area of educational governance.

Basic Research Questions

After much discussion, and substantial revision as a result of field testing in Ohio,[1] we organized the EGP research to answer these basic descriptive and analytic questions:

1. Who are the major participants in state education policy systems?
2. What policy-making resources are available to these participants?
3. How do participants seek to influence the education policy-making process?
4. What are the significant relationships among participants in the determination of policy?
5. How much and what kind of difference do features of governmental structure make for the operation of state education policy systems?

6. What factors other than governmental structures might explain the variations that exist among states with regard to education policy making?

Scope

The scope of our inquiry was intentionally delimited in several ways. To begin with, we focused on policy making for public elementary and secondary schools. Non-public schools and institutions of higher learning only received attention if they intersected with the process of central interest. Second, while intergovernmental relationships were not ignored, the vantage point was from state capitols, rather than attempting to explore these relationships at their local or federal sources. Finally, neither environmental conditions nor policy consequences were examined in any detailed fashion. As to the first, data gathering was confined to general information on socioeconomic, political, and institutional characteristics. And policy consequences were considered only as they emerged as feedback in the policy system.

Conceptual Framework

We developed a conceptual framework to guide our investigation. Such a framework is composed of related concepts, assumptions, and questions that appear to be a fruitful way of attacking a research problem.[2] Its purpose is not to generate hypotheses to be confirmed or denied by the marshaling of evidence; instead, in the words of Lasswell and Kaplan, "it is intended to serve the function of directing the search for significant data, not predicting what the data will be found to disclose."[3] The conceptual framework, then, offers a vantage point from which to view the subject, criteria for judging what sorts of information are relevant to its study, and a device for organizing the data that are gathered. The framework we fashioned was adapted from political systems theory and allocative theory.[4]

Political Systems Theory

The political systems approach, speaking generally, stresses the utility of viewing policy making as an interactive process through which inputs, including demands for change, are converted into outputs, including authoritative decisions. Though we did not employ the full conceptual apparatus of this approach, three general notions did serve as a preliminary orientation: (1) policy decisions, (2) system boundaries, and (3) functional relationships.

Policy Decisions. The system outputs of concern to us are policy decisions--namely, the authoritative decisions that establish the goals and priorities governing subsequent choices. Such parameter-setting decisions are not to be confused with either implementations of existing directives or goal-like pronouncements that fail to assign priorities. Policies, to borrow from Lasswell's classic definition, declare "who gets what, when, how."[5] Thus, it is education policy that gives direction to the allocation of such valued education goods as school funds, instructional personnel, curriculum innovations, bargaining authority, and the racial composition of student bodies.[6]

As a concept, "policy decision" refers to an event, not a process. Once a system has been engaged by a demand for change, this event can be said to happen when there is either the promulgation of a new policy or existing policy has been upheld by the purposeful action of those authorities capable of acting on the demands that were represented. The latter kind of decision can be manifested in an opposing vote or a veto. It also can be the outgrowth of informal action that prevents new policy from being made. Policy decisions, therefore, do not necessitate that established goals be revised, nor that these outputs always be the result of a formal enactment.[7]

Related to policy decisions are "outcomes." We thought of these as being the consequences of policy decisions and as representing the impact of these choices on the environment. Easton offers a most apt analogy: "In short," he writes, "an output [e.g., a policy decision] is the stone tossed into the pond and its first splash; the outcomes are the widening and vanishing pattern of concentric ripples."[8] A treatment of policy outcomes was beyond the research resources made available to the EGP. However, the social effects of decisions are linked to the flow of inputs by feedback mechanisms. And changes in the patterns of demands and their relationship to the modifications of public school policies were considered in our inquiry.

System Boundaries. The application of a systems approach requires that the boundary which sets the system for analytical purposes apart from its environment be specified. In doing this, we found Gross's distinction between the general environment and the immediate environment to be helpful.[9] By "general environment" is meant the physical, socioeconomic, and political milieu that forms the backdrop for policy making. As has been said, the design of our study called for only a limited investigation of this milieu, an investigation that was confined to readily accessible data on such phenomena as demographic trends, industrialization and urbanization, amount and distribution of wealth, and characteristic features of a state's political culture. The term "immediate environment" refers to the various individuals and groups who have interests in state school policies, interests that on occasion become expressed as political demands.

Crossing the boundary from the immediate environment to the system itself, one finds a relatively stable group of actors who have a continuing concern with public school policy, who interact on a regular basis, and who together constitute the elements of the state education policy system. These actors, as identified by existing research, include the (1) governor's office, (2) legislature,

(3) state board of education (4) chief state school officer and state department of education, (5) state court , and (6) state-level educational interest groups.[10]

System actors were focal points in our inquiry, but they did not receive equal emphasis. Because our ultimate goal was the development of state governance models, we devoted most of our attention to the policy-making behavior of those institutions--state board, chief state school officer, state department of education, and governor's office--that we expected to be central to the consideration of models. and devoted less resources to those institutions--the legislature, and, to even a lesser degree, the judiciary--that we expected to treat largely as "givens."[11]

Functional Relationships. Identifying the actors who make up a policy system is but the first step in using the systems approach. The second is to ascertain the relationships among the actors that determine education policy. These relationships, not the internal characteristics or operations of the individual components, are what receive emphasis when the policy process is viewed in system terms. To facilitate analysis, policy-making relationships were conceived of in relation to four functional stages:[12]

Issue Definition:	Process by which the preferences of individuals and groups become translated into political issues (i.e., "a demand that members of the political system are prepared to deal with as a significant item").[13]
Proposal Formulation:	Process by which issues are formulated as specific proposals for a policy change or for maintaining the status quo.
Support Mobilization:	Process by which individuals and groups are activated to support or oppose alternative policy proposals.
Decision Enactment:	Process by which an authoritative (i.e., governmental) policy choice is made among alternative proposals.

Distinguishing between functional stages is analytically useful because it permits a more complete understanding of the relationships which lie behind a policy change. Specifically, there appear to be three advantages in using such a conceptualization.[14] First, it constitutes an appropriate frame of reference for investigating what actors actually do (as opposed to what they should do or are thought to do) in the deciding of policy. Second, it delineates clusters of activities that are likely to be found across policy systems, including the kind we studied. Finally, it stresses pre-enactment processes, processes that are crucial in establishing the agenda of policy options from which final choices typically are made.

Allocative Theory

Even if a political systems orientation is necessary (Spiro argues that "anyone who attempts to study politics scientifically must at least implicitly think of politics as though it were functioning as some sort of system"),[15] it is not sufficient to examine how policy is made. Indeed, what is striking is how little has been explained in other studies by the political systems construct.[16] No doubt there are a number of reasons for this dearth of explanatory payoff. Still, as a device to investigate the policy process, the systems model is not an appropriate conceptual tool to deal with the phenomenon of influence.

If, as we believe, influence is the dynamic in the pattern of actor relationships by which functions are performed, conflicts are overcome, and decisions are reached, then the crux of our research framework had to consist of concepts directed toward its study. Of these, the most fundamental are "power," "influence," and "resource." Since there are varied meanings given to these terms, definitions are necessary:

power	- actor's capacity or potential to select, modify, or achieve outputs of a system.[17]
influence	- actual exercise of power by an actor.[18]

resource - anything controlled by one actor which can be brought to bear on another actor so as to alter the latter's subjective definition of the advantages and disadvantages in a decision situation.[19]

Assumptions. Before considering in more detail the requisites of policy-making influence, some assumptions about this influence must be made explicit, for these assumptions shaped the data-gathering effort and the way in which we thought about our data. Basically, we made at least six assumptions about policy-making influence:

1. Public policies are the results of an influence process in which competing actors seek to obtain decision benefits.

Public policies are not the summary of the preferences of officeholders, nor rational choices based on technical information and criteria. All of these may be caught up in policy making, yet their inclusion does not supplant the exertion of influence. Rather, they are incorporated as "an instrument or weapon into the play of power."[20] The "play of power" as the source of policy is the concomitant of a situation in which there is shared authority among decision-makers, decision-makers who have different perceptions and priorities regarding issues and who have the resources to affect their outcome.

2. Focal actors in the influence process are those seen as being entitled to render authoritative decisions.

Government officials are not autonomous actors; they typically are subject to multiple pressures of varying intensity. And there are instances, perhaps frequent, when the choices of these officials are controlled by other actors. Even so, authorities have exclusive access to that resource, usually based on the legal right to act, which gives legitimacy to a policy decision.

3. Possession of policy-making influence is dependent on access to appropriate resources and their skillful use.

There are influence resources that are effective with many actors and in many circumstances. But the policy process in any given arena (e.g., a state legislature) is more sensitive to some means of influence than it is to others, and the stage of the process also makes a difference for the potency of a resource.[21] Command, then, of appropriate resources is indispensable to influence. It is not, however, a sufficient condition; much depends on whether and how these resources are applied in policy making. Further, since policy influence is always relational and exercised within a system, the interests, power, and leadership of the actors who are targets for influence attempts must be taken into account, as must such systemic features as formal structure and prevailing norms.

4. The influence process involved in policy making is characterized by reciprocal relationships.

The interaction between citizens and policy makers does not constitute a one-way flow of influence. There are times when this is the case, yet it is not the prevalent condition. Instead, our assumption is that influence relationships between authorities and interest spokesmen tend to be reciprocal; that what a government does and how it does it affect (as well as reflect) the demands made upon it.[22]

5. Relationships among actors in the influence process are indirect as well as direct.

In contrast to pressure group models which suggest a direct influence relationship between an interest group and a governmental agency, this proposition points to the deliberate involvement of third parties in conflicts over policy. Of particular significance here are efforts made by competing actors to enlist public support for their efforts.

6. Informal, as well as formal, rules shape the application of influence in policy making.

Besides a legal framework, the pursuit of interests in policy making takes place within normative constraints. The successful application of power in a policy system usually requires that it occur within the "rules of the game" of that system as well as within those of the broader culture in which the system is embedded. Though there have been dramatic exceptions, failure to observe these rules generally leads to a diminution of influence.

Influence Resources. As stated above (assumption three), the power of a policy actor in our framework is seen as being based on the command of resources. Many analysts have sought to explain how resources produce influence. While elaborate distinctions are possible, these ways of influencing can be thought of as falling into one or the other of the categories proposed by Parsons:

> Sanctioning influence is the addition of new advantages or disadvantages (conditional or not) to the situation of the decision-maker. Persuasion influence operates on the orientation of the decision-maker, changing the connection he sees between a decision outcome and his goals without the addition of any new advantages or disadvantages to the situation.[23]

Just as there are many things which can alter an actor's perception of advantages and disadvantages, there are many kinds of resources that can be converted into influence. Even Dahl's lengthy specification does not exhaust their number:

> A list of resources in the American political system might include an individual's own time; access to money, credit, and wealth; control over jobs; control over information; esteem or social standing; the possession of charisma, popularity, legitimacy, legality; and the rights pertaining to public office. The list might also include solidarity: the capacity of a member of one segment of society to evoke support from others who identify him as like themselves because of similarities in occupation, social standing, religion, ethnic origin, or racial stock. The list would include the right to vote, intelligence, education, perhaps even one's energy level.[24]

Enumerations like Dahl's do highlight the diversity of influence resources. Yet the productiveness of such a "grocery-list" for research is limited by its diffuseness. Our approach to this problem was to be particularly sensitive to those resources that appeared to have the widest applicability in the policy system of interest; the presumption being that it was the command of such resources which contributed most to the stable potential of a participant to exert influence.[25] Several empirical works, notably those dealing with legislative policy making, were of value to us in identifying these sources of power.[26] This literature suggested special heed be paid to the following: (1) legal authority, (2) information and specialized expertise, (3) social status, (4) group cohesion, and (5) electoral potency.

Willingness to Mobilize Resources. The possession of resources, irrespective of type, is not the equivalent of actual influence. Resources are necessary for influence, but influence also depends on the intention of the actors to whom these means are available. Even individuals who have powerful resources often exhibit no interest in employing them to affect public decisions. Wildavsky has generalized:

> That resources exist does not mean that they will be used fully, skillfully, or at all. Most people use their resources sparingly, with varying degrees of effectiveness. The cost in time, energy, money, and ego damage usually seems too great in comparision to the benefits which appear remote and uncertain. As a result, there is a vast reservoir of resources lying untapped by people who prefer not to use them.[27]

Assuming the command of appropriate resources, why are actors so unlike in their disposition toward political involvement? Part of the answer has to do with the amount of resources which are possessed. The more of a resource that an individual has the less his opportunity costs are for a unit outlay of that resource. A second explanation is to be found in the perceptions that people have of the benefits to be attained through political action.[28] We expected, in this connection, that two variables--"issue saliency" and "role expectations"--would help explain the involvement of actors in state education policy systems.

The willingness to mobilize influence resources cannot be examined apart from situational factors. One such factor has to do with the content of issues, including their differential saliency to individuals and groups. Not all issues arising within a policy system are equally vital to all its participants. To illustrate, for a teachers' association school issues vary from some which are central (e.g., collective bargaining) to those of marginal interest (e.g., school desegregation). Similar continua, with different placements of the issues, exist for all the other actors in the state education policy system.[29]

Those who take part in policy making do so from positions within the system and are subject to the expectations held for these positions. What incumbents of system positions, official or unofficial, expect of each other (and themselves) in state education policy-making affects their willingness to use resources.[30] In this regard, Sroufe looked at the self-role expectations of state board members and found that these officials, contrary to their impressive legal mandate to determine policy, rejected a "concept of the state board as a political actor within the system."[31]

Utilization of Resources to Exert Influence. Just as it is a fact of prime importance that actors differ greatly in their mobilization of resources, they differ, too, in their skill in the "art" of politics. Put most simply, this skill consists of the ability of an actor to obtain more influence than do other actors from the same resources. An assessment of the degree to which actors are efficiently utilizing their resources is always an imprecise undertaking. We attempted such an assessment in our research by looking at the tactics resorted to by individuals and groups as they sought to gain access to policy-making structures and to exploit this access for the purpose of influencing.

Any discussion of the influence exerted by policy actors must begin with the concept of "access;" for notwithstanding the goals of these actors, access is what they must immediately seek. By "access" is meant the openness of channels of communication between interest spokesmen and the policy system.[32] The extent of access can vary from just being heard at some stage in the deliberations to having an agent of the interested group being given the power to make the decision.

Though access is a sine qua non of policy-making influence, its attainment is no more than a beginning. Resources must be brought to bear at the points of access if policy making is to be influenced. Numerous classification schemes have been applied to political strategies (i.e., the intentional use of resources to influence authoritative decisions), but most are not specifically directed at its exercise in systems where policy normally is accomplished through group decision-making. In these systems, writes Riker, "policy making is invariably the same. It is a process of forming coalitions."[33] Hence, while access is the initial objective, the formation of coalitions is the requisite for ultimate success.

Accommodation among policy makers in the forging of coalitions has endless nuances. Besides organized forms such as the legislative committee structure, there are many techniques of informal influence. Political scientists, though, disagree on their relative importance. In the view of many, "the bargaining process is at the heart of the policy process."[34] The reference here is to a process in which competing actors seek agreement through the exchange of inducements. Yet even given broad meaning, bargaining is not the only way policy makers influence each other. Lindbloom has argued that persuasion is as widely employed, and that there are many times when a policy maker "achieves cooperation not by trying to manipulate others but by adapting himself to them."[35]

Systemic Features. As our earlier discussion emphasized, we recognized in considering policy influence that it is always exercised within a political system and that features of this system always condition relationships among actors. Schoettle, in fact, urges that investigators concentrate on "role structures and the rules of the game as the major determinants of the policy-making process."[36] And other scholars have stressed such organizational variables as "established routines" and "standard operating procedures."[37]

Our limited resources, coupled with the intention of studying at least a dozen states, precluded any in-depth investigation of systemic features. But our concern for developing evidence relevant to models did lead us to give careful scrutiny to formal governmental arrangements. Presumably, such arrangements have an impact on the expression of preferences and the flow of influence in policy making. This presumption, we believed, could be tested through an examination of whether (and how) governmental structure affected: (1) the number and type of actors who participated in state education policy making, (2) the resources available to participants, (3) their willingness to mobilize these resources, (4) the channels of communication and degree of access commanded by different actors, and (5) the influence exercised by these actors when a policy choice was being determined.

Review of the Conceptual Framework

To review, we accepted the utility of a political systems orientation as our point of departure. This orientation emphasizes the relationships among the actors who constitute education policy systems as demands are converted into authoritative decisions. Particular attention is directed toward actor relationships in each functional stage--issue definition, proposal formulation, support mobilizations, and decision enactment--of the conversion process. Allocative theory was used to augment the political systems approach. We assumed, consistent with its insights, that education policy making is a competitive process, the dynamic of which resides in the interplay of influence. The explanation for policy decisions, from this perspective, comes from revealing the patterns of accommodation among competing actors, actors who differ greatly in resources, intention, and skill. These patterns are organized through a governmental structure as well as being channeled and constrained by other systemic features. In Figure 1 are depicted the general concepts we employed in our framework.



Figure 1--EGP System and Influence Concepts

Research Methodology

The research findings presented in this report are the product of a comparative case study methodology. Four facets of this methodology warrant comment: (1) selecting the states, (2) conducting the field work, (3) assuring comparable data, and (4) analyzing the findings.

Selecting the States

Inasmuch as governance models were intended to be a major product of the research, structural criteria took precedence in deciding upon the states to be investigated. There was, though, the question of which of the innumerable variations in state government, and in what combination, should be represented in the case studies. Neither theory nor research provided much illumination. Faced with this situation, we began with the approach suggested by Jacob and Lipsky. "Significant variables," they argue , "may be isolated by quantitative techniques, while the case method may be employed to approach greater understanding of the appearance of significant correlations."[38]

Our initial approach consisted, therefore, of applying statistical analysis to aggregate data as a device to search for significant structure-policy relationships, relationships that we could then subject to intensive case study. This approach required that we first devise a number of measures for each of four classes of variables: (1) socioeconomic development, (2) political culture, (3) governmental structure, and (4) education policy output. Second, we gathered data from readily available sources on these measures for all fifty states. Following this, we employed partial correlation and multiple regression techniques to explore the relationships between the structural variables and policy output variables, while controlling for socioeconomic and political culture differences. The results of this analysis were disappointing in terms of identifying governmental arrangements that appeared to have an independent effect on education policies.[39] And, in the end, we chose the twelve states to be studied primarily on the basis of the selection method used for the state board and for the chief state school officer, anticipating these variables would be central to the governance models that we eventually would develop.[40] The twelve EGP states are shown in Table 1-1.

TABLE 1-1

EGP STATES BY STATE BOARD AND CSSO SELECTION METHODS

EGP States	State Board Selection Method	CSSO Selection Method
Colorado	Popular Election	SBE Appointment
Michigan	Popular Election	SBE Appointment
Nebraska	Popular Election	SBE Appointment
Texas	Popular Election	SBE Appointment
California	Governor Appointment	Popular Election
Georgia	Governor Appointment	Popular Election
Tennessee	Governor Appointment	Governor Appointment
Massachusetts	Governor Appointment	SBE Appointment
Minnesota	Governor Appointment	SBE Appointment
New York	Elected by Legislature	SBE Appointment
Florida	Ex-Officio Members	Popular Election
Wisconsin	No State Board	Popular Election

Besides governmental structure, we took into account five other factors in deciding upon the states to be studied. First, we wanted to be sure to have many of the states with large populations, and six of the ten "mega-states" were included. Second, we wanted to represent all major regions of the country. In our first cut of states we noted that two regions, the Plains and the Rocky Mountain area, were not represented. This consideration led us to substitute Nebraska and Colorado in place of some states initially selected. Third, we wanted to have several pairs of comparable cases in our study. The states in each pair were to be similar in many important attributes (e.g., political culture and socioeconomic development) but dissimilar in respect to structural features (e.g., the separation of educational governance from general governance). Minnesota and Wisconsin is an example of such a pair. Fourth, we wanted to include states where there had been recent court intervention in education decision making. Finally, we wanted to be certain that background data were available for each state to be investigated and ready access to both participants and informants looked to be possible.

Conducting the Field Work

Our field work had a twofold purpose. The primary one was to develop data for a comparative analysis of state education policy making. A secondary purpose was to ensure that accurate and reasonably complete accounts could be written about this process for each of the twelve states.[41] While these purposes were not unrelated--some data pertain to both--they were different. In the case of the comparative data, our intent was to generalize, the emphasis here being on abstraction and standardization. Producing adequate state reports, however, meant that some attention had to be given to the particular and unanticipated.[42]

In the fall of 1972, EGP research teams collected background data on the twelve states where the case studies were to be done. One or more members of a team then made a preliminary visit to each state to confer with informants about its education governance process and to prepare for a more extended visit to the state. During January-March, 1973, teams composed of two or three research associates spent some twenty days in each of the twelve states. This field work, along with having two purposes, reflected a combination of two distinct research strategies--one based on the issue area approach; the other on a policy systems (and reputational) approach.

Issue Area Approach. An "issue area" can be defined as a broad topical concern (e.g., state aid for schools) in respect to which individuals and groups have disparate and often conflicting preferences, preferences that when advanced as political demands become the grist for the decision process. Scholars in the pluralist tradition have long contended that each issue area tends to have its own power structure.[43] That is, each issue is held to have its own character and to be of differential saliency to actors. The pattern of cleavage shifts with the controversy and allies in one sometimes are antagonists in another. Pluralists' findings are vulnerable to many criticisms. But we did assume, with them, that state education policy making is not likely to be the same for different issues; consequently, various kinds of decisions have to be investigated to understand the participation of actors in this process. We also assumed that the comparative analysis of policy making would be facilitated by the standardization, so to speak, of issues across the states.[44]

Obviously, not all state education policy decisions could be examined. Still, more needed to be done than simply looking at only one or two types of decisions. After much discussion, we decided that our resources permitted us to consider four issue areas in each state. Our first criterion in selecting these areas was their perceived importance. To obtain such an assessment, we asked through letters sent to each of the fifty states that the chief state school officer, the governor (or his education aide), the executive secretaries of the state NEA and AFT affiliates, and a university professor specializing in the politics of education rate, on a five point scale, eight issues as being critical to the policy system in their state. We received responses from 90 per cent of the chief state school officers, 56 per cent of the governors, 63 per cent of the teacher organization heads, and 76 per cent of the professors. The survey ratings as aggregated for all respondents are shown in Table 1-2.

Perceived importance was not our only criterion in deciding upon the four issue areas to be studied. We were equally concerned that the selected issues reveal the involvement of different actors and governmental institutions in education policy making; and, particularly, that they afford insights into the policy role of state boards and chief state school officers. In light of these considerations it seemed to us that one area had to be an issue demanding much participation by the governor and the legislature.

TABLE 1-2

TOTAL RATING VALUES GIVEN BY RESPONDENTS
TO EIGHT SELECTED POLICY ISSUES

Policy Issue	Rating Value
Financial Support	237
Planning and Evaluation	169
Curriculum Reform	122
Teacher Bargaining	108
District Reorganization	93
Professional Certification	90
School Desegregation	54
Non-Public School Support	45

School finance was clearly the most useful for this purpose, and it had been ranked by a large margin as the most critical issue in our survey. We also wanted one of the areas to focus on the state education agency as a policy-making arena. Even though teacher-administrator certification had not been rated as critical by many of our respondents, we thought that decisions in this area were important and would typify, in many ways, the more routine policy enactments that must be made in every state. We then looked for an issue where the courts were involved as policy makers. Desegregation--though it ranked low in our survey, perhaps because the federal courts more than the state courts were the chief actors--appeared to be an obvious choice. Finally, we decided to pick as the fourth issue the one in which the state education agency thought it had done its best job in exercising leadership. In gross terms we called this the program improvement area. In about half of our states, this involved attempts to establish evaluation, "accountability," or assessment programs.

EGP researchers collected data on a recent policy decision (1970 to 1973) in each of the four issue areas--school finance, professional certification, racial desegregation, and educational program improvement--for all twelve states. This required an examination of diverse sources including newspaper files, official documents and reports, interest group publications, and secondary materials. Additionally, the research team conducted personal interviews with both issue participants and knowledgeable informants about the policy decisions. The issue-oriented interviews were not highly structured, nor was a single interview schedule used with all respondents. Their purpose, for the most part, was to fill in gaps in information and to probe the questions about the decision process suggested by our conceptual framework. With regard to the latter, we asked our interviewers to draw selectively--depending on their own knowledge as well as the information believed to be possessed by the respondent--from these basic questions:

1. Who initiated the demand for a policy change or was most responsible for making it an issue? What was the position taken by that individual or group? Whom did this individual or group speak for or represent?

2. Why do you think this individual or group took that position? What background factors were particularly important?

3. Were other individuals or groups important participants? Which ones and what positions did they take on the matter?

4. Did this issue become associated with other state issues? What issues and how did this occur? What positions did the various participants take on this other issue?

5. When did all this take place? Did the early alignments and positions undergo major shifts over time? How did they change? Why?

6. What did the participants do to win support or neutralize opponents? Which participants seemed to be particularly effective? Why? What were their sources of influence and points of access?

7. When did the matter come up for formal consideration by the state legislature and/or the state board of education? While it was being considered by the legislature and/or the state board, what policy proposals were the main focus of attention?

    a. What, in summary, was the content of each proposal?
    b. Who presented them? Who actually formulated them?
    c. Which of the contending individuals and groups supported each one? How did they attempt to mobilize supporters or neutralize opponents?

8. Basically, how did the final decision get made? Who persuaded (or bargained or directed) whom and how did they do it?

9. Which individual or group was most responsible for the decision that was finally enacted? Which individual or group might be said to have "won" by this decision? Who might have "lost"?

One section of each of our individual state reports deals with education policy making as reflected in the selected issue areas. Many of these treatments, especially those on school finance, are reasonably comprehensive and provide research-based answers to most of the questions set forth above.[45] Unfortunately, some of the issue descriptions turned out to be short on detail, spotty in coverage, and deficient in process analysis. Two things, above all, limited our use of the issue area approach. First, in-depth study of a decision process is costly. And we found that attempting to examine four such processes, coupled with our other research tasks, stretched our resources thin in some states. Second, policy decisions that do not become public issues--that is, they receive little or no media attention--are hard to study. Even participants often can recall only the most sketchy outline of events, and contemporary written accounts that might be used to structure, supplement, and verify these recollections do not exist. In this sense, if in no other, school finance was an easy area to investigate; teacher certification and school desegregation, as state-level issues, proved to be quite difficult. Partly for these reasons, the issue area approach did not yield as much data as we had originally expected for the comparative analysis contained in this report, though school finance reform in four states is the subject of one chapter, and some use is made of the issue-oriented data in several of the other chapters. It must be reiterated, however, that for us the examination of specific decision processes was just one of the means by which we sought to understand state education policy systems.

Policy System Approach. Besides issue-specific information, data also were sought on the perceptions that the major actors had of the way the education policy system typically worked in their state in terms of role performance and policy-making relationships. Included in this approach were a variety of reputational-type questions in which respondents were asked about how much "influence" (or "importance" or "leadership") they attributed to the various system participants. Structured interview schedules were employed to obtain the perceptual data, and ten different schedules, one for each class of actors, were constructed. These classes of actors were as follows:

State Board Member
Chief State School Officer
SDE Administrator-Legislative Liaison
SDE Administrator-State Board Liaison
Governor
Governor's Education Staff
Director of Finance and/or Administration
Legislative Committee (Education or "Money") Leader
Legislative House or Senate Leader
Educational Interest Group Leader

The individual respondents within these ten classes were pre-selected with an eye toward their being comparable across the states. We tried, for instance, to interview the state board president, the chief state school officer, the governor's key education aide, the chairmen of the education committees, and the lobbyists for the state-level education organizations in each of our twelve states. We also had a procedure for substituting respondents when our first choices were unavailable, a procedure in which we tried to obtain substitutes whose general viewpoints presumably were similar to those of the initially selected respondents.

As can be seen from Table 1-3, over 400 structured interviews were held with policy actors. The interviews averaged about one hour in length, though some--notably with chief state school officers--were much longer.

TABLE 1-3

NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS (STRUCTURED) WITH STATE POLICY MAKERS

	CSSO	SDE[d] Adm	State Board	Governor	Gov. Staff	Admin/ Finance	Leg. Leaders[c]	Leg. Staff[e]	Educ. Org.	Totals
California	1	3	10	0	1	2	15	3	7	42
Colorado	2	2	4	1	2	1	14	2	6	34
Florida	1	3	7[a]	1	1	1	9	1	6	30
Georgia	1	3	7	1	1	1	13	0	5	32
Massachusetts	2	2	7	0	7[b]	2	12	4	8	44
Michigan	1	3	6	1	2	1	15	0	10	39
Minnesota	1	3	6	0	1	1	15	0	5	32
Nebraska	1	3	5	1	1	1	7	0	5	24
New York	1	5	9	0	3	1	13	9	8	49
Tennessee	2	2	8	1	2	1	11	0	6	33
Texas	1	2	11	1	2	1	10	0	6	34
Wisconsin	1	1	-	0	2	1	15	2	7	29
TOTALS	15	32	80	7	25	14	149	21	79	422

[a] Five of these are Cabinet Aides.
[b] Includes the Secretary of Education and his staff.
[c] Includes both Legislative Committee leader and House/Senate leader.
[d] Includes both Legislative Relations expert and State Board expert.
[e] Interviewed using the legislator schedules.

NOTE: In addition to these structured interviews, some 200 unstructured interviews were held with informants (e.g., newspaper reporters, university professors, legislative staff members, and SDE administrators) in the twelve states regarding specific policy decisions.

The political leaders, in general, posed the most severe problems in interviewing. We were not successful with five governors. Legislative leaders in New York, California, Florida, and Texas were especially difficult to interview, requiring considerable deviation through substitution from the original list of respondents. Nonetheless, we are confident that a representative cross-section of influential state education policy actors was obtained, and the data gathered from interviewing these actors are relied upon heavily in this report. We also encouraged the different respondents to complete a short questionnaire--the "Education Policy Maker Inventory"--and some of their replies are presented in the chapters on the state board and the chief state school officer.

The structured interview schedules, collectively, contained hundreds of specific questions, many of which were addressed to only a single class of respondents. Underlying these questions, however, were several general concerns, concerns based on our conceptual framework:

1. What were the policy-making capabilities of the different system actors? That is, what access did each have to influence resources, and how willing was each to mobilize these resources?

2. What were the policy-making relationships among the different system actors? That is, what were the channels of communication and points of access that connected the actors to one another and to the various decision arenas? What patterns of conflict and cooperation existed? Who sought to influence whom, how, and with what success?

Assuring Comparative Data

We were determined, from the beginning, that the data obtained from the field work would be suitable for comparative analysis. Specific steps were taken in attempting to assure this, several of which have already been mentioned. First, we focused on a common set of issue areas. Second, our data-gathering instruments were the same in each state, except for language changes to make them appropriate to a particular setting. Third, a common panel--that is, the incumbents of homologous positions--were included in each state study. Lastly, we devoted an eight-week summer session to familiarizing our research associates (ten persons organized into four teams) with the conceptual framework and to having them work on the various interview schedules. Toward the end of the summer (August, 1972), the entire group participated in a pilot study so that the research procedures and interview schedules could be tested and modified as found necessary. The state education policy system in Ohio was the subject for the pilot.

The typical procedure in constructing the interview schedules was for team members, working individually or in small groups, to formulate the questions they thought were most relevant to both the research purpose and the class of actor who was the intended respondent. The questions were then analyzed in group meetings, and new drafts were written and re-written to eliminate ambiguity and enhance the content validity of the instruments. Next, the interview schedules were pilot tested in Ohio with some thirty respondents, an experience that led to extensive revision. During this period the interview schedule drafts were shared with various outside consultants--persons with recognized expertise in state education politics, instrument construction, and "elite" interviewing. As the final step, the schedules were organized, through an adaptation of a format developed by the National Opinion Research Center, so as to facilitate the interviewing process, the recording of responses, and the eventual coding of the data.[46]

Analysis of the Findings

Some of the data collected by the EGP are amenable only to qualitative treatment--the chapter on school finance reform offers a good illustration of a systematic examination of such data. But many of our data are quantifiable; hence, considerable use is made of tables to display frequency distributions. We wanted, though, to do more than engage in a comparative description of state education policy systems. We also wanted to investigate the relationships among variables, especially those that might provide us with evidence as to the structural effects of different governmental arrangements.

To accomplish this, ordinal or interval measures of the phenomena of interest had to be constructed. Our general approach here was to assign each state a score on each variable, a score based usually on the structured interview responses, but occasionally on information from the case study analyses, or on both. Often we incorporated the replies of different classes of actors to measure a variable, feeling that this served as a corrective for respondent bias.

The strengths and weaknesses of a measurement approach such as ours have been well assessed by Gurr and McClelland. They write:

> The quantification of historical [and other qualitative] materials makes it possible to index and compare concepts which have been previously operationalized poorly or not at all, but the use of judgmental scales raises questions about the validity of the indicators and the reliability of coders that we can only begin to answer. The use of multiple measures of each variable helps allay the criticism that single measures of complex conditions are useless because they ignore too much important variation, but our combination of these multiple measures into summary ones raises the same criticism transformed by one turn of the screw: the conditions whose measures are being combined may seem incommensurable. Finally, the treatment of judgmental data as though they were...susceptible to...statistical manipulations will offend methodological purists in spite of the now-conventional argument that many important comparisons cannot otherwise be made.[47]

As we saw it, the advantages of these judgmental procedures outweighed their disadvantages. And it was the only way that we had to create the measures necessary for a quantitative assessment of some of the "why" questions about state education politics. In any event, our scoring procedures for the variables are discussed in either the chapters or the technical appendices to this report.

Working with crude measures and a small N, we limited ourselves for the most part to rank order correlations (Spearman rho) in investigating our data. But some of these data were examined through more powerful statistical tools--for example, factor analysis--in an effort to search systematically for relationships. It must be emphasized that the twelve EGP states do not constitute a probability sample. No statistical inferences applicable to all the American states can be derived from our findings, and the generalizations made in this report pertain, strictly speaking, only to the states we studied. As for the usual tests of statistical significance, while some members of our staff do employ them, it is as a device to point to relationships worth noting, rather than as having any inferential meaning.

Concluding Observation

Our findings, whether the result of quantitative or of qualitative inquiry, do not speak for themselves. They are selected, arranged, and given meaning through interpretation. Thus, our conceptual framework not only performs the function of giving initial direction to the research (by indicating where to look and what to look for), but also serves to organize the presentation of findings. Yet even within the constraints of this framework, many interpretations are possible and can find some support in the data. Whether the findings and interpretations presented in this report are persuasive in terms of logic and evidence is a matter for the reader to decide.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER I

[1] An early statement of the conceptual framework and research methodology used by the EGP appears in Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr., "Investigating State Education Policy Systems: Methodological Approach and Research Framework," (Unpublished draft, May 5, 1972), pp. 1-83. (Mimeographed)

[2] For a brilliant treatment of the use of conceptual models, see Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971).

[3] Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. xxiii.

[4] The political systems approach has been given many distinct formulations, see, for example, William C. Mitchell, The American Polity (New York: The Free Press, 1962); Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1963); David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965). The classic statement of allocative theory is in Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936).

[5] Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How.

[6] This definition corresponds to that found in Gerald R. Sroufe, "State School Board Members and the State Education Policy System," Planning and Changing, II (April, 1971), pp. 16-17.

[7] See Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: John Wiley, 1964), pp. 43-47.

[8] David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley, 1965), p. 353.

[9] Bertram H. Gross, The Managing of Organizations (New York: The Free Press, 1964), Chapters 17 and 18.

[10] The major studies of state education policy making include the following: Stephen K. Bailey, et al., Schoolmen and Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962); Nicholas A. Masters, et al., State Politics and the Public Schools (New York: Knopf, 1964); Michael D. Usdan, David W. Minar, and Emanual Hurwitz, Jr., Education and State Politics (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1969); Laurence Iannaccone, Politics in Education (New York: Center for Applied Research in Education, 1967); Joel S. Berke and Michael Kirst, Federal Aid to Education (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Health, 1972); and Mike M. Milstein and Robert Jennings, Educational Policy Making and the State Legislature (New York: Praeger, 1973).

[11] See Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr., State Governance Models for the Public Schools (Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, August, 1974), Chapter II.

[12] These categories are adapted from those developed by Schneier. See Edward Schneier (ed.), Policy Making in American Government (New York: Basic Books, 1969), pp. xi-xii.

[13] David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics 9 (April, 1957), p. 389.

[14] Many criticisms have, of course, been directed at the theoretical and explanatory usages of functionalism. See the review article by William Flanagan and Edwin Fogelman, "Functional Analysis," in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 72-85.

[15] Herbert J. Spiro, "An Evaluation of Systems Theory," Contemporary Political Analysis (ed.), James C. Charlesworth (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 164.

[16] See Gerald Sroufe, "Political Systems Analysis in Educational Administration: Can the Emperor be Clothed" (Unpublished paper presented at the American Educational Research Association, February, 1969).

[17] The definition is Terry Clark's. See the discussion in Terry N. Clark (ed.), Community Structure and Decision Making: Comparative Analyses (San Francisco: Chandler, 1968), Chapter 3.

[18] This distinction between "influence" (the actual exercise) and "power" (the potential) is made by several authors. For example, see Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 218-222.

[19] The definition is adapted from Ronald L. Nuttall, Erwin K. Scheuch and Chad Gordon, "On the Structure of Influence," in Clark (ed.), Community Structure and Decision Making, pp. 352-353.

[20] Charles E. Lindbloom, The Policy-Making Process (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 30.

[21] For a brief discussion of the potency of resources in respect to policy-making stages, see Clark (ed.), Community Structure and Decision Making, Chapter IV.

[22] Lindbloom, The Policy-Making Process, pp. 102-105.

[23] William A. Gamson, "Reputation and Resources in Community Politics," in Clark (ed.), Community Structure and Decision Making. His distinction is based on those of Talcott Parsons. See Talcott Parsons "On the Concept of Influence," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXVII (Spring, 1963), pp. 37-62.

[24] Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 226.

[25] While the idea of "generality" is used often, the only theoretical discussion is in Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence."

[26] These included John C. Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962); and Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971).

[27] Aaron Wildavsky, "Why American Cities are Pluralist," Thomas R. Dye and Bret W. Hawkins (eds.), Politics in the Metropolis (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrille, 1967), p. 351.

[28] Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 55-71.

[29] On issue saliency, see particularly Ernest A. T. Barth and Stuart D. Johnson, "Community Power and a Typology of Social Issues," Willis D. Hawley and Frederick W. Wirt (eds.), The Search for Community Power. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 265.

[30] Heinz Eulau, Journey in Politics (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), p. 256.

[31] Sroufe, "State School Board Members and the State Education Policy System," p. 22.

[32] The best theoretical treatment of access is still David Truman, The Governmental Process, 2nd ed., (New York: Knopf, 1964).

[33] William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

[34] Raymond A. Bauer, "The Study of Policy Formation," Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth Gergen (eds.), The Study of Policy Formation, p. 13.

[35] Lindbloom, The Policy-Making Process, pp. 93-99.

[36] Enid Curtis Bok Schoettle, "The State of the Art in Policy Studies," Bauer and Gergen (eds.), The Study of Policy Formation, p. 171.

[37] See Kirst's conclusions in Michael W. Kirst, "Six States and Federal Aid: Key Conclusions and Methodological Considerations" (Unpublished paper presented to the annual meeting of AERA, Chicago, April 5, 1972).

[38] Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics," Richard Hofferbert and Ira Sharkansky (eds.), State and Urban Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1971), p. 33.

[39] Our findings are reported in Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr. and Roald F. Campbell, "State Governmental Structure and Education Policy Decisions: A Statistical Exploration" (Unpublished AERA paper, March 1, 1973).

[40] Again, see our report on State Governance Models for the Public Schools, Chapter II.

[41] Case studies were published in 1974 on each of the twelve states.

[42] Combining the comparative method with the case study is, of course, much more easily said than done. Too much standardization in advance means that important factors are likely to be overlooked; too little standardization often results in little more than a juxtaposition of case studies.

[43] "Pluralist" assumptions are set forth in Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963). For an excellent collection of articles representing both the "pluralist" and "elitist" positions, see Hawley and Wirt (eds), The Search for Community Power. Pluralism is thoughtfully criticized in the articles by Anton and by Bachrach and Baratz.

[44] A good recent example of such issue standardization is found in David J. Kirby, et al., Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1973).

[45] See, for example, the treatment of the school finance issue by Peggy Siegel in Edward R. Hines, et al., State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Michigan (Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, June, 1974).

[46] We looked, especially, at the interview schedule format used by Robert Crain and David Kirby in their work on the politics of school desegregation.

[47] Ted Robert Gurr and Muriel McClelland, Political Performance: A Twelve-Nation Study (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1971), p. 8. A particularly imaginative example of the use of this approach is Robert Crain, The Politics of School Desegregation (Garden City, New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1969).

CHAPTER II

THE POLICY-MAKING INFLUENCE OF STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION

Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr.

Introduction

> The activities and influence of state boards of education is a dark continent in view of the paucity of research.
>
> Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, 1972

While we have not by any means explored fully the "dark continent" of state board behavior, we have examined with some care the policy-making role of these institutions. In particular, research-based answers were sought to two general questions:

1. How influential are state boards of education in the process by which state-level policy decisions are determined for the public schools?

2. What factors account for the variations in policy-making influence among state boards of education?

To answer these questions, the chapter has been divided into five sections. In the first are reported the perceptions that a cross-section of policy participants and knowledgeable observers had of the influence exerted by each of 10 state boards of education in the two arenas where most public school policies are enacted--the legislature and the state education agency. The second section contains a description of the access possessed by state boards to policy-making resources. The willingness of board members to utilize their resources is treated in section three. In the fourth section a statistical analysis is undertaken to provide evidence on the correlates of state board policy-making influence. The chapter then concludes with some general observations about state boards of education as actors in education policy systems.

It should be emphasized that our intent is not to examine state board performance across the range of governmental functions, much less do we attempt to evaluate this performance. The research focus of the Educational Governance Project (EGP), as stated in Chapter I, is on state education policy making--setting the goals and fixing the priorities that give direction to subsequent choices--and, particularly, on the relationships among the actors who participate in this process. Policy formation, not policy implementation or adjudication, is our concern. In this chapter we present what essentially is a "snapshot," dated late 1972-early 1973, of the policy-making influence of 10 selected state boards, as that influence was assessed by various policy participants and by EGP researchers.

The data contained in this chapter often are quantifiable and, therefore, considerable use is made of tabular presentation, with the accompanying narrative being primarily to highlight or to summarize. The state board rather than the individual board member is usually the unit of analysis. Data about these officials, or data provided by them, are aggregated to permit us to make statements about state boards. The variables constructed from such procedures are crude and the N of 10 is small for statistical purposes. Still, we are convinced that crude measures and some systematic analysis are infinitely better than none, a condition that describes most of the present literature dealing with state boards of education.

Although the discussion which follows deals with the policy-making role of state boards, some descriptive information about these institutions is helpful to an understanding of that discussion.

Institutional Features

Lay boards have long been an integral part of school governance arrangements in the United States. State boards of education (SBEs), though they have not existed for as many years as their local counterparts, go back to the early 1800s in North Carolina, Vermont, Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Tennessee. (The New York Board of Regents is even older, but it did not have authority over elementary-secondary education until 1904.)[1] By the beginning of the twentieth century, this governmental institution had been established by either constitutional or statutory provision in more than one-half of the states.[2] And by 1972 the number of state boards of education stood at 48. Wisconsin and Illinois were the only exceptions, and in the latter a state board began functioning in 1974.

In the late 1800s most state boards of education were ex-officio in composition--that is, they were comprised of various elected state officials, one of whom customarily was the chief state school officer (CSSO).[3] During the twentieth century there has been a steady movement away from ex-officio boards toward those appointed by the governor, and more recently those elected directly by the people or their representatives. This trend, along with selection methods for the state boards in the EGP sample, is indicated by the figures reported in Table 2-1. As is evident from this table, only two selection procedures--gubernatorial appointment and popular election--have become prevalent and these are the ones in use in nine of the 12 EGP states.

Although 26 state boards of education, as of 1972, appointed the CSSO, the other 24 boards did not have this legal power. Of the 10 state boards to be considered in this chapter, the four whose members are elected--in Colorado, Michigan, Nebraska, and Texas--all appoint their CSSO. So do

TABLE 2-1

SBE SELECTION METHODS, 1940 and 1972

Selection Method	Used in the 48 States in 1940	Used in the 50 States in 1972	Used in the 12 EGP States in 1972
Election by Popular Vote	4	12	4
Appointment by Governor	27	31	5
Election by Peoples' Representatives	0	3	1
Ex-Officio Members	8	2	1
No State Board	9	2	1

SOURCE: Dewey Wahl, "State-Level Governing Structures for Education--Alternatives and Implications for Change" (Indiana State Department of Public Instruction, 1973).

two of the appointed state boards--in Massachusetts and Minnesota. But the other three appointed boards--in California, Georgia, and Tennessee--lack this authority. The CSSO is popularly elected in the first two of these states; in Tennessee this official is appointed, as is the state board, by the Governor. The New York Board of Regents, whose members are elected by the legislature, appoints its Commissioner of Education. While our analysis of the importance of these different selection methods appears in the fourth section of this chapter, the tables are organized to facilitate such assessments being made by the interested reader.

State boards of education vary not only in selection method and in control of the CSSO, but also in membership size, term of office, scope of authority, and performance of governmental functions. The largest such body, having 24 members in 1972, is in Texas; the smallest with just three members is in Mississippi. The most common board sizes are seven members and nine members. Terms of office range from 15 years on the New York Board of Regents* to three years on the Delaware State Board of Education. Terms of four years and six years are found most frequently.[4]

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*Reduced in 1974 to seven years for newly elected members.

While four states have a governance structure that places all levels of education under a single agency, most have state-level arrangements for higher education which exist apart from those institutions (i.e., the state boards of education) charged with the general supervision of the elementary and secondary schools. Nearly all state boards, however, have authority over vocational education and most are responsible for vocational rehabilitation.[5] Additionally, there are a number of K-12 areas of substantive jurisdiction common to state boards of education. As categorized in the mid-1960s by Schweickhard, these included: (1) foundation aid programs, (2) certification of professional personnel, (3) school standards and curriculum, (4) district organization and re-organization, (5) building and sites, (6) federal assistance programs, and (7) transportation of pupils.[6]

Even with respect to common areas of jurisdiction, state boards of education do not have the same authority or duties. Legally, these bodies are administrative boards. Yet most are authorized to undertake judicial and quasi-legislative functions as well. Harris concluded after studying the formal powers of state boards that

> most State boards of education have the authority to formulate or determine administrative-level policies and adopt such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the responsibilities assigned to them by the constitution and statutes of the State. In many instances State boards can formulate and approve policies needed to supplement those already prescribed by the legislature for the guidance of the chief State school officer and the staff of the State department of education and of local school districts.[7]

Besides exercising general supervision over K-12 schools and, in most cases, over vocational education and rehabilitation, state boards often have approval authority for top-level appointments to the state department of education, acting upon the recommendation of the CSSO. Also, they generally are charged, along with the chief, to prepare and submit reports with recommendations to the governor and legislature on the financial needs of both the education agency and the schools of the state. All in all, then, the legal powers delegated to state boards of education are such that we, with Sroufe, "would expect them to be effective instruments for the formation and implementation of state education policy."[8]

In considering state boards as "instruments" of education policy making, we will draw mainly upon interview and questionnaire data that were collected in early 1973 on 10 state boards of education. (See Table 2-3 for structural information on each state board.) At that time, there were 112 members serving on these boards. Seventy-three (65 per cent) were interviewed by EGP researchers. Of the board members who were interviewed, 64 (57 per cent of the total) also completed a paper-and-pencil questionnaire--the "Education Policy Maker Inventory." Because the percentage of board member respondents in a few states is fairly low (the figures are shown in Table 2-2), and because these respondents could not always be selected through an appropriate sampling procedure, caution should be used in interpreting the findings, especially those involving state-by-state comparisons, based on these data or that furnished by the other policy actors who were interviewed.

TABLE 2-2

SBE MEMBER RESPONDENTS (PERCENTAGES IN PARENTHESIS)

State	Members On Board	SBE Members Interviewed	SBE Members Completing Questionnaire
California	10	10 (100)	5 (50)
Colorado	5	4 (80)	4 (80)
Georgia	10	7 (70)	5 (50)
Massachusetts	11	7 (64)	6 (55)
Michigan	8	6 (75)	8 (100)*
Minnesota	9	6 (67)	6 (67)
Nebraska	8	5 (63)	5 (63)
New York	15	9 (60)	7 (47)
Tennessee	12	8 (67)	8 (67)
Texas	24	11 (46)	10 (42)
Total	112	73 (65)	64 (57)

*Two board members who were not interviewed filled out a questionnaire.

TABLE 2-3

STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE TEN STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION STUDIED BY THE EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE PROJECT (LATE 1972)

State	Size[a]	Term[b]	Compensation	Method of Selection	Special Qualifications[c]	Appoints CSSO	Authority Over Voc. Ed.	Authority Over Voc. Rehab.
California	10	4	Expenses	Appointment by Governor, with approval of Senate		No	Yes	Yes
Colorado	5	6	Expenses	Election by partisan ballot, four from congressional districts; one at large		Yes	No	No
Georgia	10	7	$20 per diem plus expenses	Appointed by Governor, with approval of Senate. One from each congressional district		No	Yes	Yes
Massachusetts	11	5	Expenses	Appointed by Governor from nominees supplied by Adivisory Council	One labor representative; two women; one student	Yes	Yes	No
Michigan	8	8	$60 per day, plus expenses	Elected at large by partisan ballot		Yes	Yes	Yes
Minnesota	9	6	$25 per day, plus expenses	Appointed by Governor, with approval of Senate, from separate congressional districts	Three members must have local school board experience	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nebraska	8	4	Expenses	Elected by nonpartisan ballot, one member from each of eight districts		Yes	Yes	Yes
New York	15	15	Expenses	Elected by Legislature. One from each of 11 judicial districts; 4 at large		Yes	Yes	Yes
Tennessee	12	9	$15 per day plus expenses	Appointed by Governor. Four from each of the 3 "grand divisions"	Each political party must have three members	No	Yes	Yes
Texas	24	6	Expenses	Elected by partisan ballot, one from each congressional district.		Yes	Yes	Yes

[a] Not include ex-officio members.

[b] All terms are overlapping.

[c] A number of states prohibit professional educators, and state-local government officials, from being state board members

SOURCE: Most of these data are from Sam P. Harris, State Departments of Education, State Boards of Education and Chief State School Officers (Washington, D.C.· U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.

Policy-Making Influence of State Boards

"Policy-making influence," to reiterate, refers to the ability of an actor in a policy system to select, modify, or attain its decisional outputs. We employed a twofold procedure to investigate this influence for state boards of education. In the first, a variation on the power attribution method, we asked both system participants and close observers about how much "influence" (or "importance" or "leadership") they attributed to state boards in the making of education policy. The assumption here is that such respondents have the knowledge and the candor to provide valid general assessments. We also questioned, in this connection, board members about their channels of communication and means of influence. Second, we employed as much of the procedure known as decision analysis as our resources would allow. EGP staff investigated in each state an issue area (school finance) in which the legislature was presumed to be the decisive policy arena and several issue areas (certification and the educational program) where the state education agency had traditionally been delegated broad policy-making authority. State policy decisions pertaining to school desegregation also were studied. In the decision approach it is assumed that the participants who have their demands realized, wholly or in part, in the final enactments, or who can block the efforts of other actors, are influential in the policy-making process.[9]

Under the most ideal circumstances one is seldom certain that he has correctly attributed or weighed policy-making influence. But attempting to assess empirically that exercised by state boards of education, particularly in their interaction with CSSOs, posed special problems. Board members and state department administrators alike were prone to legalistic responses (e.g., "the state board determines policy, the chief state school officer carries it out"). Most policy matters that appeared before state boards aroused little or no controversy. Media coverage was skimpy and even participants were hard pressed to recall any but the most sketchy outline of the events that led to a given decision. Apart from state department staff, knowledgeable observers of board activities were few and far between--educational interest group leaders being the closest we could find to such observers in most states. In a couple of states, though, an official from the League of Women Voters was an insightful "board watcher." Finally, while they are legally distinct, the state board of education and the state department of education were sometimes looked upon as one entity by our interviewees, a perspective that made it difficult to examine their respective roles. For all these reasons, the decision analysis approach proved to have serious limitations. Thus, most of the comparative assessments presented in this section are based on the attributions of influence, or non-influence, to state boards by legislators, governors' staffs, and educational interest group spokesmen, as well as by the board officials themselves.

The Legislative Arena

Unlike most local school boards, the legal powers of state boards of education do not include independent access to monetary resources. Fiscal power in all states belongs with the legislature and the governor. And since "issues of educational finance," to quote Wirt and Kirst, "inevitably involve judgments on educational programs and priorities, so the constitutional separation of education from general state government can never extend to many important educational issues."[10] Moreover, legislatures can, and often do, enact laws on a wide spectrum of non-fiscal education policies. The implication of this lodgement of authority for the policy-making influence of state boards is unmistakable. Either its officials can wield influence with key lawmakers or these bodies will be without impact on the basic allocative decisions, as well as many other policies, made for the schools of their state.

Legislator Relationships. We asked the legislative leaders who were interviewed to evaluate their state board "in actually formulating and working for education legislation." The responses of lawmakers are shown in Table 2-4. Only about one-fourth (28 per cent) said their state board was "important" in determining education legislation; the remainder assessed board significance as being either "minor" (50 per cent) or "not important at all" (22 per cent). In just one state, Texas, did a majority of these respondents (60 per cent) rate the state board as being an important actor in legislative policy making for education, though in two states, Georgia and New York, the percentages in this category constitute a near majority, 46 per cent and 45 per cent respectively. At the other extreme, the Nebraska State Board of Education was not viewed by a single legislator respondent in that state as being important in education legislation; four of the six leaders we interviewed dismissed that body as being of no consequence in this process.

Legislators also provided their assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of their state board as an actor in the legislative arena. These assessments were then coded into some broad categories. Those that were indicated at least five times are listed below by frequency of mention (in parenthesis):

Perceived Strengths

Prestige of the state board (23)
Legal authority of the state board (9)
Board member specialization in education (8)
State board access to state department data (5)
Personal involvement (e.g., lobbying) of board members (5)
Board member standing with the governor (5)

TABLE 2-4

LEGISLATIVE LEADER ASSESSMENTS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR STATE BOARD IN "ACTUALLY FORMULATING AND WORKING FOR EDUCATION LEGISLATION" (IN PERCENTAGES)

State Board		Single Most Important	Important	Minor	Not Important at All
Elected by People					
Colorado	(N=13)	0	38	46	15
Michigan	(N=14)	0	36	43	21
Nebraska	(N=6)	0	0	33	67
Texas	(N=10)	0	60	40	0
Appointed by Governor					
Massachusetts	(N=9)*	0	11	67	22
Minnesota	(N=14)	0	7	71	21
California	(N=14)	0	14	50	36
Georgia	(N=13)	0	46	54	0
Tennessee	(N=8)	0	13	75	13
Elected by Legislature					
New York	(N=11)	0	45	18	36
All Members	(N=112)	0	28	50	22

N=Number of legislative leaders who responded to the question.
*Includes two members of the legislative staff.

Perceived Weaknesses

Traditional apolitical posture of state board (15)
"Invisibility" of state board to the legislature (13)
Dependence of state board on the CSSO (10)
State board lack of political "clout" (9)
Board member lack of expertise (9)
No direct channels between board and legislature (9)
State board factionalism (6)
"Unrealistic" state board pronouncements (5)
Board member lack of time (5)

Of the perceived strengths, the resource we have termed prestige--the respect accorded board members because of presumed personal or positional attributes--was cited many more times by legislative leaders than any other. The weaknesses most often identified by legislators were the state boards' not having a tradition of political involvement or any "clout" (apparently meaning an inability to mobilize constituents of importance to politicians);

their lack of visibility to many legislators (a number said that they neither knew what state boards did, nor would they recognize a single board member); and the dependence of these bodies on the CSSOs (a "real Charley McCarthy-Edgar Bergen act," one respondent tartly phrased it).

Both board members and legislator interviewees were asked to describe the channels by which the state board "usually" communicated its positions and recommendations to the legislature. The discrepancy in perceptions between the two groups is quite marked (see Table 2-5). State board members were much more likely to see definite channels of communication than were the legislative leaders. Indeed, almost one-third of the latter (31 per cent) did not consider the state board as communicating with the legislature at all. Despite the fact that these lawmakers typically reported contacts with the CSSO, or other state department staff, they evidently did not look upon these administrators as acting as agents for the state board.

A higher percentage of board officials than of legislative leaders perceived the state board as communicating through each of the channels listed in Table 2-5. One noticeable difference was in respect to board member testimony before legislative committees. Approximately one-half of the board officials indicated that this was a customary means of communication. Yet of the legislators who recalled board members testifying (only 19 per cent), most stated their recollections with a qualification like "rarely" or "only occasionally."

An even larger disparity in perceptions involved the extent and impact of individual board member contacts with legislators. In probing this matter further with each group of respondents, we found that the state board officials tended to identify such contacts as their principal way to influence legislators. Of the 44 board members (61 per cent of the

TABLE 2-5

SBE MEMBER AND LEGISLATIVE LEADER PERCEPTIONS OF "USUAL" COMMUNICATION CHANNELS BETWEEN STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION AND STATE LEGISLATURES

Communication Channel	Percentage of SBE Members Mentioning the Channel	Percentage of Legislative Leaders Mentioning the Channel
Written (formal) recommendations or proposals by the SBE	50	33
Through the CSSO or SDE staff	57	28
Board member testimony at legislative committee hearings	49	19
Personal (informal) contacts between SBE members and legislators	54	17
Meetings (formal) between the SBE and legislative committees (or leaders)	11	6
No communications between SBE and the legislature	2	31

total) who claimed to have "any means" of legislative influence, exactly half suggested "personal persuasion" as being among these means. (No other influence technique was named more than eight times; the one receiving eight mentions was for the state board to work through the CSSO.) On the other hand, when we asked each legislative leader specifically if "board members on a personal basis ever attempted to persuade you regarding their legislative concerns and recommendations," some 57 per cent replied "no," implying that they had never been so contacted. Of those that answered "yes," nearly all (some 90 per cent) singled out only one or at most two board members as having done this, rather than most members or the state board as a body. Further, these respondents intimated that board member efforts at persuasion did not take place often--language such as "seldom" or "rarely" being used to characterize their frequency of occurrence.

Because we expected state board officials to have more person-to-person communications with education committee chairmen and the ranking minority members of these committees than with other legislative leaders, we calculated a separate frequency distribution for this group of respondents. But while we found some differences by state between all legislator interviewees and just those serving on the education committees, the overall percentage totals were very much the same. More exactly, 54 per cent of the education committee legislators reported no board member contact on a personal basis, as against 57 per cent for all legislator respondents.

Besides questioning participants about the channels of communications and means of influence between state boards and legislative leaders, we also wanted the perceptions of policy actors external to this relationship. For this, we turned to the leaders of the four major state-level educational interest groups--the state teachers association (NEA-affiliate), state teachers union (AFT-affiliate), state school boards association, and the state administrators association. While hardly disinterested observers, these persons are probably more so than, say, state department officials or members of the governors' staffs, and they are knowledgeable on the workings of the legislature. In any event, spokesmen for the educational interest groups were asked whether "the state board ever takes the lead in promoting education legislation." Their responses are summarized in Table 2-6.

Of the 36 assessments reflected in Table 2-6, 25 (69 per cent) are negative regarding the legislative influence of state boards. There is considerable similarity between these perceptions and those given by the legislative leaders (refer to Table 2-4). The state boards in New York, Texas, and Michigan are near the top in both, and those in Nebraska, Tennessee, and California are at the bottom. Marked discrepancies occur only in Minnesota

TABLE 2-6

EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUP LEADER ASSESSMENTS OF WHETHER STATE BOARDS "EVER TAKE THE LEAD" IN PROMOTING EDUCATION LEGISLATION

State Board		Percentage of Interest Group Spokesmen Saying "Yes"[a]
Elected by People		
Colorado	(N=4)	25
Michigan	(N=4)	50
Nebraska	(N=3)[b]	0
Texas	(N=3)[b]	67
Appointed by Governor		
Massachusetts	(N=4)	25
Minnesota	(N=4)	50
California	(N=4)	0
Georgia	(N=3)[b]	0
Tennessee	(N=4)	0
Elected by Legislature		
New York	(N=3)[c]	100
All Members	(N=36)	31

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[a] Where an interest group had two or more respondents, we chose for this rating the one who seemed to be most knowledgeable about the legislature.

[b] No state affiliate of AFT.

[c] State NEA and AFL affiliates have merged.

and Georgia. Just one legislator respondent out of 14 considered the Minnesota State Board of Education to be important in legislating for the public schools, but two of the four educational organization spokesmen said that this body sometimes took the lead in this process. More dramatic was the perceptual contrast in viewing the Georgia State Board of Education. Here nearly one-half of the legislators implied that the Board was a significant force on education matters; none of the interest group respondents, however, saw it in this light. The explanation for this appears to be that the lawmakers in Georgia were rating to some extent the CSSO, who is by all accounts a very powerful figure in the legislature, in answering our question on the State Board Other responses from the Georgia legislators, most of which depicted the State Board as a passive body, support this explanation.

Governor Relationships. There are, of course, other ways to influence state legislatures besides establishing direct relationships with their members. Indeed, in most states the crucial access point to the legislative process is probably the governor's office, a fact that has become increasingly true for education policy making in recent years (see Chapter V). But the state boards in our sample were no more likely to sit on the "inner councils of the mighty" in the office of the governor than they were in the legislature.

Only 51 per cent of the board members interviewed believed that their state board had any sort of "direct working relationship with the governor or his staff." And even many of these interviewees made it clear in elaborating on this relationship that governor-state board contacts were infrequent and largely formal; that the CSSO and his staff undertook most of the communications. In only four states--Colorado, Michigan, Texas, and Georgia--did a majority of board members mention personal contacts with the governor or his staff.

Persons in the governor's office, including in six states the governor himself, were asked to compare state board members with other individuals as "a source of ideas and advice for the governor's office" (see Table 2-7). Just 38 per cent considered board officials to be an "important source," while 62 per cent evaluated them to be either a "minor source" (48 per cent) or "not at all important as a source" (14 per cent). In only four states--Colorado, Texas, Minnesota, and Tennessee--did a majority of these respondents say that the state board was important for its ideas and advice.

Although more than one-third of those we interviewed in the governor's office attributed significance to state board proposals, none singled out a board official as being among the governor's confidants on education

TABLE 2-7

GOVERNOR'S OFFICE ASSESSMENT OF STATE BOARDS AS SOURCES OF "IDEAS AND ADVICE"

State Board		Single Most Important	Important	Minor	Not At All Important
Elected by People					
Colorado	(N=3)*		2	1	
Michigan	(N=4)*		1	3	
Nebraska	(N=3)*		1	1	1
Texas	(N=3)*		2	1	
Appointed by Governor					
Massachusetts	(N=5)		1	3	1
Minnesota	(N=2)		2		
California	(N=1)			1	
Georgia	(N=3)*			2	1
Tennessee	(N=3)*		2	1	
Elected by Legislature					
New York	(N=2)			1	1
All Members	(N=29)	(0%)	11 (38%)	14 (48%)	4 (14%)

N=Number of respondents from the Governor's Office. In Massachusetts the Offices of Lieutenant Governor and Secretary of Education are included.

*Respondents include the Governor.

policy matters. And, with few exceptions, neither did our board member respondents. Thirty-eight per cent did think that they had some means to influence the governor--personal contacts and party standing being referred to most frequently. Yet only 13 per cent (nine of 69 respondents) saw either themselves or any of their colleagues as having a close advising relationship with the chief executive. These percentages on a board-by-board basis are:

Colorado	(75%)	Massachusetts	(0%)
Minnesota	(33%)	Michigan	(0%)
Tennessee	(25%)	Texas	(0%)
Nebraska	(20%)	Georgia	(0%)
California	(10%)	New York	(0%)

There is some congruence between these perceptions and those held by the governor or his staff. In particular, the state boards in Colorado, Minnesota, and Tennessee were judged by both groups of respondents as having influence in the governor's office.

School Finance Policy. Of the education issues resolved in the legislative arena, the most fundamental have to do with raising and allocating revenue for the public schools. In each of the EGP states the process of determining school finance policy was investigated.[11] Our concern was not the substance of the decision; it was to identify the influential participants. One important finding from this analysis was that state boards of education were on the periphery of school finance decisions.

Typically, the state board did adopt a position on the school finance issue confronting the legislature, and this position was communicated by such means as a formal resolution or a budget request. But beyond taking a position, most boards did not do much. Neither policy-making participants nor informed observers gave any weight to board activity in the process through which the school finance decisions were enacted. And our investigators could find little evidence that most state boards even sought to exert influence--for example, by trying to mobilize supporters or by arousing the public.

There were some notable exceptions to the description presented above. The Nebraska State Board of Education was so factionalized that its members found it impossible even to arrive at a common position on the school finance dispute which erupted in 1972 (over LB 1377) between the legislature and the Governor. Conversely, the New York Board of Regents not only made fiscal "pronouncements" but also gave them wide public visibility and legislative impetus through SDE-developed proposals. Although a number of our legislator respondents denounced these pronouncements as "unrealistic," they did take them seriously. Another illustration of a state board's attempting to exert influence on the school finance issue came in Texas. The Texas State Board of Education, responding to the Federal District Court's decision in the Rodriguez case, declared that it accepted full responsibility for developing an acceptable school finance proposal. And the Board established a Committee on School Finance which eventually did formulate a long-range plan. While legislative enactment of school finance reform was not forthcoming in 1973, the Board had taken an active and visible role.

State Education Agency Arena

Not all state education policy is decided in the legislature and in the governor's office. Broad discretionary authority is normally delegated to the state education agency. Within this agency, it is the state board of education that is legally authorized to set public school policy in such areas as teacher certification, curriculum standards, district organization, educational planning, and federal assistance programs. But whether state boards undertake functions other than formal enactment--whether they participate in initiating new policies, in formulating alternative proposals, or in seeking to activate supporters--is the question that must be answered in assessing their policy-making role. In considering this question, there is one relationship above all to be examined, that being the relationship between the state board and the CSSO.

State Board-CSSO Relationship. The centrality of the CSSO in the world of state board members is obvious from our interviewees' replies to many different questions. On the most specific, board member respondents were handed a list of nine categories of persons and told to check if each was "very important," "important," or "unimportant" in helping them attain "a perspective on state education policy issues." In spite of board officials being prone to assign some significance to nearly all the possible influences (except party leaders and non-educator organizations), the distribution of "very important" ratings are revealing. A rank order of the individuals and groups by the percentage of board members (shown in parenthesis) who gave each this rating is presented below:

Chief State School Officer	(74)
Other State Board Members	(50)
Local School People	(32)
Governor	(28)
Legislator	(25)
Teacher Organization	(17)
Administrator Organization	(14)
Political Party Leaders	(4)
Non-Educator Groups	(2)

As can be seen, approximately three-quarters of the state board respondents indicated that the CSSO was "very important" in their forming a view on policy issues. It should be added that there was not a single state where this figure was less than 50 per cent, and every board member, with one exception, gave the CSSO at least an "important" rating.

There are, of course, many personal and positional attributes that contribute to the preeminent status of the chief among board members. Two that are especially germane to policy making are the CSSO's control over (1) the issues that appear before the state board and (2) the information that is systematically developed on these issues. In neither case is the control total, but in both it clearly is dominant and is probably decisive for state board action on most policy matters.

State boards rely on the chief and other state department personnel to establish meeting agendas. According to our board member respondents, their agendas normally were "checked" or approved by the state board chairman, and individuals members could add items if they wished. Our strong impression, though, is that the first was essentially pro forma and the second took place only infrequently. Three of the state boards we studied had instituted procedures or were assigned state department personnel in a way that seemed to give board officials a greater voice in agenda-setting. In New York, in addition to a well-developed committee structure, there was a Secretary of the Board of Regents, a department employee who served as an assistant to the Commissioner for Regents Affairs. The California State

Board of Education had a Special Assistant, also a department employee. And in Michigan each meeting agenda was always previewed for the State Board at the conclusion of the preceding meeting.

When we asked our board member respondents to identify their "main sources of information" on agenda items, these officials nearly always pointed to the CSSO or another education department administrator. Our interviewers were instructed to probe this matter further by inquiring to see if respondents had other sources of information that were "sometimes" relied upon or sought out. Nearly half of the board officials (47 per cent) indicated that they had no such sources, implying that they were dependent on the chief and his staff for information on agenda items. Of those who did mention an external source, most named either one of the educational interest groups--the teachers association being named most frequently--or local school superintendents and school board officials. We will have more to say about the availability and quality of information resources in the next section of this chapter.

In their national survey of local school boards, Zeigler and his associates took as a behavioral indicator of board members' involvement in decision making their willingness to muster on occasion significant opposition to the superintendent about the content of his programs. These scholars reasoned that it would be the superintendent who was likely to advance the policy proposals and that the main function of the school board would be to react (much like Congress reacts to the President's legislative initiatives). They discovered that only about one-quarter of the boards surveyed ever manifested opposition to the superintendent in their reactions to his proposals.[12]

Our interviewees were questioned about whether there were members of their board who "frequently" opposed the CSSO on major policy issues. As is evident from Table 2-8, not many of the education officials (19 per cent) perceived such opposition on their boards. In only Michigan and California did most board member respondents identify the presence of an opposition bloc, two or three persons in each case, to the CSSO's policy thrust. Two state board officials in Massachusetts and a like number in Tennessee also said that there was frequent opposition by at least one board member to the chief, but neither their colleagues nor observers corroborated this assessment.

The data reported in Table 2-8 suggest that most CSSOs in our sample were not often challenged in their approach to major policy issues by their boards. Certainly, the chiefs did not face, with the possible exceptions of the state boards in Michigan and California, anything like the "loyal opposition" that a President or governor could expect to encounter from a legislative body. Still, there was somewhat more state board-CSSO conflict in the ten states than is indicated by the cross-sectional data in Table 2-8. In Nebraska, a few years prior to the time of the EGP study, the State Board of Education and the Commissioner of Education had engaged in a bitter public dispute, the result being that the Commissioner was dismissed. In Georgia, just as our field work was being concluded, there were signs of disagreement between several of the Governor Carter appointees on the State Board and the elected CSSO.

While CSSOs and their staffs formulate board meeting agendas, supply nearly all information on agenda items, and encounter little overt resistance from board members, it still is an exaggeration to portray all state boards of education as simply legitimating decisions made elsewhere. Some board members, and some boards, do have a say about the agenda, consult

TABLE 2-8

SBE RESPONDENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS ON THEIR BOARD WHO "FREQUENTLY OPPOSE" THE CSSO ON "MAJOR POLICY ISSUES"

State Board	Percentage of SBE Respondents Indicating Opposition	Number of SBE Members in Opposition (Frequency of Mention)			
		One	Two	Three	Four or More
Elected by People					
Colorado (N=4)	0				
Michigan (N=6)	67		3	1	
Nebraska (N=5)	0				
Texas (N=11)	0				
Appointed by Governor					
Massachusetts (N=7)	29	2			
Minnesota (N=6)	0				
California (N=9)	78*		3	3	
Georgia (N=7)	0				
Tennessee (N=8)	36	1		1	
Elected by Legislature					
New York (N=9)	0				
All Members (N=72)	19				

N=Number of SBE members who responded to the question.

*Seven of the nine SBE respondents indicated opposition, but only six indicated the number of board members involved.

diverse sources of information, and react critically to the policy recommendations of administrators. Additionally, there certainly operates in state board-CSSO relationships what Friedrick has called the "rule of anticipated reactions."[13] That is, what the chief state school officer does in preparing the agenda or developing information is based to some degree on his anticipation of what board members want or need. Such premises of action usually are not articulated and exceedingly difficult to study. We did, though, request our state board respondents to estimate the frequency with which their CSSO took "ideas or suggestions" from board members and formulated these into policy proposals (see Table 2-9). We found that less than one-third (29 per cent) checked "often," whereas 59 per cent replied "sometimes" and 12 per cent indicated "rarely" or "never."

TABLE 2-9

SBE MEMBER ESTIMATE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE CSSO TAKES "IDEAS OR SUGGESTIONS" FROM BOARD MEMBERS AND DEVELOPS THESE INTO POLICY PROPOSALS

State Board		Percentages Responding			
		Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
Elected by People					
Colorado	(N=4)	25	75		
Michigan	(N=6)	50	50		
Nebraska	(N=5)	60	40		
Texas	(N=11)	18	64	18	
Appointed by Governor					
Massachusetts	(N=7)	14	86		
Minnesota	(N=6)	50	50		
California	(N=7)	14	29	43	14
Georgia	(N=7)	29	43	29	
Tennessee	(N=8)	13	87		
Elected by Legislature					
New York	(N=7)	43	57		
All Members	(N=68)	29	59	10	2

N=Number of SBE members who responded to the question.

A final point that needs mention here is that some state boards do set definite limits on the policy positions a chief can advocate without jeopardizing his job. Former Commissioner Miller evidently exceeded these limits in taking positive stands, notably on school district consolidation, in Nebraska as did former Superintendent Polley in publicly opposing parochiaid in Michigan. And both of these men, partly because of their stands on these issues, found it impossible to remain in office. Yet setting policy constraints of this sort is not the same as giving the chief positive and sustained direction. Furthermore, it has been possible for some CSSOs--for example, California's Max Rafferty in the 1960s--to defy openly and successfully the state board.

Does the state board of education, then, give real direction to the chief state school officer or does it just formalize his policy recommendations? We directed this very question to the spokesmen for each of the major state-level educational interest groups. Their replies are reported in Table 2-10. Of the 36 respondents, 26 (72 per cent) said they detected no "real direction" on policy issues being given the CSSO by the state board. A majority of the educational interest group respondents in only four states--Texas, New York, Minnesota, and Nebraska--thought that the state board ever offered such direction. Even the two boards with opposition blocs--California and Michigan--were not considered by these interviewees as exercising much influence over the CSSO.

TABLE 2-10

EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUP LEADER ASSESSMENTS OF WHETHER STATE BOARDS "EVER GIVE REAL DIRECTION" TO THE CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICER

State Board		Percentage of Group Spokesmen Saying "Yes"[a]
Elected by People		
Colorado	(N=4)	25
Michigan	(N=4)	0
Nebraska	(N=3)[b]	67
Texas	(N=3)[b]	100
Appointed by Governor		
Massachusetts	(N=4)	0
Minnesota	(N=4)	50
California	(N=4)	0
Georgia	(N=3)[b]	0
Tennessee	(N=4)	0
Elected by Legislature		
New York	(N=3)[c]	67
All Members	(N=36)	28

[a] Where an interest group had two or more respondents, we chose for this rating the one who appeared to be most knowledgeable about the state education agency.

[b] No state affiliate of AFT.

[c] State NEA and AFT affiliates had merged.

The last evidence we have that pertains to policy-making relationships between the state board and CSSO comes from the case study investigation of three issue areas: (1) certification, (2) desegregation, and (3) educational program improvement.[14] For reasons that were discussed at the beginning of this section, the use of decision analysis did not prove very helpful in illuminating the respective policy roles of the board and chief. But as far as we could tell, though our state board members often sat on policy-oriented committees or task forces and gave their formal approval to the enactment of a major decision, the basic policy-making functions of initiation, formulation, and support mobilization were largely exercised by the CSSOs and their staffs.

It was, in fact, hard to identify in our 10 states and three issue areas many clear-cut examples of state boards being actively involved in the performance of the policy-making functions other than formal legitimation. Some such involvement, to be sure, might have been overlooked by EGP researchers, especially when investigating a lengthy and complex decision process. And we do not doubt that "in some cases," in the words of one observer," the policy recommendation attributed to the CSSO really started as the result of individual board members personal inputs, research, and digging for alternatives and then working with the CSSO and SDE staff." Also, the CSSOs might have taken cues from the anticipated, rather than the actual, behavior of the state boards, and in this sense these bodies might have influenced, perhaps significantly, the policy-making activities of their chief administrative officers. Decision analysis, unfortunately, does not easily lend itself to the detection of this sort of influence. The most we can say is that a review of the case studies done on each state and discussions with their primary authors did not reveal many decision processes in which the state board's overt actions marked it as the central policy actor or even as sharing that role with the CSSO.

Board leadership, however, was not absent in all of the states. While educational program issues provide some examples, the most significant involve school desegregation. The New York Board of Regents has been a pacesetter in this area, its actions dating back to 1962. The Massachusetts State Board of Education, though responding to legislative action (i.e., the Racial Imbalance Act of 1965), strongly supported pro-desegregation CSSOs. And the Minnesota State Board of Education assumed a leadership role in the early 1970s in developing an effective state-level desegregation policy.

Review of Findings

In this section we have relied primarily on the perceptions of different actors, augmented by evidence from the examination of specific decisions, to assess the policy-making influence of state boards of education. Our findings will be re-stated under these two headings: (1) state boards in general and (2) board-by-board comparisons.

State Boards in General. The 10 state boards we studied were not widely viewed as significant actors in the legislative arena:

1. Most legislative leader respondents evaluated their state board as either of minor importance (50 per cent) or of no importance at all (22 per cent) in "actually formulating and working for education legislation." Only about one-quarter (28 per cent) said the board was important in this process. These respondents most frequently identified the legislative weakness of state boards as resulting from their apolitical traditions, lack of visibility to lawmakers, absence of political "clout," and dependence on the CSSO.

2. Nearly 70 per cent of the spokesmen for the four major state-level educational interest groups did not perceive the state board of education in their state as "ever taking the lead" on education legislation.

3. Less than two-thirds (61 per cent) of the board member interviewees, themselves, believed that they had "any means of influence" with the legislature, with half of the respondents indicating personal contacts ("persuasion") as these means. But 57 per cent of the legislative leaders could recall no such contact with board members. Those legislators who did give an affirmative reply usually indicated only one or two members as doing this, and it happening on only a few occasions.

4. Just half (51 per cent) of the board members we interviewed saw their state board as having any sort of "direct working relationship with the governor or his staff." And only nine of the 69 interviewees (13 per cent) considered either themselves or any of their colleagues as having a close advisory relationship with the chief executive.

5. None of the persons interviewed from the governor's office felt that board members were on the inner council of gubernatorial advisers. While 38 per cent of these respondents perceived their state board, compared to other individuals and groups, as being an "important source of ideas and advice for the governor's office," 62 per cent assessed this body as being either a "minor source" (48 per cent) or "not at all important as a source" (14 per cent).

6. Our investigation of school finance policy making in each state revealed that state boards typically were marginal participants. They usually took a position on the issue and communicated it by some formal means to the legislature. Beyond these actions, state boards did little. In only a few cases did we find any evidence of the state board working with the governor or legislative leaders in this area.

Because of their constitutional or statutory authority, or both, the state boards we studied were clearly more influential regarding school policies established by the state education agency than those determined in the legislative arena. Nonetheless, the dominant influence in the process by which the state education agency decided policy for the public schools appeared to be the CSSO.

1. Three out of four board member respondents (74 per cent) indicated that the CSSO was "very important" in their developing "a perspective on state education policy issues."

2. Agenda-setting for state board meetings was a function performed almost entirely by the CSSO and his staff. Virtually all board members pointed to these administrators as their primary source of information on agenda items; indeed, some 47 per cent suggested by their replies that they had no other source which they "sometimes" turned to or relied upon.

3. Most board member respondents (81 per cent) did not perceive any frequent opposition to the CSSO on their boards. In only two states did a majority indicate the presence of a continuing opposition bloc.

4. While the policy-making behavior of CSSOs no doubt reflected to some extent their anticipation of the wants and needs of state boards, less than one-third (29 per cent) of the board member respondents checked the category "often" when asked how frequently the CSSO took "ideas and suggestions" from board officials. Fifty-nine per cent replied "sometimes" and 12 per cent indicated "rarely" or "never."

5. Just over 70 per cent of the spokesmen for the major state-level educational interest groups said that they perceived no "real direction" on policy issues being given the CSSO by the state board.

6. Our investigation of policies made by state education agencies in the areas of certification, desegregation, and educational program improvement did not reveal many decision processes in which the overt action of the state board marked it as the central policy actor or even as sharing that role with the CSSO. Though board members often sat on policy-oriented committees and special task forces--and were required to give their approval at various stages in the enactment process, including legitimation of the final decision--the policy-making functions of initiation, formulation, and support mobilization were largely performed by the CSSO and state department administrators.

Board-by-Board Comparison. To summarize board-by-board variation in policy-making influence, as well as to prepare for the analysis section of this chapter, we first quantified and combined by subjective procedures a number of the state board characteristics that have been described into (1) an index of legislative influence, and (2) an index of state education agency influence.[15] Then, by adding their scores, a composite index of policy-making influence was developed.* The variables we included in each index are set forth below:

Legislative Influence Index

Legislative leaders' perceptions of SBE importance in "formulating and working for" education legislation.

Education interest group spokesmens' perceptions of the SBE "taking the lead" in promoting education legislation.

Governor's office perceptions of the SBE as a source of "ideas and advice" for that office.

EGP investigators' assessments of SBE influence in school finance policy making.

State Education Agency Influence Index

SBE members' perceptions of the extent to which the CSSO takes their "advice or suggestions."

Educational interest group spokesmens' perceptions of the SBE giving "real direction" to the CSSO.

EGP investigators' assessments of SBE influence in certification, desegregation, and educational program policy making.

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*Our scoring procedures are described in Appendix A.

Policy-Making Influence Index

Legislator Influence Index.

State Education Agency Influence Index.

Rank orders of the 10 state boards on each index and on the composite measure are contained in Table 2-11. Based on our data and scoring procedures, we would judge that Texas, New York, and Minnesota had, overall, the most influential state boards in their respective policy systems at the time of our study. Though our case study of education policy making in New York did indicate that the power of the Board of Regents has probably diminished somewhat in recent years, it still was near the top among our 10 states. As for Texas and Minnesota, their state boards had come to be seen as influential only in the early 1970s, with the former seizing the opportunity (and responsibility) afforded by the Rodriguez decision, and the latter exhibiting leadership in trying to desegregate the schools of the state. Somewhat below these three, we ranked the state boards in Colorado and Michigan, both which tended to receive above average scores on our measures. Then came the Nebraska State Board of Education, a body that was widely, albeit not always positively, seen as being directive in its relationships with the CSSO, but as having no impact at all in the legislature. The remaining four state boards--Georgia, Tennessee, Massachusetts, and California--received many negative assessments on their policy-making influence in both arenas, though the Georgia Board was perceived rather positively by legislative leaders (but see our discussion of Table 2-6).

The policy-making influence of a state board is, of course, a relative matter. Its scope and strength depends partly on the power, interests, and skill of the other actors in state education policy systems. In California and Massachusetts, for example, it is quite clear that the presence of a powerful and assertive legislature narrowly constrains the role

TABLE 2-11

RANK ORDERS OF THE STATE BOARDS ON THE DIMENSIONS OF LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE, STATE EDUCATION AGENCY INFLUENCE, AND OVERALL POLICY-MAKING INFLUENCE

Influence in the Legislative Arena		Influence in the State Education Agency Arena		Overall Policy-Making Influence	
Texas	1	Minnesota	1	Texas	1
New York	2	New York	2 (tie)	New York	2
Colorado	3	Texas	2 (tie)	Minnesota	3
Michigan	4 (tie)	Nebraska	4	Colorado	4
Minnesota	4 (tie)	Colorado	5	Michigan	5
Georgia	4 (tie)	Michigan	6	Nebraska	6
Tennessee	7	California	7	Georgia	7
Massachusetts	8	Tennessee	8 (tie)	Tennessee	8
California	9	Massachusetts	8 (tie)	Massachusetts	9
Nebraska	10	Georgia	10	California	10

which the state board can play. Even so, the policy-making resources accessible to a state board, along with the willingness of its members to apply these resources, are factors that affect state board influence, and it is to a consideration of these that we now turn our attention.

Policy-Making Resources

Potential for policy influence is contingent on access to resources, resources that can be drawn upon to command, persuade, or bargain in the decision process. In this section, we will examine the access possessed by state boards to six kinds of resources: (1) authority, (2) time, (3) information, (4) cohesion, (5) prestige, and (6) votes.

Authority

Constitutional and statutory language setting forth the powers of state boards of education is extensive and specific in some states, brief and general in others. Yet that these institutions are intended to be education policy makers can be concluded from this language in nearly all of our

10 states. In Texas, for example, the State Board is authorized to be the "policy-forming and planning body for the public school system of the state." The broad charge to this body in Michigan is that it provide "leadership and general supervision over all public education...except... institutions of higher education," while in Nebraska the Board of Education is called upon to be the "policy forming, planning and evaluative body for the state school program."[16] It must be pointed out, however, that the policy-making authority of a state board, no matter how extensive it appears, always exists in the legal shadow cast by the state legislature.

Despite seven of our 10 state boards--Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Tennessee are the exceptions--being constitutionally established, most of their formal empowerments, as well as the policy areas actually open to them,depend on legislative action. (Even the powerful Board of Regents is not independent of legislative authority since the constitution of New York stipulates that it "shall be governed and its corporate powers may be increased, modified, or diminished by the legislature...")[17] Legislatures and the governors make all the tax decisions, establish the level of school appropriations, decide the essential features of the state aid distribution formula, and enact countless other laws pertaining to the public schools.

While the authority of state boards is constrained, sometimes narrowly, by constitutional and statutory provisions, these bodies are charged with exercising general supervision over elementary-secondary education. And to undertake this basic responsibility they usually are delegated broad discretionary powers. These powers are such that state boards of education can appropriately be seen as setting, as well as implementing, public school policy in such areas as professional certification, district organization, pupil assignments, education standards, school sites and buildings, and federal assistance programs.

Comparing the legal powers vested in state boards with those assigned to CSSOs makes it clear that it is the boards which have the principal authority for state governance of elementary and secondary education. An examination of constitutional and statutory language by an EGP researcher indicated that only in California is there any marked deviation from the prevailing legal pattern, one in which the chief is largely dependent on state board authorization for his power to govern the schools.[18]

In seven of the 10 EGP states the CSSO attains his position as a result of state board appointment and serves either for a fixed term or at the pleasure of this body. But in three states--California, Georgia, and Tennessee--the selection of the chief occurs independently of the state board. Consequently, it lacks formal control over this administrator. In some states, moreover, the appointment of upper-echelon education department personnel, apart from the CSSO, does not require the approval of the state board. In six of our 10 states the state board approves the appointment of all persons to positions on the deputy or assistant commissioner level. But this is not the case for some positions at this level in each of the other four states.

A final component of state board authority that merits discussion has to do with its institutional scope. Only one of the 10 boards is comprehensive in scope, this being the New York Board of Regents which has overall supervision of education in that state from pre-kindergarten to post-graduate programs. Nine of the other state boards are responsible for vocational education as well as elementary-secondary education. Only Colorado's State Board of Education does not have authority over vocational education. And the state boards in Minnesota and California must share some of their authority in the teacher certification area with semi-independent commissions.

For the purpose of more systematic comparison, we quantified the various aspects of state board authority that have been discussed and the combined these to create a single legal authority indes. Our scoring procedure is outlined below:

Authority Dimension and Its Components	Scoring Procedure
Legal Foundation of SBE	
Constitutional provision	+1.5
Statutory provision	+0.5
SBE/CSSO Division of Formal Authority	
SBE authority all major responsibilities*	+3.0
SBE authority all but one major responsibility	+2.5
SBE authority but CSSO some major responsibilities	+1.5
SBE Control of the State Department of Education	
SBE appoints CSSO; all other top-level SDE administrators	+3.0
SBE appoints CSSO; some other top-level SDE administrators	+2.5
SBE not appoint CSSO; appoints most other top-level SDE administrators	+1.0
SBE not appoint CSSO; nor most other top-level SDE administrators	+0.5
SBE Scope of Authority	
SBE is comprehensive board for all education	+3.0
SBE has authority over K-12, vocational education, not higher education	+1.5
SBE has authority over K-12, except certification, vocational education, not higher education	+1.0
SBE has authority over K-12, not vocational education or higher education	+1.0

In Table 2-12 are shown the scores that the different state boards received on each authority dimension and on our composite measure. Unsurprisingly, the New York Board of Regents received the highest score. This is the institution which Bailey once described as having "independent...power of such scope as to

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*In the EGP survey these legal responsibilities were (1) determination of policy, (2) administration of K-12 schools, (3) distribution of state funds, (4) determination of courses of study, (5) textbook adoption, (6) teacher certification, (7) school building plans.

TABLE 2-12

LEGAL AUTHORITY OF STATE BOARDS--FOUR SELECTED DIMENSIONS AND OVERALL INDEX

State Board	Legal Foundation	SBE/CSSO Division of Formal Authority	SBE Approval of SDE Personnel	SBE Scope of Authority	Overall Index of SBE Legal Authority
Elected by People					
Colorado	1.5	3.0	3.0	1.0	8.5
Michigan	1.5	2.5	3.0	1.5	8.5
Nebraska	1.5	3.0	3.0	1.5	9.0
Texas	1.5	3.0	2.5	1.5	8.5
Appointed by Governor					
Massachusetts	.5	3.0	3.0	1.5	8.0
Minnesota	.5	3.0	3.0	1.0	7.5
California	1.5	1.5	1.0	1.0	5.0
Georgia	1.5	3.0	1.0	1.5	7.0
Tennessee	.5	2.5	.5	1.5	5.0
Elected by Legislature					
New York	1.5	3.0	2.5	3.0	10.0

bring into question its consonance with American constitutional principles of separation of powers and checks and balances."[19] But such a statement would hardly characterize, for example, the legal posture of the Board of Education in Tennessee, embedded within a centralized executive structure, or the California State Board of Education whose authority relationships with their CSSO have in times past been the subject of angry public controversy, controversy that did little for the reputation of any of the participants.

Time

Of the resources available to a public official, time is among the most crucial. Simply by investing a great deal of time, coupled with some skill, a policy maker often can extend his influence over an issue. State board members are part-time officials. Our respondents, when asked about the time they gave "to the work of being a board member," replied as shown in Table 2-13. A majority on the state boards in Nebraska, Massachusetts, and Tennessee indicated they spent only two or three days per month. Four to six days per month was the modal response from the officials in Texas and Minnesota. Most of the respondents from Colorado, Michigan, California, Georgia, and New York answered that they gave the equivalent of at least one week each month to state board duties.

TABLE 2-13

SBE MEMBER ESTIMATES OF THE TIME THEY DEVOTE TO "THE WORK OF BEING A BOARD MEMBER" (IN PERCENTAGES)

State Board		Day or So Per Month	Two-three Days Per Month	Four-Six Days Per Month	Week or More Per Month
Elected by People					
Colorado	(N=4)			50	50
Michigan	(N=6)				100
Nebraska	(N=5)		60	20	20
Texas	(N=11)		18	45	36
Appointed by Governor					
Massachusetts	(N=7)		57	14	29
Minnesota	(N=6)		17	67	17
California	(N=10)		20	20	60
Georgia	(N=7)		14	14	71
Tennessee	(N=8)	25	75		
Elected by Legislature					
New York	(N=9)		11	22	67
All Members	(N=72)	3	28	24	46

N=Number of SBE members who responded to the question.

Participation in regularly-scheduled meetings consumes part of a board member's time. Information on the number of regular meetings per month and the average length of these meetings--as provided by a state department of education observer in each of the 10 EGP states--is set forth in Table 2-14. The average state board, judging from these figures, convenes once a month for a session lasting either a half or a full day. The Michigan State Board of Education meets most frequently--twice a month for two days (estimated at eight or nine total hours at each session)--and the Tennessee State Board of Education meets least frequently--only once each quarter for six hours or so.

TABLE 2-14

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS' ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF REGULAR STATE BOARD MEETINGS AND THE AVERAGE LENGTH OF THESE MEETINGS

State Board	Number of Regular Meetings Per Month	Average Length of Regular Meeting
Elected by People		
Colorado	2	"6-7 hours"
Michigan	2	"8-9 hours over two days"
Nebraska	1 (not July/August)	"½ day"
Texas	1 (10 per year)	"½ day"
Appointed by Governor		
Massachusetts	1 (not July/August)	"1 full day"
Minnesota	1	"1 full day"
California	1	"10 hours or so over 3 days"
Georgia	1	"3 hours"
Tennessee	1 (every 3 months)	"6 hours"
Elected by Legislature		
New York	1	"Over a 3-day period"

Inspection of state board agendas indicates that a substantial portion of each involves the formal approval of routine matters. To quantify this, our board member interviewees were asked to estimate the amount of meeting time their boards devoted to the "legal approval of routine items" (Table 2-15). Forty-six per cent said that such action consumed about one-quarter of their board's meeting time. Twenty-six per cent estimated this time expenditure at one-half; another eight per cent thought it to be as high as three-quarters. Nearly 20 per cent, on the other hand, checked "almost none" in reply to this question.

The state board spending the least time on routine matters, according to board member estimates, is the New York Board of Regents. Seven of the nine persons interviewed from this body said that the Regents spent almost no time in their regular meetings on such matters. The other two persons perceived about one-quarter of the meetings being used in this fashion.

TABLE 2-15

SBE MEMBER ESTIMATES OF THE AMOUNT OF MEETING TIME DEVOTED TO "THE LEGAL APPROVAL OF ROUTINE ITEMS" (IN PERCENTAGES)

State Board		Three-Quarters	About Half	One-Quarter	Almost None
Elected by People					
Colorado	(N=4)		75		25
Michigan	(N=6)		50	33	17
Nebraska	(N=5)	20	20	60	
Texas	(N=11)	9	9	64	18
Appointed by Governor					
Massachusetts	(N=7)		43	57	
Minnesota	(N=6)	17	17	50	17
California	(N=10)	20	30	50	
Georgia	(N=7)		43	29	29
Tennessee	(N=8)	13	25	63	
Elected by Legislature					
New York	(N=9)			22	78
All Members	(N=73)	8	26	46	19

N=Number of SBE members who responded to the question.

At the other extreme, five of the California board member respondents checked the one-quarter category in answering this question, three said one-half, and two respondents claimed the figure was closer to three-quarters.

Information

That information is central to policy-making influence is obvious. Many analysts would support Iannaccone's contention that:

> ....the control of information and its quantity at points of access to the legislative process are extremely important sources of influence in the modern legislature. By having data on this dimension alone, a researcher who had no other might pinpoint more accurately the sources of influence over the sources of legislation than he would with any other data.[20]

Since state boards of education are like legislatures in their need for information, it becomes important to identify the individuals or groups to whom board members frequently turn for information and to assess the quality of the information these officeholders receive.

The board members interviewed were first asked to name their "main sources of information" for agenda items. In virtually all cases, as we said earlier, the first person named was either the CSSO or another department administrator. If the respondent stopped at this point, our interviewers were instructed to probe to see if the board member would identify "other sources of information that you sometimes rely upon or seek out." The replies by state board members to these questions are in Table 2-16.

Two points bear emphasis from the data presented in this table. The first is that nearly half (47 per cent) of the board members indicated no source of information on agenda items other than the chief or the department. The second is that when outside sources were cited they usually were educators or persons, like local school board members, who are closely identified with education. The types of groups most frequently named were these:

Type of Group	#SBE Respondents Who Named Groups
Local School People (Superintendent/Board Members)	20 (27%)
State-Level Educational Interest Groups (Unspecified)	8 (11%)
State Teachers Association	8 (11%)
University Spokesmen	5 (7%)
School Boards (Local) Association	4 (5%)
Local Citizens	3 (4%)
Media	3 (4%)
Legislators or Governor's Office	3 (4%)
Non-Educator Groups	3 (4%)

The heavy reliance by state board members on information supplied by the CSSO and the state department was not matched by a uniformly high assessment by board member respondents of its quality. As can be seen from Table 2-17, only one-third of the interviewees saw state department information as "almost always" meeting their needs. Slightly less than half (46 per cent) felt that this information "usually" met their needs. More critical were the board members (19 per cent) who checked the response "sometimes meets

TABLE 2-16

SBE MEMBERS' IDENTIFICATION OF GROUPS (OTHER THAN THE STATE DEPARTMENT) WHICH THEY RELIED UPON FOR INFORMATION ON AGENDA ITEMS

State Board		Teachers Assn.	Teachers Union	Administrators Assn.	School Boards Assn.	Educational Groups (Unspec.)	Local School People	University Spokesmen	SBE Advisory Committee	Other SBE Members	Non-Educator Interest Groups	Legislators or Governor's Office	Media	Non-Partisan Research Group	Local Citizens	No Source Other Than CSSO/SBE
Elected by People																
Colorado	(N=4)	1			1		2		1			1			1	1 (25%)
Michigan	(N=6)					2										3 (50%)
Nebraska	(N=5)					1	2					1				3 (60%)
Texas	(N=11)	2					4	1		1	1					6 (55%)
Appointed by Governor																
Massachusetts	(N=7)						4	2			1	1		1	1	1 (14%)
Minnesota	(N=6)	2		1	2	1										3 (50%)
California	(N=10)					2	1	1			1		1			5 (50%)
Georgia	(N=7)						5	1		1					1	1 (14%)
Tennessee	(N=8)	2			1		2									5 (63%)
Elected by Legislature																
New York	(N=9)	1				2							2			6 (67%)
All Members	(N=73)	8	0	1	4	8	20	5	1	2	3	3	3	1	3	34 (47%)

N=Number of SBE members who responded to the question.

your needs" in answering the information-assessment question. Still, only one interviewee maintained that state department information was "almost never" satisfactory. There was considerable state-by-state variation ranging from New York, in which 56 per cent of the Regents who were interviewed checked the highest category of satisfaction, to Nebraska, in which 60 per cent of the respondents assessed state department information as being only sometimes responsive to their needs.

TABLE 2-17

SBE MEMBER ASSESSMENTS OF STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION
(IN PERCENTAGES)

State Board		Almost Always Meets Needs	Usually Meets Needs	Sometimes Meets Needs	Almost Never Meets Needs
Elected by People					
Colorado	(N=3)	33	67		
Michigan	(N=6)	33	50	17	
Nebraska	(N=5)	20	20	60	
Texas	(N=11)	27	64	9	
Appointed by Governor					
Massachusetts	(N=7)	14	57	29	
Minnesota	(N=6)	33	50	17	
California	(N=10)	50	10	30	10
Georgia	(N=7)	43	57		
Tennessee	(N=8)	13	50	38	
Elected by Legislature					
New York	(N=9)	56	44		
All Members	(N=72)	33	46	19	1

N=Number of SBE members who responded to the question.

Cohesion

The board members we interviewed were questioned about the extent of agreement on their state board when it confronted a major policy issue. Specifically, these officials were asked to indicate which one of the following statements best characterized their board's decision behavior:

> Board is harmonious, little serious disagreement.
>
> Board is usually in agreement, but there are board members who sometimes dissent.

> Board often is divided but the lines of division depend on the issue that is confronting the Board.
>
> Board tends to divide into rival factions, but there is a clear working majority on the Board.
>
> Board tends to divide into rival factions of nearly equal strength.

In Table 2-18 are reported board member responses to the five statements. As can be seen, 60 per cent checked one of the first two alternatives, suggesting that their boards were basically consensual in dealing with policy issues. A pluralist pattern--issue-by-issue division--was perceived by one-third of our board members. And just six of those interviewed (8 per cent) characterized their boards as being factional in policy-making behavior.

Many factors combine to encourage agreement among state board members. These officials are quite homogeneous in social background, do not typically have political constituencies, pay great heed to expertise, and operate largely from a common information base. Many, perhaps most, of the items on the meeting agendas of state boards of education are routine in nature and not apt to spark controversy. Lastly, there are informal norms on most boards in opposition to "special interest" representation and in favor of acting collectively for "the entire state."[21]

A consensual decision-making style does enable a state board to move expeditiously through crowded agendas, and to do so in a manner that reduces controversy and vulnerability to external groups. And it permits a state board to act in a unified manner in advancing a policy proposal in the legislature. The state boards in our sample that were most divided--Nebraska, California, and Michigan--were perceived by several lawmakers in each of these states as being hampered by their disunity in effectively advocating a board position on education legislation. Nonetheless, while in some ways an influence resource, a stress on internal cohesion and on a consensual

TABLE 2-18

SBE MEMBER ASSESSMENTS OF THE EXTENT OF AGREEMENT ON THEIR STATE BOARD WHEN IT "MUST DECIDE MAJOR POLICY ISSUES" (IN PERCENTAGES)

State Board	Completely Harmonious	Usually in Agreement	Often Divided on Issue-by-Issue Basis	Factional, Working Majority	Factional, Equal Strength
Elected by People					
Colorado (N=4)	25	25	50		
Michigan (N=6)		17	83		
Nebraska (N=5)		20	40		40
Texas (N=11)	9	55	36		
Appointed by Governor					
Massachusetts (N=7)	43	57			
Minnesota (N=6)		100			
California (N=10)		20	40	40	
Georgia (N=7)		71	29		
Tennessee (N=8)		75	25		
Elected by Legislature					
New York (N=9)		67	33		
All Members (N=73)	7	53	33	5	3

N=Number of SBE members who responded to the question.

decision-making style is not without shortcomings. Such a style, because it seeks to avoid or suppress conflict, does not encourage the generation or searching examination of different policy alternatives, at least at the board level. Hence, it is not a style that is conducive to board member control, as opposed to bureaucratic control, of policy making.[22]

Prestige

A number of the factors that have been discussed--the historic origins of state boards, the legal authority delegated to these bodies, and the ability of state boards to pursue goals in a cohesive fashion--are relevant to a more generalized influence resource, a resource that might be termed "prestige." This concept is hard to pin down with any great precision and is used here to refer to the capacity to evoke respect. The possessors of this resource are believed to have certain stable personal or institutional qualities--for example, impartiality, wisdom, tradition, or social distinction--that transcend specific issues and that make their opinions persuasive to many people.[23]

Of our 10 state boards, the New York Board of Regents, albeit "cracks are appearing in the pedestal," is undoubtedly the most prestigious. Nearly two centuries old (it was founded in 1784), constitutionally established as an independent body, and comprehensive in the scope of its authority, the Board of Regents has been comprised over the years of some of the most distinguished citizens in New York. Even state lawmakers who were sharply critical of the Regents for their school finance pronouncements and their controversial efforts in school desegregation acknowledged that this institution had a stature, as well as legal powers, which made it a force to be reckoned with. In the words of one legislator, the Regents "are important for who they are rather than what they do."

Most of the other state boards we studied were also perceived by policy actors in their states as "having status" though not usually as having power. The social background of the board members probably contributed to this image. The typical board official among our respondents was white (94 per cent), male (75 per cent), and middle-aged (84 per cent were 41 years or older). His occupation was to be found in business or the professions (70 per cent). He was affluent (51 per cent earned in excess of $30,000 annually) and was almost certain to be well educated (92 per cent were college graduates; 58 per cent held an advanced degree). In this connection, it might be pointed out that 47 per cent of our board member respondents had professional educator experience.[24]

Turning back to the prestige of our state boards, four of them--Texas, Georgia, Minnesota, and Massachusetts--were almost uniformly seen by our different respondents as possessing that resource. For other state boards--California, Michigan, Colorado, and Tennessee--were widely perceived as prestigious institutions, but regarding each there was an undercurrent of negative comment. The well-publicized forays of the California State Board of Education into "creation" politics were pointed to with derision by more than a few respondents, and several in Michigan condemned the board recruitment process in that state for its partisanship. The appellation "rubber stamp" as applied to the policy-making function of the state board was heard by our interviewers with some frequency in both Colorado and Tennessee, albeit there were respondents in each state who argued that changes in the early 1970s presaged a more assertive role for the state board. As for the Nebraska State Board of Education, it was seen by many of our interviewees as being the victim of, among other things, a debilitating factionalism.

Votes

That interest groups can bring electoral sanctions effectively to bear on lawmakers is doubted by some analysts who cite various reasons why these groups find it difficult to convert their resources into votes. Yet we found in our interviews with political leaders that the electoral strength ascribed to a group was viewed as a critical factor in its having "clout" with the legislature. Furthermore, state education policy making has become highly politicized, with the growing assertiveness of governors and legislatures, the emergence of "teacher power," and the controversy surrounding school finance. Such politicalization can only make the capacity to mobilize constituents an increasingly potent resource in arenas like the state legislature.

How much "political clout" of the sort described above is commanded by state boards of education as a means by which to influence legislative policy making for the public schools? The answer to this question is "almost none." A state board in our sample would have been hard pressed on the basis of its "low profile" recruitment process, whether elected or appointed, to claim that it spoke for some broad constituency, let alone that it had powerful sources of external support. And, outside of perhaps the New York Board of Regents, there was little effort on the part of these bodies to heighten and to focus public expectations for legislative performance regarding the schools, expectations that might have translated into votes when legislators had to stand for election.

Review of Findings

The overall situation of state boards with respect to policy-making resources is a curious mixture of strengths and weaknesses, with the latter being clearly the more pronounced for most of these bodies. True, state boards have been delegated considerable legal authority to set education policy for elementary-secondary schools. But it is the legislature--the "big school board"--that enacts the laws and determines all basic fiscal policy. State boards of education do not have the financial independence (i.e., taxing authority) of most of their local counterparts. As a result, the state boards do not have direct access to monetary resources. To obtain these resources for their agency and its programs, or for the public schools of the state, board officials must have the capacity to influence state lawmakers.[25] And for our 10 state boards this capacity as measured by such resources as time, information, cohesion, prestige, and votes was not impressive, though significant variation by both resource and state did exist.

To review some general findings, the board members we studied were part-time officeholders (most devoted less than the equivalent of a week per month) and much of their time in board service was spent on functions other than policy making. These officials were heavily dependent on state department administrators for data on agenda items. To the limited degree they relied upon other sources (only 53 per cent indicated such a reliance), board members were most likely to turn to educators, or their allies, for information and advice. Some state boards of education were seen as cohesive and prestigious bodies; others as deficient in both of these resources. None of the state boards had developed much capacity to arouse and to mobilize voter sentiment regarding legislative policy making for the public schools. Thus, they were without "political clout," a resource reported to be much respected by constituency-oriented lawmakers.

The rankings we ascribed to the 10 state boards of education on the influence resources were substantial differences among these bodies could be discerned are presented in Table 2-19. It must be reiterated that our

TABLE 2-19

RANKINGS OF STATE BOARDS ON SIX INFLUENCE RESOURCE DIMENSIONS

State Board	Legal Authority	Time		Information Utility	Cohesion	Prestige
		Devoted by SBE Members	Policy Emphasis			
Elected by People						
Colorado	4	4	7.5	3	2.5	7.5
Michigan	4	1	4.5	5	8	7.5
Nebraska	2	9	9	10	10	10
Texas	4	6	2	4	5	3.5
Appointed by Governor						
Massachusetts	6	8	6	8	1	3.5
Minnesota	7	7	4.5	6	2.5	3.5
California	9.5	5	10	7	9	7.5
Georgia	8	2.5	3	2	6	3.5
Tennessee	9.5	10	7.5	9	4	7.5
Elected by Legislature						
New York	1	2.5	1	1	7	1

indices are always relative and are, for the most part, judgmental. Certainly, they do not measure the resource capability of a state board on any absolute scale.*

Policy-Making Expectations

The possession of resources, irrespective of type, is not the same as actual influence in policy making. Resources are always necessary for such influence but in themselves they are not sufficient. Much depends on the intention of the actors to whom the means of influence are available. How willing are state boards of education to use their resources to play an active part in the determination of education policy? To provide data relevant to this question we asked board members to indicate their agreement or disagreement with statements measuring (1) their sense of policy-making efficacy, and (2) their expectations for the policy-making role of both state boards and CSSOs.

Sense of Policy-Making Efficacy

"Sense of policy-making efficacy" is a gross index of motivation.[26] The assumption is that a public official who believes he can both understand the issues confronting him and act effectively upon them is more likely to seek an active policy-making role than a public official who has reservations about these matters. The three questionnaire items we employed, the replies indicating a sense of efficacy, and the percentage of board members who gave these replies--all are reported in Table 2-20. For comparative purposes, the responses of the legislative leaders who completed the questionnaire are also shown in this table.

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*Scoring procedures are described in Appendix A.

TABLE 2-20

SBE RESPONDENTS COMPARED WITH LEGISLATIVE LEADER RESPONDENTS ON THEIR SENSE OF POLICY-MAKING EFFICACY

Attitude Statement	Item Response Indicating Sense of Efficacy	Percentages Indicating Sense of Efficacy	
		State Board Members (N=64)	Legislative Leaders (N=74)
"Many educational issues are so complicated that a policy maker cannot really make wise decisions."	Disagree	73	72
"There is much that a public official in my position can do to initiate new policy ideas for education."	Agree	83	81
"A public official in my position really does not have the time to study the consequences of policy decisions he made, say, four or five years ago."	Disagree	77	76

Almost equal proportions of both groups--board officials 73 per cent, legislators 72 per cent--eschewed the notion that educational issues were too complicated for them to understand; and 83 per cent and 81 per cent, respectively, expressed the belief that a person in their position could take a major initiating role in education policy making. Variation between the two groups was equally non existent on whether a public official lacked the time to study the consequences of his decisions, 77 per cent of the board members and 76 per cent of the legislative leaders rejected this contention.

Role Expectations

A sense of efficacy in policy making may motivate a public official to seek involvement in that process, but the behavioral content of this involvement will also be shaped by the official's expectations for relationships with other policy actors, as well as by their expectations for his role.[27] We examined such policy role expectations through several different sets of Likert-type items, some contained in our questionnaire and others completed during the interviewing session. Five of the questionnaire items, the replies indicating a state board policy role, and the percentages of both board member and legislator respondents who gave these replies--all are contained in Table 2-21.

Understandably, our legislator respondents did not take quite as positive a view of the state board's policy role as did board member respondents. Yet on each item most lawmakers did concur with such a role and on one--the state board's developing proposals for the legislature--a slightly higher percentage of legislative leaders (76 per cent) agreed with this prescription than did board members (70 per cent). Legislator respondents, however, indicated less agreement than board member respondents on the legislature "limiting itself to broad goals" (62 as against 95 per cent), on state board views being "taken into account by the governor" (95 as against 100 per cent), on the CSSO being supervised by the state board (78 as against 90 per cent); and on rejecting, as its "major function," the state board's granting approval to CSSO-developed proposals (55 as against 69 per cent).

As could have been anticipated, the major difference between these two groups of respondents was over the distribution of education policymaking authority between the legislature and the state board. Even though a majority of both favored having the legislature establish "broad goals for the public schools," the gap between the two groups was a substantial 33 percentage points. And on a state-by-state basis, not shown in Table 2-21, the difference was particularly wide in Michigan (86 percentage points), Colorado (50 percentage points), Nebraska (50 percentage points),

TABLE 2-21

SBE RESPONDENTS COMPARED WITH LEGISLATIVE LEADER RESPONDENTS ON THEIR POLICY ROLE EXPECTATIONS FOR STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION

Attitude Statement	Item Response Indicating SBE Policy Role	Percentage Indicating SBE Policy Role	
		State Board Members (N=64)	Legislative Leaders (N=74)
"The Legislature should limit itself to determining broad goals for the public schools and leave most policy-making authority to the State Board or State Superintendent (Commissioner)."	Agree	95	62
"The views of the State Board of Education should be taken into account by the Governor in his major proposals for education legislation."	Agree	100	95
"The responsibility of the State Board of Education should include supervision over the activities of the State Superintendent (Commissioner)."	Agree	90	78
"The most important task for the State Board of Education should be to develop major policy proposals for the legislature to consider."	Agree	70	76
"The major function of the State Board of Education should be to approve programs developed by the State Superintendent (Commissioner) and his staff."	Disagree	69	55

and California (40 percentage points). In each of these states, at least half of the legislative leader respondents indicated that the legislature should retain the authority to act as the "big school board" for elementary-secondary education and not confine itself to setting general goals.

If the role conceptions that state board members hold for themselves help shape their policy-making activities, the expectations of these officials for the role of the CSSO are probably more crucial in determining the actual policy involvement of both boards and chiefs. This is so because the potentially dominant figure in the state board arena is the CSSO. Notwithstanding his formal subordination to the state board in most states, the CSSO's fulltime commitment to his position, acknowledged status as an educational expert, access to the resources of a large state agency, and control of policy-relevant data give him a powerful position vis-a-vis the state board. If the board concedes policy initiation, formulation, and leadership to the chief, retaining for itself only advisory and approval functions, then that administrator has the resources and sometimes the interest to relegate the state board to little more than a symbolic entity.

To examine the policy role expectations held by state boards and CSSOs for the latters' position, a number of agree-disagree items were included in the interviews. Eight of these items and the replies indicating a policy role for the chief are listed below:

Attitude Statement	Response Indicating CSSO Policy Role
"A State Superintendent (Commissioner) should assume leadership in shaping the policies enacted by the State Board of Education."	Agree
"A State Superintendent (Commissioner) should maintain a neutral stand on education policy issues that are very controversial among the citizens of his state."	Disagree
"A State Superintendent (Commissioner) should actively seek to influence legislative leaders with regard to education policies."	Agree
"A State Superintendent (Commissioner) should work to have people he respects become members of the State Board of Education."	Agree

Attitude Statement	Response Indicating CSSO Policy Role
"A State Superintendent (Commissioner) should administer the State Department of Education and leave education policy matters to other state officials."	Disagree
"A State Superintendent (Commissioner) should actively work with party leaders in order to attain education policy goals."	Agree
"A State Superintendent (Commissioner) should take a policy position in which he believes even when most professional educators may be hostile."	Agree
"A State Superintendent (Commissioner) should be the principal advocate of major changes in state education policy."	Agree

Data on the policy role expectations for CSSOs are presented in Table 2-22. It is obvious from these data that our state board members emphatically rejected the policy-administration dichotomy and wanted their chief to be a central policy participant. An overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that this administrator should take policy positions even in the face of educator hostility (93 per cent), actively seek to influence legislative leaders (89 per cent), assume leadership in shaping state board policies (87 per cent), voice positive policy stands on highly controversial issues (83 per cent), and be "the principal advocate" of major education policy changes (80 per cent). Some two-thirds of the board member interviewees (67 per cent) rejected the contention that the CSSO should manage the state department and leave education policy matters to other officials. Well more than half (61 per cent) believed that the chiefs' policy-making participation should extend to working with party leaders. Only with respect to board member recruitment itself did most of our respondents prescribe a narrow role for the chief state school officer. And even on this item, a surprising 27 per cent expressed a preference for CSSO involvement.

TABLE 2-22

SBE MEMBER EXPECTATIONS FOR THE POLICY ROLE OF CSSOs (IN PERCENTAGES)

State Board		Leadership for SBE (Agreed)	"Neutral" on Educational Matters (Disagreed)	Influence Legislators (Agreed)	Work to Recruit SBE Members (Agreed)	Leave Policy Matters to Other Officials (Disagreed)	Work With Party Leaders (Agreed)	Position in Opposition to Educators (Agreed)	Advocate of Major Changes (Agreed)
Elected by People									
Colorado	(N=4)	100	100	75	0	75	25	78	50
Michigan	(N=6)	83	100	100	50	67	67	100	100
Nebraska	(N=5)	100	60	80	40	80	80	100	100
Texas	(N=10)	80	50	50	10	50	10	90	90
Appointed by Governor									
Massachusetts	(N=7)	100	86	100	14	86	71	100	100
Minnesota	(N=6)	83	83	100	50	83	17	100	67
California	(N=9)	78	100	100	25	78	78	89	44
Georgia	(N=7)	71	86	86	14	57	71	71	71
Tennessee	(N=8)	100	87	100	63	75	100	100	100
Elected by Legislature									
New York	(N=9)	89	89	100	11	37	78	100	78
All Members	(N=71)	87	83	89	27	67	61	93	80

N=Number of SBE members who responded to the question.

Review of Findings

Whatever the factors that constrain the policy-making involvement of state boards of education, a feeling of futility about this involvement does not seem to be among them. Our state board respondents were every bit as likely as the legislative leaders who were interviewed to exhibit a strong "sense of policy-making efficacy," at least as we operationalized the concept. The great majority of both groups (more than 70 per cent for each item making up the index) said, in effect, that educational issues are understandable; that time is available to study the consequences of prior decisions; and that public officials in their positions can do much to initiate new policies.

Most board member respondents also held policy role expectations for the state board. Specifically, they replied it should exercise quasi-legislative authority (95 per cent), give advice to the governor (100 per cent), supervise the CSSO (90 per cent), formulate legislative proposals (70 per cent), and reject as "the major board function" the legitimating of CSSO-developed programs (69 per cent). A majority of our legislator interviewees also subscribed to these role prescriptions, albeit they generally did not agree with them as strongly, notably when the authority of the legislature to set education policy was in question.

But while most board officials in our study said they wanted to be policy makers and indicated they felt efficacious in that role, their conception of the policy functions of the CSSO was so expansive as to raise doubt about just what functions, other than advice and approval, state boards themselves were willing to undertake. State board members advanced a set of expectations for the CSSO which cast that administrator as the key innovator, formulator, advocate, and influential in education policy making. One wonders whether other governmental bodies envisage for their administrative officers such a sweeping policy role.[28]

Just as with influence resources, we can rank order our 10 state boards on the attitude and expectations measures described in this section. These rankings appear in Table 2-23. There is little correlation between the rank orders shown in the first two columns--one based on sense of policy-making efficacy, and one based on an index of state board members' self-role expectations. Significantly, perhaps, there is a moderate inverse relationship between the rank order based on the state board members' self-role expectations and that based on state board members' expectations for the policy role of the CSSO. The rank order coefficient here (Spearman rho) is -.44.

TABLE 2-23

RANK ORDERS OF THE STATE BOARDS ON "SENSE OF POLICY-MAKING EFFICACY" AND ON POLICY ROLE EXPECTATIONS FOR THE SBE AND CSSO*

Sense of Policy-Making Efficacy		State Board's Policy Role		CSSO's Policy Role	
Colorado	1 (tie)	Colorado	1	Tennessee	1
Michigan	1 (tie)	New York	2	Michigan	2
Tennessee	3	Texas	3 (tie)	Massachusetts	3
Minnesota	4	Nebraska	3 (tie)	Nebraska	4
Massachusetts	5	California	5	California	5
New York	6	Massachusetts	6	Minnesota	6 (tie)
Nebraska	7	Minnesota	7	New York	6 (tie)
California	8	Tennessee	8	Georgia	8
Texas	9	Michigan	9	Colorado	9
Georgia	10	Georgia	10	Texas	10

*Scoring procedures are described in Appendix A.

Correlates of Policy-Making Influence

Up to this point, we have described how 10 state boards of education differed in the influence they were perceived as having in their respective legislative and education agency arenas. We also have described how the state boards differed in their policy-making resources and expectations for role performance. But describing such variations is a far simpler task than explaining them. In this section we will attempt to identify some of the major correlates of state board policy-making influence.

Selection Method

Much of the normative literature on state board selection methods assumes that they make an important difference for the kind of member who is recruited and what this person does once in office. Yet the few empirical studies that exist cast doubt upon this assumption.[29] Is selection method related to policy-making influence for our state boards? As a first step toward answering this question, we divided the 10 state boards in terms of their perceived influence into two ordered categories: (1) Medium Influence and (2) Low Influence. (Our evidence does not support the label "high influence" being applied to any of the boards.) The state boards in each category are listed below:

Medium Influence	Low Influence
Texas	Nebraska
New York	Georgia
Minnesota	Tennessee
Colorado	Massachusetts
Michigan	California

Figure 1 indicates the association between selection method and policy-making influence for the state boards in our sample. As can be seen, a disproportionate number of the elected boards are in the medium category, whereas most of the low influence boards are appointed. The statistical association between the two variables, using the index phi (0), is .55. This means that, relative to the maximum relationship possible between the two variables, the set of data shown in Figure 1 represents an association of about 30 per cent (the percentage value of phi squared).[30] But, as our next analyses will show, it is questionable whether this difference between elected and appointed boards is attributable to formal selection method.

	Medium Influence	Low Influence
Popularly Elected	Texas Colorado Michigan	Nebraska
Gubernatorial Appointment	Minnesota	Georgia Tennessee Massachusetts California

*New York is not included in this analysis.

Figure 1--Relationship For State Boards Between Selection Method and Policy-Making Influence

Policy-Making Resources

We anticipated that access to such resources as authority, time, information, cohesion, and prestige would affect the policy-making influence exerted by a state board. In Table 2-24 are presented the relationships between our measures of these resources and state board influence.

TABLE 2-24

RELATIONSHIP FOR STATE BOARDS BETWEEN RESOURCES AND POLICY-MAKING INFLUENCE

Resource Measures	Rho Coefficients
Legal Authority	.66
Time Devoted by SBE Members	.29
Emphasis in SBE Meetings on Non-Routine Matters	.69
SDE Information Utility to SBE	.56
SBE Cohesion	.09
SBE Prestige	.44

The index of association is rho (r_s). To obtain this for each resource-influence relationship we correlated the variables as sets of rank orders. The value of rho represents the extent of agreement between two sets.

A r_s of, say, .25 indicates only a slight tendency for the same state boards to have similar rankings on both variables, a r_s of .5 indicates a moderate relationship, and a r_s of .7 indicates strong agreement between the two rank orders.[31]

Inspection of the rho coefficients in Table 2-24 reveals, first, that the legal authority of state boards has a fairly strong association (.66) with policy-making influence. While several of the individual components of the legal authority index (presented in Table 2-12) appear to contribute to this relationship, one stands out--the legal control over the state department of education exercised by its state board. And we discovered, upon further examination, that the key element here is whether or not the state board appoints the CSSO.

Figure 2 depicts the association between state boards' formal control over the CSSO and their policy-making influence. The most striking thing about this distribution is that all three of the boards which do not appoint their chiefs are in the low influence category. The phi (ϕ) value is .65 which means that some 43 per cent of a perfect relationship between the two variables are represented by the data in Figure 2.

	Medium Influence	Low Influence
SBE Appoints	Texas New York Minnesota Colorado Michigan	Nebraska Massachusetts
SBE Not Appoint CSSO	(None)	Georgia Tennessee California

Figure 2. Relationship For State Boards Between SBE Appointment of the CSSO and Its Policy-Making Influence

Is a state board's legal authority over the CSSO a more critical factor in its policy-making influence than how board members are selected? Our data support such an inference. First, the index of association (phi squared) is somewhat higher, 43 per cent compared with 30 per cent, for the distribution shown in Figure 2 than for that in Figure 1. Second, and more important, the perceived influence of the appointed state boards that select their CSSO is considerably higher than the appointed state boards where the CSSO is selected either by the people or by the governor. Indeed, the influence scores we subjectively assigned to the former are nearly equal to those of the elected state boards, though there is still a gap in the legislative arena (see Table 2-25).

TABLE 2-25

RELATIONSHIP FOR STATE BOARDS BETWEEN THREE SELECTION MODELS AND POLICY-MAKING INFLUENCE SCORES*

Selection Model for SBE and CSSO	State Board	Legislative Influence	State Education Agency Influence	Overall Policy-Making Influence
State Board is Popularly Elected; It Appoints CSSO	Colorado	2.7	2.6	5.3
	Michigan	2.6	2.4	5.0
	Nebraska	1.1	3.4	4.5
	Texas	4.6	3.6	8.2
	Average	2.75	3.00	5.75
State Board is Appointed; It Appoints CSSO	Massachusetts	2.0	2.0	4.0
	Minnesota	2.6	4.0	6.6
	Average	2.30	3.00	5.30
State Board is Appointed; It Does Not Appoint CSSO	California	1.7	2.2	3.9
	Georgia	2.6	1.8	4.4
	Tennessee	2.1	2.0	4.1
	Average	2.13	2.00	4.13

*New York is not included in the analysis.

Referring back to the rho coefficients in Table 2-24, we would conclude from their magnitudes--if board member perceptions of their resources are close to reality--that the policy-making influence of a state board is strongly related to the time emphasis given in its meetings to non-routine matters (r_s of .69) and is moderately related (r_s of .56) to the utility for board members of state department information. The time devoted to board service by individual members, the internal cohesion of state boards, and the prestige accorded to these bodies--none of these appears to be a major contributor to state board policy-making influence.

The relative weakness of prestige (r_s of .44) as an influence resource is puzzling, especially since so many of our interviewees pointed to it as the primary one in their evaluation of state boards. Since our measure of this resource is particularly subjective, we decided to try some "hard" indicators constructed from the social background data that had been obtained from board member responses to our questionnaire. But this, too, produced no correlations of any consequence. Thus, while we think, based upon intuition as well as what many respondents told us, that prestige is an important board resource, our quantitative data do not offer much to sustain this belief.

Policy-Making Expectations

Are the policy role expectations that board members hold for themselves and for their CSSO related to the perceived influence of state boards? The rank-order correlations among our measures are reported in Table 2-26. Again, all the relationships are in the expected direction--the medium influence boards tend to rank higher on a sense of policy-making efficacy and in their expectations for a state board policy role, and to rank lower in their conception of a policy role for the CSSO. But, except for the last, these relationships are not very strong. The negative association (r_s of -.59) for state boards between their members' expectations for an expansive CSSO policy role and their own policy-making influence is worth noting, however.

TABLE 2-26

RELATIONSHIP FOR STATE BOARDS BETWEEN ROLE EXPECTATIONS AND POLICY-MAKING INFLUENCE

Expectations	Rho Coefficients
Sense of Policy-Making Efficacy	.06
SBE Expectations for a Board Policy Role	.42
SBE Expectations for a CSSO Policy Role	-.59

Background Characteristics

Our examination to this point has uncovered a few sizable correlates. But it could well be, of course, that the associations in these data are merely reflections of more fundamental socioeconomic and political forces at work in the 10 states. To explore this possibility, an array of indices of socioeconomic development and political culture were correlated with the influence variable. We can see from the coefficients in Table 2-27 that the values of rho for all these associations are miniscule for the most part and none exceeds -.33. Certainly they are not of a magnitude to suggest that background characteristics, and not the other attributes more immediately related to state boards, account for much of the variation in the policy-making influence of these bodies.

TABLE 2-27

RELATIONSHIP FOR STATE BOARDS BETWEEN POLICY-MAKING INFLUENCE AND SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STATES*

Characteristics	Rho Coefficients
Socioeconomic	
Population Size, 1970	-.03
Rate of Population Growth, 1960-1970	-.07
Per Capita Income, 1972	-.03
Population 4 or More Years of School, 1970	-.28
Urbanism-People in Towns of 2,500 or Less, 1970	.05
Political	
Party Competition, Ranney Index, 1956-70	.08
Voter Turnout, 1970 House Elections	-.33
Political Culture, Elazar-Sharkansky Scale, 1969	.26
Legislative "Effectiveness," Citizens Conference Index, 1970	-.09
Formal Powers of the Governors, Schlesinger's Index, 1970	.01
Localism (Per Cent Revenue to K-12 Schools from Local Sources)	-.26

Relative Importance of Policy-Making Correlates

Our analysis of quantitative data about 10 state boards of education has identified only four moderate to strong correlates of their policy-making influence. These are legal authority ($r_s = .66$), time devoted to non-routine matters ($r_s = .69$), member expectations for an expansive CSSO policy role ($r_s = -.59$), and perceived utility of SDE information ($r_s = .56$). While all the other correlations involving either policy resources or role expectations are in the predicted direction, they are of rather small magnitude. And none of the socioeconomic and political indicators employed as background measures has a value of r_s exceeding -.33 with state board policy making influence. As for selection methods, there is a positive association between elected board members and their perceived influence. But we think that this is largely, perhaps entirely, attributable to fact that all four or our elected state boards appoint their CSSO, a power that is lacking for three of the five appointed state boards.

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*The socioeconomic and political variables are discussed in Appendix B.

With an N of 10 we obviously cannot go very far in trying to sort out the relative importance of the four variables that correlate most strongly with policy-making influence. Still, some statistical assessment is possible. In the first place, the absence of sizable socioeconomic or political correlates allows us to examine the relationships for the 10 state boards among resources, expectations, and influence with some confidence that environmental characteristics of their states are not confounding the results. Second, inspection of a correlation matrix involving just the four variables of interest disclosed that legal authority is only weakly related to the other three measures, measures that in turn tend to be strongly associated with each other. This suggests that legal authority and at least one of the remaining variables are additive in their effects on policy-making influence. Indeed, we found that by using as the base variable whether or not the state board appoints the CSSO, and by adding in each state board's score on one or more of the other variables, r_s values in the neighborhood of .80 could be obtained.

Finally, we went beyond simple correlation analysis and used partial correlations to estimate what would happen to the relationship between each of the four variables and policy-making influence if the other three variables were held constant. If, for example, legal authority is actually mediated by the time boards spend on non-routine matters or by member expectations for the role of the CSSO, then the partial correlation coefficient between authority and influence, with either of the other variables controlled, should be quite small. As can be seen from the partial rank coefficients (Kendall tau) in Table 2-28, this does not happen for legal authority, emphasis on non-routine matters, or role conception for the CSSO. But the remaining variable--perceived utility of SDE information--does not, however, survive the "controls" quite as well, raising doubts about its having much independent impact on the policy-making influence of state boards.

TABLE 2-28

PARTIAL CORRELATIONS FOR STATE BOARDS AMONG SELECTED INFLUENCE, RESOURCE, AND EXPECTATION VARIABLES

Relationship	Kendall Partial Rank Correlation Coefficient*
Legal Authority (x) Policy-Making Influence (tau=.47)	
SBE Non-Routine Emphasis held constant	.40
SBE Role Conception for CSSO held constant	.42
Utility of SDE Information held constant	.43
SBE Non-Routine Emphasis (x) Policy-Making Influence (tau=.51)	
Legal Authority held constant	.46
SBE Role Conception for CSSO held constant	.45
Utility of SDE Information held constant	.39
SBE Role Conception for CSSO (x) Policy-Making Influence (tau=-.41)	
Legal Authority held constant	-.34
SBE Non-Routine Emphasis held constant	-.32
Utility of SDE Information held constant	-.31
Utility of SDE Information (x) Policy-Making Influence (tau=.36)	
Legal Authority held constant	.29
SBE Non-Routine Emphasis held constant	.11
SBE Role Conception for CSSO held constant	.22

*Since rho cannot be employed to obtain a partial correlation coefficient, another rank correlation statistic, Kendall tau, had to be used for this analysis. For formulas and interpretation see Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), pp. 223-229.

Concluding Observations

The findings pertaining to the policy-making influence, resources, and expectations of the 10 state boards we studied are reviewed at the end of each of the preceding sections and they will not be restated here. Instead, our conclusions are organized in relation to three general observations about state boards: (1) they tend to be minor participants in establishing state education policy; (2) many of their members, at least in a few states, are concerned about and striving to enhance board influence; and (3) strengthening the state board relative to other actors looks to be possible, but the constraints on these institutions are many and serious.

Based on questionnaire data on the self-role expectations of board members, data gathered in the late 1960s, Sroufe inferred that "state boards of education, rhetoric to the contrary, have little capability as actors in the education policy system of the state."[32] Judging from the perceptions of our respondents in state legislatures, governors' offices, and educational interest groups--as well as from the evidence contained in our individual case studies--we would have to concur with this assessment for most state boards in our sample. Their policy-making role in the legislative arena was marginal. And these boards were so overshadowed by the CSSO in the agency arena as to raise doubt about what policy-making functions, if any, they performed beyond the one (i.e., formal enactment) that was legally required.

To be sure, there were some exceptions--for instance, the involvement by the Texas State Board of Education in the school finance issue and by the Minnesota State Board of Education in attempting to effect a desegregation policy. Furthermore, the perceptions of our board member respondents toward their policy-making role were generally much more positive than those of the other actors. Board officials were more likely to see channels of communications and influence with the legislature, as well as with the governor's office; and they were more likely to consider the CSSO and the state department as being basically implementers of state board directives. Such perceptions are not to be discounted. Still, we think that our data, on balance, point unmistakably to the weakness, rather than the strength, of state boards of education as policy-making participants.

While board members are unlikely to agree with our assessment, some of these officials in the states we studied did express the belief that "in the past" their board had been too passive, and that they wanted it to take a more anticipatory and aggressive posture. This kind of thinking appeared to be most prevalent in Texas, Minnesota, and Colorado, but the same sentiment was voiced in other states as well. In Texas the push for a more vigorous role coincided with the reapportionment in 1972 of the State Board and the opportunity for involvement afforded by the Rodriguez decision. As for the Minnesota State Board, its efforts, especially in the desegregation area, caused one observer to remark: "In 1967 people were talking about abolishing the State Board because it didn't do anything; by the 1970s the talk was about abolishing the State Board because it was doing too much." Several of our respondents from the Colorado State Board of Education said that they were seeking a more active role, including individual lobbying, in the legislative arena. And in 1973 the Colorado State Board presented, for the first time, its platform to the General Assembly.

What does the EGP research have to say to board members who are concerned about and seeking to enhance the policy-making influence of these institutions? Our analysis of state-by-state variations in this influence suggests several steps that might be taken. One that appears to be necessary, though hardly sufficient, is for the state board to have the power to select and to remove the CSSO. The three state boards in our sample that lack this authority are all near the bottom on the different rankings of policy-making influence.

A second step is for the state board to organize its time so that policy concerns, not routine financial and procedural items, receive emphasis. The experience of the state boards in New York and Texas, both large boards it might be noted, indicates that a well-developed committee system may contribute toward this end, as well as providing some subject matter specialization and expertise. A third step is for the state board to insist that useful information on policy issues and alternatives be furnished by the state department of education. The question here is whether this can be done effectively through existing authority relationships (e.g., by the board requesting such information from the CSSO and if met by repeated inadequate performance by replacement of the chief), or whether it requires that a board have a small staff of independent assistants. Fourth, the members of the state board should examine their policy role expectations both for themselves and for the CSSO. If the pendulum of power, as our research suggests, has swung a long way toward the CSSO, then board members need to consider how an appropriate balance can be achieved between professional expertise and public control.

Finally, the plenary authority lodged with legislatures and governors to set education policy means that a state board has to be able to influence these lawmakers if it is to have an impact on "who gets what, when and how" with regard to valued school services. To accomplish this, board members cannot just rely, as most did in our sample, on a few formal channels to the legislature and the governor's office, or on the CSSO to carry their program into the legislative arena. Effective points of personal access to legislative leaders and governors need to be forged, and board members need to give attention to how they can convincingly claim to act as the public's spokesmen in these endeavors.

Although the steps outlined above would probably strengthen the state boards, the constraints on these bodies are many and serious. State board members, like others who sit on lay governing boards, serve on a part-time basis, lack expertise, and have limited data sources. In this connection, students of business management have repeatedly pointed to the weakness of corporate boards of directors, and a recent comprehensive survey of local educational decision making bluntly concludes that school board members, legal authority notwithstanding, are "virtually without power" in that process.[33] Moreover, unlike most of their local counterparts, state boards of education have no independent access through taxing authority to monetary resources, and their policy-making capacity is more contingent on the influence and interest of other governmental actors. In California and Massachusetts, for example, the extensive involvement of the legislature in determining public school policy constricts narrowly the role the state board can play. On the other hand, in Texas and New York the legislature has traditionally delegated much school policy making to the education agencies. But even in states such as these, if New York is any test, the rapid politicalization of education is working to curtail the scope of agency prerogatives.[34]

Perhaps, when all is said and done, state boards of education should not seek a highly active policy-making role, particularly in the legislative arena, and should devote their energies more to the performance of other governmental functions. We did not examine the participation by state boards in functional areas other than policy-making, and it could be that another study would find that they are effective in performing them. But if the rationale for a state board is predicated on its policy-making involvement then our research gives cause for concern.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER II

[1] E. Dean Coon, "Judicial Functions of State Boards of Education" (Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Denver, December, 1973), p. 27.

[2] Robert F. Will, State Education, Structure and Organization (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 12.

[3] Lerue W. Winget, et. al., "State Departments of Education Within State Governments," Edgar Fuller and Jim B. Pearson (eds.), Education in the States (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1969), II, pp. 77-78.

[4] Sam P. Harris, State Departments of Education, State Boards of Education, and Chief State School Officers (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 69-74.

[5] Ibid., pp. 60-61.

[6] Dean M. Schweickhard (ed.),"The Role and Policymaking Activities of State Boards of Education" (A Special Study Project Report to the U. S. Office of Education, St. Paul, Minnesota, September, 1967), pp. 47-66.

[7] Harris, State Departments of Education..., p. 57.

[8] Gerald Sroufe, "State School Board Members and Educational Policy," Administrator's Notebook, XIX, No. 2 (October, 1970), p. 1.

[9] The relative merits of the two approaches are thoughtfully discussed in Terry N. Clark (ed.), Community Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative Analyses (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler, 1968), pp. 72-81.

[10] Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, The Political Web of American Schools (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), pp. 114-115.

[11] An analysis of a school finance decision process is contained in the issues section of each of our 12 case study reports.

[12] Harmon Zeigler, "Creating Responsive Schools," The Urban Review Vol. 6, No. 4 (1973), p. 41.

[13] Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1941), pp. 589-591. Also see on "Cuing", Harry L. Summerfield, "Cuing and the Open System of Educational Politics," Education and Urban Society (August, 1971), pp. 425-439.

[14] Again, analyses of these decision processes are found in the issues section of each of our 12 case study reports.

[15] The utility of such highly judgmental measures in the investigation of social phenomena is demonstrated by such diverse studies as Robert L. Crain, The Politics of School Desegregation (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books), 1969, and Ted Robert Gurr and Muriel McClelland, Political Performance: A Twelve-Nation Study (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971).

[16] Texas Education Code, 11.24; Constitution of the State of Michigan, Art 8, Sec. 3; Nebraska School Laws, 79-321 (Amended 1971).

[17] Article II of the New York Constitution provides for the Board of Regents.

[18] Gary Branson, "Constitutional and Statutory Provisions for State Boards of Education and Chief State School Officers" (Unpublished EGP paper, 1973), p. 2.

[19] Stephen K. Bailey, et al., Schoolmen and Politics (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1962), p. 27.

[20] Laurence Iannaccone, Politics in Education (New York: Center for Applied Research, 1967), p. 61.

[21] Sroufe, "State School Board Members and Education Policy," pp. 2-3.

[22] On the relationship between conflict and policy control, see particularly Herbert Simon, et al., "Dividing the Work: Specialization Among Organization Units," Edward V. Schneier (ed.), Policy-Making In American Government (New York: Basic Books, 1969), pp. 218-221.

[23] See the discussion of "reputation as a resource" in William A. Gamson, "Reputation and Resources in Community Politics," in Clark (ed.), Community Structure and Decision Making, pp. 336-337.

[24] Data on the representativeness of state boards of education are presented in our companion report, State Governance Models for the Public Schools (Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, August, 1974), Chapter II.

[25] This point is particularly stressed by Gerald Sroufe. See his article on "State School Board Members and the State Education Policy System," Planning and Changing (April, 1971), pp. 16-17.

[26] "Sense of political efficacy" was originally conceptualized in 1952 by the Survey Research Center. See the discussion in Heinz Eulau, Micro-Macro Political Analysis (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), pp. 170-172.

[27] Self-role expectations are central to Sroufe's analysis in his "State School Board Members and the State Education Policy System," pp. 15-23.

[28] These questions were largely adapted from a set used in the mid-1960s with city councilmen in the San Francisco Bay Region. It might be noted that the city councilmen, generally speaking, tended to restrict the appropriate policy activities of the manager to those of adviser and rejected his claim to broader community leadership. See Ronald O. Loveridge, "The City Manager in Legislative Politics: A Collision of Role Conceptions" (Unpublished paper delivered at the 1967 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, March 16-18, 1967.

[29] Sroufe, "State School Board Members and the State Education Policy System." Also see Edwin M. Bridges, "Elected Versus Appointed Boards: The Arguments and Evidence." (Unpublished paper, University of Chicago, n.d.).

[30] The interpretation of Ø (phi) is from William L. Hays, Basic Statistics (Belmont, California: Brooks/Cole, 1967), p. 95. The formula used is

$$\text{phi} = \frac{ac \text{ [illegible] } bd}{\sqrt{(a+b)(c+d)(b+c)(a+d)}}$$

for the four-cell table

b	a
c	d

. See Jum C. Nunnally, Psychometric Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 119.

[31] The formula for the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is

$$r_s = 1 - \frac{6 \sum d^2}{N(N^2-1)}$$

. Nunnaliy, Psychometric Theory, p. 121. All the correlations are computed using the Spearman rho formula under the assumption that only an ordinal level of measurement can be claimed for most of our variables.

[32] Sroufe, "State School Board Members and the State Education Policy System," p. 23.

[33] Summary statement by Max Abott introducing a symposium on local educational decision-making, Annual meeting of AERA, March 1, 1973. Some of the findings of the national survey are reported in Harmon Zeigler, "Creating Responsive Schools," The Urban Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1973), pp. 38-44. On corporate boards of directors, see "Needed: An Effective Board" in Peter F. Drucker, Management (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), Chapter 52.

[34] Edward R. Hines, State Policy Making for the Public School of New York (Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, January, 1974), pp. 89-119.

CHAPTER III

THE CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICER AS A POLICY ACTOR

Roald F. Campbell

Every state has established by law a chief state school officer. These officials are designated superintendents of public instruction, commissioners of education, or by some similar title. New York, in 1812, was the first state to provide for such a position. Some years later the office was abolished and was re-established in 1854 and has remained, with some modifications, since that date. Michigan provided for a state superintendent in 1836 and Kentucky and Massachusetts in 1837.[1] In all three cases the position has been retained on a continuous basis but with some modifications in duties and titles. Other states followed the example set by these leaders and established a comparable office. At present the position is authorized by constitutional provision in 35 states, by statutory enactment in the remaining 15.[2]

In most states the chief state school officer (CSSO) serves as the executive officer of the state board of education, as the head of the state department of education, and as the chief administrative officer of the state for executing the laws and regulations of the state pertaining to education. While many of his functions are administrative in nature, the CSSO also becomes an actor in the process by which policies for education are made. It is with the policy-making role of the CSSO that we are concerned here. Our decision to deal with the policy-making role of the CSSO should in no way be interpreted as denigrating the importance of the implementation or management functions of the office. It simply means that in a study of state governance for education we concluded that it was most useful to begin with policy decisions and to determine who the major actors were and how they proceeded to influence those decisions.

We have given some attention to the CSSOs in all 50 states. Most of our data, however, have been collected on CSSOs in 12 states and this analysis will focus on those states. There is no way of saying that these 12 states are a true sample of the 50 states but in many respects the variables found in the 50 states are also found in the 12. For instance, methods of selecting CSSOs are shown in Table 3-1. In the United States 19 CSSOs are elected, in our study four such officers were included; 26 CSSOs are appointed by state boards of education, our study included seven; and five CSSOs are appointed by the governor, our study included one.

TABLE 3-1

METHODS OF SELECTING CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS IN THE U.S., 1972

Method	All States	States in Study
Elected	19[a]	4[b]
Appointed by State Board	26	7
Appointed by Governor	5	1

[a] 13 partisan, 6 nonpartisan
[b] 2 partisan, 2 nonpartisan

SOURCE: Sam P. Harris, State Departments of Education, State Boards of Education, and Chief State School Officers.

In this chapter we are concerned with two major questions: (1) What is the policy-making influence of the CSSO? (2) What factors or conditions help explain that influence? In the course of approaching these two questions we shall deal first with who the CSSOs are; second, note the policy-making resources available to them; third, report the policy-making influence they are perceived as exercising; fourth, turn to factors that help explain the differential influence among CSSOs; and finally, we shall draw whatever conclusions the analyses seem to warrant. We emphasize again that the study was done in selected states and that it covered the time period 1972 and early 1973.

Who Are the CSSOs?

In describing CSSOs we shall look at a number of their personal characteristics including their educational backgrounds, recruitment routes, and salary levels. Our identification in each case is by state, not by the person who was in office in 1972-1973. It should also be noted that in a number of states the incumbent has changed since our data were collected.

Personal Characteristics

The age, sex, and ethnicity of CSSOs are shown in Table 3-2. All 12 incumbents at the time of our study were male, 10 were white and two were black. By way of age the youngest was 41 and the oldest 68. Average age

TABLE 3-2

CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS BY AGE, SEX, AND ETHNICITY

		Sex		Ethnicity		
States	Age	M	F	White	Black	Other
Elected						
California	55	1	0	0	1	0
Florida	57	1	0	1	0	0
Georgia	51	1	0	1	0	0
Wisconsin	64	1	0	1	0	0
Average	56.8					
Appointed						
Colorado	54	1	0	1	0	0
Massachusetts	61	1	0	1	0	0
Michigan	41	1	0	0	1	0
Minnesota	46	1	0	1	0	0
Nebraska	63	1	0	1	0	0
New York	58	1	0	1	0	0
Tennessee[a]	64	1	0	1	0	0
Texas	68	1	0	1	0	0
Average	56.9					
Total - Average	56.8	12	0	10	2	0

---

[a] Tennessee is included among appointive CSSOs even though appointment is by the Governor.

for the entire group was 56.8 years and there was no appreciable difference in age between the elected and the appointed officials. One black was in the elected group and one in the appointed group. It should be noted that these are the only blacks among all 50 CSSOs. When our study began only Montana had a female CSSO, more recently, Wisconsin elected a woman to that office. Thus, two of the 50 CSSOs are now female.

Officials of many kinds have frequently been examined in terms of their local or cosmopolitan orientations.[3] This appeared to be a useful dimension upon which to examine CSSOs. In this case, however, we used in-state versus out-of-state data to establish the dimension. As can be noted in Table 3-3 six of the 12 CSSOs were born in the state in which they later served as CSSO. Seven received their K-12 schooling in the same state,

TABLE 3-3

IN-STATE IDENTIFICATION OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS, N=12

State	Birth	K-12 Schooling	Undergraduate	Graduate	Only Permanent Address	Position Prior to CSSO	In-State Score
Elected							
Cal.	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Fla.	0	1	1	1	0	1	4
Ga.	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Wis.	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Per Cent	50	75	75	75	50	100	
Appointed							
Col.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mass.	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Mich.	0	0	1	1	0	1	3
Minn.	1	1	1	0	0	1	4
Neb.	1	1	1	0	1	1	5
N.Y.	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Tenn.	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Texas	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Per Cent	50	50	63	38	38	88	
Total	6	7	8	6	5	11	
Per Cent	50	58	67	50	42	92	

eight did their undergraduate programs in the same state, six did their graduate programs in the same state, for five their only permanent address was in the same state, and in 11 of the 12 cases they held a position in the same state immediately before becoming the CSSO.

By counting one point for each in-state identification across these six characteristics, a total in-state score has been developed for each CSSO. If scores of 4, 5, and 6 are thought to depict "local" and scores of 1, 2, and 3 "cosmopolitan," it is clear that most, 7 of 12, CSSOs are local or instate products. In the case of elected CSSOs three of the four are local, while in the appointed group four of eight are local. Thus, in the matter of in-state identification there appears to be a real difference between elected and appointed CSSOs, a finding which should come as no surprise.

Frequently, the literature on state education agencies alludes to the rural identification of personnel in these agencies.[4] In Table 3-4 the rural identification of CSSOs, as determined by the location of their K-12 schooling and their prior job experience, is shown. Half of the CSSOs received their K-12 schooling in rural communities and seven of the 12 had prior job experience in rural schools. By combining the presence of rural identification on these factors a rural score has been established for each CSSO.

These scores may be divided into three categories: 2 for rural, 1 for part rural, and 0 for nonrural or urban. As a group CSSOs do appear to represent a rural background, perhaps more so than might be expected in an urban society. Here again, there appears to be a real difference between elected and appointed CSSOs, with all elected CSSOs rural or part rural and only half of the appointed CSSOs rural or part rural.

TABLE 3-4

RURAL IDENTIFICATION OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS, N=12

State	K-12 Schooling	Prior Job Experience	Rural Score
Elected			
California	0	1	1
Florida	1	0	1
Georgia	1	1	2
Wisconsin	1	1	2
Per Cent	75	75	
Appointed			
Colorado	0	0	0
Massachusetts	0	1	1
Michigan	0	0	0
Minnesota	1	1	2
Nebraska	0	0	0
New York	0	0	0
Tennessee	1	1	2
Texas	1	1	2
Per Cent	37	50	
Total	6	7	
Per Cent	50	58	

Recruitment and Salary

In any study of an occupational group recruitment routes to the occupation are matters of interest. Such routes for CSSOs are reflected in Table 3-5. It will be noted that nine of the 12 incumbents had been public school teachers, seven had been public school principals, four had served as subordinate administrators in a school district central office, eight had been public school superintendents, and four had served in some capacity in higher education. Obviously, some of the incumbents had served in several of these positions prior to becoming members of state departments of education. Two had served in nonpublic school positions: one in a civil rights agency, and one in a business firm. However, both of these

CSSOs had also been teachers and principals in the public schools as part of their early experience. Recent attempts to recruit administrative talent from such fields as business, law, and public administration to serve in top administrative posts in education were not reflected in the recruitment patterns of the 12 CSSOs in this study.

TABLE 3-5

EDUCATIONAL POSITIONS HELD BY CSSO PRIOR TO APPOINTMENT TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, N=12

	Public School Teacher	Public School Principal	Central Office Administrator	Public School Superintendent	Higher Education	Other
Elected						
California	1	1	0	0	0	1
Florida	0	0	0	1	0	0
Georgia	1	0	0	1	0	0
Wisconsin	1	1	0	1	0	0
Total	3	2	0	3	0	1
Per Cent	75	50	0	75	0	25
Appointed						
Colorado	1	1	1	1	1	1
Massachusetts	1	1	0	1	0	0
Michigan	1	0	0	0	1	0
Minnesota	1	1	0	1	0	0
Nebraska	0	0	1	0	0	0
New York	0	0	0	0	1	0
Tennessee	1	1	1	1	1	0
Texas	1	1	1	1	0	0
Total	6	5	4	5	4	1
Per Cent	75	63	50	63	50	13
Total	9	7	4	8	4	2
Per Cent	75	58	33	67	33	14

Consideration was also given to the positions held by CSSOs immediately prior to their selection as chiefs. In seven cases (California, Georgia, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, and New York) the CSSO was recruited from the staff of the state department of education. In five cases the chief was recruited from outside that staff. In Florida the Governor reportedly encouraged the candidate to run for the office. In Colorado, Minnesota, and Texas the state boards of education sought persons for the office outside the state department of education. In Colorado a businessman but former district school superintendent outside the state was selected; in Minnesota and Texas district superintendents within the state were selected. In Tennessee the Governor made the selection and he, too, chose a district superintendent from the state. Practices followed in these 12 states suggest two main routes to the office of the CSSO; the public school superintendency or service in the state department of education or some combination of both.

These patterns of recruitment deserve some additional examination. When Carlson did his study of district superintendents he was able to categorize them as place-bound or insiders and career-bound or outsiders.[5] Insiders, said Carlson, were usually selected when the board was relatively satisfied with the operation of the district, and under these conditions insiders had difficulty in persuading the board to make changes. Conversely, outsiders were usually selected when the board was not satisfied with the status of things, and outsiders thus had a greater opportunity to effect changes in the school system. At the time of the selection of the 12 CSSOs under consideration here, seven were true insiders and four others were insiders in the sense of holding a district superintendency in the same state. In only one case was the new CSSO secured from beyond the state boundaries. Following Carlson, it appears that even in those states where the selection was made by boards and governors, that they were so satisfied with the operation of the state education agencies that they felt no need to look beyond state boundaries.

As to constraints, CSSOs reported a number of factors that affected their recruitment to their present positions, as summarized in Table 3-6. A requirement that a CSSO be a resident of the state pertained in five cases, an educational experience requirement of some nature was stipulated in six cases, an educational preparation requirement was established in eight cases, and endorsement of a political party was required in three cases. In some instances these requirements were established by the constitution of the state, in other cases by state statutes, and in still other cases by state board regulation. It should be noted that constraints of any kind limit the pool of potential candidates for any office.

Again, there are differences between the elected and appointed CSSOs. Four of the five states with a residency requirement are those with elected CSSOs. On the other hand, stipulation of a particular type of educational experience is much more prevalent among the states with appointed CSSOs. Required educational preparation does not seem to differ much among the two groups; the stipulation pertains in three of the four elected CSSOs and in five of eight of the appointed CSSOs. Only in Florida and Georgia in the elected group and Tennessee in the appointed group require endorsement or support of a political party. In Tennessee it is well to note again that the appointment is by the Governor which may help explain the party affiliation.

Salary levels also appear to be a factor in recruiting persons to a position. In Table 3-7 the salaries of CSSOs are shown. The 1972 salaries

TABLE 3-6

FACTORS REPORTED BY CSSO THAT AFFECTED RECRUITMENT TO THEIR POSITIONS, N=12

	State Residency Requirement	Educational Experience Requirement	Educational Preparation	Political Party Endorsement
Elected				
California	1	0	0	0
Florida	1	0	1	1
Georgia	1	1	1	1
Wisconsin	1	0	1	0
Total	4	1	3	2
Per Cent	100	25	75	50
Appointed				
Colorado	0	1	1	0
Massachusetts	0	1	1	0
Michigan	0	0	0	0
Minnesota	0	1	1	0
Nebraska	0	1	1	0
New York	0	0	0	0
Tennessee	0	0	0	1
Texas	1	1	1	0
Total	1	5	5	1
Per Cent	13	63	63	13
Total	5	6	8	3
Per Cent	42	50	67	25

ranged from $21,000 to over $51,000 per year. One is struck with such a wide range in salaries. The average for the elected CSSOs was about $3,000 below the average for the appointed CSSOs but this difference is due almost entirely to the high salary paid in New York.

TABLE 3-7

SALARIES OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS, 1972, N=12

States	Salaries
Elected	
California	$35,000
Florida	36,000
Georgia	28,000
Wisconsin	21,000
Average	30,000
Appointed	
Colorado	35,000
Massachusetts	30,000
Michigan	39,550
Minnesota	29,400
Nebraska	21,900
New York	51,275
Tennessee	25,000
Texas	31,500
Average	32,953
Total Average	31,969

SOURCE: Sam P. Harris, State Departments of Education, State Boards of Education and Chief State School Officers.

While we have no way of knowing just how much CSSOs should be paid, one useful comparison can be made. In a comprehensive study of district school superintendents, Knezevich[6] collected salary data for 1969-70. Those data for school districts with large pupil enrollments are summarized in Table 3-8. Since the data on district superintendents were collected two years earlier than the data on CSSOs, estimated median salaries for district superintendents for 1971-72 have been adjusted by increasing them by 10 per cent over those of 1969-70. If we assume that the average salary for CSSOs ought to be at least comparable to district superintendents in the 112 larger districts of the country, we might use $33,000 as a yard stick. By applying such a yard stick it will be noted that five of the CSSOs, two elected and three appointed, are paid salaries equal to or above that figure.

On the other hand, seven CSSOs, two elected and five appointed, are paid salaries below that figure. Salaries in Wisconsin and Nebraska seem to be much out of line.

TABLE 3-8

MEDIAN SALARIES PAID DISTRICT SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS BY PUPIL ENROLLMENT CATEGORIES IN 1969-70 AND WITH ESTIMATED INCREASES FOR 1971-72

Enrollments	Number of Districts	Median Salaries for 1969-70	Adjusted Salaries for 1971-72
100,000 and above	19	$35,000	$38,500
50,000 to 99,999	26	30,250	33,275
25,000 to 49,999	67	29,465	32,411
Total	112	30,000	33,000

SOURCE: Stephen J. Knezevich (Ed.), The American School Superintendency, p. 38.

We are aware of the fact that the Wisconsin legislature has recently approved a salary of $25,000 for the CSSO, a figure that still seems very modest.

Summary

In summary, we can now look at some of the personal and professional characteristics of the CSSOs found in the 12 states included in this study. As to personal characteristics they were all male, and 10 were white and two were black. In these personal characteristics no appreciable differences were found between elected and appointed chiefs.

In terms of professional characteristics the CSSOs most frequently had in-state and rural orientations. On both of these measures the appointed CSSOs were not as often in-state nor as rural as the elected CSSOs. By way of recruitment, the route to the office was clearly through teaching and administration in the public schools and frequently an appointment in the state department of education. Eight of the 12 CSSOs had at one time been district superintendents and seven of the 12 held a position in the state department of education immediately prior to being selected as CSSO. There were a few constraints to holding the office. Elected CSSOs were required in every case to be residents of the state. Appointed CSSOs were frequently confronted with a legal stipulation regarding prior experience in public school work. Salaries on the whole were below those paid superintendents in populous school districts in the United States.

Resources of the CSSO

As one aspect of the consideration of the influence of CSSOs we shall give some attention to the resources these officials have at their command. Among those resources are the formal power of the office of the CSSO, his capacity to attract staff, the freedom he has to select and discharge members of his own team, and the perceptions held about the information generated by his office.

Formal Power of Office

In Table 3-9 a number of characteristics are shown which, taken together, would seem to represent the formal power of the office of the CSSO. Thus, we have assumed that if the office has constitutional status it is potentially more powerful than if it does not. We have also assumed that if the CSSO is a member of the state board of education his potential influence is increased, that if he is the chairman or the executive officer of the board his potential influence is further enhanced, and that if he is required to report to the governor and/or the legislature his formal powers are even greater. Only in the case of New York has the Commissioner been given quasi-judicial powers, a condition which seems to represent an addition to formal power. We have also ascribed more power to the office if the CSSO serves under a term contract or can be re-elected than if he simply serves at the pleasure of the board. We recognize that the formal power of office is only one side of the picture. Actually, as is well recognized in the administrative literature,[7] the full power of any official leader is some kind of combination of vested and entrusted authority. Vested authority springs from the nature of the office, and entrusted authority springs from the esteem and respect the subordinates in an organization have for the official leader. The fact remains that an office does represent some potential for power.

We have given a weight to each of the items enumerated in Table 3-9 and this permits us to arrive at a formal power score for each chief. It will be noted that elected chiefs on the average have more formal power than do their appointed counterparts. The two exceptions to this seem to be the cases of Michigan and New York where, in one case, the increase in formal powers are primarily due to the fact that the chief is, by law, not only a member of the state board of education, but its chairman, and in the other case the provision that the chief exercise quasi-judicial power. In the case of Wisconsin, we have ascribed the power of board chairman to the CSSO since he is obviously the top education official in the state and there is no state board of education.

Attract Personnel

We turn now to another potential resource of CSSOs; their capacity to attract and hold personnel. We have used two indexes, level of training and level of salary, as evidence of this capacity. We recognize that neither index is a perfect measure. Persons with advanced degrees are not always competent to perform specialized tasks nor are relatively high salaries a guarantee that more expertise is being purchased. Yet, if one turns the

TABLE 3-9

FORMAL POWERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CSSO, N=12

States	Constitutional Officer Yes = 1; No = 0	Ex-Officio Member of Board Yes = 1; No = 0	Adm. Officer of Bd. Chairman = 2 Ex. Officer = 1 Secretary = 0	Required to Report to Governor and/or Legislature Yes = 1; No = 0	Quasi-Judicial Power Yes = 2; No = 0	Tenure Indef. = 1 At Pleasure = 0	Formal Power Score
Elected							
California	1	0	1	1	0	1	4
Florida	1	1	1	0	0	1	4
Georgia	1	0	1	1	0	1	4
Wisconsin	1	0[a]	2[b]	0	0	1	4
Average							4
Appointed							
Colorado	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Massachusetts	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Michigan	1	1	2	1	0	0	5
Minnesota	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
Nebraska	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
New York	1	0	1	0	2	0	4
Tennessee	0	1	2	0	0	0	3
Texas	0	0	1	1	0	1	3
Average							2.6

[a] No state board.
[b] Power of chairman.

SOURCE: Sam P. Harris, State Departments of Education, State Boards of Education, and Chief State School Officers.

matter around it seems that CSSOs would indeed be handicapped if they were unable to attract persons with advanced training and unable to pay attractive salaries.

In Table 3-10 we have shown the number and per cent of top staff (CSSO, associate or assistant CSSOs, and directors) in state departments of education with doctoral degrees. We have also shown the number and per cent of top personnel in each SDE with salaries of $25,000 or more per year.

TABLE 3-10

PER CENT OF TOP STAFF OF CSSOs WITH THE DOCTORATE AND WITH SALARIES OF $25,000 OR MORE, N=12

States	Number of Responses from Top Staff[a]	With Doctorate	With Salary of 25,000 or More	Staff Attraction Score
Elected				
California	22	41	50	91
Florida	16	25	75	100
Georgia	14	43	22	65
Wisconsin	18	33	17	50
Average		35	41	76
Appointed				
Colorado	14	21	7	28
Massachusetts	19	42	37	79
Michigan	14	57	86	143
Minnesota	13	23	31	54
Nebraska	16	19	0	19
New York	33	70	88	158
Tennessee	18	22	0	22
Texas	15	33	7	40
Average		36	32	68

[a] Top staff included the CSSO, the associate and assistant CSSOs, and directors of major programs. In states with large Departments a 30 per cent sampling of directors was used.

We have combined the two percentage columns to represent a staff attraction score. In these terms the states of New York, Michigan, Florida, and California rank high, while the states of Nebraska, Tennessee, and Colorado rank low. The differences between elected and appointed CSSOs are not great.

Form Own Team

Another aspect of resources available to the CSSO has to do with his freedom to employ and discharge members of his top staff or to establish his own team. We recognize that there are two answers to this question. One has to do with the formal arrangements for the appointment of top staff and the other has to do with the informal practices which pertain. A part of the Interview Schedule for CSSOs contained the question, "how free are you with regard to civil service provisions to appoint and remove top administrators?" Whatever the answer regarding formal provisions, we probed to obtain the best picture possible of actual practice. Responses to this question have been summarized in Table 3-11. Six of the twelve CSSOs have great freedom to form their own administrative teams, three have some freedom, and three have little freedom in this regard.

Some additional insight into this situation is provided from selected excerpts from the interview protocols. In Michigan where freedom is somewhat limited the CSSO commented, perhaps wrly, "not very free, but there's no difficulty. I kill them off by expecting much hard work." In Wisconsin where civil service regulations are very strict we got the following comment, "He (CSSO) has two positions he can appoint, period." From Minnesota came a similar remark, "Not free at all, everyone in the Department is in civil service." For Tennessee our interviewer recorded what may be an extreme comment, "Since all are patronage appointees they are really very well protected, negating any CSSO power." Except for Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Tennessee, each CSSO would appear to have considerable freedom to set up his own administrative team.

Related to this matter is another response from CSSOs. The question was, "Have there been occasions when you could not get the full support of State Department administrators...?" In this instance 10 of the 12 CSSOs responded "no" and the "yes" response from Michigan was qualified by the remark, "We thresh things out and come to agreement." We, thus, seem to be left with Wisconsin as the only state where the CSSO is seriously constrained both in terms of employment of staff and staff support after

TABLE 3-11

FREEDOM OF CSSO TO APPOINT AND REMOVE TOP ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF, N=12

States	Great 3	Some 2	Little 0	Staff Freedom Score
Elected				
California		1		2
Florida	1			3
Georgia		1		2
Wisconsin			1	0
Average				1.7
Appointed				
Colorado	1			3
Massachusetts	1			3
Michigan		1		2
Minnesota			1	0
Nebraska	1			3
New York	1			3
Tennessee			1	0
Texas	1			3
Average				2.1

employment. It should also be noted that appointed chiefs appear to have more freedom to set up their administrative teams than do elected chiefs.

Information Resources

As heads of their respective state departments of education, CSSOs have established within their organizations a unit of some kind for the purpose of generating information about the schools of the state. The information generated by the office of the CSSO is made available to the state board of education and frequently to legislators and to the governor, and may be used as the data base for policy decisions. The extent to which such information was seen by legislative leaders, governors, and state board members as meeting their needs seemed to be another way of assessing the resources of the CSSO. Thus, on the Interview Schedule for legislative leaders we asked: "In terms of meeting your needs in deciding upon education and school finance bills, how would you rate the information coming to your office from the State Department of Education?" Responses were recorded on the four point scale shown below:

Almost always meets our needs	1
Usually meets our needs	2
Sometimes meets our needs	3
Almost never meets our needs	4

The responses of legislative leaders are shown in Table 3-12. To arrive at a legislative information score we used the percentage of responses above "sometimes." In the case of Georgia this was 100 per cent and we thus ascribed a score of 100 to Georgia. Other high states included Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Texas. States given low information ratings by legislators included California, Massachusetts, New York, and Colorado. Again, it is well to suggest what these low scores may mean. Our data suggest that in three of the four states with low ratings the legislatures have strong staff arrangements and rely on their own people, in large measure, to generate information. In terms of elected and appointed CSSOs, the average information score for the elected chiefs is 74.5 as contrasted with 61 for the appointed chiefs.

We also asked governor's personal staff members to indicate the extent to which information generated by the SDE met their needs. Their responses are shown in Table 3-13. In this case high information scores are ascribed to California, Georgia, Colorado, Nebraska, and Texas. Low scores are ascribed to Florida, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York. Governor's personal staff agree with legislators in terms of high scores only in the case of Georgia. In terms of low scores, there is agreement in the cases of Massachusetts and New York. We thus find more discrepancy than agreement from the two sets of respondents regarding how well SDE

TABLE 3-12

PERCEPTIONS OF LEGISLATIVE LEADERS REGARDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH SDE INFORMATION MET THEIR NEEDS, IN PERCENTAGE

States	Number of Respondents[a]	Almost Always	Usually	Sometimes	Almost Never	Legislative Information Score (Per Cent Above Sometimes
Elected						
California	15	7	40	40	13	47
Florida	8	13	50	37	0	63
Georgia	13	31	69	0	0	100
Wisconsin	17	65	23	6	6	88
Average						74.5
Appointed						
Colorado	11	18	36	18	27	54
Massachusetts	12	0	50	42	8	50
Michigan	16	19	37	37	6	56
Minnesota	14	36	36	14	14	72
Nebraska	6	50	17	17	17	67
New York	17	24	29	18	29	53
Tennessee	11	0	63	36	0	63
Texas	14	0	71	21	7	71
Average						61
Total Average						65.3

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[a] In some states legislative staff members were included among persons interviewed.

information met their needs. It may be that the information needs of governor's offices are different than the needs of legislators and that the SDE efforts were found to be more adequate for one than the other. Or, it may be that the limited number of respondents in some governor's offices provided us with biased perceptions of the situation. In this case the difference between elected and appointed CSSOs was not great but the direction favored the elected chiefs.

TABLE 3-13

PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNOR'S STAFF REGARDING EXTENT TO WHICH SDE INFORMATION MET THEIR NEEDS, IN PERCENTAGE

States	Number of Respondents	Almost Always	Usually	Sometimes	Almost Never	Legislative Information Score (Per Cent Above Sometimes
Elected						
California	1	0	100	0	0	100
Florida	1	0	0	100	0	0
Georgia	1	0	100	0	0	100
Wisconsin	2	0	50	50	0	50
Average						62
Appointed						
Colorado	1	0	100	0	0	100
Massachusetts	4	0	25	25	50	25
Michigan	3	0	33	67	0	33
Minnesota	1	0	0	100	0	0
Nebraska	1	100	0	0	0	100
New York	3	0	33	67	0	33
Tennessee	2	0	50	50	0	50
Texas	3	0	100	0	0	100
Average						55
Total Average						57

We also asked SBE members to assess the extent to which the information provided by the chiefs, and generated by the state departments of education, was useful to them as board members. Responses to this inquiry are shown in Table 3-14. In some contrast to responses from legislators and governors, we are impressed with the strong affirmation of most board members that the information "almost always" or "usually" meets their needs. Information scores for each of the chiefs have been calculated. In three states, Georgia, Colorado, and New York, such scores are 100. In six other states the scores run from 75 to 91. Only in Nebraska with a score of 40 and California with a score of 55 can one sense that SBE members have appreciable reservations about the information with which they are being provided. Average scores for the elected chiefs are somewhat higher than for the appointed chiefs but the difference is not great.

TABLE 3-14

PERCEPTIONS OF SBE MEMBERS REGARDING EXTENT TO WHICH SDE INFORMATION MEETS THEIR NEEDS, IN PERCENTAGE

States	Number of Respondents	Almost Always	Usually	Sometimes	Almost Never	Legislative Information Score (Per Cent Above Sometimes
Elected						
California	9	44	11	33	11	55
Florida	6	33	50	17	0	83
Georgia	7	43	57	0	0	100
Wisconsin[a]	-	-	-	-	-	-
Average						79
Appointed						
Colorado	4	25	75	0	0	100
Massachusetts	8	12	63	25	0	75
Michigan	6	33	50	17	0	83
Minnesota	6	33	50	17	0	83
Nebraska	5	20	20	60	0	40
New York	9	55	45	0	0	100
Tennessee	11	27	64	9	0	91
Average						82
Total Average						81

[a] No state board.

When the responses of board members are compared with those of legislative leaders and governors and governor's staffs who found that SDE information "almost always" or "usually" met their needs we get the figures shown below:

Legislators	65.3
Governor's offices	57.0
SBE members	81.0

Clearly, the information generated by state departments of education was thought to be more useful by board members than by legislative leaders and governors and their staffs.

Summary

In terms of a number of rather discrete elements having to do with resources available to CSSOs, each state varies appreciably. For instance, Michigan is relatively high in formal power of office, capacity to attract staff, freedom of the chief to form his own team, the staff support enjoyed by the chief, and the extent to which SDE information is seen as meeting the needs of state board members. However, Michigan is perceived as ranking low in the extent to which SDE information meets the needs of the governor's staff, and is in the middle range in the extent to which SDE information is seen as meeting the needs of legislative leaders. Even more variation is found in Colorado where perceptions suggest relatively high ranks can be assigned to the freedom of the chief to form his own team, staff support enjoyed by the chief, and the extent to which SDE information meets the needs of state board members. Colorado stands about in the middle with respect to SDE information meeting the needs of the legislative leaders and the governor's office. Colorado ranks low on the formal power of office and the capacity to attract staff. Later, we shall examine the relationships between a number of these variables and the influence of the CSSO.

The Policy-Making Influence of the CSSO

In looking at the policy-making influence of the CSSO, we deal largely with the perceptions various actors in the policy-making process have about the influence of the CSSO. We supplement these perceptions with the case study data available to us. We begin by looking at the self-perceptions of the chiefs, then consider their influence in legislative arena, and last their influence in the state education agency arena.

Self Perceptions of CSSO

The Interview Schedule used with CSSOs contained a section in which ten statements regarding the desirable leadership role of the CSSO in the policy-making process were listed and chiefs were asked to indicate for each statement one of four possible responses: strongly agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, or strongly disagree. Six of those ten statements seemed to be particularly appropriate by way of revealing the self perceptions of the chiefs concerning the desirable leadership role of the office of CSSO. Those six statements are shown below:

1. A State Superintendent (Commissioner) should assume leadership in shaping the policies enacted by the State Board of Education.

2. A State Superintendent (Commissioner) should maintain a neutral stand on education policy issues that are very controversial among the citizens of his state.

3. A State Superintendent (Commissioner) should actively seek to influence legislative leaders with regard to education policies.

5. A State Superintendent (Commissioner) should administer the State Department of Education and leave policy matters to other state officials.

7. A State Superintendent (Commissioner) should take a policy position in which he believes even when most professional educators may be hostile.

8. A State Superintendent (Commissioner) should be the principal advocate of major changes in state education policy.

In Table 3-15 we have shown the responses of the 12 CSSOs to these statements. We have collapsed the two agreement categories into one and the two disagreement categories into one. We have also given each chief a self perceived leadership score. If the chief agreed with items 1, 3, 7, and 8 we gave him a point for each one. If he disagreed with items 2 and 5 we gave him a point for each; this required, as noted in Table 3-15, a reversal in scoring the self perceived leadership role of the chief.

The most notable finding is the almost unanimous self perception of the CSSOs that they as CSSOs should be leading participants in the policy-making process. All chiefs believed that they should assume leadership in shaping the policy positions of the state board of education. All chiefs believed that they should actively seek to influence legislative leaders with respect to educational policy. All chiefs believed that they should be the principal advocate for changes in state policy for education. Clearly, CSSOs hold for themselves a very significant role in the policy-making process. This generalization applies equally to elected and appointed chiefs.

TABLE 3-15

SELF PERCEPTIONS OF CSSO REGARDING THEIR LEADERSHIP ROLE IN POLICY MAKING, N=12

States	Assume Policy Leadership with SBE		Remain Neutral on Controversial Issues (Reverse)		Actively Seek To Influence Legislative Leaders		Administer Dept. and Leave Policy To Others (Reverse)		Take Policy Positions Even If Educators Hostile		Be Principal Advocate of Policy Changes		Self-Perceived Leadership Role Score
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	
Elected													
California	1			1	1			1	1		1		6
Florida	1			1	1		1		1		1		5
Georgia	1			1	1			1	1		1		6
Wisconsin	1			1	1			1	1		1		6
Average													5.8
Appointed													
Colorado	1			1	1		1		1		1		5
Massachusetts	1			1	1			1	1		1		6
Michigan	1			1	1			1	1		1		6
Minnesota	1			1	1			1	1		1		6
Nebraska	1			1	1		1		1		1		5
New York	1			1	1			1	1		1		6
Tennessee	1			1	1			1	1		1		6
Texas	1		1		1		1		1		1		4
Average													5.5

In addition to noting the responses of the chiefs to the general role statements, as discussed above, we turned to the responses of the chiefs to a number of specific items on the Interview Schedule. Item 19 asked, "Are there board members who frequently oppose you on major policy issues?" Three chiefs, as noted in Table 3-16, answered "yes" to this question, eight answered "no," and in Wisconsin with no state board of education the question was not applicable. Item 22 raised the following question: "Have there been occasions when you could not get the full support of State Department administrators for implementing a major policy of yours or the Board's?" To this question two chiefs responded "no" and 10 responded "yes," again noted in Table 3-16. In terms of arriving at a self perceived influence score for the chiefs, responses to items 19 and 22 were scored in reverse and a point given for a "no" response.

We turn now to item 23b which read in part as follows: "Compared to other sources of advice and ideas available to the Governor, how important is the office of the State Superintendent (Commissioner)?" Chiefs were requested to respond on a four-point scale as follows:

Most important single source	1
Among his most important sources	2
A relatively minor source	3
Not at all an important source	4

All responses were either 1 or 2, hence we have shown only two categories in Table 3-16. Five of the 12 chiefs saw their advice and ideas as the most important source to the governor, and the other seven placed their advice and ideas as among the governor's most important sources. In item 24 we asked chiefs to rate their communication with legislative leaders and with committee chairmen in the legislature. In most instances there were eight such persons and we sought a rating of excellent, good, fair, or poor for each one. The rating shown in Table 3-16 is the composite of these ratings. Again there were few "fair" and "poor" ratings, hence only the two categories "excellent" and "good" were required to portray the responses. Overall, five chiefs thought they had "excellent" communication

TABLE 3-16

SELF PERCEPTIONS OF CSSO REGARDING THEIR INFLUENCE
WITH OTHER POLICY ACTORS, N=12

	Board Members Who Frequently Oppose You (Reverse) (19)		Sometimes Lacks Support of Department Administration (Reverse) (22)		Importance of Advice to Governor (23b)		Rate Communication With Legislative Leaders (24c)		Success With Legislative Program (24e)		Cooperation of EIG (28)		Self Perceived Influence Score
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Most	Some	Excellent	Good	Half or More	Less Half	Much	Little	
Elected													
California	0			1		0	1		1		1		4
Florida	0			1	1		1		1		1		5
Georgia		1		1	1		1		1		1		6
Wisconsin[a]			0			0		0		0		0	0
Average													3.8
Appointed													
Colorado		1		1		0		0	1		1		4
Massachusetts		1		1	1			0	1		1		5
Michigan		1	0		1			0		0	1		3
Minnesota		1		1	1		1		1		1		6
Nebraska	0			1		0		0		0		0	1
New York		1		1		0	1		1		1		5
Tennessee		1		1		0		0	1		1		4
Texas		1		1		0		0	1		1		4
Average													4

[a] No board.

with legislative leaders, while seven thought their communication was "good." However, we went beyond communication and in item 24 we asked each chief to indicate how successful his legislative program had been with the legislature. Responses were sought on the five point scale as shown below:

Almost always successful	1
Successful most of the time	2
Successful about half of the time	3
Successful less than half the time...........	4
Almost always unsuccessful	5

Nine of the chiefs gave responses which could be interpreted as about half the time or more and two chiefs indicated success as less than half the time. In the case of Nebraska the question proved difficult since the CSSO noted that, by law, neither he nor the Department of Education could formally sponsor a legislative program. In arriving at a self perceived influence score for the chiefs, we gave a point for "most" under item 23b, a point for "excellent" under item 24c, and a point for "half or more" for item 24e.

In item 28 of the Interview Schedule we asked the chiefs to respond to the question: "When you are seeking support in the legislature for an important proposal, do you usually work closely with the major educational organizations?" In addition to the simple yes-no responses, we probed for the degree of success the chiefs thought they had with these organizations. These comments permitted us to establish the "much" and "little" categories shown in Table 3-16. Ten of the chiefs thought they had received much cooperation from the interest groups and only two felt that cooperation had been little in amount. We attached a score of one to those responses which indicated much cooperation.

By combining the six measures shown in Table 3-16 we were able to arrive at a self perceived influence score for each of the CSSOs. These scores have a wide range, running from zero in Wisconsin to the maximum of six in Georgia and Minnesota. Wisconsin is at some disadvantage in the scoring since they have no state board of education. Even so, the range of scores is of interest and deserves further comment. The range in Table 3-16 contrasts markedly with the lack of range in Table 3-15. This contrast may derive from the fact that the role statements in Table 3-15 deal with what the responsibilities of CSSOs should be and are phrased in general terms. The items in Table 3-16 are not only more specific but they require an assessment of what did happen as contrasted to what should happen. Again, we find very little difference between elected and appointed chiefs. We next turn to what other actors thought the influence of the chief to be.

The Legislative Arena

As we consider the policy making influence of CSSOs in the legislative and state education agency arenas, and particularly as we attempt to place the chiefs in order, such analyses are potentially sensitive. Thus, we wish to be very clear about what we are and are not doing. We reiterate that we are looking at the policy making role of the chief, not at his managerial or implementing role. Our data are derived largely from the perceptions of other actors in the policy system, not from direct observation or some measurement of performance. Moreover, the reference point for the influence of each chief is his own situation and these situations vary greatly. There is no way by which we can deal with how influential chiefs would be in a common situation. Finally, we are not equating influence with good; in our view persons in government can have too much as well as too little influence.

It is clear that many of the policy decisions for public education are made in the legislative arena. Particularly, is this the case with decisions having to do with the financing of education. Frequently, the governor recommends policy positions to the legislature, hence the governor and his office as well as members of the legislature become important participants in what we refer to here as the legislative arena. If the CSSO is to affect policy decisions in the legislative arena, he must influence the governor or the legislature or both. In our interviews in the 12 states we sought judgments from official actors in the legislature and in the governor's office about the influence of the CSSO. We also turned to the leaders of education interest groups as informed observers for their judgments about the influence of CSSOs in the legislative arena. We shall now look at the responses of these persons.

In Table 3-17 we have shown the responses of legislative leaders, and in some cases legislative staff members, to the question of how successful CSSOs have been in getting their legislative programs adopted by the legislature. Responses were recorded on a five point scale similar to the one reported earlier. We might note, for example, the responses from Georgia where the CSSO was apparently very successful in getting his legislative program adopted. Thirteen legislative leaders responded to this question, one person or eight per cent of the respondents indicated "almost always" and 12 persons or 92 per cent of the respondents agreed with "most of the time." In order to arrive at a legislative success score for the chiefs we have used the percentages of responses above "about half the time," in the case of Georgia, 100 per cent, to arrive at a score of 100. In Massachusetts the results were very different. Of the 14 legislative leaders none said "almost always," 7 per cent said "most of the time," 21 per cent said "about half the time," 29 per cent said "less than half the time," and 43 per cent said "almost never." Based on these responses the legislative success score in Massachusetts is 7 as compared to 100 in Georgia.

TABLE 3-17

PERCEPTIONS OF LEGISLATIVE LEADERS OF SUCCESS OF LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMS SPONSORED BY THE CSSO, IN PERCENTAGES

States	Number of Respondents	Almost Always	Most of the Time	About Half the Time	Less Than Half the Time	Almost Never	Legislative Success Score (Per Cent Above Half
Elected							
California	17	12	65	23	0	0	77
Florida	8	25	37	25	0	0	62
Georgia	13	8	92	0	0	0	100
Wisconsin	14	0	50	36	14	0	50
Average							72
Appointed							
Colorado	10	10	10	20	50	10	20
Massachusetts	14	0	7	21	29	3	7
Michigan	15	0	33	53	7	7	33
Minnesota	13	8	54	15	15	8	62
Nebraska	7	14	29	0	29	29	43
New York	20	0	25	40	25	10	25
Tennessee	11	18	82	0	0	0	100
Texas	16	25	69	6	0	0	94
Average							48
Total Average							56

Other CSSOs with high scores included Tennessee, Texas, and California. We should note, however, that the score for Tennessee may be spurious since the CSSO is appointed by the governor and in a sense the chief's legislative program is the governor's program. Other CSSOs with low legislative success scores include Colorado, New York, Michigan. It should be made clear what these legislative success scores represent. Each score is built on the perceptions of the legislators. In some cases, Texas and California for instance, perceptions tend to cluster. In other cases, New York and Nebraska for example, there is much more spread in the perceptions. In cases where there is considerable spread different respondents may be looking at different aspects of the chief's legislative program. It should also be noted that in one state a chief may have an ambitious program and get relatively little of it through the legislature, while in another state the chief may have a less extensive program and get much of it through the legislature. Some of our respondents in Nebraska, for instance, made note of the latter situation by such remarks as "for what little they propose."

There seems to be a significant difference between the legislative success of elected and appointed CSSOs. The average legislative success score for elected CSSOs is 72 as contrasted with an average score for appointed CSSOs of 48. It may be that legislators, who are themselves elected, feel a closer kinship to elected than to appointed chiefs. Or, elected chiefs may have a stronger power base with the voters. Or, it may be that elected chiefs are indeed more skillful in the legislative arena than are their appointed counterparts.

But legislators are not the only observers of how successful CSSOs are in getting their legislative programs enacted. In Table 3-18 we have shown the responses of education interest group leaders to the same question. In this instance high legislative success scores were found for Texas, California, Georgia, and Tennessee. Again, we suspect the result in Tennessee has to be interpreted somewhat differently than in the other states. Low scores were found for Massachusetts, New York, Colorado, and Wisconsin. It seems significant that the interest group leaders ascribed high legislative success scores to the same four states receiving the high scores from the legislative leaders. At the other end of the scale, interest group leaders agreed with legislative leaders in ascribing low legislative success scores to three out of four states placed low by legislators.

TABLE 3-18

PERCEPTIONS OF INTEREST GROUP LEADERS OF SUCCESS OF LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMS SPONSORED BY THE CSSO, IN PERCENTAGE

States	Number of Respon-dents	Almost Always	Most of the Time	About Half the Time	Less Than Half the Time	Almost Never	Legislative Success Score (Per Cent Above Half
Elected							
California	8	0	88	12	0	0	88
Florida	4	75	0	0	0	25	75
Georgia	6	0	83	17	0	0	83
Wisconsin	7	0	29	71	0	0	29
Average							69
Appointed							
Colorado	7	0	14	57	29	0	14
Massachusetts	8	0	0	0	50	50	0
Michigan	10	20	40	30	10	0	60
Minnesota	4	25	50	25	0	0	75
Nebraska	5	0	40	0	0	40	40
New York	7	0	0	71	29	0	0
Tennessee	6	33	50	17	0	0	83
Texas	6	17	83	0	0	0	100
Average							46.5
Total Average							54

Agreement between these two sets of observers also holds with respect to the difference between elected and appointed CSSOs. With the interest group leaders the average legislative success score for the elected chiefs is 69 and for the appointed chiefs 46.5, a difference that seems to have considerable significance.

Our scheme for scoring legislative success may make some CSSOs look like failures. Even zero scores for Massachusetts and New York cannot be so construed. It is entirely possible that when 71 per cent of the interest group leaders in New York indicate that the CSSOs legislative program is successful "about half the time" that the achievement is as high as one could possibly expect. Particularly, does this seem to be the case when one recalls the demographic, economic, and governmental characteristics of the state. Perhaps, even more important, the Governor's office and the legislature have established competent and sophisticated staffs to help them with data collection and analysis. These agencies are clearly in a position to be quite independent of the CSSO and his office, if that be their wish.

We turn next to the perceptions of governors and their staffs about the influence of CSSOs. These data are reported in Table 3-19. One item in the Interview Schedule asked, "Compared to the other sources of advice and ideas, how important is the State Superintendent (Commissioner)?" Responses were recorded on a four point scale similar to the one used above. All responses fell within the 1, 2, 3 range, hence in Table 3-19 only those three categories are shown. Another item in the Interview Schedule asked, "If the State Superintendent (Commissioner) is strongly opposed to an education bill in the legislature, are its chances of passage greatly diminished?" Responses were listed as "yes" or "no" and these are reported in Table 3-19. It will be noted that respondents in three states are limited to one person, a member of the governor's personal staff. In other states more personal staff members were interviewed and in six of the states the governor himself was among the respondents. We made an effort to have at least three to four respondents, including the governor, in each state but our research teams were only partially successful in reaching that number of respondents.

In order to provide for comparisons among states responses are converted to percentages. Thus, in Wisconsin where there were two respondents, one respondent, or 50 per cent, indicated the CSSOs ideas and advice were "among the most important single source" and one respondent, or 50 per cent, indicated that such ideas and advice were "a relatively minor source." As shown in Table 3-19 weights were assigned to these responses and also to the

TABLE 3-19

PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNORS AND THEIR PERSONAL STAFFS REGARDING INFLUENCE OF CSSO, IN PERCENTAGE

States	N	Importance of CSSO Ideas and Advice			Power of CSSO to Stop Legislation		Influence Score (Percentage X Weight ÷ 100
		Most	Among Most	Minor	Yes	No	
		3	2	1	3	0	
Elected							
California	1		100		100		5.0
Florida	1	100			100		6.0
Georgia	2[a]		100		100		5.0
Wisconsin	2		50	50	100		4.5
Average							5.1
Appointed							
Colorado	2[a]		100		50	50	3.50
Massachusetts	4	25		75	75	25	3.75
Michigan	4[a]		100		75	25	4.25
Minnesota	1			100		100	1.00
Nebraska	2[a]		100		50	50	3.50
New York	3		100		67	33	4.00
Tennessee	3[a]	100			67	33	5.00
Texas	4[a]		100		75	25	4.25
Average							3.66

[a] Included the Governor.

responses having to do with the power of the CSSO to stop legislation. An influence score was developed by multiplying the percentages by the weights and dividing by 100. While the spread between high and low influence scores is not as dramatic as in the preceding tables, it still seems worth noting. High influence scores are assigned to CSSOs in Florida, California, Georgia, and Tennessee. Again, the Tennessee situation is atypical. Low influence scores are ascribed to CSSOs in Minnesota, Colorado, Nebraska, and Massachusetts.

Again, in terms of averages, the four elected CSSOs are seen by governors' offices as having more influence than the appointed CSSOs as represented by scores of 5.1 and 3.66 respectively. Since this difference is supported by three independent sets of observers, it must be taken with some seriousness. Perhaps the chief in Colorado had a point when he said, "As an appointed official, I am not really a policy maker, I am a manager." We should note, however, that this remark runs counter to the very strong policy roles all of the chiefs set for themselves as reported earlier.

On the basis of the appraisals made by legislators, interest group leaders, and members of the governor's staff we can deduce something about the overall influence of chiefs in the legislative arena. In Table 3-20 we show the rankings provided by these sets of actors for each of the chiefs. As we attempted to aggregate these rankings, it became apparent that we should also take account of some of the descriptive and analytical statements found in the case studies, thus a brief characterization of that material is also shown in Table 3-20. As noted above, the Tennessee situation is atypical since the Governor appoints the CSSO and the chief has no legislative program separate from the Governor. Since there seemed to be no way of compensating for this condition, we decided to leave Tennessee out of the across-state comparison.

The overall influence rank ascribed to each of the eleven CSSOs in the legislative arena, shown in Table 3-20, is a product of our best judgment as we have assessed the perceptions of a number of actors near the scene and recorded on the Interview Schedule, and as we have considered the interactions of the chief with other actors reported in the case studies. In Texas, Georgia, and California the CSSO appears to have great influence with all three sets of actors and there is abundant confirmatory evidence in the case studies. For Michigan, Florida, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and New York the influence of the chiefs in the legislative arena appears to be

TABLE 3-20

OVERALL INFLUENCE OF THE CSSO IN THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA

States	Rank Legislators	Rank EIG	Rank Governor's Office	From Case Study	Ascribed Overall Rank
Elected					
California	3	2	2.5	Strong with Governor and Legislature	3
Florida	4.5	4.5	1	Has lost some influence with Legislature	5
Georgia	1	3	2.5	Great influence with Legislature; often successful in challenging Governor	2
Wisconsin	6	8	4	Strong deputy CSSO; effective with Governor and Legislature	7
Appointed					
Colorado	10	9	9.5	Growing in stature but too soon to be sure	9
Massachusetts	11	10.5	8	CSSO and SDE weak in total state context	11
Michigan	8	6	5.5	A strong advocate in a complex state	4
Minnesota	4.5	4.5	11	Moderately effective with Legislature and Governor	6
Nebraska	7	7	9.5	Holds line, meager program	10
New York	9	10.5	7	Effective in highly competitive situation	8
Texas	2	1	5.5	Low profile, but trusted in Legislature	1

moderate, sometimes less with one set of actors than with another. In Colorado, Nebraska, and Massachusetts the chiefs have relatively little policy influence in the legislative arena. We shall now look at the other arena in which the CSSO is a policy actor.

The State Education Agency Arena

While the legislature in all of our states is the plenary body for the enactment of policy, in certain education areas policy functions have been delegated to the state education agency. Usually these functions are delegated specifically to the state board of education but in some instances they are lodged with the CSSO and occasionally with the department of education. We use the term state education agency to include all three of these components. It is well to note again that in this study we have looked only at the policy-making functions which obviously command much of the state agency's time and energy. Specifically, we are concerned here with the influence of the CSSO in policy enactments stemming from the agency of which he is a part. In most cases these policy expressions will be formalized by the state board of education. Only Wisconsin of our 12 states does not have a state board of education. While the ex-officio nature of the Florida board makes it somewhat atypical, we shall include it in some of our discussion.

To test the role state board members hold for the CSSO, we asked them to respond to the same role questions we posed for the chiefs. Responses of SBE members are shown in Table 3-21. State board members in every state hold very strong leadership expectations for the CSSO. In four states, Colorado, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Tennessee, 100 per cent of the board members "strongly agree" or "tend to agree" that the CSSO should assume the leadership role in shaping policy proposals coming to the boards. In no state were these leadership expectations expressed by less than 71 per cent of the board members. Indeed, expectations of SBE members for strong leadership on the part of the CSSOs were almost as high as the expectations the chiefs set for themselves. Interestingly, the expectations of board members for appointed chiefs, on the average, were even higher than for elected chiefs, average scores of 92 and 82 respectively, but the most notable finding is the high expectations held for all chiefs.

TABLE 3-21

PERCENTAGE OF SBE MEMBERS WHO CONTEND THAT THE CSSO SHOULD ASSUME LEADERSHIP IN SHAPING POLICIES ENACTED BY THE STATE BOARD

States	N	Strongly Agree	Tend to Agree	Tend to Dis-Agree	Strongly Disagree	Leadership Expectation Score (Per Cent Strongly Agree and Tend to Agree
Elected						
California	8	50	25	25	0	75
Florida	5	80	20	0	0	100
Georgia	7	57	14	14	14	71
Wisconsin[a]	-	-	-	-	-	-
Average						82
Appointed						
Colorado	4	75	25	0	0	100
Massachusetts	8	87	13	0	0	100
Michigan	6	67	17	17	0	84
Minnesota	6	50	33	17	0	83
Nebraska	5	100	0	0	0	100
New York	9	67	22	0	11	89
Tennessee	8	75	25	0	0	100
Texas	10	60	20	20	0	80
Average						92

[a] No state board.

We next attempted to get some appraisal of the leadership style of the CSSO. We asked SBE members, CSSOs, and a state board expert, a person in each state department whose major assignment was to work directly with the state board of education, to describe the approach used by CSSOs in the development of policy proposals for board consideration. In Table 3-22 we have reported responses of board members, chiefs, and board experts to the question of how often chiefs developed a detailed proposal for the entire board to consider. These responses are reported on a four point scale: often, sometimes, rarely, and never. We arrived at what we called a directive score for each chief by simply taking the percentage of board responses under the "often" column. In this sense, chiefs in Colorado, Michigan, and Georgia were seen as most directive. Not only do most board members in these states ascribe such behavior to the chiefs, but the chiefs themselves and the board experts concur with the descriptions. Using the same criteria, chiefs in Tennessee, California, and Florida were found to

TABLE 3-22

PERCEPTIONS OF SBE MEMBERS, THE CSSO, AND THE BOARD EXPERT REGARDING EXTENT TO WHICH CSSO DEVELOPS DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR ENTIRE BOARD, BOARD RESPONSES IN PERCENTAGE, CSSO = C, EXPERT = E

States	N	Often	Some-times	Rarely	Never	Directive Score (% Often)
Elected						
California	8	25E	25C	37	13	25
Florida	3[b]	33C	0	67	0E	33
Georgia	7	71CE	14	14	0	71
Wisconsin[a]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Average						43
Appointed						
Colorado	4	100CE	0	0	0	100
Massachusetts	8	50CE	37	13	0	50
Michigan	6	83CE	17	0	0	83
Minnesota	6	67	16	0C	16E	67
Nebraska	5	60CE	0	20	20	60
New York	8	62CE	25	0	13	62
Tennessee	8	13E	37C	13	0	13
Texas	15	47C	7E	27	13	47
Average						60

[a] No state board.

[b] Three of the Cabinet members did not respond.

be least directive. In these three states there was less agreement among board members, nor was there agreement between chiefs and board experts. In the case of Florida the chief responded "often" and the expert "never," a difference which we find difficult to explain. Chiefs in the other five states appeared to have rather high directive scores, clustered between 67 and 47. In three of these five states both chiefs and board experts concurred with a majority of the board members, while in the other two states there was some dispersion between the responses of the chief and the board expert.

In Chapter II board members responded to another part of the question having to do with the approach used by the CSSOs in preparing a major policy proposal. In this instance, board members indicated the extent to which chiefs took ideas or suggestions from the board members and developed them into a policy proposal. In Table 2-9 of Chapter II it was shown that on the average only 29 per cent of the board members saw chiefs responding "often" in this manner. We thought it would be useful to see how chiefs and board experts responded to the same question and their responses are shown in Table 3-23. In order to provide for ready comparison, we have also superimposed the responses of board members from the previous chapter in Table 3-23. Again, we have used the percentage of board members who indicated "often" as a basis for establishing a score for each of the chiefs, in this case a receptive score.

Whereas chiefs as a group rank high by way of "directive" scores, they rank relatively low by way of "receptive" scores. This seems to be a reasonable outcome since in some ways directive and receptive approaches to the development of policy proposals are at opposite ends of a continuum. The highest receptive scores are ascribed to Nebraska, Minnesota, Michigan, and

New York. We also note that in the case of Nebraska and Michigan both the chief and the board expert tend to agree with the board members. In the case of New York the board members divide between "often" and "sometimes" with the chief agreeing with a majority of the board and the expert with the minority. The receptive scores for Nebraska and New York seem rather logical when compared to the directive scores of these two states, both of which were in the middle range. That kind of agreement does not hold as well for Michigan and Minnesota with high receptive scores and high directive scores.

TABLE 3-23

RESPONSES OF SBE MEMBERS, CSSOS, AND BOARD EXPERTS TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH CHIEFS TAKE IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS FROM BOARD MEMBERS AND DEVELOP THESE INTO POLICY PROPOSALS, SBE IN PERCENTAGE
C = CSSO, E = BOARD EXPERT

States	N	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Receptive Score (% Often)
Elected						
California	7	14	29CE	43	14	14
Florida	4	25	50E	25C	0	25
Georgia	7	29	43CE	29	0	29
Wisconsin[a]	-	--	--	--	--	--
Average						23
Appointed						
Colorado	4	25	75CE	0	0	25
Massachusetts	7	14	86CE	0	0	14
Michigan	6	50CE	50	0	0	50
Minnesota[b]	6	50	50C	0	0	50
Nebraska	5	60CE	40	0	0	60
New York	7	43E	57C	0	0	43
Tennessee	8	13	87CE	0	0	13
Texas	11	18CE	64	0	0	18
Average						34

[a] No state board.

[b] No response from board expert.

At the other end of the scale the lowest receptive scores were for California, Massachusetts, Texas, and Tennessee. Three of these four states were also at the very bottom on the directive dimension. This strange finding obviously needs an explanation. It could be that the two concepts of direction and reception have not been adequately operationalized; in one case bringing a fully developed proposal for board consideration, and in the other case beginning with a consideration of ideas generated by board members themselves. Or, it could be that the two notions are not incompatible; a chief might begin with board generated ideas and then develop a detailed proposal. Or, it could be that our respondents were providing, particularly in the receptive part of the question, "good" answers, those that make their chiefs, whom they hold in great respect, look good. We suspect that all three conditions pertain to some degree.

The difference between the average score for elected chiefs, 23, and the average for appointed, 34, seems to suggest that the appointed chiefs begin more frequently with board ideas than do their elected counterparts. As one compares Tables 3-22 and 3-23 it also seems clear that CSSOs on the whole are much more prone to bring in policy proposals than to solicit them.

To this point, we find the chiefs are lords in their own manors; SBE members expect them to exert strong leadership on policy issues, information generated by the state departments at the behest of the chiefs is highly valued by board members, and most chiefs most of the time formulate their policy proposals in detail and bring them to their boards for legitimation. While we now have some feel for the milieu in which the chief works, we are still not quite certain just how influential he is in that milieu. We thus turned to another part of the Interview Schedule where state board members were asked to rank the importance of a number of actors in providing perspective on state education policy issues. As noted in Chapter II, CSSOs were most frequently cited as important actors. For our purpose here, we have shown in Table 3-24, the importance ascribed to CSSOs by state board members in each state. In spite of the fact that chiefs are relatively important in providing understanding to SBE members in all states, there is some differentiation among the states. Examination of the "very important" column suggests greatest importance is ascribed to chiefs in Massachusetts, New York, Texas, and Minnesota. Moderate importance is indicated for chiefs in Nebraska, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, and Michigan. Somewhat less importance is indicated for Colorado and California, while Wisconsin, it will be recalled, has no state board of education. Boards with appointed chiefs rate their importance appreciably higher than boards with elected chiefs.

TABLE 3-24

IMPORTANCE ASCRIBED TO CSSOs BY SBE MEMBERS
TO THEIR UNDERSTANDING EDUCATION POLICY ISSUES, IN PERCENTAGE

States	N	Very Important	Important	Unimportant	Importance Score
Elected					
California	9	44	44	11	44
Florida	6	67	33	0	67
Georgia	7	71	29	0	71
Wisconsin[a]	--	--	--	--	--
Average					61
Appointed					
Colorado	4	50	50	0	50
Massachusetts	8	100	0	0	100
Michigan	6	67	33	0	67
Minnesota	6	83	17	0	83
Nebraska	5	80	20	0	80
New York	9	89	11	0	89
Tennessee	8	75	25	0	75
Texas	15	87	13	0	87
Average					79

[a] No state board.

Another indication of the influence of CSSOs in the state agency arena was dealt with in Chapter II. This had to do with whether or not board members opposed the chief on major policy issues. It was noted that most board members did not oppose the CSSO. Only in the cases of California and Michigan did a majority of board member respondents acknowledge that some board members frequently opposed the chief. We raised this same question with the CSSOs and in the cases of California and Florida they confirmed the responses of the board members. The chiefs in the cases of Massachusetts, Michigan, and Tennessee did not agree with board respondents that board members frequently opposed them on major policy issues. In the case of Nebraska the CSSO indicated that board members frequently opposed him while no board members acknowledged such behavior on the part of their colleagues. In the cases of Georgia, Colorado, Minnesota, New York, and Texas both sides of the partnership agreed that board members did not oppose the CSSO. Only in the case of Michigan where 67 per cent of the board members indicated opposition to the chief and the chief did not acknowledge opposition do we find these responses difficult to understand. Perhaps in Michigan board members and the chief have different interpretations of what is meant by opposition or by major policy questions. Or, the Michigan chief may be more of an optimist than are some of his board members. Despite the emergence of some disagreement between boards and chiefs and some differences in perceptions about these disagreements, the central tendency is one of harmony between boards and their chiefs, as can be seen in Table 3-25.

Again, we refer back to Chapter II, Table 2-10, where interest group leaders, who may be impartial observers of boards and chiefs, responded to the question of whether or not state boards ever gave real direction to the CSSO. For the state of Texas three of these observers said "yes"; for the states of New York, Minnesota, and Nebraska two observers said "yes"; and for Colorado one EIG spokesman said "yes." In the other five states no EIG spokesmen saw the state boards as giving real direction to the CSSOs. In other words, the chiefs in Michigan, Massachusetts, California, Georgia, and Tennessee could follow a course with few constraints or guidelines established by their state boards. This is not to say that there were no constraints. In Tennessee, for instance, the chief serves at the pleasure of the Governor and when he did not follow the bidding of the Governor he was replaced. In California and Georgia, where chiefs are elected, we suspect that constraints are in some ways set by the electorate. The significant point, however, is that in at least half of the states, in the view of EIG leaders and as noted in Table 3-25, boards do not give real direction to the chiefs. Even in the other states where EIG spokesmen say boards sometimes establish guidelines, we suspect that in most cases such direction is gentle and infrequent.

We had one other source of data about the influence of chiefs in the state education agency; the case studies themselves. Even though these data cannot be quantified, we have attempted to characterize briefly each of the case studies on this point, as shown in Table 3-25.

We come then to our basic concern; how influential are CSSOs in the state education arena? Again, we find it necessary to drop one state. Wisconsin with no state board of education is obviously atypical, hence has been excluded. In Table 3-25 ranks were established for the importance question. For extent of opposition and extent of direction to the chief categories only are shown. We have already noted that a brief comment only is used in an attempt to characterize evidence from the case studies on this point. Taking these four lines of evidence into account, our best judgment would place the states in the overall ranks as shown.

TABLE 3-25

OVERALL INFLUENCE OF CSSO IN THE STATE EDUCATION AGENCY ARENA

State	Ranked Importance of CSSO to SBE on Issues	Extent of Opposition from SBE	Extent of Direction from SBE	From Case Studies Analyses	Ascribed Overall Rank
Elected					
California	11	Some	None	Still some opposition in the Board	9
Florida	8.5	Little	None	Many see SDE as stronger than the CSSO	8
Georgia	7	None	None	Strong with Board and Staff	5
Appointed					
Colorado	10	None	Little	Coping well with independent Board	7
Massachusetts	1	Little	None	Board loyal to CSSO	2
Michigan	8.5	Some	None	CSSO moves with majority of Board	6
Minnesota	4	None	Some	Supportive and collegial	4
Nebraska	5	None	Some	Holds line, little leadership	11
New York	2	None	Some	SDE seen as better than USOE	1
Tennessee	6	Little	None	Board is not sure who is the captain	10
Texas	3	None	Some	Low profile, long tenure, respected	3

In placing New York at the top, we have reasoned that the importance score is very high, that there is no reported opposition to the CSSO by board members on major issues, that the board gives some direction to the chief but certainly does not dominate him, and that board members and state department members in our interviews clearly revealed respect, confidence, and support for the CSSO. In placing Nebraska in last place we reasoned that while the importance score is in the middle range, and while now there is no reported opposition on the part of the board, there is still some direction given by the board. Even more important board members, when interviewed, did not see the CSSO as bringing leadership to their own deliberations. For each of the other states a similar process was employed in establishing the comparative ranks. Thus, we conclude that CSSOs in New York, Massachusetts and Texas have very great influence in their respective state agencies; that chiefs in Minnesota, Georgia, Michigan, Colorado, and Florida have somewhat less but still great influence; and that chiefs in California, Tennessee, and Nebraska while still influential in their respective state agencies, in comparative terms rank below those already named. These positions are not easy to establish. In the cases of California and Nebraska an additional qualification may be in order. In California, we suspect that our data were influenced by a former CSSO who was often in open conflict with board members. In the case of Nebraska, we sense that the lack of leadership, often ascribed to the CSSO, may have resulted, at least in part, from his early frustration in dealing with a board that was split down the middle; any recommendation was certain to meet opposition from one faction of the board. In both cases these are situational factors peculiar to the state in question.

We are intrigued by a comparison of the influence of CSSOs in the state agency arena with their influence in the legislative arena. Only Texas is found in the high influence group for both arenas. Only Nebraska is found in the low influence group for both arenas. California is in the high group for the legislative arena and in the low group for the state agency arena. Massachusetts, on the other hand, occupies a reverse position; high in the state agency arena, low in the legislative arena. We shall examine the possible implications of these relationships later.

A Correlational Analysis

At several points in the preceding sections of this chapter we have suggested possible relationships between certain variables and the policy-making influence of CSSOs. At this time we shall test statistically some of those relationships. Since our numbers are small, and some measures are ordinal, our best statistic for the purpose appears to be the Spearman rank-difference correlation or rho.[8]

Influence of CSSOs in Two Arenas

Initially, we expected to arrive at some indication of the overall influence of the CSSO in the policy-making system, including both the legislation arena and the state education agency arena. However, as we have noted in preceding sections, it appeared that there was relatively little congruence between CSSO influence in the two arenas. A chief could have much influence in one arena and little in the other. It thus seemed that we should examine the influence of CSSOs in each arena and not try to combine them. To test that proposition further, our first correlation has to do with the relationship of CSSO influence in the legislation arena to CSSO influence in the state agency arena. Since, as we noted earlier, we had dropped Tennessee out of consideration for the legislative arena and Wisconsin out of consideration for the state agency arena, we were left with ten states in testing this relationship. We found that rho or $r_s = -.02$.

A correlation of this order means there is no relationship at all. In other words, a chief may have influence in both arenas, in neither arena, some influence in both, or great influence in one and little in the other. This finding confirms what was said above and makes it clear that the two arenas are quite distinct and to attempt a combined overall measure of influence would only confuse the matter.

Aside from methodological considerations, this may also be one of the important findings of the study. We suspect that many assumed, as we did, that a chief with great influence would be so perceived by all or most of the other policy actors. Now it seems quite clear that a chief may have great influence with the state board and with members of the department of education and be relatively weak in dealing with the governor and legislators. Or, a chief may exert great influence with governors and legislators and not be as well perceived by state board members and members of his own department. But it does not follow systematically that chiefs are high in one arena and low in the other. Many combinations of influence patterns may exist. The important point is that the study demonstrates the need to look at these influence patterns in both arenas and the hazard of assuming that degree of influence in one arena portrays the degree of influence in the other.

Relation of Selected Variables to CSSO Influence

Having established the point that we must relate our selected variables to two measures of CSSO influence, we now turn to that task. In Table 3-26, we have shown the correlations derived from these calculations. For these computations, except for one case, eleven states were included in the legislative arena, all but Tennessee; and eleven states were included in the state agency arena, all but Wisconsin. The one exception had to do with the policy influence of the SBE, a rank order derived in Chapter 2 where ten states made up the population.

As a rough guide for interpreting the correlations, we can say that a r_s of .3 to .4 indicates a trend only, a r_s of .5 to .6 indicates a moderate relationship, and a r_s of .7 and above indicates a strong relationship. We should point out that these relationships are statistical associations, that is one variable tends to go with the other. Such relationships may or may not have anything to do with cause and effect. A few general observations can be made about these relationships. Many of them are not high enough to have any significance. Eleven correlations are in the .3 to .4 range and thus suggest a trend or slight relationship. Only six correlations are in the .5 to .6 range where moderate relationships are indicated. No correlations are as high as .7 or above. We shall discuss each set of relationships briefly; it may be as important to note what is not related as to note what is.

We look first at the relationship between method of selecting the CSSO and his influence in the two arenas. In this instance, since there were only two categories of selection, we had to use a two by two table and a chi square formula to compute the relationship.[9] A phi (ϕ) of .45 indicates a tendency for elected chiefs to have more influence in the legislative arena. Method of selection apparently has no relationship to CSSO influence in the state agency arena. Clearly, these results do not support method of selection as having a strong relationship to the influence of the CSSO.

Size of SDE staff apparently has a moderate association with the influence of the CSSO in both arenas. The positive correlations of .50 and .45 go in the logical direction but again size of staff alone does not seem to represent an overriding influence.

TABLE 3-26

RANK-ORDER CORRELATIONS OF TWO MEASURES OF CSSO INFLUENCE WITH SELECTED VARIABLES

	Influence of CSSO in Legislative Arena	Influence of CSSO in State Agency Arena
Structural Variables		
Method of Selection (Elected/ Appointed)	.45	-.15
Size of SDE Staff	.50	.45
Political Variables		
Inter-party competition (Ranney Index)	-.42	-.19
Voting Turnout	-.44	-.07
Political Culture (Elazar-Sharkansky Index)	-.29	.15
Socioeconomic Variables		
Personal Income Per Capita	-.43	.36
Population Size	.52	.38
Per Cent of Urban Population	-.04	.39
Industrialization Index (Hofferbert-Sharkansky Index)	-.06	.52
Other Selected Variables		
Formal Power of Office	.56	-.09
Per Cent of Doctorates in Top Staff	.28	.65
Per Cent of Salaries over $25,000 in Top Staff	.12	.46
Staff Attraction Capability	.19	.48
Freedom to Select and Discharge Staff	.27	.27
SDE Information Usefulness	.15	.37
Self-Perceived Influence	.17	.58
CSSO Directive Style	-.18	.22
Policy Influence of SBE	.20	.45

We might look at the political variables as a group. Inter-party competition, an index developed by Ranney,[10] has a slight negative relationship to the influence of chiefs in the legislative arena and no relationship in the state agency arena. This may mean that less inter-party competition permits the chief to be slightly more influential in the legislative arena. The political culture index was developed by Sharkansky out of work done by Elazar[11] and was designed to portray a reform as opposed to a traditional approach to government. Either the index is too crude to be useful or there is no relationship between such a dimension and the influence of chiefs in either arena.

From the outset we wondered how socioeconomic variables would be related to the influence of chiefs. A look at the eight correlations under this category in Table 3-26 suggests that most such relationships are very modest. For income there are some tendencies, a negative one in the legislative arena and a positive one in the agency arena. We have no reasonable explanation for this difference. There may be some logic in the cluster of negative income, negative voter turnout, and negative party competition and their relationship to legislative influence of the CSSO but all correlations are too modest to press the point. Population size appears to have a moderate relationship to the influence of the chief in the legislative arena but is merely a trend in the agency arena. Per cent of urban population is not related to the influence of the chief in the legislative arena but is slightly related to his influence in the agency arena. Industrialization, using an index developed by Hofferbert and Sharkansky,[12] follows the same pattern as urbanization; no relationship to the influence of the CSSO in the legislative arena, a somewhat stronger relationship in the agency arena.

We turn now to a number of variables discussed earlier in this chapter, particularly those having to do with the resources of the CSSO. The first is the formal power of the office of the CSSO. The correlation of .56 suggests a moderate relationship between the power of the office and the influence of the chief in the legislative arena. The strength of this relationship may be somewhat inflated since in ranking the states on formal powers of office there were a number of ties. The correlation of -.09

suggests there is no relationship between power of office and the policy influence of the chief in the agency arena.

The next six correlations are related; the first and second pairs, having to do with doctorates and salaries, are used to make up the third pair, designated staff attraction capability. All three pairs of correlations run in the same direction; no relationship to the influence of the CSSO in the legislative arena, moderate relationship in the agency arena. It may be that legislators and governors are somewhat unaware or unconcerned about the capability of the CSSO to attract and hold staff members. Or, it may be that the actors in the legislative arena ascribe more importance to political skills than they do to expertise usually thought to be associated with highly trained and well paid staff members. Another aspect of staffing had to do with the freedom of the chief to select and discharge his top assistants. There was considerable variation among the states on this matter, but such a measure does not seem to represent a relationship of any significance for the CSSO in either the legislative or the agency arena.

It will be recalled that we dealt with the usefulness of SDE information to legislators, governors' staffs, and state board members. The responses from these actors were combined into a total SDE information score. As suggested by the earlier analysis, SDE information does not seem to be related to the influence of the chief in the legislative arena; there is a trend for it to be related to his influence in the agency arena. With such low correlations, it seems clear that many variables other than information affect the influence of the CSSO.

We turn now to the relationship of the self-perceived influence of the chiefs to the influence ascribed by others to the chiefs in the two arenas. For the legislative arena, the correlation was .17 which must be interpreted as no relationship. Apparently chiefs see themselves as much more influential in the legislative arena than do the other policy actors in that arena. On the other hand, with a correlation of .58 between the self-perceptions of the chiefs and the perceptions of the other actors in the agency arena there is considerable agreement. Put otherwise, the CSSOs appear to make a more realistic appraisal of their influence in the agency arena than in the legislative arena.

It will be recalled that we dealt to some extent with what we called the directive style of the chiefs. We were able to array the chiefs on this dimension and then relate such rankings to their influence in the two arenas. In both cases the correlations are too low to have any significance. Either a chief being more or less directive makes no difference to his influence in either arena or our way of operationalizing the term was inadequate.

Finally, we turn to the relationship between the policy influence of the state board of education, as developed in Chapter II, and the influence of the CSSO in both arenas. A r_s of .20 for the legislative arena suggests there is no relationship. In other words, whether boards have much or little influence is not systematically related to the influence of the chief. In the agency arena with a r_s of .45 there is a moderate positive relationship between the influence of the board and the chief.* This suggests that both the board and the chiefs can have influence and does not sustain the notion that a strong board will have a weak chief or a strong chief will have a weak board. While we seem to have examples of both such cases, the relationship prevents one from making any such generalization. This may suggest that influence is not a zero-sum game where one actor gains at the expense of another; rather, many actors in the policy system may exert influence.

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*It might be noted that one item is common to both indices.

Summary

In summary, we found that there is no systematic relationship between the chief's influence in the legislative arena and his influence in the agency arena. The old question of elected vs. appointed chiefs produced only one moderate relationship and that favored elected chiefs in the legislative arena. Relationships to all political variables were too modest to be of much significance. For the most part, the same was true with all socioeconomic variables. The formal power of the office of the chief was positively related to his influence in the legislative arena only. The capacity of the chief to attract staff was modestly related to his influence in the agency arena only. CSSOs appear to make rather realistic assessments of their influence in the agency arena but their perceptions of influence in the legislative arena are less reliable. There is some evidence to suggest that boards and chiefs may both exert influence and that one does not have to dominate the other.

Concluding Observations

At this point we shall summarize our findings and suggest a few implications the findings may hold for the future role of the CSSO as a policy maker.

Findings

By way of who CSSOs are, they are male, they frequently have rural and in-state orientations, they most often reach their office through service as a district superintendent of schools and as a member of a state department of education. As to resources, chiefs vary with respect to formal powers of office, their ability to attract and hold staff, and their freedom to select their top administrative team members. Elected chiefs appear to have more formal power and appointed chiefs seem to have more freedom in establishing their own administrative teams. The perceived usefulness of SDE information to governors' offices and legislators varies greatly among the states with information from elected chiefs held in somewhat higher regard than information from appointed chiefs. On the other hand, SDE information tends to be seen as very useful by state board members whether provided by elected or appointed chiefs.

We come now to our major concern, just how influential are CSSOs as policy makers? Almost without exception they exert great influence in the state education agency arena. SBE members expect the chief to provide leadership, board members ascribe great importance to the chief in providing understanding on policy issues, board members seldom oppose the chief on major issues, and most boards give the chief little or no general direction. Even though the general picture is one of great influence, using data such as noted above and additional insight from the case studies, we were able to ascribe an influence rank for chiefs in the state agency arena, as shown in Table 3-25. It is interesting to note that the four chiefs with most influence in the state agency arena were appointed, but the two with least influence were also appointed.

The influence of the chief as a policy maker in the legislative arena is quite another picture. Legislators, interest group leaders, and governors and their offices ascribe influence to the chiefs but it is clearly not so overwhelming as that ascribed to chiefs by state education agency actors. By using the perceptions of actors close to the legislative process along with insights from the case studies, we have been able to ascribe an influence rank for chiefs in the legislative arena as shown in Table 3-20. In this case, it should be noted that of the four chiefs with most influence two were appointed and two were elected. Those at or near the lower end of influence were all appointed, a finding which may reflect the fact that eight of the twelve chiefs in the EGP study were appointed.

Examination of the influence ranks ascribed to chiefs in the two arenas are most revealing. Only Texas is found in the high influence group in both arenas. Only Nebraska is found in the low influence group in both arenas. California is high in the legislative arena and low in the agency arena, while for Massachusetts the positions are reversed. Inspection suggests that these are indeed two quite different arenas of operation. When we ran a correlation between the two sets of influence ranks our result was $r_s = -.02$, or no systematic relationship. This means that a chief can have much influence in both arenas, much in one and little in the other, or little in both, a finding of considerable import.

We point out again that the rankings in the two arenas have to do only with the policy-making roles of the chiefs. The implementation or management roles of chiefs were not part of the study, hence are not taken into account. Moreover, we emphasize the point that these rankings suggest the policy influence of each CSSO in his own situation. These situations vary appreciably. In some states governors and legislatures are strong, in others they are weak. In some states the education agency enjoys high status, in others it does not. In some states the political culture encourages responsive public officials, in others it does not. In some states financial resources are abundant, in others they are not. In those states where governors' offices, legislatures, or state boards are powerful a CSSO may find it very difficult to influence the situation. Perhaps in those states where governors' offices, legislatures, or the state board of education are less powerful the opportunity for the CSSO to exert influence is somewhat greater. This is to say that there is no way of arraying the twelve CSSOs on some abstract scale of influence. All we can say is what our data suggest by way of the policy-making influence of each chief in his own state. Finally, we do not equate most influence with what is best. In any systems approach to government it seems reasonable to assume that influence should be spread among the major actors and not concentrated in the hands of one. We do assume that the CSSO is one of those major actors.

We recognize that differentiating among major actors in terms of their influence is at times difficult. One of our professional colleagues who read an early draft of this chapter reminded us of this problem in the following language:

> ....when the CSSO is operating in the legislative arena it is awfully difficult to disentangle the CSSO influence (even in the minds of perceivers) from that of other actors. Legislation proposed and lobbied for by EIGs, for example, may bear CSSO input unbeknownst to observers. Observers may be unaware of telephone calls to the chief from individual legislators, or of the fact that a given piece of legislation was "cleaned up" by the chief before it went into the hopper. On the other side, it may be friendly legislative stalwarts who actually "wrote" and then carried through some components of the chief's legislative program.

Tempting as it may be to despair of the complexities involved and thus do nothing about ascribing influence to particular actors, we have chosen the other course even though we recognize our findings may be incomplete and at times seem naive. We think that this line of study must get started.

Through a correlational analysis we ascertained the relationships between a number of variables and the influence of chiefs in both arenas, as shown in Table 3-26. Formal structure, specifically election as opposed to appointment of the CSSO, was modestly related to the degree of influence of the chief in the legislative arena; there was no relationship to the influence of the chief in the agency arena. This confirms some of the other findings. For instance, SDE information from elected chiefs was perceived as more useful by legislators and governors' offices than SDE information from appointed chiefs. It may be that elected officials tend to look with more favor upon chiefs who are also elected. In a sense, they have come through the war together. But the relationship is not high enough to become too persuasive, particularly in view of the fact that some appointed chiefs, notably those in Texas and Michigan, have achieved considerable influence with the legislature.

Most of the relationships between political and socioeconomic variables and the influence of chiefs were too low to be significant. One pattern of moderate strength did emerge. Apparently, in states with little inter-party competition, low voter turnout, and low personal income the chief has somewhat more influence in the legislative arena. It may be that in states with these characteristics that other agencies of government are less developed and the chief can more easily emerge as a leader in the situation. The r_s of .52 between industrialization and the influence of the chief in the agency arena may be something of a reverse picture. Assuming that industrialization may also mean more inter-party competition, higher voter turnout, and higher income, it is interesting to note that the greater influence of the chief is in the agency and not in the legislative arena.

We noted above the moderate relationship between the formal power of office and the influence of the chief in the legislative arena. Formal power of office, as shown in Table 3-9, is an aggregate of six variables: the legal status of the office of CSSO, membership status of chief on the board, the board role prescribed for the chief, reporting relationships to governor and legislature, quasi-judicial power of the chief, and the tenure status of the office. Taken alone few of these variables provide much differentiation among the chiefs. Taken together the formal power scores run from one to five. Elected chiefs have an average score of four and appointed chiefs 2.6. The fact that elected chiefs enjoy greater power of office and they also are seen as having greater influence in the legislative arena suggests that power of office and elected status of the chief have a relationship. Or, to put it differently, formal power of office, as we have defined it, seems to be more visible and more significant to legislators and governors than to members of the state boards and state departments.

Only three other variables suggest relationships strong enough to merit comment and these all pertain to the influence of the chief in the agency arena. The power of chiefs to attract staff is related to the influence of chiefs in the agency but not in the legislative arena. Of particular interest is the r_s of .58 for the relationship of the self perceived influence of chiefs and their state agency influence as perceived by other actors in that arena. In this instance, the chiefs apparently have a rather good sense of reality. For the legislative arena the chiefs do not have the same sense of reality. Finally, the r_s of .45 between the policy influence of state boards and the policy influence of CSSOs in the agency arena suggests that chiefs and boards may share power and that one actor need not dominate the other.

Some Implications

For those who are concerned that CSSOs have significant but not necessarily dominating influence in policy making for education our findings may suggest some implications.

1. While the formal structure of the office does not come through as the overriding variable related to the influence of the chief, it does seem to have some significance. In some states the office should be given more legal status, its relationship to the governor and legislature should be

stipulated, and the leadership and administrative roles of the chief vis-a-vis the board should be made explicit. It also seems clear that the board should have the right to appoint and hold responsible their own chief executive officer. This can be argued from the standpoint of administrative principle, it can also be argued from some of the data shown above. For instance, appointive chiefs more frequently solicit ideas from board members. This fact alone suggests that one way to make both the board and the chief important policy actors is to let the board select its own chief. Also, our data show that appointed chiefs more frequently have the freedom to select and discharge their own top staff members, a condition we think essential to an effective organization. Apparently, boards are more disposed to give the chief such freedom when he is a person of their own selection. Finally, we suggest that a term appointment gives the office more status than an "at the pleasure of the board" arrangement.

2. People also make a difference. In California, for instance, the formal structure for educational governance has not changed much in recent years. Yet, the present State Superintendent and his immediate predecessor are quite different people, as many of our respondents in the California case study[13] kept insisting. Superintendent Rafferty was elected to two four-year terms and he apparently looked to the electors as his constituency. From all reports he was less concerned about relationships with the state board of education, the legislature, or even the governor. In a sense he was an ideologist and his basic message was a return to the fundamentals. He pressed his point eloquently from the platform and the public press. In time, the message, or the ensuing controversy which the exponent of the message provoked, apparently lost its appeal. In any case, in the election of 1970 the people rejected Rafferty and chose Wilson Riles who came over

as sincere, warm, approachable, and concerned about youngsters. Since his election Riles has been characterized by many as "the great peacemaker." He took the position that he would not submit a legislative program independently of the state board of education, he has worked closely with the legislature, and he and the Governor apparently agreed not to "shoot at each other." Despite his peacemaking efforts Riles got only part of what he was seeking for early childhood education in the first round but Riles apparently sees other rounds coming. In any case, we note that Rafferty and Riles, while in the same formal structure, have responded quite differently to it.

Much the same point can be observed in three other case studies where our respondents kept drawing contrasts between the incumbent CSSO and his immediate predecessor. In Colorado[14] the former Commissioner was often characterized as aggressive; the incumbent as diplomatic. In Massachusetts[15] the former commissioner frequently was seen by legislators as chastizing them, the incumbent (1973) more inclined to mollify them. In Tennessee[16] the former commissioner seemed to employ a directive style with the state board, the legislature, and the governor; the incumbent attempted to use a non-directive approach with his associates. To note that people respond differently to formal structures does not suggest that one kind of behavior on the part of the CSSO is more effective than another. Much depends on other factors in the situation, as will be noted more fully later.

3. In many states the balance of influence between chiefs and boards should be redressed. As noted in Chapter II, most boards do little more by way of policy influence than legitimate the recommendations of the chief. We suspect that one way for appointed chiefs to exercise more influence in the legislative arena, a place where many of them are now relatively weak,

is through the active participation of their board members. Obviously, this will often require more of a team relationship between the chief and his board members than is now the case. Our data suggest that more influence on the part of board members does not necessarily mean less influence on the part of the chief. Such a team effort might actually enhance the influence of both actors in the policy process.

4. To exercise influence in policy making for education many CSSOs must find ways of operating more effectively in the legislative arena. Policy, by its very nature, is most frequently enacted in that arena. To increase CSSO influence in the legislative arena is a change that will be hard to achieve since most chiefs now think, often mistakenly, that they are already influential with governors and legislatures. Apparently, the accurate perception of great influence at home confounds the perception CSSOs have of their influence abroad. In addition to helping chiefs recognize their limited influence in the legislative arena, ways might be found of making SDE information more useful to governors and legislators. It may be, too, that chiefs and board members need to give consideration to the kinds of behavior required when they work with elected officials as contrasted to professional educators.

5. The personal characteristics and operating styles of CSSOs are important to other policy actors. Some evidence for this position was found in each of the twelve case studies. The point was made more dramatically in the four case studies, referred to above, where our respondents kept contrasting the incumbent CSSO with his immediate predecessor. For many, sincerity was preferred to arrogance, compromise to obduracy, listening to pronouncing, and direction to non-direction. Perhaps our best example of what legislators respect was found in Texas. Here was a chief who had worked hard at his job for 25 years, whose advice was seen as sound,

who did not seek the limelight for himself, and who came in time to be trusted implicitly.

We are not disposed to call one style good and another bad. We also recognize that the style employed by any person is a product of both the person and the situation. This brings us to the consideration of congruence between the person and the situation. While one chief was seen as bringing little leadership to the state board of education, we are aware of the fractionated nature of that board which almost forced the chief to reduce his leadership to the lowest common denominator. In another case, the directive style of one chief apparently established the expectations of other policy actors in the system for the office of CSSO and a new chief with a non-directive style could not meet those expectations. Thus, we are disposed to say that any style may be effective if it be congruent with the expectations held by other actors in the system.

6. When a CSSO is to be selected, whether by the board or by the electorate, every effort should be made to find a person who gives promise of exercising appropriate influence in both the state agency and the legislative arena. For the state agency, professional expertise and some political skill is required. For legislators and governors, the requirements must be posed in reverse order, political skill and professional expertise. These criteria are far more important than age, sex, pattern of experience, or place of residence. Obviously, in the selection of a CSSO boards have more direct control over such a process than do the voters of the state. However, in states where chiefs are elected more attention should be given to nomination procedures to the end that candidates with both political skills and professional expertise are placed in nomination. In keeping with what was noted above, those who select chiefs should also consider to what extent the leadership style of the candidate will be congruent with the expectations of other actors in the policy system.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III

[1] See Elwood P. Cubberley and Edward C. Elliott, State and County School Administration. Vol. 2, New York: The MacMillan Co., 1915, pp. 213-286.

[2] Sam P. Harris, State Departments of Education, State Boards of Education, and Chief State School Officers. DHEW Publication O. (OE) 73-074000, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973, Ch.3.

[3] Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," Administration Science Quarterly. December 2, 1957 and March, 1958, pp. 281-306 and 444-480.

[4] David J. Kirby and Thomas A. Tollman, "Background and Career Patterns of State Department Personnel," in Roald F. Campbell, et. al., Strengthening State Departments of Education. Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, 1967, Ch. 4.

[5] Richard O. Carlson, Executive Succession and Organizational Change. Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, 1962.

[6] Stephen J. Knezevich (Editor), The American School Superintendency. Arlington, Va.: American Association of School Administrators, 1971.

[7] J. W. Getzels, J. M. Lipham, and R. F. Campbell, Educational Administration as a Social Process. New York: Harper & Row, 1968, pp. 133-150.

[8] See Footnote 30, Chapter II.

[9] See Footnote 31, Chapter II.

[10] Austin Ranney, "Parties and State Politics," in Politics in American States: A Comparative Analysis. Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (Editors), Boston: Little, Brown and Co., p. 87.

[11] Ira Sharkansky, The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture: A Research Note," Polity. II (January, 1969), p. 67.

[12] Richard I. Hofferbert and Ira Sharkansky (Editors), State and Urban Politics. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971, p. 456.

[13] JAlan Aufderheide, State Policy Making for the Public Schools of California. Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, February, 1974.

[14] Linda Clare Moffatt, State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Colorado. Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, February, 1974.

[15] Peggy M. Siegel, State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Massachusetts. Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, February, 1974.

[16] Gary V. Branson and Donald J. Steele, Jr., State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Tennessee. Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, February, 1974, p. 55.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF UPPER LEVEL ADMINISTRATORS IN DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION

Gary V. Branson

Introduction

This chapter deals with selected characteristics of top level administrators in state departments of education. To begin with, a comparative description of these characteristics is presented for persons in twelve state departments of education. This is followed by some state-by-state comparisons. Finally, factor analytic techniques are used to summarize the various administrator characteristics and the dimensions revealed by these techniques are then correlated with a number of other state variables.

Research Design and Methodology

While this study was related to the larger Educational Governance Project, a design different from that used in the larger project was employed. A questionnaire was developed and used for the collection of most of the basic data and additional data were derived from secondary sources. This chapter is chiefly descriptive but some analysis is provided through the use of rankings, correlation procedures, and factor analysis. A more complete treatment of the findings can be found in a dissertation prepared by the author.[1]

Developing the Questionnaire

The questionnaire was constructed in consultation with the staff of the Educational Governance Project. The questionnaire was then pre-tested with a number of upper level administrators in the Ohio State Department of Education and revised as needed. The final questionnaire consisted of twenty-five questions and required no more than 10 to 15 minutes for completion. The questionnaire was designed to elicit the following kinds of information on upper level administrators:

1. Place of birth and K-12 education
2. Age, sex, and race or ethnicity
3. Salary level
4. Educational preparation--degrees held, location of college/university attended
5. Previous experience--types of jobs and the different social environments
6. Work experience outside of education
7. Methods by which administrators were recruited to the SDE
8. Requirements that were established for these positions
9. Number of positions held, length of service in the current position and with the SDE
10. Salaries and salary comparisons with those paid in comparable positions
11. Opportunity to use one's best abilities in the SDE
12. Evaluation of the adequacy of legislative fiscal support for the programs for which the SDE is responsible

Selection of the States

The states used in this study were the twelve states being examined by the Educational Governance Project (EGP). Since preliminary contacts and working relationships existed with these states, the task of data collection was made somewhat easier. While these states cannot be seen as a random sample of all states, they are representative of all states on a number of dimensions. Even so, this study should not be construed as a portrayal of SDE personnel in all states.

Selection of State Department Personnel

Examining all professional employees within twelve state departments of education was not practical because of limitations of money and time. On the other hand, examination of the top man only in each state department would not tell us much about the characteristics of SDE professional employees. Somewhat arbitrarily, it was decided to include only the positions that are near the apex of the SDE hierarchy.

The positions that were included are limited to what we chose to call upper level administrators and include the following: state superintendent (or commissioner); deputy superintendent; associate superintendent; assistant superintendent; and the hierarchical position immediately below that of assistant superintendent, usually called a director or chief.

We have assumed that the characteristics, backgrounds, and attitudes of SDE upper level administrators, due to their strategic location, have an influence upon the direction and policies of the state education agency. In respect to the importance of the men who staff the upper hierarchy of an organization, Downs has stated:

> A shift in only a small proportion of the officials in a bureau can have a profound effect upon its operations. If most of the officials occupying key positions in a bureau are of one type (that is, conservers, climbers, and so on), then the bureau and its behavior will be dominated by the traits typical of that type. This relatively small group of key officials can exercise dominance even if a majority of bureau members are of other types.
>
> The possibility of a few men dominating the activities and "spirit" of a whole bureau arises because its hierarchical structure tends to concentrate power disproportionately at the top.[2]

The position and names of personnel included in the study were taken from the Education Directory-State Governments, 1971-73 (U.S. Office of Education). The large number of personnel in the director or chief category necessitated the use of random sampling at this level in some states. Persons to be included in the study were determined as follows:

Level 1	State Superintendent/Commissioner	100% of total
Level 2	Deputy Superintendents/Commissioners	100% of total
	Associate Superintendents/Commissioners	100% of total
	Assistant Superintendents/Commissioners	100% of total
Level 3	Director/Chief/Coordinator/Administrators, if 20 or less	100% of total
	Director/Chief/Coordinator/Administrators, if more than 20	30% of total

Where it was necessary to sample those in the director-chief category, all such personnel were assigned a number and a blind draw was used to determine those to be included. In Table 4-1 the numbers of personnel within each category from each state included in the study are shown.

TABLE 4-1

NUMBER OF SDE PERSONNEL BY STATE INCLUDED IN THE STUDY

State	CSSO	Assistants	Directors	Total
Elected CSSO				
California	1	7	16	24
Florida	1	4	12	17
Georgia	1	5	9	15
Wisconsin	1	6	11	18
Appointed CSSO				
Colorado	1	4	14	19
Massachusetts	1	6	14	21
Michigan	1	7	13	21
Minnesota	1	5	8	14
Nebraska	1	4	12	17
New York	1	20	14	35
Tennessee	1	6	12	19
Texas	1	8	10	19
Total	12	82	145	239

The Collection and Treatment of the Data

The data were collected during the winter and spring of 1973. The questionnaires were delivered to persons in each state department of education by a member of the EGP research team assigned to that state. A follow-up questionnaire was mailed to the administrators in each state department who did not respond to the first request. Where necessary, this was followed by a personal telephone call asking them to complete the questionnaire. This procedure resulted in a 93.73 per cent response; 224 of 239 questionnaires were returned.

For treatment of the data several coding and analytic procedures were used. One coding provided descriptive statistics on the total group. In addition, coding procedures were used so that separate findings on (1) the CSSOs, (2) assistants (including deputy, associate, and assistant superintendents), and (3) directors could be discerned. Administrators from SDEs with an appointed as opposed to an elected CSSO were also grouped into separate categories. Next, the administrators from each state were coded so that state level descriptive statistics would be available; the scores on the various personnel characteristics being used to rank order the twelve SDEs. Finally, factor analysis was employed to better understand the dimensions which were related to the differences among SDE administrators. And scores on each dimension were used for correlation with a selected set of state socioeconomic, political, and structural variables.

Characteristics of Upper Level Administrators

The descriptive characteristics of these 224 administrators are shown in Table 4-2 and a narrative discussion of the findings is presented below.

Background and Personal Characteristics

The SDE administrators were predominantly male (98 per cent). Only four females were represented in the 224 administrators surveyed. Male dominance at the upper levels of SDE administration corresponds with conditions found

TABLE 4-2

STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
UPPER LEVEL ADMINISTRATORS COMPOSITE PROFILE (N=224)

Variables	Characteristic	Per Cent or Mean
Personal		
1. Sex	Male	98%
2. Race	White	95%
3. Average Age (years)	--	48.9
Background		
4. Location of Birth	Instate	56%
5. K-12 Schooling-Community Size	10,000 or less	51%
6. K-12 Schooling-Community Type	Rural	46%
7. Mobility (Permanent addresses)	Three states or more	31%
Education		
8. Location of Undergraduate Institution	Instate	65%
9. Location of Graduate Institution	Instate	67%
10. Highest Graduate Degree	Doctorate	38%
Previous Experience		
11. In Higher Education	Yes	35%
12. As a Public School Superintendent	Yes	23%
13. Size and Type of School District	Rural under 1,000	31%
Recruited From		
14. Higher Education Position	Yes	18%
15. Public School Administration	Yes	37%
16. Non-Education Position	Yes	26%
17. Location of Position	Instate	82%
SDE Career		
18. Average Years with the SDE	--	10.3
19. Average Years at Current Position	--	4.6
Salaries and Reactions		
20. Salary Range	More than $22,000	57%
21. Salary Comparison (with others in my state)	Same as most or better	63%
22. Chance to Use Abilities	Excellent	46%
23. Adequacy of Legislative Fiscal Support for SDE Programs	Half or more of the programs	65%

in other educational organizations; females are almost exclusively engaged in teaching, few of them are in administration.[3] In terms of race or ethnicity SDE administrators were very homogeneous, 95 per cent being white. Two per cent of the administrators were black, one per cent Latin American, one per cent American Indian, and one per cent "other." Stating it another way, of the 224 SDE administrators, only eleven were from minority groups. Including the four females mentioned previously, we find that 209 of these administrators were white males. The average age of SDE administrators was 48.9 years.

A majority of these administrators (56 per cent) were born in the state in which they were working. The tendency to employ instate residents probably reflects the practice of most other state agencies. Sixty-two per cent of the respondents also received most of their schooling in the state in which they were working.

Fifty-one per cent of these administrators received most of their K-12 schooling in communities with populations of 10,000 or less; only 20 per cent received their K-12 schooling in communities of more than 100,000 population. The small-town background of these administrators is further illustrated when their K-12 school communities are classified: rural (47 per cent), suburban (15 per cent), and urban (38 per cent). Only one urban community in five could be classified as inner city. Clearly, SDE personnel have small town and rural backgrounds.

SDE administrators were not highly mobile, as measured by the number of states in which they had had permanent addresses. Thirty-eight per cent had lived in one state only, 31 per cent had lived in two states, and 31 per cent had lived in three states or more.

The tendency of SDE administrators to be "instate" on the previous factors held true for their undergraduate college experience. Sixty-five per cent of these administrators received their bachelor's degree at an "instate" institution. Major fields of study at the undergraduate level for SDE administrators were as follows: social studies-language arts (46 per cent), vocational education (18 per cent), math-science (17 per cent), and education (11 per cent).

The location of graduate institutions in which SDE administrators received their highest degree, (or last institution attended if no degree) again proved to be primarily "instate" (67 per cent). Almost three out of four (73 per cent) of the SDE administrators majored in the field of education at the graduate level. In terms of degrees these administrators rank high; 87 per cent had earned a masters degree, and 38 per cent had completed a doctoral program.

In looking at the previous job experiences of SDE administrators in education, one finds that 64 per cent had held positions as public school teachers. Additionally, many had held positions as public school administrators; as superintendents (23 per cent), central office administrators (24 per cent), and principals (34 per cent). Somewhat surprisingly, 35 per cent reported that they had held positions in higher education. Very few (7 per cent) of these administrators had held positions in private schools, in other state departments of education (3 per cent), or the United States Office of Education (2 per cent).

Some information on the prior experience of respondents by type and size of school districts was obtained. The most frequently indicated prior experience was in rural districts with under 1,000 students (31 per cent). The percentage of administrators who had worked in other type districts was rather evenly distributed: rural 1,001-3,000 (18 per cent); rural over 3,000 (12 per cent); suburban under 3,000 (11 per cent);

suburban 3,001-10,000 (18 per cent); suburban over 10,000 (11 per cent); city under 10,000 (16 per cent); city 10,001-50,000 (17 per cent); and city over 50,000 (19 per cent).

In summarizing the background and personal characteristics of the typical state department upper level administrator, one finds a middle-aged white male who was born and went to school in the state in which he is working. His educational preparation has been at an "instate" institution at both the undergraduate and graduate level. His major field of preparation was in some area of social studies-language arts at the undergraduate level and education at the graduate level. Furthermore, he has earned at least a masters degree. He has served as a public school teacher and in most instances has held a position as a public school administrator. He has not been highly mobile, in most instances having lived in no more than two states.

Recruitment

In the area of recruitment, this study is concerned with a number of questions: (1) To what degree do SDEs recruit administrators from positions in the field of education? (2) What specific education positions did these administrators hold immediately prior to their entry into the SBE? (3) To what degree do SDEs recruit individuals from beyond their state borders? (4) By what methods were these individuals recruited to the SDE? (5) What requirements were established by SDEs for these administrative positions? Beyond answers to these questions, an effort was made to ascertain what individuals or groups had to approve of the selection of individuals for these administrative positions. While answers to these questions do not provide a complete picture of the process of personnel recruitment in SDEs (a number of informal processes undoubtedly exist in each state), they do provide some useful indicators of these practices.

In terms of recruitment from the field of education, 74 per cent of SDE administrators were working in this area immediately prior to their entry into a state department, distributed by position as follows: higher education (18 per cent), public school superintendents (17 per cent), central office administrators (12 per cent), public school principals (8 per cent), public school teachers (13 per cent), other SDE (2 per cent), U.S. Office of Education (1 per cent), and other education positions (2 per cent). As to location, a huge majority (82 per cent) of these administrators were working at a position in the same state as the SDE when they were recruited.

These administrators were recruited to the SDE primarily by two methods: personal contact by SDE personnel (60 per cent), and formal application to the SDE (25 per cent). Other methods of recruitment indicated less frequently were: personal contact by an educator outside of the SDE (5 per cent), university placement (2 per cent), personal contact by the state board of education (1 per cent), and other unspecified methods (6 per cent). The fact that such a large percentage of these administrators were recruited through personal contact suggests that SDEs seek specific individuals to fill vacancies, rather than considering a group of candidates through a more formal procedure. But the general statement--"these men are sought for the positions, rather than they seeking the position"--may not be as true as it appears in that we have no way of knowing from these data how many of the administrators before being sought had indicated interest in a SDE position. A further point of clarification on these recruitment methods is that they apply to the original position held by these administrators in the SDE.

The two chief requirements that had been established for SDE administrative positions were: (1) experience in education (80 per cent), and (2) educational preparation (78 per cent). Experience in education generally referred to prior experience as a teacher or administrator. Educational preparation generally referred to the level of education (degree requirements) and/or certification. Other position requirements indicated less frequently by these administrators were: civil service (36 per cent), employment or promotion examination (25 per cent), state residency (11 per cent), instate preference (7 per cent), minority preference (4 per cent), and political party endorsement (3 per cent).

Finally, within the area of recruitment, SDE administrators were asked to indicate who had to approve their selection. The responses indicate that almost all (92 per cent) of these administrators had to meet with the approval of the CSSO before they were selected (5 per cent were CSSOs). Only three per cent of these administrators indicated that CSSO approval was not necessary for their appointment. A significantly smaller percentage of these administrators (56 per cent) had to meet with state board approval. Very few of these positions needed the approval of the governor (4 per cent); Tennessee accounts for five of the eight instances where this was indicated. Two CSSOs (Minnesota and Texas) were the only administrators who indicated that legislative approval was necessary for selection to their position.

To sum up, most of these SDE administrators were recruited from the field of education. A majority of the administrators were working at a position within the same state as the SDE when they were recruited. These administrators were recruited primarily through personal contact, though a sizable number were recruited by formal application. The two chief requirements established for these three positions were experience in education and educational preparation. The selection of an individual for a position almost always had to meet with the approval of the CSSO, while approval of of the state board was necessary for only about half of these administrators.

Career Patterns

An individual can follow a number of different career patterns within an organization. He can serve a relatively long time and receive many promotions before arriving at one of the top administrative positions. Or, he can enter the organization near the apex of the administrative hierarchy. In this section we are concerned with questions that provide information on career patterns of SDE members.

Only 27 per cent of these administrators began their SDE careers in their current positions. Most of the administrators at all three position levels were appointed or elected to their present positions after prior experience in the organization. The average age of these administrators when they entered the SDE was 38.7 years. The average number of years with the agency was 10.3.

The number of different positions held by these administrators during their SDE careers was 2.5. In terms of years in their current positions, the average was 4.6 for these administrators. The immediate predecessors of these administrators had served in these positions 7.6 years. The fact that over one-third (36 per cent) of these administrators were new appointees reflects the growth that has taken place in SDEs during recent years. The personnel turnover and additions among upper level administrators is further emphasized by the fact that 60 per cent of these persons had joined the SDE since 1962.

The salaries of these administrators ranged from less than $13,000 (2 per cent) to more than $31,000 (14 per cent). Fifty-seven per cent of the administrators were earning more than $22,000, while 14 per cent were earning $16,000 or less. The SDE administrators were asked to compare their salaries with salaries paid [illegible] others in their state holding positions of similar responsibility. These comparisons were as follows: my salary is among the best (14 per cent); my salary is better than most (12 per cent); my salary is about the same as most (37 per cent); my salary is not as good as most (29 per cent); my salary is much poorer than most (6 per cent).

These administrators were very positive about SDEs as a place in which they could use their best abilities. Specifically, they rated their chances to use their best abilities as excellent--46 per cent, good--38 per cent, some--15 per cent, little--1 per cent, and none--1 per cent. Overall, more than three-fourths of the administrators felt they had an excellent or good chance to use their best abilities. The high positive response to this question in all twelve states and at all three position levels is at odds with the negative comments often made about the opportunities that exist in SDEs.

Lastly, these administrators were asked to rate the adequacy of the fiscal support provided by the legislature for the programs undertaken by the SDE. These administrators responded to this question in the following manner: adequate for most programs--43 per cent; adequate for half of the programs--22 per cent; adequate for less than half the programs--11 per cent; adequate for only a few of the programs--16 per cent; adequate for none of the programs--2 per cent; and no response--5 per cent. While the most frequent response on this question was that legislative fiscal support was adequate for most programs, the mean response on this question was that legislative fiscal support was adequate for about half the SDE programs.

In concluding this section, one could state that while most of these administrators compared their salaries favorably with those of others holding positions of similar responsibility in their states, a sizable percentage (35 per cent) felt that their salaries were not as good as others in their states. These administrators were almost unanimous in viewing SDEs as a place where they had an excellent or good chance to use their best ability. As a group, they felt that legislative fiscal support was adequate for somewhat more than half of the programs for which the SDEs were responsible.

Comparison of CSSOs, Assistants and Directors on Selected Characteristics

Upper level administrators in state departments have just been described. The differences on selected characteristics among the CSSOs (12), Assistants (81), and Directors (131) will now be presented. As can be seen from Table 4-3, the SDE administrators at the three position levels had many similarities as well as some differences. On personal characteristics the three position levels varied only slightly. CSSOs and Assistants were 100 per cent male compared with 97 per cent for the Directors. The administrators at each higher position level, as a group, were about five years older in terms of average age. Some differences are discernible on the background variables between the three position levels, but these differences are not large. CSSOs were slightly less likely to be born "instate" than were Assistants or Directors. A slightly higher percentage of the Assistants received most of their K-12 schooling in small rural communities than did CSSOs or Directors. The three position levels did differ rather substantially on the mobility factor. Mobility increased as the position level decreased, with Directors most mobile (34 per cent) and CSSOs least mobile (17 per cent). On education characteristics, the tendency to attend "instate" undergraduate and graduate institutions was somewhat higher for the Assistants. Still, a majority of administrators at all three position levels attended "instate" institutions. The percentage of administrators in each group who had earned a doctoral degree were noticeably different. A much larger percentage of Assistants (49 per cent) than CSSOs (25 per cent) had earned a doctorate. On previous experience variables, the Assistants (41 per cent) had held positions in higher education somewhat more frequently than

TABLE 4-3

A COMPARISON OF CSSOS, ASSISTANTS, AND DIRECTORS ON SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS

Variables	CSSOs N=12	Asst. N=81	Dir. N=131
Personal			
1. Sex (Male)	100%	100%	97%
2. Race or Ethnicity (white)	83%	99%	94%
3. Average Age (Years)	56.8	51.7	46.9
Background			
4. Location of Birth (Instate)	50%	57%	55%
5. K-12 School-Community Size (10,000 or Less)	41%	57%	48%
6. K-12 School-Community Type (Rural)	42%	53%	43%
7. Mobility (Permanent Addresses - three states or more)	17%	28%	34%
Education			
8. Location of Undergraduate Institution (Instate)	67%	72%	61%
9. Location of Graduate Institution (Instate)	50%	73%	64%
10. Highest Graduate Degree (Doctorate)	25%	49%	32%
Previous Experience			
11. In Higher Education	33%	41%	31%
12. As a Public School Superintendent	67%	30%	15%
13. Size and Type of School District (Rural under 1,000)	50%	38%	25%
Recruited From			
14. Higher Education Position	8%	16%	20%
15. Public School Administration	58%	41%	27%
16. Non-Education Position	16%	16%	33%
17. Location of Position (Instate)	92%	82%	80%
SDE Career			
18. Average Years with the SDE	14.9	11.0	9.2
19. Average Years at Current Position	5.7	4.8	4.4
Salaries and Reactions			
20. Salary Range (More than $22,000)	92%	84%	37%
21. Salary Comparison (Same or Better than Most in My State)			
22. Chance to Use Abilities (Excellent)	58%	61%	38%
23. Adequacy of Legislative Fiscal Support for SDE Programs (For Half or More of the Programs)	83%	70%	60%

the CSSOs (33 per cent) or Directors (31 per cent). Sixty-seven per cent of the CSSOs had previously served as a public school superintendent compared with 15 per cent of the Directors. Fifty per cent of the CSSOs had previously held a position in a rural school district with less than 1,000 students as against 25 per cent of the Directors.

The type of employment from which SDE administrators were recruited varied greatly by position level. Twenty per cent of the Directors were recruited from positions in higher education, but this was true of only 8 per cent of the CSSOs. Conversely, 58 per cent of the CSSOs were recruited from public school administration positions compared with 27 per cent of the Directors. Directors (33 per cent) were more frequently recruited from non-education employment than were Assistants (16 per cent) or CSSOs (16 per cent). Recruitment from "instate" positions was in excess of 80 per cent at each of the three position levels. The years of service with the SDE and at current positions increased at each higher position level.

The salaries paid to the SDE administrators went up by position level. Ninety-two per cent of the CSSOs were earning more than $22,000 compared with 84 per cent of the Assistants, and 37 per cent of the Directors. In comparing their salaries with salaries paid to others in their state holding positions of similar responsibility, Assistants more frequently expressed positive evaluations. A larger percentage of the CSSOs (58 per cent) and Assistants (61 per cent) felt they had an excellent chance to use their best abilities in the SDE than did the Directors (38 per cent). Evaluation of the adequacy of legislative fiscal support for SDE programs was more positive at each higher position level.

Elected or Appointed CSSOs and Upper Level Administrators

Beyond position level differences a question of further interest in this study was whether the factor of an elected or appointed CSSO made a difference in the type of upper level administrators one would find in a State Department of Education. Contrasting the SDE administrators with an appointed CSSO (N=150) with those having an elected CSSO (N=74) produced only a few noteworthy differences. Moreover, the strong influence of California and Florida in the elected group made even these differences suspect.

A comparison of the characteristics between these two groups is presented in Table 4-4. The two groups differed little on sex, race, and age. On the background characteristics, the differences were somewhat more pronounced between the two groups. Sixty-three per cent of the administrators in the appointed group were born "instate" compared with 40 per cent of the elected group. A larger percentage of those in the elected group (54 per cent) than in the appointed group (42 per cent) classified the K-12 school community in which they received most of their schooling as rural. The two groups were very similar on the mobility findings. On the education characteristics, both groups reflected similar tendencies regarding attendance at undergraduate and graduate institutions within the state. A slightly higher percentage of the administrators in the appointed group (40 per cent) had earned a doctorate than those in the elected group (34 per cent).

On the previous experience characteristics, the only notable difference between the two groups was the percentage of those who had held a position in higher education. Thirty-nine per cent of the appointed group had previously worked in this area while the figure for the elected group was 27 per cent. On the recruitment characteristics, a higher percentage of the appointed group (20 per cent compared with 15 per cent) were recruited from

TABLE 4-4

A COMPARISON OF ADMINISTRATOR IN STATES WITH AN ELECTED CSSO WITH ADMINISTRATORS IN STATES WITH AN APPOINTED CSSO

Variables	Elected (N=74)	Appointed (N=150)
Personal		
1. Sex (Male)	100%	97%
2. Race or Ethnicity (White)	93%	95%
3. Average Age (Years)	49.5	48.6
Background		
4. Location of Birth (Instate)	46%	63%
5. K-12 Schooling-Community Size (10,000 or Less)	60%	46%
6. K-12 Schooling-Community Type (Rural)	54%	42%
7. Mobility (Permanent Addresses - Three States or More)	33%	29%
Education		
8. Location of Undergraduate Institution (Instate)	65%	65%
9. Location of Graduate Institution (Instate)	68%	66%
10. Highest Graduate Degree (Doctorate)	34%	40%
Previous Experience		
11. In Higher Education	27%	39%
12. As a Public School Superintendent	24%	22%
13. Size and Type of School District (Rural under 1,000)	31%	31%
Recruited From		
14. Higher Education Position	15%	20%
15. Public School Administration	47%	32%
16. Non-Education Position	22%	28%
17. Location of Position (Instate)	84%	81%
SDE Career		
18. Average Years with the SDE	10.7	10.1
19. Average Years at Current Position	4.3	4.8
Salaries and Reactions		
20. Salary Range (More than $22,000)	65%	53%
21. Salary Comparison (Same or Better than Most in My State)	74%	58%
22. Chance to Use Abilities (Excellent)	41%	48%
23. Adequacy of Legislative Fiscal Support for SDE Programs (For Half or More of the Programs)	70%	64%

higher education positions, while a higher percentage of the elected group (47 per cent compared with 32 per cent) were recruited from positions in public school administration. Recruitment of individuals from noneducation positions was more prevalent among the administrators in the appointed group (28 per cent compared with 22 per cent). Recruitment from positions within the state was the tendency for both groups: elected 84 per cent; appointed 81 per cent. The two groups did not differ much on either the average years of service with the SDE or the average years in their current positions; this varied by less than one year in both instances.

The salaries of administrators in the elected group were somewhat higher than those in the appointed group. Sixty-five per cent in the elected group were earning more than $22,000 compared with 53 per cent in the appointed group. Seventy-four per cent of the administrators in the elected group felt that their salaries were as good or better than those paid most persons in positions of similar responsibility in their state, as against 58 per cent of the appointed group. The administrators in the appointed group were somewhat more positive about their chances to use their best abilities. Forty-eight per cent of them felt they had an excellent chance compared with 41 per cent of the elected group. The administrators in the elected group were slightly more positive in their ratings of the adequacy of legislative fiscal support for SDE programs. Seventy per cent of the elected group felt that this support was adequate for half or more of the SDE programs; only 64 per cent of the appointed group felt this way.

Changes in SDE Administrator Characteristics During the Last 35 Years

In the literature on the state department of education, two earlier studies on the characteristics of SDE personnel were found: (1) State

Personnel Administration: With Special Reference to Departments of Education, 1938, by Katherine Frederic[4] and (2) Strengthening State Departments of Education, 1966, by Roald F. Campbell, Gerald E. Sroufe, and Donald H. Layton.[5] An effort was made to extract some of their findings as a basis for comparison with this study. Both of the above studies included SDE positions below the third level of the bureaucracy in contrast with this study which included only the administrators in the upper three levels. The Frederic study included 40 states, the Campbell et. al. study included only three states, and this study (1973) included twelve states with a pronounced large state bias. Table 4-5 displays some selected comparisons of the findings of these three studies.

Some of the differences in the findings are attributable to the fact that the 1938 and 1966 findings were based on more position levels. In spite of this, some differences are worthy of comment. It would appear that SDE professional personnel are older today than they were in 1938. The 1938 study found the average age of SDE professional to be around 45 years, while the 1966 study found an average age of around 50 years. The findings of this study were similar to those of the 1966 study. In 1938, one-fourth of the SDE professional personnel surveyed were females. One would assume that there would be somewhat more women below the upper three levels in SDEs than was found in our study. The surprising comparison is that the 1966 study, which did cover the 4th and 5th levels of SDE professional employees, found that only 6 per cent of the professional personnel were females. This could indicate that our finding of 98 per cent males for SDE administrators is quite reflective of the overall condition. This finding is supportive of the notion that as education became more attractive to the male (1940-1970) the advancement opportunities for females decreased. It does appear that SDE professional personnel have become better educated over the years, at least in terms of

TABLE 4-5

COMPARISONS OF THE FINDINGS ON SDE PERSONNEL OF THREE SEPARATE STUDIES. 1938, 1966, AND 1973

Characteristics	Studies		
	1938[a]	1966[a]	1973
1. Average Age	45	50	48.9
2. Sex (Male)	57%	94%	98%
3. Master's Degree	43%	88%	87%
4. Doctor's Degree	9%	-	38%
5. Prior experience as a School Principal	38%	- (66%)[b]	34%
6. Prior experience as a School Superintendent	20%		23%
7. Mobility--Three or More States	-	8%	31%
8. Recruited from School Superintendency	-	12%	17%
9. Recruited by Personal Contact by SDE Personnel	Majority	77%	59%
10. Number of Years with the SDE (Ten or Less	69%	71%	61%
11. Number of Years at Current Position (Four or Less)	53%	60%	60%
12. Number of Positions (Two or Less)	75%	69%	52%

[a] Includes more than top three levels of SDE administrators

[b] Included only top two levels and was shown as a combined figure as either having been a principal or superintendent.

academic degrees. The percentage of those who had earned a master's degree was twice as high in the 1966 study as in the 1938 study. The percentage of those who had earned a doctor's degree was four times as high in our study as in the 1938 study. Though the findings on prior experience show some differences, the similarity between the findings is striking considering the 35-year time span between the 1938 and 1973 study. These similarities are also to be noted on the career pattern characteristics. The years of service with the SDE, years in their current positions, and number of positions held--all are remarkably alike for the SDE administrators in the three studies.

State-by-State Comparisons

Among the 12 SDEs there are some differences in their upper level administrators, as may be seen in Table 4-6. On some characteristics this variation is only minor; on others it is quite pronounced. The SDE administrators on a state-by-state basis were particularly homogenous by way of personal characteristics. Eight of the twelve groups were 100 per cent male; overall, 98 per cent of all upper level administrators were men. In six of the twelve SDEs the administrators were 100 per cent white, and this was only slightly less true in the other six SDEs. In terms of average age, the administrators in the individual states displayed a little more variation, with six years being the difference between the youngest and oldest (45.9 to 51.9) group of SDE administrators.

Much more striking are the differences on the background characteristics of these twelve groups of SDE administrators. In seven of the states a majority of the administrators were born in the state, with the highest percentage (86) being in Minnesota. In the other five states a majority of the administrators were born outside of the state, the highest percentage (73) being in Colorado. In seven of the twelve states a majority of the administrators classified the K-12 school community in which they received most of their schooling as rural, Minnesota again being at the top with 86 per cent. Among the five states in which a majority did not classify their communities as rural, Massachusetts was the lowest with five per cent. The mobility of the SDE administrators, though typically low, did differ substantially from state to state. The number who had lived in three or more states constituted

TABLE 4-6

RANK ORDERS OF THE TWELVE STATES ON THE TEN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SDE UPPER LEVEL ADMINISTRATORS USED IN THE FACTOR ANALYSIS

Average Age		% Instate Birth		K-12 School Community (10,000 or Less) (%)		K-12 School Community Rural (%)	
Fla.	51.9	Minn.	86	Minn.	79	Minn.	86
Neb.	51.5	Texas	81	Neb.	77	Neb.	71
Cal.	51.0	Mass.	73	Tenn.	74	Tenn.	68
N.Y.	50.9	Neb.	71	Wis.	68	Texas	63
Tenn.	50.4	Tenn.	68	Ga.	67	Wis.	58
Texas	49.6	N.Y.	59	Fla.	64	Cal.	57
Wis.	49.5	Ga.	53	Texas	63	Ga.	53
Mich.	47.6	Wis.	47	Cal.	48	Fla.	47
Mass.	46.5	Fla.	41	Mich.	33	Mich.	27
Minn.	46.3	Mich.	32	N.Y.	29	N.Y.	24
Col.	45.9	Cal.	30	Col.	27	Col.	20
Ga.	45.9	Col.	27	Mass.	10	Mass.	05

Permanent Address 3 States or More (%)		Graduate Institution % Attended Instate		Doctor's Degree (%)	
Col.	47	Tenn.	84	N.Y.	67
Mich.	47	Wis.	79	Mich.	60
Wis.	42	Fla.	77	Ga.	40
Cal.	39	Mass.	75	Mass.	40
N.Y.	35	Neb.	71	Cal.	39
Ga.	27	Cal.	70	Texas	38
Mass.	25	N.Y.	65	Wis.	32
Fla.	24	Texas	63	Col.	27
Minn.	21	Minn.	57	Fla.	24
Tenn.	21	Mich.	53	Minn.	21
Texas	19	Col.	53	Tenn.	21
Neb.	18	Ga.	40	Neb.	18

Previous Experience in Higher Education (%)		Previous Experience as a Supt. (%)		Previous Experience in a Rural District under 1,000 Students (%)	
Col.	60	Minn.	36	Neb.	77
N.Y.	56	Wis.	32	Minn.	50
Mich.	47	Texas	31	Wis.	42
Mass.	35	Neb.	29	Mich.	40
Wis.	32	Col.	27	Cal.	39
Cal.	30	Cal.	26	Texas	31
Neb.	30	Fla.	24	Col.	27
Texas	25	Tenn.	21	Tenn.	26
Fla.	24	N.Y.	15	Fla.	24
Minn.	21	Mass.	15	N.Y.	15
Tenn.	21	Ga.	13	Ga.	13
Ga.	20	Mich.	13	Mass.	10

47 per cent of the administrators in Colorado, but only 18 per cent in Nebraska.

On education characteristics, the administrators in the twelve states were quite similar in their attendance of "instate" undergraduate and graduate institutions. A majority of the administrators in eleven states attended "instate" undergraduate and graduate institutions. SDE administrators differed markedly on the percentage of those in each state who had earned a doctorate. Sixty-seven per cent of the New York administrators had completed a doctorate compared with 18 per cent for Nebraska.

The previous job experiences of the SDE administrators on a state-by-state basis were dissimilar. Sixty per cent of the administrators in Colorado had held positions in higher education, but this was true of only 21 per cent in Tennessee and Minnesota. Thirty-six per cent of the administrators in Minnesota had served as a public school superintendent, while only 13 per cent of Michigan and 15 per cent of New York administrators had held this position. Previous experience in a rural school district with less than 1,000 students was also quite varied. Not surprisingly, 77 per cent of the Nebraska administrators had worked in this type of district, as against 10 per cent in Massachusetts.

The positions from which the SDE administrators were recruited showed considerable state-by-state variation. Thirty-eight per cent of the New York administrators were recruited from positions in higher education, whereas none were recruited from this field in Minnesota and Nebraska. Sixty per cent of the SDE administrators in Georgia were recruited from positions in public school administration; the comparable figure was 20 per cent for the Michigan SDE administrators. Recruitment of administrators from noneducation positions ranged from a high of 42 per cent in Tennessee to a low of 13 per cent in California. Recruiting individuals from positions within the state was a characteristic on which the SDEs were largely similar. The high was 95 per cent in Wisconsin, the low 71 per cent in Florida.

The career patterns of the SDE administrators--measured by the average years of service with the SDE and average years in their current positions--differed substantially among the twelve states. The Nebraska administrators had served an average of 13.5 years with the SDE, as against 5.3 years for the administrators in Colorado. In their current positions the Wisconsin administrators had served an average of 6.9 years compared with 2.0 years for the administrators in Colorado.

The salaries of these administrators, and the salary comparisons made by them, were very different from state to state. Over 90 per cent of the New York SDE administrators were earning over $22,000; just 5 per cent of these in Tennessee were in that income bracket. While more than 80 per cent of the administrators in New York, Michigan, and Florida felt their salaries were as good or better than those paid to individuals in comparable positions in their state, a mere six per cent of the administrators in Nebraska felt this way. In evaluating their chances to use their best abilities in the SDE, 70 per cent or more of the administrators in each state department said they had an excellent or good chance. More variation existed among the states on the percentage of those who responded "excellent" to this question. This ranged from a high of 60 per cent in Colorado and Michigan to a low of 25 per cent in Massachusetts. Considerable variation existed on the evaluation of the adequacy of legislative fiscal support of programs for which the SDE was responsible. While 80 per cent or more of the administrators in Florida, Georgie, and Tennessee felt legislative fiscal support was adequate for half or more of the SDE programs, only 20 per cent of the administrators in Massachusetts felt this way.

Factor Analysis

Procedure

In the previous sections of this chapter we described the SDE administrator characteristics and discussed some state-by-state differences. We now turn to an effort to determine the internal correlations among the 23 administrator characteristics (shown in Table 4-2). To do this, one needs a mechanism for sorting out the commonality and diversity among these characteristics. Factor analysis serves this need. This technique starts from the assumption that statistical relationships among variables signal the existence of underlying traits (i.e., "factors") they share in common. Stated otherwise, a factor analysis manipulates a collection of variables to discern the patterns of association among them. The groups of variables that relate closely to one another, but only loosely (or not at all) to other variables, or groups of variables, are extracted as the principal factors. The individual variables that show the strongest relationship with other members of their factor have, in the language of factor analysis, the highest loadings. More specifically, a variable loading is the coefficient of correlation between the variable and the underlying factor. The variables with the highest loadings come closest to representing that underlying trait, although it is unlikely that any single variable represents that trait perfectly.[6]

The factor analytic technique employed here was that of principal component analysis with a varimax rotation.[7] In the initial factor analysis the state scores on twenty-three SDE administrator variables were rotated on six factors. Some of these variables loaded high on more than one factor while others loaded weak on all of the factors. The ten variables (shown in Table 4-6) that had the strongest and the "purest" loadings, and that seemed to offer the most potential for discerning differences among these 12 groups of

SDE administrators, were selected for the final factor analysis. These ten variables were rotated on three factors, which we subsequently labeled: (1) "Rural-School Superintendent" type SDE administrator; (2) "Experienced" type SDE administrator; and (3) "Mobile" type SDE administrators. The labels, of course, are our names and are based on the characteristics that loaded the highest on each of the three factors. In a general sense, these dimensions are the ones which most differentiated the SDE administrators in one SDE from those in another.

The three dimensions of SDE administrator characteristics and the loadings of the ten variables on each dimension are presented in Tables 4-7, 4-8, and 4-9. In addition, the 12 SDEs with their factor scores on each of these dimensions are also shown in Tables 4-7, 4-8, and 4-9.

The proportion of total variance among these 12 groups of SDE administrators that could be associated with these three dimensions are: "Rural Superintendent" dimension (.39), "Experienced" dimension (.15), and "Mobility" dimension (.13). The three factors combined accounted for 67 per cent of the variance among the 12 groups of SDE administrators. The correlation among factors was low as is shown below:

Factors	1	2	3
1	1.00	.21	.01
2	.21	1.00	.05
3	.01	.05	1.00

Administrator Types

The variables that have the highest positive loadings on the "Rural-School Superintendent" dimension are: prior experience as a public school superintendent; K-12 school attendance in a rural community; and prior experience in a rural school district. There is also a strong negative loading on having a doctor's degree. The inter-correlations among these

TABLE 4-7

FACTOR 1 - "RURAL SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT" TYPE SDE ADMINISTRATORS

Loadings of 10 SDE Administrator Variables

1.	Prior Experience as a Public School Superintendent	+.85
2.	Attended K-12 School in a Rural Community	+.72
3.	Prior Experience in a Rural School District	+.70
4.	High Average Age	+.17
5.	Attended an "Instate" Graduate Institution	+.15
6.	"Instate" birth	+.08
7.	Years with the SDE	-.06
8.	Mobility	-.16
9.	Prior Experience in a Higher Education Position	-.34
10.	Doctorate Degree	-.71

State Rankings and Factor Scores

1.	Minnesota	+1.54
2.	Nebraska	+1.05
3.	California	+0.74
4.	Wisconsin	+0.63
5.	Colorado	+0.37
6.	Florida	+0.12
7.	Tennessee	+0.02
8.	Texas	-0.04
9.	Georgia	-0.08
10.	Michigan	-0.93
11.	New York	-1.31
12.	Massachusetts	-1.38

Correlation of High Loading Variables

Variables	1	2	3	10
1	1.00	.66	.61	-.65
2	.66	1.00	.60	-.58
3	.61	.60	1.00	-.43
10	-.65	-.58	-.43	1.00

TABLE 4-8

FACTOR 2 - "EXPERIENCED" TYPE SDE ADMINISTRATORS

Loadings of 10 SDE Administrator Variables

1.	High Average Age	+.83
2.	Attended an "Instate" Graduate Institution	+.73
3.	Years with the SDE	+.71
4.	Prior Experience in a Rural School District	+.22
5.	Attended K-12 School in a Rural Community	+.16
6.	"Instate" birth	+.03
7.	Prior Experience as a Public School Superintendent	-.01
8.	Doctorate Degree	-.02
9.	Prior Experience in a Higher Education Position	-.17
10.	Mobility	-.20

State Rankings and Factor Scores

1.	Nebraska	+1.02
2.	California	+0.89
3.	Tennessee	+0.86
4.	Florida	+0.76
5.	New York	+0.74
6.	Wisconsin	+0.47
7.	Massachusetts	-0.09
8.	Michigan	-0.40
9.	Texas	-0.47
10.	Minnesota	-0.99
11.	Georgia	-1.15
12.	Colorado	-1.62

Correlation of High Loading Variables

Variables	1	2	3
1	1.00	.67	.58
2	.67	1.00	.48
3	.58	.48	1.00

TABLE 4-9

FACTOR 3 - "MOBILE" TYPE SDE ADMINISTRATORS

Loadings of 10 SDE Administrator Variables

1.	Mobility	+.89
2.	Prior Experience in a Higher Education Position	+.72
3.	Doctorate Degree	+.34
4.	Higher Average Age	+.02
5.	Prior Experience in a Rural School District	+.01
6.	Prior Experience as a Public School Superintendent	-.10
7.	Attended an "Instate" Graduate Institution	-.10
8.	Years with the SDE	-.29
9.	Attended K-12 School in a Rural Community	-.45
10.	"Instate" birth	-.84

State Rankings and Factor Scores

1.	Colorado	+1.64
2.	Michigan	+1.18
3.	Wisconsin	+0.86
4.	California	+0.79
5.	New York	+0.43
6.	Florida	-0.02
7.	Nebraska	-0.48
8.	Georgia	-0.73
9.	Tennessee	-0.80
10.	Massachusetts	-0.81
11.	Texas	-0.89
12.	Minnesota	-0.20

Correlation of High Loading Variables

Variables	1	2	10
1	1.00	.72	-.82
2	.72	1.00	-.48
10	-.82	-.48	1.00

high loading variables are above the .05 level (r = .53) for five of the six correlations (see Table 4-7). The highest loadings on the "Experienced" dimension are: high average age, having attended an "instate" graduate institution, and number of years with the SDE. The inter-correlations among these variables are above the .05 level for two of the three correlations (see Table 4-8). The highest positive loadings on the "Mobility" dimension are: mobility of the SDE administrators, and prior experience in a higher education position. There also is a strong negative loading involving instate birth. The inter-correlations among these variables are above the .05 level for two of the three correlations (see Table 4-9).

Factor scores show how each state compares with the other states in this study on the particular factor that is described. The computation of factor scores takes account of the loading of individual variables in each factor, and the score of each state on each of the variables. To illustrate, the factor score for Minnesota on the "Rural-School Superintendent" dimension (Table 4-7) is computed from the state scores on the SDE administrator variables in the factor, weighted according to their loadings on the factor.

The results of this factor analysis make sense in that the states which had the highest factor scores on the three dimensions were at or near the top in their ranking on the variables that loaded the highest on these dimensions. For example, Minnesota had the highest factor score on the "Rural-School Superintendent" dimension and the Minnesota SDE administrators (shown in Table 4-6) ranked first on prior experience as a school superintendent; ranked first on attending K-12 school in a rural school district; and ranked tenth in terms of the percentage who had earned a doctor's degree.

Correlates of Administrator Types

The state factor scores on each dimension were used as the basis for correlation with 20 other state variables. These variables were:*

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*For specific scores for each of the 12 states see Appendix C.

Socioeconomic

1. Personal income per capita
2. Total population
3. Percentage of urban population
4. Percentage of population 25 years of age or older with four or more years of high school
5. Rate of population growth
6. Industrialization Index
7. Region (South and non-South)

Structural

8. Size of SDE professional staff
9. Method of selecting CSSO
10. Independence of CSSO from general state government
11. Method of selecting SBE members
12. SDE/LEA ratio
13. Per cent of state support in the SDE budget
14. Per cent of revenue for public elementary and secondary education from local government
15. Civil service requirements for SDE

Political

16. Inter-party competition
17. Per cent of voting age population voting for U. S. Representative in 1970
18. State legislators biennial salary 1970
19. Political culture score
20. Legislature "effectiveness" score

Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were computed. In computing them, all the measures were assumed to have the characteristics of an interval scale. Simple correlation coefficients above the .05 level of confidence (r = .53) were taken as indicators of relationships that were sizable enough to warrant comment. Since the data in this study constitute a population, the tests of statistical significance have no inferential meaning. Correlation coefficients at or above .05 are shown in Table 4-10. Only five (8 per cent) of the 60 correlation coefficients are above the .05 level and those correlates are not very strong. The dimension of "Rural-School Superintendent" type of SDE administrator correlates negatively at the .05 level with just two of the state variables. These are size of SDE professional staff (-.53) and percentage of state support in the SDE budget (-.58).

TABLE 4-10

SDE ADMINISTRATOR CHARACTERISTICS DIMENSIONS CORRELATED WITH OTHER STATE CHARACTERISTICS

"Rural-School Superintendent"		
(struc.)	Size of SDE Professional Staff	-.53
(struc.)	Per cent of State Support in SDE Budget	-.58
"Experienced Administrators"		
(pol.)	Legislative Effectiveness Ranking	.58
"Mobile Administrators"		
(struc.)	Independence of the CSSO	.61
(pol.)	Inter-party Competition	.55

Apparently, states with larger professional staffs in their SDEs and those that provided more state support in the SDE budget had fewer "Rural-School Superintendent" type SDE administrators. The dimension of "Experienced" type of SDE administrators correlates positively at the .05 level with only one of the state variables. This correlate was the Citizens Conference's measure of legislative effectiveness (.58). This correlate indicates that those states in which the SDE administrators had served somewhat longer and were older in average age were the states in which the legislatures were evaluated as being more effective. The dimension of "Mobile" type of SDE administrator correlates positively at the .05 level with two state variables. These are the independence of the CSSO from the general state government (.61) and inter-party competition (.55). The correlation with independence of the CSSO could be a reflection of the disproportionate influence of California and Florida since both have elected CSSOs, presumably more independent. The positive correlation with inter-party competition is logical in that mobility is lower in the Southern states and these states have lower rankings on the inter-party competition variable.

The morale or attitudinal characteristics of the SDE administrators (shown in Table 4-2, items 21, 22, and 23), and their correlates, were of particular interest. To probe this area a bit further, we correlated the responses in these areas with the SDE administrator dimensions. These correlations are shown in Table 4-11.

TABLE 4-11

ATTITUDINAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SDE ADMINISTRATORS
CORRELATED WITH ADMINISTRATOR TYPES

Characteristics	"Rural School Supt." Type	"Experienced" Type	"Mobile" Type
1. Administrators who compared their salaries favorably with others in the state	.27	.11	-.43
2. Administrators who felt they had an excellent chance to use their best abilities in the SDE	-.03	.04	-.42
3. Administrators who evaluated legislative fiscal support as being adequate for half or more of the SDE programs	-.06	-.08	-.01

While none of these correlates reach the .05 level, two of the negative correlations with "mobile" type of administrators are relatively high. These relationships may suggest that SDEs which employ more mobile individuals have administrators who are somewhat less favorable in their attitudes toward both their salaries and the opportunity to use their best abilities.

In summary, our efforts did not produce many correlates between the SDE administrator dimensions and the other state variables, and the few that did emerge were not strong. The differences among the states on these dimensions might well reflect different state traditions and practices. Obviously, one could continue to speculate as to what might cause SDEs to employ the "rural-school superintendent" type, or to have professionals who have been with the

SDE a longer number of years ("experienced"), or to recruit the more highly educated "mobile" type of administrator. But very little relationship has been shown between any of these dimensions and the other state variables. It should, of course, be recognized that, even though few strong relationships emerged from the correlation analysis, we now know more than we did before. It seems important to known what relationships are not sustained as well as those that are.

While the results of the factor analysis and the correlation of these dimensions with the other state variables did not produce many significant relationships, the dimensions that emerged from the factor analysis, and the ranking of the 12 states on these dimensions, are useful in a descriptive sense. They do provide a better understanding of the particular dimension or dimensions that differentiate the administrators among the twelve SDEs. Table 4-12 represents our efforts to characterize the SDE administrators from each of the states as they related to the three dimensions identified by the factor analysis. To do this, SDE administrators were subjectively classified on the three dimensions in the following manner:

Above +.75	+.74 to +.38	+.37 to -.37	-.36 to -.75	-.76 and below
Very High	High	Average	Low	Very Low

Using this classification scheme, we characterized these SDE administrators on the dimensions according to their factor scores. California SDE administrators, for instance, are characterized as "Mobile Experienced" administrators. The descriptive characterizations that can be derived from Table 4-12 are as follows:

1. California - "Mobile Experienced" administrators
2. Florida - "Experienced" administrators
3. Georgia - "Young Immobile" administrators
4. Wisconsin - "Mobile" administrators
5. Colorado - "Young Mobile" administrators

6. Massachusetts - "Immobile Non-Rural School Superintendent" administrators
7. Michigan - "Mobile Non-Rural School Superintendent" administrators
8. Minnesota - "Young Immobile Rural School Superintendent" administrators
9. Nebraska - "Experienced Rural School Superintendent" administrators
10. New York - "Non-Rural School Superintendent" administrators
11. Tennessee - "Experienced Immobile" administrators
12. Texas - "Immobile" administrators

TABLE 4-12

THE 12 GROUPS OF SDE ADMINISTRATORS CHARACTERIZED ON THE THREE DESCRIPTIVE DIMENSIONS

States	"Rural School Supt." Type	"Experienced" Type	"Mobile" Type
California	High	Very high	Very high
Florida	Average	Very high	Average
Georgia	Average	Very low	Very low
Wisconsin	High	High	Very high
Colorado	Average	Very low	Very high
Massachusetts	Very low	Average	Very low
Michigan	Very low	Low	Very high
Minnesota	Very high	Very low	Very low
Nebraska	Very high	Very high	Low
New York	Very low	High	High
Tennessee	Average	Very high	Very low
Texas	Average	Low	Very low

Concluding Observations

As we review the data and analyses set forth in this chapter we come to a number of concluding observations.

1. Upper level administrators in these twelve state departments of education are, for the most part, male, white, "instate" by way of birth and

education, and with prior experience as public school teachers and administrators. Only five per cent of these persons were from ethnic minorities and only two per cent were women. One suspects that affirmative action programs and a need for more diverse skills on the part of SDE staff will soon require some changes in this general picture.

2. With respect to many characteristics CSSOs are much like their immediate subordinates (associate and assistant superintendents and directors). There are, however, some differences that we shall note. As might be expected CSSOs are older and their salaries are higher. Chiefs are somewhat less "instate" products than are their subordinates. On the other hand, they have more frequently been district school superintendents than have other SDE top level administrators.

3. In most respects SDE top level administrators are not differentiated by the method used in selecting the CSSO. However, SDE administrators with elected chiefs tend to have had more rural school experience and to come more frequently from a background of employment in local school administration. SDE administrators with appointed chiefs more frequently have had experience in higher education.

4. In a number of characteristics upper level SDE administrators have changed little over the past third of a century. In terms of age, recruitment from local school administration, recruitment by means of personal contact, and tenure in the SDE the picture in 1973 was much like it was in 1938. One notable change over the period is the amount of graduate training possessed by SDE administrators; for instance, the percentage with a doctoral degree in 1973 was 38 as compared to nine in 1938. We note again, however, that two-thirds of the graduate work of SDE administrators was done at "instate" institutions. This may help explain why most characteristics of SDE administrators seem to have changed little over the years.

5. The characteristics of SDE upper level administrators vary appreciably among states. For instance, by way of "instate" birth the percentage in Minnesota was 86, while in Colorado it was 27. In terms of a K-12 rural school background for SDE administrators, again the percentage was 86 in Minnesota but only five in Massachusetts. As to graduate training 84 per cent of the SDE administrators in Tennessee did such work "instate" while for Georgia the corresponding figure was 40 per cent. Percentage of those holding the doctoral degree was 67 in New York and 18 in Nebraska. The proportion of those with prior experience in higher education was 60 per cent in Colorado and 20 per cent in Georgia. Still another contrast was found in those with prior experience as a local district superintendent; in Minnesota the percentage was 36 while in Michigan it was 13. While these figures prove nothing, it seems that when a state finds itself in the extreme end of a distribution it may wish to examine why that is the case and possibly also raise the question of desirability.

6. The factor analysis permitted us to characterize SDE upper level administrators into three groups: a "rural school superintendent" type, an "experienced administrator" type, and a "mobile administrator" type. The common element in all three types is administrative experience in schools as a prerequisite to employment in the SDE. In a day of increasing specialization in such areas as information systems, data processing, planning, and evaluation, the great reliance on school administrative experience and the relative lack of salience of experience in other areas and in other types of institutions seems open to question.

7. Few other state variables were significantly related to any of the three administrator types. However, relationship between size of SDE staff and the rural school superintendent type was negative (-.53) as was per cent of state support in SDE budget (-.58). Only a legislative effectiveness

ranking was related to the experienced administrator type (.58). Two state factors were related to the mobile administrator type: independence of CSSO (.61) and interparty competition (.55). Relationships between any of the administrator types and such items as personal income per capita, total population, percentage of urban population, years of schooling of persons 25 years of age and older, rate of population growth, industrialization, region (South and non-South), method of selecting state board members, civil service requirements, or political culture score were not significant. Frankly, we were surprised that none of these variables appeared to be related to the characteristics of SDE upper level administrators. It almost appears that state departments operate independently of the culture in which they exist.

8. Sixty per cent of all SDE upper level administrators in this study were recruited by means of personal contact on the part of a person already in the state department. If state department personnel are to have more diversity by way of personal characteristics and possibly also by way of attitudes, understandings, and skills the recruitment process will probably have to be extended. This is not to discourage personal contact as a desirable method. It is to suggest that the whole recruitment process needs to be more complete. Persons may need to be sought in settings other than schools and more formal procedures than personal contacts may have to be employed.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER IV

[1] Gary V. Branson, "The Characteristics of Upper Level Administrators in State Departments of Education and the Relationship of These Characteristics to Other State Variables" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1974).

[2] Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 11.

[3] Burton R. Clark, "Sociology of Education," in Robert E.L. Faris (ed.), Handbook of Sociology (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964), pp. 753-757.

[4] Katherine A. Frederic, State Personnel Administration: With Special Reference to Departments of Education (Washington, D.C.: The Advisory Committee on Education, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939).

[5] Roald F. Campbell, Gerald E. Sroufe, and Donald H. Layton, Strengthening State Departments of Education (Chicago: The University of Chicago, Midwest Administration Center, 1967).

[6] A good general discussion of factor analysis is contained in Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Policy" in Politics in the American States, (eds.), Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971), pp. 587-588.

[7] R.J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI (December, 1967), pp. 478-480.

CHAPTER V

GOVERNORS AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING

Edward R. Hines

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the roles of governors in legislative policy making for the public schools. To do this, we first will describe governors' involvement in each stage of the policy process. As indicated in Chapter I, this process can be conceived of as occurring in four functional stages: issue definition, proposal formulation, support mobilization, and decision enactment. Our choice to examine the extent of governors' educational involvement in each policy-making stage is somewhat arbitrary, for in reality the four stages are highly interrelated.

Second, we will construct an index of governors' educational policy-making involvement by analyzing the extent of their involvement in each stage of the policy process. By comparing governors' ranking on this index of educational involvement with other background and policy-making variables, we hope to explain more fully gubernatorial involvement in state policy making for the public schools.

The Educational Governance Project (EGP) afforded an opportunity to investigate the role of the governor in educational policy making. The interview schedules used by the EGP provide the basic data for the description and analysis contained in this chapter. There were an average of thirty-five formal interviews in each of twelve states with a range of twenty-four to forty-nine respondents in each state. Material from secondary sources as well as detailed case studies describing state policy-making systems for public schools in each state provided an additional data base for research on governors. Table 5-1 contains some of the background characteristics of these twelve governors.

TABLE 5-1

GOVERNORS WHO WERE IN OFFICE AT THE TIME OF THE EGP, 1972-1973 (N=12)

States	Political Party	Length of Term in Yrs.	Present Term Began	Number of Previous Terms	Interviewed by EGP
California	R	4	1971	1	No
Colorado	R	4	1971	2	Yes
Florida	D	4	1971	0	Yes
Georgia	D	4	1971	0	Yes
Massachusetts	R	4	1971	0[a]	Yes
Michigan	R	4	1971	0[a]	Yes
Minnesota	DFL[b]	4	1971	0	No
Nebraska	D	4	1971	0	Yes
New York	R	4	1971	3	No
Tennessee	R	4	1971	0	Yes
Texas[c]	D	2	1971	1	Yes
Wisconsin	D	4	1971	0	No

[a] The Massachusetts and Michigan Governors succeeded to office in January, 1969, to fill the unexpired terms of the former Governors, respectively.

[b] Democratic-Farmer-Labor.

[c] Preston Smith, Governor of Texas from 1969 through 1972, was defeated in the 1972 primary by Dolph Briscoe, who became Governor and began his term of office in 1973.

SOURCE: The Book of the States, 1972-1973, The Council of State Governments, Lexington, Kentucky, 1972, p. 151.

Issue Definition

This initial stage of the policy-making process is one in which the preferences of individuals and groups become translated into political issues. As chief executive, the governor has great opportunity for defining state issues. The visibility of the governor and the resources available enable him to select those issues to be formulated into policy proposals, to define the issues in ways in which their saliency can be maximized, and to emphasize those issues deemed important. Governors' involvement in the issue definition stage of the policy process was considered from two perspectives: (1) the emphasis they gave to educational issues in their 1970 campaigns, and (2) the extent to which public school issues were a top priority in governors' subsequent legislative programs.

Education and Gubernatorial Campaigns

The views of governors, members of their staffs, and other executive officials will be used to determine the extent of governors' involvement in education as part of their 1970 campaigns. Four of the governors, despite repeated efforts, could not be interviewed, but of the eight governors who were interviewed, six believed that educational issues had been used in the 1970 campaigns (see Table 5-2). The Massachusetts and Nebraska governors did not believe that they used education as a campaign issue.

TABLE 5-2

GOVERNORS' VIEWS ABOUT THEIR USE OF EDUCATIONAL ISSUES, INCLUDING SCHOOL FINANCE, IN THEIR CAMPAIGNS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE (N=9)

State	Interviewee	Educational Issues Were Used	Educational Issues Were Not Used
Colorado[1]	Governor	X	
	Lt. Governor	X	
Florida	Governor	X	
Georgia	Governor	X	
Massachusetts[2]	Lt. Governor		X
Michigan	Governor	X	
Nebraska	Governor		X
Tennessee	Governor	X	
Texas	Governor	X	
Total	9 (8 states)	7 (6 states)	2

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[1] While both Governor and Lieutenant Governor were interviewed in Colorado, this research will treat Colorado as though one representative, the Governor, was the respondent.

[2] It was confirmed by the Massachusetts Governor that the Lieutenant Governor handled educational matters, but this research will treat Massachusetts as though the Governor was the respondent.

This same question regarding governors' campaign involvement in education was asked of other key actors. Table 5-3 reports executive staff members' responses to this question. In the eight states where both governors and their staffs were interviewed, there was disagreement only in Colorado where staff members did not believe that education had been a campaign issue. Careful examination of the EGP interview schedules revealed that the Colorado Governor and Lieutenant Governor were hesitant about whether education had been used as a campaign issue. Although citizen concerns about taxes were beginning to surface in Colorado in 1970, educational issues do not appear to have been in the forefront. In Massachusetts, three staff members believed that education was a 1970 campaign issue but twice as many

TABLE 5-3

GOVERNORS' EMPHASIS OF EDUCATIONAL ISSUES INCLUDING SCHOOL FINANCE, IN THEIR CAMPAIGNS ACCORDING TO MEMBERS OF GOVERNORS' PERSONAL STAFFS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF ADMINISTRATION/FINANCE (N=37)

State	Number Interviewed[a]	Educational Issues Were Used	Educational Issues Were Not Used
California	3	3	0
Colorado	2	0	2
Florida	2	2	0
Georgia	2	2	0
Massachusetts[b]	9	3	6
Michigan	3	3	0
Minnesota[c]	1	1	0
Nebraska	2	0	2
New York	4	4	0
Tennessee	3	3	0
Texas	3	3	0
Wisconsin	3	3	0
Total	37	27	10

[a] In all states except Minnesota, at least one representative of Administration/Finance was interviewed.

[b] In Massachusetts, eight members of the Governor's and Lieutenant Governor's Personal Staffs were interviewed, and one representative of Administration/Finance was interviewed. This number was unusually great because of the rapid turnover in staff and the fact that educational functions were performed by members of both the Governor's and the Lieutenant Governor's Personal Staffs.

[c] In Minnesota, only one member of the Governor's Personal Staff was interviewed.

did not believe that education was a campaign issue. Colorado, Massachusetts, and Nebraska will be treated as though education had not been a campaign issue.

The next question asked of members of executive staffs was which educational issues were included in the 1970 gubernatorial campaigns. Educational issues were subordinate to tax reform or emerged only indirectly in California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and New York. Table 5-4 indicates that various educational issues surfaced in the other eight states during the campaigns with those relating to school finance being the most prevalent.

Governors and Educational Legislation

Three groups of individuals were interviewed regarding the extent to which governors emphasized public school issues in their legislative programs: persons in state departments of education working on legislative matters whom we designated as legislative experts, legislators, and educational interest group (EIG) leaders. The responses of these three groups are summarized in Table 5-5. SDE legislative experts in Colorado, Massachusetts, and Nebraska, in agreement with governors' staff responses, said that these governors had not emphasized public school issues in their legislative programs. On the other hand, 63 per cent of the Colorado legislators interviewed and two-thirds of the interest group leaders believed that the Governor _had_ emphasized educational legislation. These differences can be explained. Colorado legislators who said that the Governor had given emphasis to educational legislation were confronted, at the time of the field interviews (early 1973), by a school finance issue, and their responses were undoubtedly affected by that pending issue. Further, examination of the Colorado interview schedules for legislators and EIG leaders showed that the Governor was not considered to be a strong voice for or against education. Rather, he seemed to have been considered as supportive of education because he had not opposed educational measures such as increasing school aid. The Colorado Governor had no record of involvement in educational policy making. The Massachusetts Governor, according to a majority of legislators and EIG leaders, had not emphasized educational legislation,

TABLE 5-4

EXECUTIVE STAFF MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO THE OPEN-ENDED QUESTION ABOUT WHICH EDUCATIONAL ISSUES WERE USED IN GOVERNORS' CAMPAIGNS (N=37)

State	Educational Issues Which Were Mentioned as Having Been Used by Governors in Their Campaigns for Office
California	Tax reform and school finance
Colorado	Property tax reform; school finance was included indirectly
Florida	Getting more citizens involved in educational affairs; accountability; assessment, equalization of state funding
Georgia	Planning; improvement of the Minimum Foundation Plan; early childhood education
Massachusetts	Property tax relief; to a lesser extent attaining greater inter-district equalization
Michigan	School finance; equalization; quality of education; reorganization in education; vocational and special education
Minnesota	Tax reform; increasing state aid to education; holding the line on taxes
Nebraska	Holding the line on taxes, while not decreasing aid to education
New York	School finance; increasing efficiency in fiscal management in education
Tennessee	Kindergarten education; special education; decreasing the pupil/teacher ratio; increasing teacher salaries
Texas	Vocational and technical education; bilingual education; increasing teacher salaries
Wisconsin	Property tax relief; school finance

and assigned educational matters to his Lieutenant Governor. Additionally, elementary and secondary education in Massachusetts appears to be regulated primarily by statutory guidelines, leaving little room for executive initiative in education. Six of seven Nebraska legislators interviewed viewed the Governor as not being active in education, but only one-third of the EIGs saw the Nebraska Governor as not active in educational legislation. Those Nebraska EIG leaders who viewed the Governor as active in educational

TABLE 5-5

VIEWS OF SDE LEGISLATIVE EXPERTS, LEGISLATORS, AND EIG LEADERS REGARDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, INCLUDING SCHOOL FINANCE, WERE EMPHASIZED BY GOVERNORS IN THEIR LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMS (N=246)

	SDE Legislative Experts			Legislators			EIG Leaders		
	N	Educational Issues		N	Ed. Issues		N	Ed. Issues	
State		Emph	Not Emph		Emph	Not Emph		Emph	Not Emph
California	1	0	1	15	4	11	7	0	7
Colorado	1	0	1	16	10	6	6	4	2
Florida	2	2	0	6	3	3	6	4	2
Georgia	2	2	0	13	12	1	5	5	0
Massachusetts	1	0	1	16	4	12	7	3	4
Michigan	1	1	0	15	13	2	9	7	2
Minnesota	2	2	0	15	15	0	3	3	0
Nebraska	1	0	1	7	1	6	3	2	1
New York	4[a]	4	0	18	12	6	5	3	2
Tennessee	1	1	0	11	11	0	5	5	0
Texas	1	1	0	10	8	2	6	6	0
Wisconsin	1	1	0	17	16	1	7	6	1
Total	18	14	4	159	109	50	69	48	21

[a] In New York the number of "Legislative Experts" in the State Education Department exceeded those found in other states because in New York individuals were located who worked on both the legal and the fiscal aspects of educational legislative matters.

legislation said that the Governor's recent (1972) educational activity was in his veto of a major school finance bill. While one EIG leader in Nebraska, a former legislator, said that the Nebraska Governor may have been disposed to passing the bill for school aid increase, the Governor was under pressure from conservatives to hold to his campaign pledge of no new taxes. The Nebraska Governor was determined to reduce state spending and thus, the major school finance bill was vetoed.

In his 1970 campaign, according to members of the Governor's personal staff, the California Governor emphasized education. But in subsequent educational legislation,as one aide saw it, school finance was emphasized only "in the sense that it was part and parcel of the overall tax reform problem." The California SDE legislative expert and all EIG leaders believed that the Governor had not emphasized educational legislation. Seventy-three per cent of the California legislators interviewed agreed that the Governor had not emphasized public school issues in his legislative proposals.

Turning to those governors who emphasized public school issues in their legislation, SDE legislative experts and at least half of the legislators and EIG leaders believed that governors had emphasized public school issues in Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. Table 5-5 reports a nearly unanimous response regarding these governors being active in educational legislation with the exceptions of Florida and New York. A small number of legislators were interviewed in Florida, and these legislators may not have been at all representative. In early 1973, there were feelings of uncertainty about the Florida Governor because the issue of school finance was far from resolved at the beginning of the legislative session. A major school finance bill was finally passed late in the 1973 session, apparently influenced by the work of nationallyrecognized consultants who were brought to Florida to work with legislators and a citizens' committee appointed by the Governor. In the process, however, the Governor gained a reputation as an education advocate because of his support of reform in school finance. In New York, the Governor's primary legislative thrust in 1972 was a hold-the-line fiscal posture. Educational interest group leaders in New York expressed concern about the Governor's recent critical position toward education. But unlike the Nebraska Governor, the New York Governor had established a long-standing progressive record in education. His shift toward a politically conservative posture, in the opinion of some observers, was made for other political reasons. Unlike the California Governor, New York's Governor was not perceived as anti-education but as assuming a stance reflective of hard fiscal realities during a period when the agencies were demanding more money than the state had in available revenue.

Legislators were asked about which educational issues had surfaced as a top priority in governors' legislative programs. There can be no doubt that school finance was considered the most common legislative issue in education. As shown in Table 5-6, school finance was mentioned more than twice as often as the next most frequently mentioned issue, tax reform which of course is related to school finance. In Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Florida it is apparent that school finance and tax reform were viewed as related issues. The other five most frequently mentioned educational legislative issues were, in order: early childhood education, holding the line on spending, higher education, vocational/technical education, and reorganization. Reorganization was an aggregate of several related issues including school consolidation, assessment, and educational reorganization at the state level.

TABLE 5-6

LEGISLATORS' RESPONSES TO THE OPEN-ENDED QUESTION ABOUT WHICH EDUCATIONAL ISSUES WERE GIVEN TOP PRIORITY IN GOVERNORS' LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMS (N=159)

STATE	N	School Finance[a]	Tax Reform	Hold the line on spending	Accountability[b]	Early Childhood Education	Higher Education	Pupil/Teacher Ratio	Remedial Instruction	Reorganization[c]	Special Education	Teacher Salaries	Vocational Education	Pro-educational rhetoric with no fiscal follow-through or support	Total[d]
California	15	2	7	7			1								17
Colorado	16	14	4		1					3				1	23
Florida	6	2	2	1											5
Georgia	13	4				11		2	2		6	4	4		33
Massachusetts	16	3		1			3			5				3	15
Michigan	15	12	3		1					2				2	20
Minnesota	15	12	11								1				24
Nebraska	7		6	5											11
New York	18	13		3	3		5							1	25
Tennessee	11					12	1			2	2	3	1	1	22
Texas	10	3				1	1					2	7		14
Wisconsin	17	16	6		2		5			2	1				32
Total	159	81	39	17	7	24	16	2	2	14	10	9	12	8	241

[a] In this instance, the category of school finance included increasing the amount of state support to education and changing the distribution mechanism to effect greater equalization among local districts.

[b] In Colorado, Michigan, and Wisconsin, accountability refers to movements in each of the three states to define, more precisely, educational output in terms of quantifiable measures. In New York accountability appears a bit more vague and refers to the wishes of the Governor and some state legislators to achieve greater fiscal efficiency in education.

[c] In Colorado, reorganization refers to district consolidation of schools. In the other four states, reorganization refers to structural reorganization, either accomplished or called for, at the state level.

[d] Total responses are for each state. The Grand Total exceeds the aggregate of those interviewed because of multiple responses.

Comparative Summary

According to the perceptions of those interviewed, governors in nine of the twelve states had been involved in education either by including education as a campaign issue or by emphasizing education in their legislative programs. In this initial policy-making stage of issue definition, governors should be viewed not only according to the extent of their educational involvement but also according to the nature of this involvement. Four governors appeared to be oriented toward fiscal reform in the areas of school finance and taxation. By fiscal reform, we mean that these governors attempted to increase the overall funding for education as well as the state percentage of aid to education. Changes were proposed in the allocation formula to achieve greater inter-district equalization and to relieve the property tax burden. The Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Florida governors were actively involved in defining educational issues so as to stress the need for reform in school finance and taxation.

The Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas governors were involved in education but school finance and tax reform had not emerged as major state-level issues. The definition of educational issues by these three governors appeared to be more in a traditional sense of focusing upon programs and their possible expansion. In Georgia the issue was early childhood education, in Tennessee it was kindergarten education, and in Texas the issues were vocational and technical education. Thus, these three governors may be viewed as wishing to expand educational programs.

In this initial stage of issue definition, the Colorado, Massachusetts, and Nebraska governors were not particularly involved in education. Although school finance and tax reform emerged as major issues in Colorado during the 1973 legislative session, the Colorado Governor apparently did not have such an interest prior to 1973. In like manner, the Massachusetts Governor could not be pictured as an "education governor." The Nebraska Governor did not have a record of educational policy-making involvement, but he did appear to be very concerned about holding the line on state spending.

Another way, then, in which governors became involved in educational policy making was to exercise fiscal restraint in state spending practices. Holding the line on state spending and no new taxes were the Nebraska Governor's promises during his 1970 campaign, and if his veto of a major school finance bill in 1972 was any indication, he held to that campaign pledge. The California and New York governors were concerned about the continually increasing costs of operating schools, the need for greater efficiency in the management of educational systems, and the reality of curbing spending patterns in light of available state revenues. In 1972, California enacted legislation in school finance and tax reform with the impetus for school finance reform coming from the legislature and the initiative for tax reform coming from the Governor. In New York the legislature did not enact major legislation in school finance reform until 1974. In 1972, the New York Governor cautioned state agencies about the necessity of adhering to zero growth in budget development. Except for a few areas including education which were allowed some allowance for growth according to previously enacted legislation, New York held to the Governor's insistence on slowing the state's spending pattern. The Governor's proposal for an "Office of Education Inspector General in the Executive Department to review performance in relation to expenditures under present programs and to recommend means of improving their effectiveness and efficiency" was a clear manifestation of his frustration with the autonomy of the state education agency and his perception that efficiency in fiscal management had to be restored to education.[1]

Issue definition is only the first stage in the policy-making process. From the definition of educational issues, policy proposals must be formulated.

Proposal Formulation

Proposal formulation can be thought of as the process by which issues are formulated as specific proposals for a policy change or for maintaining the status quo. In this stage of policy-making governors drew upon available resources for information and advice in order to formulate issues into policy proposals. A consideration of resources available to governors will enable us to determine their potential for involvement in proposal formulation. A review of the EGP case studies will provide the data with which to examine the actual involvement of the governor's office in this process.

Governors' Staff and Other Resources

Governors have formal powers and informal means of bringing their preferences to bear in the policy-making process. One important resource is the governor's personal staff, that group of aides and advisers who assist the governor in his many duties. Basic purposes of personal staff are "information control and presentation," as Sprengel wrote.[2] Staff facilitate the generating of information, filtering external input into the governor's office, organizing agenda, and presenting information to the chief executive. Intensive examination of gubernatorial staffing was beyond the purview of this research. But in the area of education, personal staff members were interviewed in all twelve states. Table 5-7 describes some of the general characteristics of governors' personal staffs in the area of education. A cross-sectional view is given, as of late 1972-early 1973, of those members of governors' personal staffs who worked on educational matters and an estimate of the budget and fiscal staff available in the executive branch.

TABLE 5-7

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MEMBERS OF GOVERNORS' PERSONAL STAFFS WHOSE RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE EDUCATION (N=24)

State	N	Year Employment Began on Governor's Staff	Previous Occupation	Highest Degree	Full-time Equivalent Staff Working on Educational Affairs	
					Policy/Program Dev.	Finance
California	1	1968	Prof. &	Ph.D.		
			U. Admin.		3	2
Colorado	1	1965	Lawyer,	J.D.		
			Office of			
			Atty. Gen.		Less than 1[a]	1
Florida	1	1969	U. Admin.	Ph.D.	2	5
Georgia	1	1971	U.Admin.	Ph.D.	2	1
Mass.	6[b]	2 in 1965	2 Lawyers	2 J.D.		
		1 in 1970	1 Legis.	2 M.A.	1½[c]	½
		2 in 1971	3 Students	2 B.A.		
		1 in 1973				
Michigan	2	1969	Prof.	Ph.D.	1	1
		1971	State Budget Dir.	J.D.		
Minnesota	1	1968	Researcher			
			in State			
			Government	M.A.	1	½
Nebraska	1	1961	State			
			Senator	B.A.	Less than 1	1/5
New York	4	1 in 1969	2 Military	1 J.D.		
		1 in 1970	1 Banker	1 M.P.A.	3+[d]	3+
		2 in 1971	1 Student	2 M.S.		
Tennessee	2	1970	Newspaper			
			Editor	B.A.	[illegible] ½	1/5
		1970	Legis. Asst.			
			in Congress			
Texas	2	1969	Staff in	M.P.A.		
		1969	State Govn.	B.A.	1/10	½
Wisconsin	2	1972	Prof.	Ph.D.	Less than 1	1
		1972	State Govn.	B.A.		

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[a] In the three states designed by "less than 1," and in Tennessee and Texas there were no staff working full-time in education. Rather, these small staffs had responsibilities in many areas including education.

[b] There were a large number of respondents in Massachusetts because of staff turnover, and there were staff working for both the Governor and Lieutenant Governor who had educational responsibilities. These respondents did not include the personnel in the newly-created Office of the Secretary for Educational Affairs.

[c] This number included both the offices of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor.

[d] The New York staffing pattern was large and diffuse. Three staff in each area is an approximation. There were two tiers of top policy staff, in addition, whose responsibilities may have included education on a part-time basis.

Some noteworthy findings are shown in Table 5-7. For instance, the mean number of years of service, through 1972, was 3.8 indicating that there may be frequent staff turnover in governors' offices. Yet, with eight of the twelve governors serving their first term it is logical that staff would have brief tenure. A recent study by Sprengel found that gubernatorial staffs tended to be well educated with 47 per cent having completed postgraduate work.[3] We found that 75 per cent had completed postgraduate work. Sprengel posited that gubernatorial staff would demonstrate political awareness and more commitment to political affairs than the general public. Thus, early political socialization was discovered, and we also found a pattern of early political socialization. Sprengel learned that 38 per cent of the respondents in his forty-state survey held some type of political position prior to serving on governors' staffs. We discovered that 46 per cent of our twenty-four staff members interviewed had served in state government, as a legislator, or as a student who became involved with the governor's campaigns. We also learned that 21 per cent of those staff members interviewed had worked previously in education as professors, administrators in higher education, or as state educational officials. The last two findings are of particular interest. Over one-half of those education aides whom we interviewed had experience in another political position or in state government, but only one-fifth had worked in education. Of those who had worked in education, without exception their careers had been in higher education in either teaching or administration. No governor's personal staff members were located who had experience in schools at the elementary and secondary level.

Next, we attempted to discover the extent to which governors relied upon their own staff for information and advice about public school issues.

Responses from governors and lieutenant governors in seven states indicated that governors solicited information from as many sources as possible, yet the input from outside organizations seemed to be offset by reliance upon their own staff advisers. The one exception to this pattern in the twelve states occurred in Texas where the Governor, possibly because of a strong personal relationship with the head of the teachers' association, relied on the teachers' association for information. Even in Texas, however, the Governor's policy advisers were his prime sources of information and advice. Governors did not rely exclusively on any one informational source outside their own staffs.

Although governors relied on their own staffs for policy advice in education, we wanted to identify those outside the executive branch who were considered to be useful sources of educational information to governors. Twenty-two members of governors' personal staffs were asked which individuals provided them with useful information about public schools. Table 5-8 indicates that SDE sources were mentioned frequently. Regarding the single most useful educational source to governors' staffs, there were multiple responses but state departments of education were mentioned in nine states and other sources within state government were mentioned in seven states. In Massachusetts the new Secretary of Educational Affairs understandably was seen as being of more use to the Governor than the Chief State School Officer. As a gubernatorial appointee, Massachusetts' Secretary of Educational Affairs was to serve the entire educational system in the state "as a means of better coordinating the [illegible]ration of the state educational systems, of increasing citizen participation in decision making, and of rationally balancing the growth of public higher education in Massachusetts with the private sector."[4] Recognizing the Secretary's impact in higher education, one university

TABLE 5-8

GOVERNORS' PERSONAL STAFF MEMBERS' VIEWS REGARDING THOSE WHO PROVIDED USEFUL INFORMATION TO GOVERNORS ABOUT THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (N=22)

State	N	Adm./ Finance Budget in State Govn.[a]	SDE	SBE	Education Interest Groups[b]	Local Educators	"A Variety"	The Single Most Useful Source
California	1	1	1					Dept. Finance and SDE
Colorado	1		1		1	1		SDE
Florida	1		1		1	1		SDE
Georgia	1		1		1	1		SDE
Mass.	4[c]		2	1			3[d]	2, Sec. of Ed. Affairs
Michigan	2	1	1		1			SDE
Minnesota	1	1	1					State Planning Agency
Nebraska	1	1	1					Dept. of Admin. Services
New York	4	1	3		1	1	2	2, "The Public" SDE
Tennessee	2	1	2	1	1			Commissioner and SDE, and Finance
Texas	2	1	1	1	1			SDE, SBE, and Finance
Wisconsin	2	1	1		1			SDE and Finance
Total	22	8	16	3	8	4	5	

[a] This category is inclusive of those individuals working within state government in departments, offices, or bureaus of administration, finance, or budget.

[b] The educational interest group category was an aggregate of all educational interest groups; the most frequently-mentioned group was the Educational Association (teachers).

[c] In Massachusetts, four responses were included rather than the six responses found in Table 15 because two responses were unusable in this area.

[d] In Massachusetts, two of the three responses of "A Variety" included mention of the new Office of Educational Affairs, established in January, 1972.

president warned that the new structure was "a serious threat to the quality of public higher education in Massachusetts."[5]

Governors' personal staff members were asked how important the CSSO was to the governor as a source of advice on public schools. Table 5-9 shows that CSSOs were considered to be governors' most important single sources in Florida and Tennessee. In six states, CSSOs were among the most important educational sources of advice to governors. Chiefs were seen as tending toward minor sources in Minnesota and Nebraska. Chiefs were considered minor sources or not at all important as sources in Massachusetts and Wisconsin. Members of administration/finance were also asked about the CSSOs' importance as sources of advice in school finance, and it appears that administration/finance persons saw CSSOs in a more favorable light than did governors' staff members. In four states, for instance, administration/finance staff viewed chiefs as being their single most important sources in school finance. Only in Massachusetts was the CSSO considered to be in the lowest of the four categories. None of the CSSOs was considered as being a relatively minor source, and most were thought of as being among the most important sources of advice in school finance.

Another resource which the governor can draw upon in formulating proposals for legislative consideration are the recommendations of commissions, citizen groups, and task forces. There were active organizations in six of the twelve states. Four of these states were the same states where governors' educational involvement in issue definition was oriented toward reform in school finance and taxation: Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Florida. In Nebraska and New York, governors were perceived to have exercised fiscal restraint in state spending. A Tax Study Committee existed in Nebraska, and the distinguished Fleischmann Commission was appointed by New York's Governor

TABLE 5-9

GOVERNORS' PERSONAL STAFF MEMBERS' VIEWS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CSSO TO THE GOVERNOR AS A SOURCE OF ADVICE ON THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (N=20)

State	N	The most important single source	Among the most important sources	A minor source	Not at all important as a source
California	1		1		
Colorado	1		1		
Florida	1	1			
Georgia	1		1		
Massachusetts	3[a]			1	2
Michigan	2		2		
Minnesota	1		1 tending to 1		
Nebraska	1		1 tending to 1		
New York	3		3		
Tennessee	2	2			
Texas	2		2		
Wisconsin	2		1	1[b]	

[a] The three Massachusetts' respondents did not include staff from the Office of Secretary of Educational Affairs.

[b] The respondent identifying the Wisconsin Chief State School Officer as "a minor source" should be considered with greater weight than the other, more favorable response since the former respondent was one of the Governor's chief policy advisers.

in 1969. The fact that broad-based citizen groups existed in the same states where governors were active in educational reform may be a finding of note. Visible citizen organizations, by using the public forum, may provide governors with a valuable resource.

Governors have a variety of internal as well as external resources to utilize in formulating policy proposals. Virtually all twelve governors had the information capability to formulate policy proposals. We will now examine governors' actual involvement in initiating policy proposals in education.

Governors as Proposal Formulators

It was evident that the office of the governor was the locus for the generation of policy proposals in education. Still, governors varied in the extent to which they initiated policy proposals in education. Four governors appeared to be in a category of being the key initiators, four tended to share in the initiation with others (primarily the legislature), and four governors were reactive in initiating policy proposals. But unlike the policy-making stage of issue definition where Colorado, Massachusetts, and Nebraska governors were inactive, all twelve governors demonstrated at least some involvement in initiating policy proposals. Albeit some governors only attempted policy initiation, gubernatorial activity in policy initiation in all twelve states would suggest than Ransone's observation twenty years ago is indeed accurate, that governors' preeminent role is to formulate and initiate statewide policies.[6]

In four states, governors were the key initiators in proposal formulation: Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Florida. Perhaps the outstanding example of the governor's office serving as a key initiator in proposal formulation was in Minnesota. The Minnesota Governor, taking cues from the Michigan Governor who wrote about the need for finance reform, initiated a proposal for education and tax reform and followed it through to final resolution by a legislative conference committee late in 1971.[7] Reform in Michigan had even deeper roots with the "Thomas Report," a study of national significance, drawing attention to the increasing problem of school funding.[8] An experienced state legislator, the current Michigan Governor encountered a long series of entanglements with such issues as parochiaid, fiscal austerity, and a statewide referendum on property taxes. Following a December, 1972 State Supreme Court ruling on the unconstitutionality of

Michigan's school finance system, the legislature finally enacted legislation in 1973 based on an equal-yield formula which raised the state contribution and provided some inter-district equalization. The initiative in the 1973 effort was provided by a Republican state senator, head of the Senate Education Committee, but the long-term goal of education reform was the Governor's. In the progressive state of Wisconsin, the Governor's key role in initiating educational reform was unmistakable. Forming a Task Force to study the problem in 1972, the Governor drew on his Assembly political support in the passing of a district power equalization bill in 1973, came to a political standoff in the Republican Senate, and was able to achieve success through a legislative conference committee which passed the bill late in the session.[9] Another Governor, in Florida, served as the major source of initiation in that state's passage of major school finance legislation in 1973. Using the recommendations of a Citizen's Committee, begun under a previous governor, and the work of national consultants brought to Florida to study school finance, the Governor was persistent in enlisting public support through the Citizen's Committee. The final enactment came after extended deliberation by a Joint Conference Committee.[10]

There were four other governors who tended to share with others in initiating policy proposals, particularly with the legislature. In Tennessee, the major school finance issue in 1972 was the financing of a statewide kindergarten program. The Governor used this issue in his 1970 campaign, and after submitting it to the legislature considerable difficulty was encountered which led to the funding of only 20 per cent of the Governor's original proposal.[11] Embroiled in political controversy which included the powerful teachers' association, the Governor saw his proposal diluted by lack of legislative support. While the Tennessee Governor was the key initiator of the statewide kindergarten program as a policy issue, the enactment of a policy falling far short of his expectations resulted in our categorizing him as sharing the policy initiation role with the legislature. The California Governor clearly shared the role of policy initiation with the legislature in 1972, when major school finance legislation reflected the Governor's initiative in tax reform and the legislature's initiative in school finance.[12]

The New York and Colorado governors demonstrated some differences in their policy initiation roles but in general they could be thought of as sharing policy initiation. The near zero growth budget for state services in New York in 1972 clearly demonstrated the Governor's key role in proposing fiscal restraint in the state budget. At the same time the Governor waited to react to the school finance proposals of the Fleischmann Commission, the Assembly Ways and Means Committee, the Board of Regents and State Education Department, and the Educational Conference Board. Not knowing which of these proposals was politically most realistic and with antagonism shown by the Democrats who claimed that the Governor wanted no action so as to use "hidden surpluses" in the state budget for a tax cut in an election year, the New York Governor and legislature delayed any major school finance decision and waited to share in initiating education policy proposals in the next legislative session.[13]

The Colorado Governor, inactive in education at least through 1972, emerged as a major actor in 1973 in proposing a "per cent equalization" formula for the legislature's consideration which, if implemented, would have nearly doubled state support for schools.[14] There were several proposals presented in the 1973 Colorado legislature for school finance reform. Although the enacted legislation in school finance resembled a proposal submitted by The Council on Education Development in Colorado (COED is a coalition comprised of educational and non-educational groups)*, portions of the Governor's bill were included. In a sense the Governor and COED shared in the legislative enactment.

The third and final category of governors serving as policy initiators occurred in the states of Massachusetts, Georgia, Texas, and Nebraska where governors generally reacted to policy proposals initiated by others.

The Massachusetts Governor, who was inactive in education, "broke with his political party (Republican) to support the graduated income tax as a means of relieving reliance on the property tax" in 1972, and thus, was active as a formulator of policy proposals affecting education.[15] Although the graduated income tax proposal was defeated at the polls, the Governor must be credited with attempting tax reform in Massachusetts. The nature of the political process in Massachusetts tend to curb the Governor's initiative in proposal formulation because school aid is distributed administratively according to a formula established by the legislature. With the Governor being of the opposite political party in a state dominated by a strong legislature reinforced by the ethic of localism, the Governor's potential as a policy formulator was limited. The Massachusetts Governor generally functioned as a reactor to policy proposals formulated and enacted by the legislature.

Other governors were in a reactive category in proposal formulation. The Georgia Governor took a reactive stance to a move by the teachers' association in the legislature, in 1972, for a $1000 salary increase. In an election year with considerable public support for the increase, the Governor acquiesced with passive support and the legislature enacted legislation just $90 short of the teachers' goal.[16] In Texas the Governor in 1972 was reactive to the State Board of Education which took the responsibility for a study on school finance in an attempt to meet the mandate of the Federal District Court in the Rodriguez decision. In 1973, following proposals submitted to the Texas legislature by committees from the Senate, the Texas State Teachers Association, and the State Board of Education, a new Governor took a "no new taxes" position which led to a stalemate in the legislature in 1973.[17] The Nebraska Governor vetoed a major school finance bill, in 1972, which was developed in the legislature with the assistance of several educational interest groups and which would have changed the distribution formula and increased state support to schools.[18]

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*Chapter VI deals with educational interest groups.

Comparative Summary

Governors tend to draw upon a diverse set of resources in order to formulate policy proposals. Most governors maximize the number of contacts with external groups and few limit these contacts to only a minimal number of groups. In all twelve states, state departments of education were considered to be useful information sources to governors; in fact, SDEs were the most useful information sources to governors in nine of the twelve states. By the same token CSSOs were considered as being at least among the governors' most important sources in seven of the twelve states. Yet, we wonder if educators' roles have not been more as generators of raw data than as trusted policy advisers? It seems clear that governors maintain a coterie of staff, varying in size with the particular state, who are located within the inner circle of policy advisers. Further, most of the governor's personal staffs in the twelve states apparently had the potential to carry on the necessary research and analysis for the governor in education without reliance upon the education agency. While staff size appears to be associated with the size of state populations, we can rank the states according to governors' staff capabilities in education (see Table 5-7, also):

1. New York
2. California
3. Florida
4. Georgia
5. Michigan
6. Massachusetts
7. Minnesota
8.5. Wisconsin
8.5. Colorado
10. Nebraska
11. Tennessee
12. Texas

The four governors previously categorized as being oriented toward reform in school finance and taxation were also those who were most active as key initiators of policy proposals. Two of the three governors active in fiscal restraint (California, New York) shared policy initiation with the legislature. One of the three governors active in the expansion of educational programs (Tennessee) shared policy initiation with the legislature. The governors reactive in initiating policy proposals included one governor who had been inactive in educational program emphasis (Massachusetts), two who were active in expanding educational programs (Georgia, Texas), and one governor who limited his educational activity to fiscal restraint (Nebraska).

Mobilization of Support

After issues have been defined and formulated into proposals, but before they can be enacted, a vital stage of the policy process occurs where support for alternative proposals is generated from available resources and mobilized in the legislative arena. The mobilization of support can take several forms including obtaining legislative votes, marshalling public support for a bill under consideration, and citing the professional opinions of recognized experts. Support mobilization, then, is the process by which individuals and groups are activated to support or oppose alternative policy proposals.

Governors and the State Education Agency

One resource which governors may use in mobilizing support for their legislative proposals is the state education agency. The structural relationship between the agency and the governor may enhance or diminish the governor's ability to rely upon its support for or against a policy proposal. As indicated in Chapter II, there are many different ways by which members of state boards of education and chief state school officers can be selected. Our twelve states included seven different combinations of state board and CSSO selection methods.

This structural variability, set in the context of what we have already learned about governors and educational policy making, may tell us little about governors' actual involvement in education. Yet, states falling into extreme categories can be identified easily. One could conjecture that in Tennessee, the Governor is involved in education simply because he appoints state board members and as we have already seen, he appoints and can dismiss the Commissioner. Furthermore, the Tennessee Governor serves as an ex officio member of the SBE, and the CSSO serves as a member of the Governor's cabinet. At the other extreme are Wisconsin and New York. There was no state board in Wisconsin, and the CSSO was a popularly-elected constitutional officer. This insulation from state government was further enhanced by the apolitical style of the past CSSO, as seen in this observation by an aide close to the Governor:

> Potentially, the importance of this office (CSSO) is great. The State Superintendent had no great policy thrusts in any area. Communications have been minimal and by some kind of Memorandum. Informally, the Superintendent is not effective. Through practical politics, this influence could be effected, however, much as WEA has done.

The elimination of the educational requirements for the CSSO position by the1971 Wisconsin legislature and the Governor's activity in educational reform and policy initiation may indicate that in Wisconsin education had moved closer to the broader state legislative policy arena, apparently without initiative by state educators.

Of the twelve states, the SEA in New York was by far the most removed from the Governor's Office. Not only were members of the SBE elected by the legislature, but the CSSO no longer was part of the Governor's Cabinet as had been true in the past. Elected to long terms of office, the Board of Regents formulated educational policies, for the most part according to CSSO and SDE priorities, in closed sessions. Although most of the fifteen years during which Nelson Rockefeller was Governor were years in which educational expansion was fiscally supported by a willing Governor and legislature, the early 1970s demonstrated that a new era had begun. Fiscal austerity in state spending, increased public criticism of education, the autonomy of the SEA, and the Governor's unprecedented proposal for an Education Inspector General brought the SEA to the brink of open conflict with the Governor. The Governor-SEA relationship, following the Governor's resignation late in 1973, could best be described as cautious with further developments anticipated after the election of a new Governor in 1974.

Varying degrees of gubernatorial control over the SEA were seen in the other nine states. It was evident that structure was only one of several important factors in the governor-SEA relationship. With the exception of Georgia, where the Governor-CSSO relationship was openly contested, the states were evenly divided between those having a positive, working governor-SEA relationship and those without much governor-SEA relationship at all. In the four states where governor-SEA relationships were harmonious, governor-SEA relationships involving previous governors and CSSOs were not without conflict. In California, Colorado, and Michigan it involved the previous CSSOs, and in Florida it involved the previous Governor. The current CSSOs or governors in those four states evidently were more disposed to establishing better working relationships. Indeed, the present California Chief was viewed as a "peacemaker" with the Governor. The Colorado CSSO worked hard to reestablish communications with the Governor's Office. The Florida CSSO and SDE were viewed as the single most useful information source to the Governor's staff. The Michigan Governor believed that the CSSO was a "committed, honest educator," and the Michigan State Superintendent won the respect of the Governor by taking a forceful stand on the issue of accountability in the schools.

In the four states where education was viewed by the SEA as being apart from politics, two of the states (Massachusetts and Minnesota) had governor-appointed state boards and SBE-appointed chiefs and two states (Nebraska and Texas) had elected SBEs and SBE-appointed Chiefs. In addition to a Massachusetts Governor whose educational activities were indirect and reactive, the Governor-SEA relationship was further diminished by a traditionally weak SDE. With three Commissioners of Education during the period 1969 through 1973, the Massachusetts SEA was hampered by CSSOs with widely-varying leadership styles and legislative effectiveness. In Minnesota, contacts between the Governor and SEA were not extensive, and the Governor-SEA relationship was not characterized by rapport for several reasons: Governor's staff did not believe that SDE data was highly usable; the Commissioner and the Governor, although of the same political party, did not work together closely; the CSSO allegedly took policy positions which were sometimes politically embarrassing to the Governor; and the SBE was insulated from both executive and legislative branches. In Nebraska, we found a Governor minimally active in education, a state board split along conservative and liberal lines, and a Commissioner who was hired to replace a former CSSO fired because of his stand favoring school district reorganization. The Texas situation was somewhat different with little overt SEA involvement in the legislative arena, a structurally weak Governor, and a long-term Commissioner who commanded widespread respect in the state.

Governors and Educational Interest Groups

The relationships between governors and educational interest groups were viewed from the perspectives of the thirty-two members of governors' personal staff and executive staff in administration/finance who were interviewed in the twelve states.

As far as governors working closely with EIGs, they seemed to do so only in Texas and Wisconsin and in those states primarily with the teachers' associations. While not working closely with EIGs, governors did solicit information and policy viewpoints from interest group leaders in Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Minnesota, New York, and Tennessee. This tactic by governors seemed to be a means of keeping communications open and should not to be confused with "working closely" together. In Colorado, the Governor paid some attention to the recommendation of the formal coalition comprised of educational and non-educational groups. In Florida the

Governor was concerned more with the work of his appointed Citizen's Commission on Education than directly with the EIGs although interest groups did have input into the Commission. Finally, the Governors appeared to have a minimal relationship with EIGs in California.

Another aspect of the EIG-governor relationship is conflict that may have been evident. In the opinions of members of governors' personal and administration/finance staffs, there was no EIG-governor conflict in California and in Texas. In California an absence of conflict was related to an absence in any relationship with the Governor, and in Texas the Governor and head of the teachers' association were close personal friends. There was an absence of contention, also, in Colorado, but the Governor was somewhat concerned that the teachers' association was so oriented to teacher benefit issues. Some conflict between EIGs and governors was observed in Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. The conflict observed in these eight states was considered to be rather natural, and it had not caused more lasting problems in governor-EIG relationships. On the other hand, there was a "very strained relationship," in one respondent's words, between the teachers' association and Governor in Georgia because the Governor became increasingly suspicious of teachers' apparent desire to insure that increased aid to education went into teacher salaries and benefits. It must be noted in in describing the governor-EIG relationships in the states, we have singled out some organizations, primarily teachers, for discussion. It may well be that in some states where either harmony or conflict has been evident between the governor and the teachers' association, relationships may be different with other educator organizations.[19]

Governors and the Legislature

In the mobilization of support for governors' policy proposals in the legislature, one could assume that more powerful governors would exert greater influence. Governors have formal powers as well as a host of informal means by which their influence can be exercised. Governors' powers vary among states. Schlesinger studied the formal powers of governors and categorized them according to potential for tenure, appointment, budget, and veto. Table 5-10 indicates how each state ranked among the five groupings for each formal power. A state ranking is listed using Schlesinger's scheme, and our own 12-state ranking is presented with New York ranked most powerful and Texas least powerful.

Two areas of governors' formal powers, as described by Schlesinger, are related particularly to governors' legislative powers. In control over the budget, eight of the twelve governors in this study were ranked highest where governors had responsibilities for budget formulation and shared this responsibility only with appointees. In Colorado and Nebraska, governors had budget formulation responsibilities and shared it with civil service appointees or those appointed by someone other than himself. The Florida and Texas governors were ranked lowest of the twelve states because governors had to work with others in the preparation of the executive budget. In veto power, seven of the twelve governors were ranked at the top because they had item veto power requiring at least a 60 per cent vote of the legislature to override their veto. The Tennessee Governor was ranked in the second highest of five categories due to the fact that he had item veto power which required a majority of the legislature to override. The Florida, Massachusetts, Texas, and Wisconsin governors were ranked in the third of five categories because governors' item vetoes could be overriden by a majority of those legislators present.

TABLE 5-10

GOVERNORS' FORMAL POWERS

STATE	Tenure (5 cat.)	Appointment (5 cat.)	Budget (5 cat.)	Veto (5 cat.)	Combined Index of Formal Powers (14 categories)	
					Score	12-state rank
California	1	2	1	1	19	3
Colorado	1	5	2	1	15	8.5
Florida	3	4	5	3	9	11
Georgia	3	5	1	1	14	10
Massachusetts	1	1	1	3	18	5
Michigan	1	2	1	1	19	3
Minnesota	1	2	1	1	19	3
Nebraska	2	3	2	1	16	7
New York	1	1	1	1	20	1
Tennessee	3	1	1	2	17	6
Texas	4	5	5	3	7	12
Wisconsin	1	4	1	3	15	8.5

SOURCE: Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Politics in the American States, Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, eds., Little, Brown, and Co., Boston, 1971, pp. 210-237.

Summary

We examined governors' means of support mobilization as they attempted to gain support for their policy proposals in the legislature. Governors' relationships with state education agencies were considered along with the degree of governors' structural control over SEAs. Relationships between governors and EIGs, including conflict, were reviewed. Governors were seen to differ in their formal powers with some having strong formal powers (New York, California, Michigan, Minnesota) and some having weak formal powers (Georgia, Florida, Texas). Before interpreting these data by ranking governors' overall policy-making involvement in education, governors' roles in legislative decision enactment, which is the fourth policy-making stage, will be considered.

Decision Enactment

This fourth and final stage of the policy-making process is the process by which an authoritative policy decision is made among alternative proposals. It is the stage in which hard choices may have to be made--the point of reckoning for those who attempt to influence policy making by the definition of issues, the formulation of proposals, and the mobilization of support. As chief executives, governors make important decisions and enact executive policy. As an example, when the state legislature in New York did not enact the necessary legislation to implement the Governor's Education Inspector General proposal, the Governor made an administrative appointment within the executive branch. The appointee carried out many of the same "watchdog" functions albeit without legislative approval and funds. In this research we did not focus on executive decision enactment, but rather on governors' involvement in the legislative enactment of decisions affecting public elementary and secondary schools.

Governors and Legislative Support

In the mobilization of support for governors' policy proposals, the influence of groups such as the state education agency and outside organizations such as educational interest groups can be helpful. But the crucial test for governors as they attempt to get proposals passed or defeated is in the legislative arena. Recommendations of so-called experts, testimonies of educators, and the policy demands of interest groups are factors to be considered but are subordinate to the extent of governors' support in the state legislatures. Governors' legislative support, in turn, is dependent upon party strengths. Table 5-11 indicated the political party line-up in state legislatures and reflects changes as a result of the 1972 general elections.

TABLE 5-11

POLITICAL PARTY LINE-UP IN STATE LEGISLATURES

State	Year	The Senate			The House of Representatives			Election of Governor and Lt. Governor on Same Ticket	Political Party of Governor
		Dem	Rep	Other	Dem	Rep	Other		
California	1971	21	19		42	37	1	No	R
	1973	19	19	2	50	29	1		
Colorado	1971	14	21		27	38		Yes	R
	1973	13	22		28	37			
Florida	1971	33	15		81	38		Yes	D
	1973	13	22		28	37			
Georgia	1971	50	6		173	22		No	D
	1973	48	8		151	29			
Massachusetts	1971	27	13		177	62	1	Yes	R
	1973	33	7		186	52	2		
Michigan	1971	19	19		58	52		Yes	R
	1973	19	19		60	50			
Minnesota[a]	1971	33	34		65	70		No	DFL
	1973	36	31		77	57			
Nebraska	Nonpartisan election				Unicameral Legislature			No[b]	D
New York	1971	25	32		71	79		Yes	R
	1973	23	37		67	83			
Tennessee	1971	19	13	1	56	43		No	R
	1973	19	13	1	51	48			
Texas	1971	29	2		140	10		No	D
	1973	28	3		133	17			
Wisconsin	1971	13	20		65	34		Yes	D
	1973	15	18		62	37			

SOURCES: The Book of the States, 1972-1973 and "State Elective Officials and the Legislatures," The Council of State Governments, Lexington, Kentucky, 1972-73.

[a] In Minnesota the Democrat-Farmer-Labor Party statistics are under the Democratic label and the Conservative Party statistics are under the Republican label.

[b] Beginning November, 1974, the Governor and Lieutenant Governor in Nebraska will be elected jointly.

Governors had political party majorities in both houses of legislatures (1971 and 1973) in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, New York, and Texas. Governors had political party minorities in both houses of the legislature in California, Massachusetts, and Tennessee. Minnesota was an example of the Governor having political party minorities in both houses in 1971 and majorities by 1973. Political party splits occurred in Michigan and Wisconsin. In Michigan the Governor had a minority in the House in both years, and the Senate was evenly divided. Wisconsin had a majority in the Governor's party in the Assembly in both years, and a minority in the Senate.

Further understanding of governors and their political strength in legislatures must include the extent of inter-party competition. In traditionally one-party states if the governor is of the same party, the significance of the governor's party line-up may be less than where governors have legislative control in a two-party state. Ranney[20] classified Texas and Georgia as one-party Democratic; we found that the Democratic Texas and Georgia governors had majorities in both houses. Florida was considered to be a modified one-party Democratic state, and the Governor had majorities in both houses in both 1971 and 1973. Colorado and New York were considered two-party states, and Republican governors had majorities in both houses during 1971 and 1973. Minnesota was a two-party state, as were Michigan and Wisconsin. Tennessee was modified-one party Democratic, and Massachusetts and California were two party but tended toward one-party Democratic. Thus, with Republican governors in Tennessee, Massachusetts, and California, one could expect that these governors would have formidable political party opposition in the legislature.

Governors and Legislative Party Influence

In the legislative enactment of educational policies, a key factor in governors' being able to influence legislative decisions is the extent to which they can activate their political strengths in legislatures. Having political party majorities in the legislature is a deceptive measure of governors' influence. Studies have shown that gubernatorial influence may be stronger in more competitive two-party states than in states where governors have overwhelming political majorities in legislatures.[21] Seven of our twelve states were classified as two-party states, as seen in Table 5-12. Comparing Table 5-12 with Table 5-11 revealed that during the years 1971 through 1973, assuming that governors' legislative influence was greater in two-party states, Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin emerge as having strong governors. The Colorado and New York governors seemed to have appreciable legislative influence, and their political party majorities were not overwhelming. Although governors in Tennessee (modified one-party) and California and Massachusetts (two-party) were of the opposition party, their potential for legislative influence seemed to rest with the abilities to attract bi-partisan support. The Florida Governor had legislative majorities in this modified one-party state. The Georgia and Texas governors, although having strong majorities in the legislature, were apparently hampered with intra-party factionalism thus limiting their capacities to rally party support. Interestingly, the Texas, Florida, and Georgia governors were ranked 12th, 11th, and 10th, respectively in governors' formal powers. These relatively weak governors were located in politically factionalized, predominately one-party states.

In order to determine governors' legislative party influence, the views of members of governors' personal and administration/finance staffs, and SDE legislative experts were obtained through open-ended questions. From previous research and the data on political party line-up in Tables 5-12 and 5-11, we wondered if the Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin governors would be perceived by respondents as strong in their legislative party influence? Our research showed that the Minnesota Governor was in a strong legislative party position. One of the reasons for the DFL success at the polls in 1972 had to do with the Governor, who in addition to his considerable formal powers, could command significant resources: position and personality gave the Governor enormous leverage, he had high standing among key members of his political party, and he wasted no time developing his own personnel staff resources. Two SDE legislative experts in Minnesota added that the Governor did not hesitate in using his available powers when necessary. For instance, when the Minnesota legislature finally passed a combination school finance and tax bill after going into special session, the Governor vetoed the bill and took his argument about its inadequate tax provisions to the public.

TABLE 5-12

GOVERNORS, LEGISLATIVE POLITICAL PARTY LINE-UP, AND INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

	Legislative Political Party Line-up, 1971 to 1973				
Inter-Party Competition	Remained Majority	Remained Minority	Majority to Minority	Minority to Majority	Split
One-party Democratic	Georgia Texas				
Modified One-party Democratic	Forida	Tennessee			
Two-party	Colorado New York	California Massachusetts		Minnesota	Michigan Wisconsin
Modified One-party Republican					

SOURCES: The Book of the States, 1972-1973 (Lexington, Kentucky: The Council of State Governments, 1973), and Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in Politics in the American States, H. Jacob and K. N. Vines, eds. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 82-121.

The Michigan and Wisconsin governors, based upon our interview data, appeared to be in strong legislative positions although perhaps not quite as strong as the Minnesota Governor. One Michigan Governor's aide said that the Governor realized his political situation early in his tenure, and began making bipartisan appeals. A finance staff person in Michigan believed that the Governor had a more successful record getting Democratic support than that of his own political party. A Wisconsin staff aide to the Governor noted that Democratic party support was relied upon in the Assembly, but a variety of approaches had to be used in the Senate including the influence of outside groups, the weight of the recommendations of task forces,and compromise with the Senate leadership.

Qualitative assessment of open-ended interview data would indicate that the Colorado and New York governors, in having legislative party majorities in 1971 and 1973, were in positions of strength with legislatures. Other than "working with legislative leadership," neither the Colorado Governor nor the Lieutenant Governor cited any particular strategies or approaches used in mobilizing legislative support. One personal staff aide noted that the Colorado Governor was successful 80 per cent of the time in the legislature and that recently issues seemed to be considered more on their merit than on a partisan basis. While a fair degree of political maneuvering seemed to be characteristic of New York politicians, the prime factor for the Governor was in getting early agreement with the legislative leaders, namely the Assembly Speaker and Senate Majority Leader, and keeping close relationships with these key figures as the legislative session drew to a termination and bills were rushed through based on political party backing.

Governors in Tennessee, California, and Massachusetts were faced with majority party opposition in their legislatures in both 1971 and 1973. It was clear that these three governors were faced with an uphill climb in getting legislative support for their educational legislative proposals. The Governor's political position was far from favorable with the Tennessee legislature. With unified support of the Republican party, a legislature limited in strength due to short sessions and lack of staff, and the ability of the Republican Governor to appeal to an influential teachers' association, the Tennessee Governor presented the potential for increasing his control over state government in the 1974 elections. In California the Governor appeared to rely upon caucus support while at the same time entering into compromises with the legislative leadership. In Massachusetts the Republican Governor appealed to a strong liberal Democratic faction when possible, in addition to arguing issues on a merit basis and compromising with legislative leadership especially in the House.

Governors in Florida, Georgia, and Texas had political legislative majorities in 1971 and 1973, but in each state the governor was faced with constraints which resulted in a legislative support base which could be characterized as somewhat weak. One Florida Governor's aide noted that the Governor, a former legislator, worked in a "low-key" fashion to try to convince individual legislators to his points of view. While there appeared to be a climate receptive to educational reform in the Florida legislature, there were some very real constraints for the Governor. The executive branch of government in Florida tended to be dominated not by the Governor but by the other six elected officials constituting the cabinet; the executive budget was formulated by the Department of Administration after close consultation with the Governor's budget recommendations based upon agency requests and state priorities, but any agency head could lobby directly in the legislature if more funds were desired, thus diluting the Governor's fiscal powers; and finally the Florida state legislature had, since a 1968 Constitutional revision, grown in strength to the extent that a national study in 1971 ranked Florida fourth among all states in legislative performance.[22]

In Georgia the Democratic majority in the legislature was reduced by twenty-four seats after the 1972 general election. Reapportionment gave urban-suburban areas (tending to be Republican) more voice, yet Democrats were still in firm control of both legislative houses. There was a marked contrast in leadership style between Georgia's current Governor and his predecessor. In contrast to his predecessor's (current Lieutenant Governor) style--clearly rural in orientation--Georgia's present Governor was more independent, somewhat aloof, certainly more liberal, and in the legislature had to overcome not a political party but a liberal-conservative split based on the politics of geographic location and traditional values.

The Texas Governor was ranked last in formal powers. But, as in Georgia, state politics in Texas were not along traditional party lines since the Democrats were in overwhelming control. Rather, politics were intensely divided along conservative-liberal lines with conservatives who tended to represent wealthier suburban and rural areas, and liberals who spoke for the cities and a coalition of Blacks and Mexican-Americans. Even a conservative-liberal split based on location does not tell the full Texas story for in the 1960s an unlikely coalition of conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats formed to combat the conservative-centrist positions of Lyndon Johnson and John Connolly.[23] There were still other factors contributing to a weak Governorship in Texas. The Texas Constitution provided for a dispersal of executive authority among six other elected executive officials; the Lieutenant Governor and Governor were not elected jointly; the Lieutenant Governor was chairman of the powerful Legislative Budget Board, an agency which developed the budget jointly with the Governor but made independent recommendations to the legislature resulting in two separate and distinct budget documents. And, although the Texas Governor had line item veto powers, his veto powers requiring more than a majority of legislators present to override were less than the veto powers of twenty-nine other governors.

In Table 5-12 Nebraska was not considered because of the unicameral legislature and non-partisan elections. In terms of the ways in which the Nebraska Governor mobilized support in the legislature for his education proposals, it will be recalled that the Governor was not particularly active in education. In fact, his primary activity in education appeared to be his 1972 veto of an educational finance bill in the legislature. A major concern in Nebraska, according to gubernatorial aides, was the fact that the Governor was viewed as representing statewide interests in a state where the ethic of local control has been strongly advocated by individual legislators and even by state-level groups representing local interests. The Governor's position on holding the line on taxes, evidently, was supported by at least some members of the State Board of Education, thus giving some support to the Governor's veto of the educational finance bill in 1972.

In the governor's mobilization of support for educational legislation, legislators were interviewed about ways in which governors work to get educational legislation passed by the legislative education and fiscal committees. Table 5-13 summarizes legislators' responses to this question. The most frequent response by those legislators interviewed was that governors used their own staff as a means of influence when working for educational legislation. Thus, an expanded role can be seen for members of governors' personal staffs. Not only are staff relied on for policy and program development, but staff members are used by governors in working directly in the legislature.

Legislators believed that governors had diverse ways in which to mobilize support in legislatures. Responses ranged from governors' using

TABLE 5-13

LEGISLATORS' VIEWS ABOUT GOVERNORS' MEANS OF INFLUENCE IN WORKING FOR EDUCATIONAL LEGISLATION (N=157)

State	Governors' Means of Influence													
	N	Giving State of State/Budget messages and introducing bills	Through the CSSO, SDE, or SBE	Through his own staff	Through outside groups including educational interest groups	Through legislative leadership	Through political party caucuses	By means of political trade-offs, and pressure tactics	Through public visibility including the media and citizen groups	Through issue-oriented merits and persuasion	Through state government agencies such as admin/budget/finance	The Governor has virtually no influence in promoting educational legislation.	The Governor is not active in promoting educational legislation.	The Governor gives us educational rhetoric but does not follow through with legislation.
California	16			5		1	3	2	1		4	3	8	
Colorado	16	3		4		6	5				1		8	1
Florida	3[a]			1				1	2	1	2	1		
Georgia	13			5		1	1		7	4	1	7	1	1
Massachusetts	14			2		4			4			3	9	1
Michigan	15		1	8	3	4	2		11	1		1		1
Minnesota	15	3		11		2	1	8	4				2	
Nebraska	7			4				1	2		1			
New York	20	2	2		1	14		1	4					
Tennessee	11		2	5		1	7	1	6					1
Texas	10		1		1		2		1	3		6	1	
Wisconsin	17	2		5		4	3	6	1		4			
TOTAL	157	10	6	50	5	37	24	20	43	9	13	21	29	5

[a] While more than three legislators were interviewed in Florida, only three responses were able to be used in this question.

pressure tactics and political trade-offs, which was the most frequent response in Wisconsin and the second most frequent response in Minnesota; to governors not being active in education, which was the most frequent response in California, Colorado, and Massachusetts. Governors were seen as being virtually without legislative influence in Texas, Georgia, and deficient in legislative influence in California and Massachusetts.

Some new information was brought to light as a result of legislators' responses in Table 5-13. At least one legislator in every state except Colorado mentioned the governor's use of the media and other means with which to make issues public. While we have seen that top education officials are contacted for useful information and advice on educational matters, Table 5-13 data demonstrates that when it came to the critical use of influence in the legislature, education officials were used in only a few states and to a lesser extent than other resources. It appears that the governors generally have emerged as skilled politicians who draw upon a diverse support when entering the legislative arena to influence the outcome of legislation in education.

Comparative Summary

In obtaining political party support in legislatures in order to get their policy preferences enacted, governors pay heed to those legislators most able to affect desired outcomes. Thus, political party line-up, interparty competition, the extent of party factionalism--combined with an adroit sense of timing to guage the political climate--are elements which must be weighed by governors who wish to have their policy proposals enacted by legislatures.

Governors varied in the degree to which they were able to activate their political party strengths in the legislatures. The Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan Governors appeared to be more involved than the other governors in mobilizing their political party strengths when legislation was being enacted. In contrast, the Georgia and Texas governors were involved only slightly in mobilizing political support in legislatures when decisions were being enacted.

Correlational Analysis

Governors' involvement in each functional stage of the policy process in education has been described. In seeking to explain gubernatorial involvement in legislative policy making for the public schools, an index is needed to show the extent of governors' overall educational policy-making involvement. By comparing this index with other socioeconomic and political background variables, school finance and tax variables, and policy-making variables, we may be able to explain more fully the conditions related to governors' involvement in educational policy making.

The index of gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making was constructed by assigning numerical values to the extent of governors' educational policy-making involvement in each functional stage of the policy process, as shown in Table 5-14. By combining the score for each governor in each policy-making stage, a total score was obtained and a ranking was derived.

As a dependent variable, this index of gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making was correlated with other selected variables using the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient (Rho), an appropriate correlational statistic for ranked data when the number of cases is small.[24] As a guideline for the interpretation of Rho, a correlation of .3 to .4 indicates only a trend, .5 to .6 indicates a moderate association, and .7

TABLE 5-14

AN INDEX OF GUBERNATORIAL INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING

State	Issue Definition	Proposal Formulation	Support Mobilization	Decision Enactment	Total Score	Ranking
California	2	4	4	4	14	6
Colorado	2	2	2	1	7	10
Florida	4	4	3	4	15	5
Georgia	5	1	1	1	8	9
Massachusetts	1	2	2	1	6	11
Michigan	5	4	4	4	17	3
Minnesota	5	5	4	5	19	2
Nebraska	1	1	2	1	5	12
New York	3	5	3	5	16	4
Tennessee	5	4	2	2	13	7
Texas	5	1	4	1	11	8
Wisconsin	5	5	5	5	20	1

Scoring Procedure: The above scores vary from 5 points for great involvement to 1 point for no involvement. See APPENDIX D for detailed scoring procedure.

or higher indicates a strong degree of association. These associations indicate the direction and the degree of the relationship between the variables, and cannot be extended to cause and effect.

The index of gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making was correlated with selected variables of socioeconomic and political background, as shown in Table 5-15. Of the socioeconomic variables there was only a slight association (.38) between the Hofferbert-Sharkansky industrialization index and the involvement index. There were two political variables, however, moderately associated with the involvement index. The technical

TABLE 5-15

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNORS' EDUCATIONAL POLICY-MAKING INVOLVEMENT, AND SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL VARIABLES

Socioeconomic and Political Variables	Governors' Educational Policy-Making Involvement
Socioeconomic Variables	
State Population Size, 1970	.29
Educational Attainment, 1970[a]	-.06
Per Capita Personal Income, 1972	.08
Industrialization (Hofferbert-Sharkansky Index)	.38
Per Cent Urban Population, 1970	.06
Political Variables	
Inter-party Competition (Ranney Index)[b]	.27
State Legislatures' Technical Effectiveness (Citizen's Conference Index)	.55
Political Culture (Elazar-Sharkansky Index)	.44
Voter Turnout	.15

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[a] Per cent of the state population 25 years or older who completed four years of high school.

[b] See footnote 25 for an explanation of the Ranney Index.

effectiveness of state legislatures, as determined by the Citizens' Conference on State Legislatures, was correlated .55 with the governors' educational involvement index. And, there was an association of .44 between the Elazar-Sharkansky index of political culture and the involvement index. (The Elazar-Sharkansky index is a measure of the extent to which states are moralistic in their political culture, rather than individualistic or traditionalistic.) Thus, states having some history of reform-orientation in state government, such as Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan, were ranked high in having moralistic political culture and legislatures with greater technical effectiveness. It was in these same states where we found governors most involved in educational policy making.

By way of contrast, there were much stronger relationships between the governors' educational policy-making involvement and some of the school finance and tax variables. Table 5-16 indicates that there was a correlation

TABLE 5-16

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNORS' EDUCATIONAL POLICY-MAKING INVOLVEMENT, AND MEASURES OF SCHOOL FINANCE AND TAXATION

School Finance and Tax Variables	Governors' Educational Policy-Making Involvement
Need	
School-Age Population as Per Cent of Total Resident Population, 1972	.28
Per Cent of Change in Public School Enrollment, 1962 to 1972	.30
Ability	
Personal Income Per Child of School Age, 1972	.06
Educational Effort	
Public School Revenue Receipts as a Per Cent of Personal Income, 1971	.75
Educational Expenditures	
Per Capita State Expenditures for All Education, 1971	.64
General Tax Effort	
State and Local Tax Collections as a Per Cent of Personal Income, 1971	.50
State Tax Burden	
State Tax Revenue as Per Cent of Personal Income, 1971	.87

of .75 between educational effort and governors' educational involvement. It was not surprising that the involvement index was strongly associated with both of these fiscal variables since educational effort was, itself, associated with tax burden (.67). Additionally, our data focused upon school finance and tax reform as major educational issues. But the magnitude of these correlations indicate that in states where greater state tax efforts were made to create revenue and where states have demonstrated effort to support education, there was greater likelihood of gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making.

Not only was gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making greater in states making greater tax and educational effort, but also in these states the actual state expenditures for education were found to be greater. There was a correlation of .64 between governors' educational involvement and the measure of educational expenditures. Interestingly, no relationship was discovered between a state's fiscal ability and the involvement index.

Relationships between governors' involvement in educational policy making and selected resource and policy-making influence variables were analyzed. As shown in Table 5-17, there was a tendency (.33) for governors to be more involved in educational policy making in states where they had

TABLE 5-17

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNORS' EDUCATIONAL POLICY-MAKING INVOLVEMENT, AND SELECTED RESOURCE AND POLICY-MAKING INFLUENCE VARIABLES

Resource and Policy-Making Influence Variables	Governors' Educational Policy-Making Involvement
Resource Variables	
Governors' Formal Powers (Schlesinger Index)	.33
Size of Governors' Personal Staffs	.29
Access to Legislative Party Resources[a]	.40
Policy-Making Influence Variables	
CSSO Influence in the SEA Arena[b]	.18
CSSO Influence in the Legislative Arena[b]	.18
SBE Overall Policy-Making Influence[c]	.06
Legislators' Perceptions of EIG Influence[d]	.13

[a] An index of governors' access to political party legislative resources, as determined by the extent of political party competitiveness in legislatures, and the governors' political party line-up in legislatures. See APPENDIX E for scoring procedure.

[b] See Chapter 3.

[c] See Chapter 2.

[d] See Chapter 6.

greater formal powers, as measured by the Schlesinger index. And, there was a slightly higher degree of association (.40) between governors' access to legislative party resources and the involvement index. (Access to legislative party resources is a measure of the extent to which governors had access to political party strengths in state legislatures.) Where governors had access to political party resources, they were somewhat more involved in educational policy making. There were no correlations of any size between the involvement index and selected policy-making influence variables involving chief state school officers, state boards of education, and educational interest groups.

Conclusions

Based upon our description and analysis of governors' roles in state policy making for the public schools, some concluding observations can be made.

1. Governors have become involved in educational policy making. In this population of twelve states, 75 per cent of the governors included education as a campaign issue in 1970. Yet, it would appear that education might provide governors with an issue more attractive for campaigning than for sustained legislative programs. Legislators who were interviewed in Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Tennessee mentioned that governors sometimes gave pro-education speeches but did not carry through with legislative programs and fiscal appropriations. The index of gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making revealed that the Georgia and Texas governors were greatly involved in defining educational issues but much less involved in formulating policy proposals in education. On the other hand, the Wisconsin and Minnesota governors were greatly involved

in all four stages of the policy process in education. The California and New York governors, although not as involved in defining educational issues as part of their legislative programs, were greatly involved in the legislative enactment of decisions affecting education.

2. Governors varied in the extent of their involvement in educational policy making. Based upon the index of gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making, governors in Wisconsin and Minnesota were found to be greatly involved in educational policy making. Governors in Michigan, New York, and Florida were considerably involved, and governors in California and Tennessee were moderately involved in educational policy making. The Texas Governor was slightly involved in educational policy making. Governors in Georgia, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Nebraska were hardly involved at all in educational policy making.

3. Governors differed according to the nature of their involvement in educational policy making. It was evident that governors differed in the nature of their educational involvement. Some governors (Minnesota, Michigan, Florida, Wisconsin) were oriented toward achieving fiscal reform in school finance and taxation. Other governors (California, New York) appeared to have fiscal concerns also, but were more oriented toward holding the line on state spending and restraining increases for areas such as education. Although inactive in educational policy making, the Nebraska Governor moved to curb spending and held to his campaign pledge of no new taxes. There were governors who were oriented toward expanding specific educational programs (Tennessee, Texas). The Georgia Governor actively defined early childhood education as an area of policy interest, but he did not follow through with specific legislative action. Two other governors (Colorado, Massachusetts) had not been involved in educational policy making.

4. Governors have resource capacities for independent involvement in educational policy making. There were gubernatorial aides in all twelve states who either worked full-time on educational matters or had part-time responsibilities in education. These governors' personal staff tended to be hired by governors currently in office, and nearly one-half of the educational staff had previous state government or political experience. Only 21 per cent of the staff who were interviewed had previous experience in education, and none came from the public schools. Rather, their previous positions were in higher education. While outside sources were utilized widely by governors in generating information and policy viewpoints about education, it appeared that policy formulation was accomplished by the aides and advisers close to the governor.

Not only did all twelve governors have the resource capacity for educational policy-making involvement, but also the governors became involved in education independent of the influence of chief state school officers, state boards of education, and educational interest groups. The lack of association between our variables of policy-making influence and the involvement index is consistent with this conclusion at least from the perspective of the policy-making influence exercised by these other major actors in education.

An outside resource which governors may be using more frequently is the citizen commission or task force. These organizations were found in six of the twelve states, but all four governors categorized as being oriented toward fiscal reform in school finance and taxation made use of this resource. Two of the three governors categorized as being oriented toward fiscal restraint in their educational policy-making involvement utilized this type of citizen organization. Particularly where major fiscal decisions must be made by governors, the legitimacy of the citizen committee may provide the governor with an important tactical resource in planning the strategy for major state policy.

5. Governors were crucial in the formulation and initiation of fiscal legislation affecting school finance and tax reform. Although governors differed in the nature of their educational policy-making involvement, virtually all twelve governors were involved in either the initiation or attempted initiation of policy. Even in the three states where governors had not been particularly active in education, the Colorado Governor attempted to initiate a policy proposal in school finance in 1973, the Massachusetts Governor attempted to initiate a policy proposal for a graduated state income tax, and the Nebraska Governor vetoed a major school finance bill. Although it is the state legislature which enacts policy, governors were critical actors in the formulation and initiation of fiscal legislation affecting school finance and tax reform.

In describing and analyzing governors' involvement in educational policy making, our view was cross-sectional as of 1972 and 1973. In the three states where governors were viewed as having the greatest educational policy-making involvement (Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan), school finance and tax reform were major state-level issues at that particular time. In other states, such as California, New York, and Massachusetts where characteristically one finds a high level of educational attainment,[26] governors were found to be somewhat less involved in educational policy making. We do not dispute either the importance or probable influence of these governors. On the Schlesinger index of governors' formal powers, New York ranked first, California third, and Massachusetts ranked fifth. Our data showed that Nelson Rockefeller was a governor with great power. In California, one could not deny the influence of Ronald Reagan in education, albeit critics would say that his influence has been exercised to the detriment of California's educational system. In Massachusetts, we do not question the influence of Francis Sargent in effecting reorganization in state government in the face of difficult political constraints. Whether it be from personal belief or state-specific conditions, school finance and tax reform issues did not *involve* some governors in the same manner and to the same extent that these issues involved other governors in 1972 and 1973.

6. *The structure for education and state government is only one among several important policy-making elements*. The Tennessee structure for state government may cause the Governor to be more involved in education if only because he can appoint and dismiss the Commissioner. On the other hand, the structure for education tended to insulate education from state government in New York and Wisconsin. Yet, the New York and Wisconsin governors became more involved in education in spite of structure. The New York Governor moved to appoint an Inspector General as a "watchdog" over education, and the Wisconsin Governor drew upon the recommendations of a task force and carried his proposal for more equalization in school finance to successful legislative enactment. In the other nine states, governors had mixed control over state education agencies. No causal relationships could be identified between governors' structural control over the SEA and their policy-making relationships.

7. *Of the variables used in the correlational analysis, the measures of state tax burden, educational effort, and educational expenditures were associated most strongly with the index of gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making*. Correlational analysis of the school finance and tax variables provided the key to explaining gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making. First, there were very strong relationships

between those governors who were involved in education and states making greater state tax effort, greater educational effort, and having greater expenditures for the public schools. Having concern for the allocation of state resources, governors were drawn into educational policy making particularly as school finance became a more visible state issue.

Second, in those states where governors were more involved in education, their concerns about education as a fiscal issue of major significance were unmistakable. Thus, the catalyst for governors' educational involvement was chiefly fiscal, and education was propelled into statewide prominence because of its demands on state revenue. In the late 1960s, rising school costs brought increasing burden on owners of residential property. But at the same time, many states experienced a fiscal crisis because the tax structure was unable to generate sufficient revenue to keep pace with the cost spiral evident in state services such as education. To make matters worse, court cases brought attention to state school finance systems which were not providing sufficient equalization to reduce inter-district fiscal disparities because of a reliance on property taxes.

Third, as chief executives who react to statewide constituencies in formulating policy, governors found themselves in the limelight. Public expectations of a solution to this fiscal dilemma forced governors to make policy choices among alternative solutions. Yet, governors differed in their responses. In our population of states, the Texas Governor encouraged others to propose solutions. In Georgia and Tennessee, there were no major issues in school finance and taxation. The Nebraska Governor simply reacted to a legislative proposal for increasing school aid. The Colorado and Massachusetts governors attempted policy initiation. In the other six states, the issues of school finance and taxation were highly visible in 1972. The

California Governor's prime interest was in tax reform. The New York Governor decided not to act on the recommendations of the Fleischmann Commission and others until a future legislative session. Four other governors (Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Florida) approached the issues directly and worked toward their solution in the legislature.

The correlational analysis indicated that governors who were more involved in educational policy making were in states characterized by legislatures having greater technical effectiveness and in states characterized as having a moralistic political culture. The correlational analysis further indicated that neither governors' formal powers nor the size of their education staff was strongly associated with their educational policy-making involvement. It may not be the size of governors' education staff which is of importance, however, but the fact that all twelve governors have at least some independent staff capability in this area.

Although the success of governors in getting their policy preferences enacted by legislatures is dependent upon many factors, we suspect that their capacity for defining salient legislative issues, their capability in formulating policy proposals, and governors' access to political party and legislative resources are among the most critical policy-making elements. Governors have the potential for involvement and evidence of involvement, based upon our analysis, in state policy making for the public schools.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER V

[1] Edward R. Hines, "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of New York," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, January, 1974) p. 101.

[2] Donald P. Sprengel, Gubernatorial Staff: Functional and Political Profiles, (Iowa City: Institute of Public Affairs, 1969), p. 3.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 15-17.

[4] Peggy M. Siegel, "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Massachusetts," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, February, 1974), p. 80.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

[6] Coleman B. Ransone, Jr., The Office of Governor in the United States, (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), p. 157.

[7] Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr., "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Minnesota," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, June, 1974), p. 52-76.

[8] Edward R. Hines, JAlan Aufderheide, Peggy M. Siegel, Linda C. Moffatt, and William E. Smith, "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Michigan," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, June, 1974), pp. 58-87.

[9] Dudley E. Brown, "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Wisconsin," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, February, 1974), pp. 38-43.

[10] Frank DePalma, "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Florida," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, January 1974), pp. 70-75.

[11] Gary Branson and Donald Steele, "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Tennessee," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, June 1974), pp. 37-42.

[12] JAlan Aufderheide, "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of California," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, February 1974), pp. 47-52.

[13] Hines, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-54.

[14] Linda C. Moffatt, "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Colorado," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, February 1974), p. 27.

[15] Siegel, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

[16] Gary Branson and Donald Steele, "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Georgia," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, January 1974), pp. 37-40.

[17] Gary Branson, "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Texas," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, January 1974), pp. 35-44.

[18] Roger Farrar, "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Nebraska," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, July 1974), pp. 68-70.

[19] See JAlan Aufderheide, "The Place of Educational Interest Groups in State Educational Policy-Making Systems," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (Columbus: The Ohio State University, 1973).

[20] Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in Politics in the American States, 2nd edition, ed. by H. Jacob and K. N. Vines (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 85-89.

[21] See Thomas R. Dye, "State Legislative Politics," in Jacob and Vines, op. cit., pp. 163-209, and Sara P. McCally, "The Governor and his Legislative Party," American Political Science Review, 60 (December 1966), pp. 923-942.

[22] John Burns, The Sometime Governments (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 52.

[23] Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa, and Douglas Matthews, The Almanac of American Politics (Boston: Gambit, 1972), p. 777.

[24] In this analysis, simple correlations were calculated because of the small number of cases (12) and the ordinal nature of the data. It is recognized that in a more extensive correlation analysis, where the interactive effect of more than one independent variable is considered in correlations with the gubernatorial involvement index and where partial correlations are used to control for specified variables, different results may be obtained.

[25] The categorization of inter-party competition, as measured by the Ranney Index (See Tables 5-12 and 5-15), is more accurately a measure of the extent to which states were Democratic in their inter-party competition. Using the Ranney Index in its original form, it correlated -.48 with the involvement index. Arranging the Ranney Index around the mid point of the extent to which states were two-party in inter-party competition (assuming the mid point of two-party competition is the greatest extent of two-party competition) the Ranney Index then correlated .27 with the involvement index. As suggested by Herbert B. Asher and Donald S. Van Meter (see Determinants of Public Welfare Policies: A Causal Approach (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973), p. 46), the Ranney Index may again be altered to provide a more accurate measure of inter-party competition. Using the computing formula of one minus two times the absolute deviation from .5, states are then distributed on a scale from 1.0 (most competitive) to 0.0 (least competitive). The Asher-Van Meter modification of the Ranney Index correlated .10 with the governors' involvement index.

[26] Rankings of the States, 1973 (Washington: NEA Research Division, 1973), p. 31. On the measure of "Per Cent of Population Age 25 and Older with 4 Years of College or More, 1970," California ranked 7th, New York 14th, and Massachusetts 11th; Minnesota ranked 20th, Wisconsin ranked 29th and Michigan ranked 31st.

CHAPTER VI

EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS AND THE STATE LEGISLATURE*

JAlan Aufderheide

Introduction

Interest groups have long been recognized as playing a basic role in public policy making, particularly in democratic governments. Group structures, relationships and influence have received the careful attention of many scholars. But the politics of education, including the activities of educational interest groups, is a relatively new area of study.[1] Much systematic investigation needs to take place if this area is to be better understood. Our purpose in this chapter is to present some of the EGP findings on the role of educational groups in legislative policy making for the public schools. More specifically, we have organized this chapter to answer five questions:

1. What basic resources are available to the educational interest groups?
2. How do these groups convert their basic resources into a working capacity (i.e., power) to exert legislative influence?
3. How much unity exists among the educational interest groups on legislative issues? What is the current status of educational coalitions?
4. How influential, collectively and individually, are the educational interest groups in the state legislature?
5. How might the differences in legislative influence among the groups and across the states be explained?

Before turning to these questions, some comments need to be made about our focus and data. As to the first, we confined our research attention in each state to the four major state-level educational interest groups (EIGs): (1) the teacher association (TA), the state affiliate of the National Education Association; (2) the teacher federation (TF), the state affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers; (3) the administrator association (AA), the state affiliate of the American Association of School Administrators; and (4) the school boards association (SBA), the state affiliate of the National School Boards Association. Our focus is further delimited in this chapter to the legislative arena. The legislature sets all fiscal policy for the schools and enacts countless other laws that affect these institutions in fundamental ways. Understandably, the legislature is "where the action is" for most educational interest groups. We chose, for this reason, to examine in this chapter legislator-educational interest group relationships, rather than looking at the relationships between these groups and other state policy actors.[2]

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*This chapter has been selected and adapted by the editors from JAlan Aufderheide's more comprehensive study, "The Place of Educational Interest Groups in State Educational Policy Systems," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1973).

The data reported in this chapter are drawn primarily from the interview schedules completed by educational interest group leaders and by legislative leaders. (See Table 1-3 for the number of these respondents.) We also interviewed the researchers who had actually conducted the field work to obtain intuitive impressions and a better sense of the "big picture" in each state. In addition, several follow-up procedures were employed to fill-in the data gaps. These included:

1. Contacting the national offices of the groups (National Education Association, American Federation of Teachers, National School Boards Association, American Association of School Administrators) by mail and telephone;

2. Contacting representatives of the various interest groups in a number of states to gain specific data or to conduct full interviews by telephone;

3. Reviewing the individual case studies written by EGP staff to determine whether data other than those from interview schedules had been used relative to educational interest group activity.

These and other follow-up procedures, albeit not without difficulties, were fairly effective in filling data gaps. Though some gaps remained, they were few enough so as not to challenge, in our opinion, the preponderance of the evidence.

Basic Resources

Basic resources, in effect, represent the "raw materials" which can be utilized by the educational interest groups to "manufacture" power and influence at the state level.

Numbers of Members

Perhaps the most fundamental resource available to any group--and the easiest to compare--is the size of its membership. Table 6-1 reports the state figures for the four major educational interest groups--teacher association (TA), administrator organization (AA), school boards association (SBA), and teacher federation (TF)--in numbers of active members. Active members are the most comparable data since many of the organizations enroll corporate, student, retired, and other members not fully participating. The data are for the 1972-73 membership years except in the case of the SBAs; the most current data available on these associations were for 1971-72.

A greater problem with the SBE membership data is that the first column of these data in Table 6-1 shows the number of school boards, not persons, which were affiliated, these organizations having institutional memberships. Therefore, these data had to be transformed. This was done (see second SBA column in Table 6-1) by multiplying the number of boards by five. The most common size for local school boards appears to be five members and the new

TABLE 6-1

EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUP MEMBERSHIP
(NUMBER OF ACTIVE MEMBERS)

STATE	TA[a]	AA[b]	SBA[c]	TF[d]
California	150,980	3,229	1,142(5,710)[e]	27,000
Colorado	19,628	1,174	129(645)	2,000
Florida	33,000	67	67(335)	5,000
Georgia	36,762	143	170(850)	NSO[f]
Massachusetts	44,458	3[illegible]5	341(1,705)	DNA[g]
Michigan	78,805	783	560(2,800)	18,000
Minnesota	34,376	502	436(2,180)	14,000
Nebraska	18,505	839	266(1,330)	NSO
New York	101,250[h]	555	754(3,770)	M[i]
Tennessee	39,149	500	141(705)	DNA
Texas	139,911	1,217	525(2,625)	NSO
Wisconsin	45,331	397	422(2,110)	DNA

[a] Teacher association, data 1972-73 from National Council of State Educational Associations.

[b] Administrator association, data 1972-73 from American Association of School Administrators.

[c] School boards association, data 1971-72 from National School Boards Association.

[d] Teacher federation, data 1972-73 from interview schedules.

[e] First number = member boards, second number () = board times 5.

[f] No state organization as reported by AFT.

[g] Data not available.

[h] Data are for association portion of merged TA-TF.

[i] Data for TF portion of merged TA-TF not available.

figures for the SBAs closely approximate the number of individuals represented by these organizations. Such weighting efforts, however, have inaccuracies because some boards may have six or more members. But for purposes of generalizing here, this margin of error is tolerable.

From Table 6-1, then, it is possible to cite four general findings:

1. The teacher associations enroll by far the largest membership, anywhere from roughly twice to hundreds of times as large as the other organizations.

2. The teacher federation's membership ranks it second in a number of states, but the federation is virtually non-existent in three states as a state-level group.

3. The school boards associations generally are smallest in size if only institution members are counted, but they rank ahead of the administrator groups when numbers of persons represented are the figures used.

4. The administrator groups represent fewest individuals, ranging from 67 in Florida to 3,229 in California.

Money

The enrollment of members in the educational interest groups is an important consideration for various reasons, not the least of which is money. Thus, attention is given here to interest group resources obtained in the form of dues. Table 6-2 contains data on the dues levels of the interest groups in the 12 states. Insofar as possible these data are presented in dollar amounts.

Both of the teacher groups in all of the states reported their dues as a flat dollar amount. The school board and administrator groups were another story. While four administrator groups did report flat dues, at least six others had a flexible dues structure which allows for reporting only an average, or in two cases a percentage of the members' salaries. In the case of school boards, only two states reported flat amounts; the other 10 states reported the range of institutional dues. It is significant to note that

TABLE 6-2

EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUP STATE DUES IN FLAT AMOUNT, AVERAGE, OR RANGE

STATE	TA[a]	AA[b]	SBA[c]	TF[d]
California	$ 72[e]	$ 95(ave)[f]	$ 60	$ 21
Colorado	50	64(ave)	358-7,051[g]	34.80
Florida	40	INC[h]	250-2,000	17
Georgia	25	10	158-4,177	NSO[i]
Massachusetts	76	125	75-500	30
Michigan	100	100	69-1,500	24
Minnesota	48	100(ave)	236-2,833	42
Nebraska	30	INC	100	NSO
New York	55	83(ave)	225-1,700	M[j]
Tennessee	25	DNA[k]	30-2,100	DNA
Texas	18	35	110-575	NSO
Wisconsin	46	DNA	180-1,876	DNA

[a] From National Council of State Education Association's, "Profiles of State Education Associations, 1972-73."

[b] From American Association of School Administrators' "Profile '73: State Associations of School Administrators."

[c] From National School Boards Association, by telephone.

[d] From respective teacher federation state offices, by telephone.

[e] All state teacher associations report flat dues, usually as per cent of average salary in state.

[f] Four state administrator associations report the "average" of a flexible dues schedule.

[g] All but two state school board groups report flexible dues; the range is given here.

[h] Inconclusive data. (e.g., Florida AA reported ½ of one per cent of individuals' salary. Nebraska reported dues at .004 per cent. These data are inconclusive in that they do not compare with other data in Table 6-2 given in dollars.)

[i] No state organization.

[j] Separate TF data not available, TF merged with TA.

[k] Data not available.

the school board groups enroll institutions, not individuals, and that these dues almost universally come from public tax monies (i.e., from school board budgets). Further, these dues structures are flexible, based upon a number of students, teachers, or annual budgets of the school districts.

To generalize, Table 6-2 shows that school board groups, by and large, have the highest dues, running as much as $7,051 in Colorado (but as little as $30 in Tennessee). Administrator groups seem to have the next largest dues, although data are inconclusive or unavailable in four states. Teacher association dues, while generally substantial, still rank third on an outlay per member basis. Teacher federation dues were reported at levels below the other organizations.

A more meaningful comparison of the financial resources of these groups comes from a consideration of the income they derive from dues. Annual income figures are presented in Table 6-3. In the case of the administrator and school board groups, AASA and NSBA had compiled data which reported such income. But in the case of both teacher groups it was necessary to multiply members (Table 6-1) times dues (Table 6-2) to estimate annual income. Admittedly, these data are not precise if for no other reason than the fact that in at least one column (SBA) the data were for 1971-72, unlike the 72-73 data for the other groups. Still, for purposes of generalization the data imperfections are relatively minor.

Table 6-3, reporting approximate annual income from dues, demonstrates the effect of the number of members as a significant variable. Whereas the teacher associations have generally lower dues than either administrators or school boards, their large numbers generate a great deal of revenue. These data reveal that the teacher association income from dues, in some

TABLE 6-3

EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUP ESTIMATED ANNUAL INCOME FROM STATE DUES (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

STATE	TA[a]	AA[b]	SBA[c]	TF[a]
California	10,870	120	444	567
Colorado	981	65	175	70
Florida	1,320	13	63	85
Georgia	919	1	90	NSO[d]
Massachusetts	3,379	37	101	DNA[e]
Michigan	7,880	77	277	432
Minnesota	1,650	58	296	588
Nebraska	555	49	97	NSO
New York	5,569	54	571	M[f]
Tennessee	979	DNA	33	DNA
Texas	2,518	38	74	NSO
Wisconsin	2,085	28	199	DNA

[a] Income from dues estimated as members (Table 6-1) times dues (Table 6-2).

[b] Income from dues as reported to and by AASA.

[c] Income from dues as reported to and by NSBA.

[d] No state organization.

[e] Data not available.

[f] Separate TF data not available, TF merged with TA.

instances, runs a hundred times that of administrator organizations and easily ten times that of school board groups. The teacher federations also rank ahead of administrators and school boards where the federation exists at the state level. School board groups rank well ahead of administrators in all cases, and ahead of the federation in one case (Colorado). Administrators uniformly rank fourth out of four groups in all 12 states.

Miscellaneous Monetary Resources

Unquestionably, income from dues constitutes by far the largest portion of educational interest group income. Yet it is worth mentioning that some income is generated from other sources. In many cases the various groups have reported income from conferences and conventions sponsored wholly or in part by the organizations. Among the administrator groups one striking example was the Association of California School Administrators which, while reporting $1.2 million from dues, also reported $148,000 in income from conference fees.

Such income clearly reflects activities beyond what might be considered normal on-going programs. However, in probing several interest group respondents about this category of income, the consensus was that such income usually was balanced, or in some cases exceeded by, conference or convention expenses. Therefore, it would be relatively safe and accurate to consider these special sources of income as "rotary" accounts which do not produce any substantial "after expenses" income for the groups.

There is another "fringe" category of income which is difficult to pin down but nevertheless is highly significant. That is, a number of the educational interest groups--teachers almost exclusively--have engaged in fund raising efforts for purposes of electing public officials "friendly" to education. (Or, perhaps more accurately, "friendly" to that particular group's point of view.) As can be seen from Table 6-4, nearly all of the teacher groups reported the existence of a "political action arm." But only three administrator groups and no school board groups had such "arms." Educational interest group leaders explained that, due to legal constraints of state and federal statutes and Internal Revenue codes, corporations may not directly engage in political campaigns. As a result, semi-autonomous political action "arms" serve to provide legal vehicles for the parent corporations to collect and disburse political funds.

These political contributions are generally on a voluntary basis and typically in unspecified amounts, making it extremely difficult to discover the total dollars involved. While it is true that such political campaign income and expenses are usually reported somewhere by someone, there appears to be much opportunity to "camouflage" the actual figures. As one group leader said: "Our local groups report the amount they spend, and if you really want to know, you could go to each county board of elections office." Similarly, the NEA Governmental Relations Office (which has helped organize and coordinate such activity) "respectfully declines" to give out such information.

In at least two cases--Michigan and California--enough is known about the political action arms to speculate on the dollar levels involved. In both of these states a political action contribution of $5.00 is attached to the state dues as a "negative check-off." ("Negative check-off," like many record and book clubs, means that the individual has to take action to prevent participation, rather than the converse.) As one group leader explained, "We run a small box in the back of one of our publications telling people how they can get their money back if they want to." The consensus is, that with this technique, a negative dues check-off typically means 95 per

TABLE 6-4

EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS HAVING POLITICAL ACTION ARMS

STATE	TA	AA	SBA	TF
California	Yes	No	No	Yes
Colorado	Yes	No	No	Yes[a]
Florida	Yes[b]	No	No	Yes
Georgia	Yes	No	No	NSO[c]
Massachusetts	Yes	No	No	No
Michigan	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Minnesota	Yes	No	No	Yes
Nebraska	Yes	Yes[d]	No	NSO
New York	Yes	No	No	M[e]
Tennessee	Yes	No	No	DNA[g]
Texas	Yes	Yes[f]	No	NSO
Wisconsin	Yes	No	No	DNA

[a] Stressed that TF involvement was via AFL-CIO.

[b] Locally coordinated as opposed to state coordination in other states.

[c] No state organization.

[d] Executive secretary indicated he became involved, but "as an individual."

[e] TF data not available, TF merged with TA.

[f] Same as political arm of TA.

[g] Data not available.

cent participation or better. The California Teachers Association, for example, was pointed to by informed observers as "having a $600,000 political war chest."

Status of Members

In addition to the resources just described, there is another kind of basic resource that is available in varying degrees to the educational interest groups, a resource that might be termed "status of members." This resource, however, is particularly hard to study. First, while an abstract definition can be offered, a practical definition widely shared among respondents is difficult to extract. As a concept, "status of members" refers to the degree to which the individual members of the respective groups command respect and credibility due to the nature of the positions they hold. For example, some respondents claimed that superintendents by virtue of their positions as the administrative heads of school systems had a valuable source of influence. But others claimed that board members, because they are elected by the people and have no "vested interest" other than to represent and protect the people, should be considered the most credible educational spokesmen at the state level.

The "status of members" concept is also difficult to deal with because of such questions as "status with whom and on what matters?" Moreover, it is impossible to measure "status" in relatively objective terms, unlike measuring numbers of members or amount of money. In any event, "status of members" as a resource is mentioned here because sufficient evidence does exist that interest group leaders, to varying degrees, claim status as a reason for group influence; and that a number of legislator respondents recognize and perhaps give legitimacy to such claims.

Review of Findings

Educational interest groups had access to two basic types of resources: members and dollars. Besides these, the interest groups sought other monetary resources. Both the teacher association and teacher federation leaders, in every case but one, said that they maintained a political action arm which, among its functions, collected and disbursed campaign monies. Administrator and school board groups indicated some cash flow outside of dues, especially as related to conferences, clinics, and workshops.

The administrator and school board groups apparently also enjoyed another more nebulous type of resource--"status of members." The "status of members" resource has to do with the credibility or prestige of local members as a reason for group strength.

In terms of sheer numbers of members the teacher associations had an overwhelming margin in comparison with other groups. The ratio of teacher association members to administrator association members was typically 10 to one, running as high as 100 to one in several states. When school board groups were compared with teacher associations the ratio was only slightly lower. The teacher federations were non-existent or otherwise non-competitive in nearly half the states. The notable exceptions were in New York, Minnesota, Michigan, and California--all Northern states with strong union movements. In New York, the size of UFT membership was sufficient to force merger with NYSTA on an equal basis.

As for state dues, the school board groups typically reported the highest dues, followed by administrators, teacher associations, and finally teacher federations. Educational interest group income from dues was substantial. Across the 12 states, the teacher associations, for example, reported nearly $40 million yearly income from dues. In comparison, the administrator groups reported less than one million and school board groups reported a little over two million. Where teacher federations existed and were willing to report, it appeared they were able to exceed administrator and school board group income somewhat.

To sum up, the teacher associations characteristically had extremely large memberships, moderately high dues, and the combination of the two produced a great margin over the other groups in terms of income. Teacher associations also uniformly reported having political action arms. School board groups typically reported having the largest dues of any group, though only a small number of members compared with teacher associations. Hence, school board groups received but a fraction of the income reported by teacher associations. Even so, the school board associations did report higher memberships and dues than administrator groups. Administrator associations were usually third and sometimes fourth among the state interest groups on the basis of members, dues, and income. The teacher federation profile was considerably less clear, partly because there was no state-level organization in Georgia, Nebraska, and Texas, and partly because of the lack of cooperation in several other states. But it can be said that federation memberships were related to urbanization and that this may be considered a characteristic. Overall, however, the federations were weak at the state level.

Power

Basic resources left in raw form, as for example money, are not in themselves capable of anything. Such resources generate power only when they are transformed, as into staff or a lobbying establishment. The power section of this chapter is based on the belief that resources are manipulated, or at least are capable of being manipulated, in a strategic manner by interest groups to produce the most "promising" kinds of power. Thus, the notion of power is used here to refer to the capacity of the interest group to affect policy enactments.

Professional Staff

The most logical starting point in presenting the findings on power is to report data on staff capabilities. These data (see Table 6-5) disclose that teacher associations in all 12 states employ by far the largest professional staffs and that only in the smaller states are other groups able to come even close numerically (as in Nebraska with a gap of only seven persons between the TA and the SBA). On a percentage basis, none of the groups employs staffs even half the size of the teacher association. The Colorado Association of School Boards comes closest with a staff not quite half the size of the Colorado Education Association.

Generally speaking, school board associations run a distant second to the teacher associations in size of professional staffs. The administrator associations and teacher federations jockey for third and fourth in size of staffs, depending on the state. In Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Michigan the teacher federation had the larger staffs. In the balance of the states--including three by default because no state teacher federations were organized--the administrator associations were larger in staff size. In looking at individual states, California stands out as having the greatest number (257) of professional staff persons employed by the four groups. By way of contrast, Nebraska reported only 14 staff persons employed by three groups.

Lobbying Staff

Along with total staff capabilities, educational interest group respondents were also asked to identify the number of part and full-time lobbyists employed by their organization. The data contained in Table 6-6 show the

TABLE 6-5

NUMBERS OF PROFESSIONAL STAFF EMPLOYED BY THE EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS

STATE	TA	AA	SBA	TF
California	216	12	19	10
Colorado	15	3	7	4
Florida	32	1 PT[a]	3	1[b]
Georgia	16	1 PT	6	NSO[c]
Massachusetts	45	2	9	6
Michigan	127	2	8	5
Minnesota	42	1	10	7
Nebraska	10	1	3	NSO
New York	150	2	29	M[d]
Tennessee	27	0	2	DNA[e]
Texas	31	1	5	NSO
Wisconsin	34	1 PT	12	DNA

[a] PT indicates part-time staff.

[b] Florida Federation's one staff position was vacant at the time of this study.

[c] No state organization.

[d] TF merged with TA, data not available for TF only.

[e] Data not available.

TABLE 6-6

NUMBER OF FULL-TIME (FT) AND PART-TIME (PT) LOBBYISTS EMPLOYED BY EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS

STATE	TA	AA	SBA	TF
California	5 FT[a]	1 FT, 5 PT	1 FT	1 FT
Colorado	2 FT, 3 PT	2 PT	1 FT	3 FT
Florida	1 FT[b]	0	1 FT, 1 PT	1 FT[c]
Georgia	1 FT, 4 PT	0	1 FT, 2 PT	NSO[d]
Massachusetts	3 FT	1 PT[e]	1 PT	2 PT
Michigan	2 FT, 3 PT	1 FT	1 FT	1 FT, 1 PT
Minnesota	2 FT[f]	1 FT	3 FT, 6 PT	2 FT
Nebraska	1 FT, 1 PT	1 FT	2 FT	NSO
New York	4 FT	1 PT	3 PT	M[g]
Tennessee	2 FT, 4 PT	0[h]	2 PT	DNA[i]
Texas	4 FT, 10 PT	0[h]	2 PT	NSO
Wisconsin	1 FT, 4 PT	1 PT	2 PT	DNA

[a] Also reported a FT "PR" man attached to lobbying corps.

[b] Also reported one more FT lobbyist about to be employed.

[c] At the time of this study, this position was vacant.

[d] No state organization.

[e] Massachusetts AA and SBA share same lobbyist.

[f] Also reported a FT intern.

[g] TF merged with TA; separate TF data not available.

[h] Relies on TA for lobbying.

[i] Data not available.

numbers of lobbyists so employed. Again, these data demonstrate the substantial edge of the teacher associations. Yet when one considers the vast differences in income among the groups, the relative differences in lobbying staff do not loom very large. In Nebraska, for example, the School Boards Association reported a lobbying corps (2 full-time) larger than that of the Teacher Association (1 full-time, 1 part-time). In Minnesota, the School Boards Association also reported the largest lobbying corps. At the other extreme, the CTA in California reported an edge of roughly five to one over the other groups.

It should be pointed out that the data in Table 6-6 are reliable for gross comparisons only. No effort was made to report part-time lobbyists on a percentage of full-time equivalent (f.t.e.) basis. In some cases, where interest groups reported "other" staff as lobbyists, the percentage f.t.e. could be as much as half-time. In still other cases, members holding full-time public school employment (e.g., president of an administrator group who served as a local superintendent) could not be devoting more than a small fraction of time to lobbying activities. In any event, Table 6-6 does indicate rough approximations of educational interest group lobbying power.

Research Capabilities

Another kind of power of educational interest groups exists in the form of research capabilities. The educational interest group respondents were asked whether they had a research department or division and, if they did, how many staff were assigned to that function. These data (see Table 6-7) show that in all 12 states the teacher associations reported the existence of such research capabilities. Staff so assigned by the teacher associations ranged from a high of four in New York to a low of one in Georgia, Nebraska, and Wisconsin.

TABLE 6-7

EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS HAVING OWN RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OR DIVISION

STATE	TA	AA	SBA	TF
California	Yes (3)[a]	No	No	No
Colorado	Yes (2)	No	Yes (1.5)	No
Florida	Yes (3)	No	No	No
Georgia	Yes (1)	No	Yes (1)	NSO[b]
Massachusetts	Yes (3)	No	No	No
Michigan	Yes (2)	No	Yes (1)	No
Minnesota	Yes (1.5)	No	Yes (3)	No
Nebraska	Yes (1)	No	No	NSO
New York	Yes (4)	No	Yes (3)	M[c]
Tennessee	Yes (3)	No	No	DNA[d]
Texas	Yes (3)	Yes[e]	No	NSO
Wisconsin	Yes (1)	No	Yes (.25)	DNA

[a] The number in parentheses () following a "Yes" gives reported number of staff assigned.

[b] No state organization.

[c] TF merged with TA, separate TF data not available.

[d] Data not available.

[e] Texas AA is affiliated with Texas TA which provides research.

In contrast, only one of the state administrator groups--Texas--reported research capabilities and, in this instance, such capability was due to direct affiliation with the Texas State Teachers Association. In looking at the respective school board groups, Table 6-7 data indicate that half of the groups had research capabilities, although one might question the value of the Wisconsin school board group's reported quarter-time staff so assigned. The teacher federations reported virtually no research capabilities, but a number of respondents indicated that they could rely on the AFT or AFL-CIO for such needs.

To review, Table 6-7 shows that in at least six of the 12 states the teacher association was the only group to have research capabilities. In the other six states, the teacher associations were joined in this capability by the school board groups. Neither administrators nor teacher federations were able to compete in this regard.

Political Action Arms

In section one of this chapter we identified the educational interest groups that had established political action arms (see Table 6-4). Those data were included in that section to show that some interest groups had access to fiscal resources outside of the normal dues structure. But such political activities must also be included here as an indicator of the power such arms represent. The ideal situation would be to report in detail the amount of support given to each candidate in dollars, man-hours, supplies, etc. Unfortunately, educational interest groups make a point of not releasing much of these data, though expenditure information must be reported to governmental agencies.

The best we can do is to report the types of campaigns in which the groups having political arms were involved. Data included in Table 6-8 depict this participation in legislative (L), state board of education (SBE), or chief state school officer (CCSO) elections. Opportunities in the latter two cases (SBE and CSSO) were, of course, limited to those states where these officials were elected as opposed to being appointed.

The data in Table 6-8 demonstrate that the teacher groups were far more inclined to become active in political campaigns than either administrators or school board groups. Yet even among teacher groups an important distinction must be noted. In no case did any teacher federation report having its own political action arm. Rather, these federations stated that their political activities were coordinated through and by state AFL-CIO political arms. Teacher association political arms, on the other hand, were reported to be independent except for their link to the national teacher association.

Data in Table 6-8 reveal that in only two states--Michigan and Nebraska--were administrator groups involved in any way in political activity. In the case of Nebraska, there may be some question as to whether the administrator group is committed to political action. The group's executive secretary was reported to have "taken some time off" to get politically involved "as an individual," presumably thus protecting the group from charges of partisanship, etc.

In essence, the data in Table 6-8 provide evidence as to the large degree to which teacher associations dominate the field of educational interest group political involvement. In all 12 states association political arms were active in legislative races, with a few also participating in state board and CSSO races. The activity of the teacher federations is perhaps suspect to the extent that their activity might be overshadowed--or precluded--by the AFL-CIO. Only two administrator groups became politically

TABLE 6-5

PARTICIPATION IN TYPES OF CAMPAIGNS BY THOSE EDUCATIONAL GROUPS HAVING POLITICAL ACTION ARMS

STATE	TA	AA	SBA	TF
California	L[a]			L
Colorado	L,SBE[b]			L,SBE
Florida	L,SBE,CSSO[c,d]			L
Georgia	L			NSO[e]
Massachusetts	L			-
Michigan	L,SBE	L		L,SBE
Minnesota	L			L
Nebraska	L,SBE	L,SBE[f]		NSO
New York	L			L(M)[g]
Tennessee	L			DNA[h]
Texas	L,SBE[i]			NSO
Wisconsin	L,CSSO			DNA

[a] L = campaigns for legislative seats.

[b] SBE = campaigns for state board of education seats.

[c] CSSO= campaigns of elected chief state school officers.

[d] Florida TA political activity is highly decentralized.

[e] No state organization.

[f] Nebraska AA does not have a formal arm; indirect activity.

[g] TF merged with TA, separate TF data not available.

[h] Data not available.

[i] Texas TA does not campaign as such but does "interview and rate" - a form of campaign activity.

involved--one of them compensating for such temerity by saying "we prayed a lot." And finally, not surprisingly given their memberships, no school board group found it practical or desirable to engage in direct political action.

Sources of Lobbying Strength

A final way to ascertain the kinds of power available to and used by the educational interest groups is to examine the means employed in lobbying activities. In this connection, educational interest group leaders were asked: "Speaking generally, what means of influence or persuasion can your organization draw upon in its lobbying efforts in the legislature?" In other words, the group leaders were asked to offer their perceptions of the sources of power used in lobbying. Their responses are summarized in Table 6-9.

Examination of the data in Table 6-9 discloses certain patterns of power, at least in the eyes of the interest group leaders. In terms of money for political campaigns, for instance, only teacher association or federation spokesmen identified this as a source of power in lobbying activity. Six of the twelve teacher association leaders mentioned money as a source of power and one federation leader mentioned it as well. As might be expected, none of the administrator or school board members referred to campaign money. This is consistent with their limited resources and absence of political action arms.

Staff contacts were mentioned as a source of power more frequently than was money. But surprisingly, given their large staffs, just half of the teacher association leaders cited staff contacts as a source of power. Three administrator leaders, one school board leader, and one federation leader also identified staff contacts. Teacher associations, then, apparently rely on the power of their staffs more so than do the other groups.

TABLE 6-9

SOURCES OF POWER UTILIZED BY EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS IN LOBBYING

STATE	TA	AA	SBA	TF
California	$,SC,RE,LO	TBS,INF	INF,LO	LO
Colorado	$,INF,RE	LO	INF,LO	SC
Florida	INF,LO,CO[a]	LO	CR	DNA
Georgia	SC,LO	LO	LO	NSO
Massachusetts	$,INF	LO,SC	LO	INF,TBS
Michigan	INF,LO	INF,LO	INF,SM	PP
Minnesota	$,LO	INF,LO	INF	$,LO
Nebraska	SC	SC,LO	SC	NSO
New York	SC,PC,$	SC,INF	INF,LO	M
Tennessee	INF,LO,SC	---[b]	INF,LO	DNA
Texas	INF,LO	---[b]	INF	NSO
Wisconsin	$,SC,INF	SM,LO	LO	DNA

Where:

$ = Campaign money
SC = Staff contact
RE = Research
LO = Local members
TBS = Telling both sides
INF = Information
CO = Coalition activity

CR = Credibility and respect of org.
DNA = Data not available
NSO = No state organization
SM = Status of members
PP = Political power
PC = Personal contacts
M = Merged with TA

[a] Coalition involves only local TAs, state organization weakness.

[b] Indicates AA used power of TA.

The source of power most frequently mentioned by interest group leaders was local member contacts with legislative leaders. Eight administrator leaders, seven teacher association leaders, seven school board leaders, and two federation leaders named this factor as a source of power. This is not an unexpected finding, especially in light of one group leader's comment that "we try to emphasize that legislative influence is most effectively applied where legislators live, not where they vote."

Another important source of power as perceived by the interest group leaders had to do with providing information. Seven school board leaders, seven teacher association leaders, four administrator leaders, and one federation leader cited information and their capability to provide it as a principal source of power. Given the substantial edge in research capability possessed by the teacher associations, it is interesting to observe that only two association respondents mentioned it as a source of power, nor did the leaders of any of the other educational groups mention research. It is likely, however, that when our interviewees pointed to information they also meant the kinds of data that might be generated out of a research capability. Status of members, while specifically cited by only two group leaders, probably also was included in the context of another factor, that being local member contacts.

Besides the factors that have been discussed, there were several less important and less descriptive sources of power cited by respondents. One group leader mentioned "credibility of the organization." Similarly, two other leaders suggested that "telling both sides" was a source of power. These less descriptive and infrequently mentioned factors might reflect a communications gap between the interviewer and the respondent.

To summarize the data in Table 6-9, they indicate that teacher associations seemed to value information, local member contacts, campaign money, and professional staffs--in that order--as means of power. Administrator groups relied heavily on local member contacts, with information and staff activity being much less important. School board groups cited local member contacts and information equally, with staff of little significance. Teacher federation responses reveal no pattern of emphasis. In part this is because between "data not available" and "no state organization" nearly half the states in our sample show no information for the federations.

Review of Findings

The educational interest groups sought to transform resources into power primarily through the employment and use of professional staff. The numbers of staff employed by the groups generally paralleled the pattern of interest group income from dues. There was, apparently, high priority given to the employment of legislative advocates, since only four of all the groups in the 12 states reported no lobbyists employed. This was particularly significant to groups with small staffs; for some of these groups the legislative arena was important enough to draw half or more of their staff time.

The teacher associations, and to a lesser extent the school board groups, allocated resources in such a way as to secure employment of research staff on a regular basis. Administrator groups and teacher federations probably found their resources spread too thin to permit acquisition of research capabilities. Political action arms were also in evidence as an expression of group power, but they were limited almost exclusively to the two teacher groups. Such political power was directed predominantly toward legislative campaigns.

As for sources of lobbying power, the teacher associations valued and made the most of campaign money, sizable memberships, and large professional staffs. Administrator and school board groups tended to emphasize information giving and local member contacts to obtain power in the legislative arena. Teacher federation data were too fragmented to draw any picture of their power sources, except perhaps for the matter of political power (i.e., the ability to participate meaningfully in legislative campaigns). The federations, like the teacher associations, stressed political activism, whereas administrator and school board groups did not.

Relationships Among the Educational Interest Groups

Commentators in the 1960s often spoke of an "establishment" at the core of which were alliances of educational interest groups.[3] There is abundant evidence that this "establishment" is no longer as united as it supposedly was a decade ago. Historic forces have shattered many, perhaps most, of these coalitions. The aftermath, as interpreted by several scholars, has been a "breakdown of political order" in respect to public education at the state level.[4] We were very interested in the extent of this "breakdown," its causes, and the current status of the educational coalitions.

Extent of Educator Unity

To test perceptions of educator unity, we asked a number of different groups of respondents this question: "To what extent do the major educational interest groups act in unison and speak with one voice? Do they do so on: nearly all, most, some, or almost no legislative issues?" Governors' personal staff members, state department legislative experts, educational group leaders and--perhaps most important--legislators, all responded to this question and their answers form the basis for Tables 6-10 and 6-11.

TABLE 6-10

PERCEPTIONS OF UNITY AMONG EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS ON LEGISLATIVE ISSUES

	Extent of unity as perceived by:					
STATE	GPS[a]	SDE-LE[b]	TA	AA	SBA	TF
California	3	3	3	3	3	3
Colorado	DNA[c]	2	2	2	2	3
Florida	3	2	2.6[d]	3	2	2
Georgia	2	2	2	1	1	NSO[e]
Massachusetts	3.5	4	3.5	1.5	4	3
Michigan	3.6	4	3.6	3	4	4
Minnesota	4	3	1	3	3	3
Nebraska	3	1.5	2	1	4	NSO
New York	3	3.5	3.5	4	2	M[f]
Tennessee	1	2	1	2	1	DNA
Texas	2	2	1.6	1	1	NSO
Wisconsin	3	2	3	1.6	2	DNA

Where: 1 = "nearly all legislative issues"
2 = "most"
3 = "some"
4 = "almost no issues"

[a] Governor's personal staff responses.

[b] State department legislative expert responses.

[c] Data not available.

[d] Other than whole numbers indicate mean of several responses.

[e] No state organization.

[f] TF merged with TA, separate TF data not available.

TABLE 6-11

LEGISLATOR PERCEPTIONS OF UNITY AMONG THE EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS ON LEGISLATIVE ISSUES

	Number of legislators describing unity on issues as:				
STATE	NEARLY ALL	MOST	SOME	ALMOST NO	(N)
California	1	3	8	4	16
Colorado		5	6	3	14
Florida			1	2	3
Georgia	6	4	3		13
Massachusetts		2	3	8	13
Michigan		2	11	2	15
Minnesota		1	6	7	14
Nebraska		2	3		5
New York		1	5	2	8
Tennessee	5	5	1		11
Texas	1	5	4		10
Wisconsin	2	5	8	2	17

The data in Table 6-10 and Table 6-11 suggest that the following states most closely approximated a high degree of unity among the educational interest groups: Georgia, Tennessee, Texas. These data also show several states at the other extreme, manifesting much disunity: Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and perhaps California. The balance of states fell in the middle ground. With few exceptions, the different respondents were rather consistent in their assessments, indicating as probable a substantial degree of accuracy in these rankings.

Aside from determining the extent of unison among the educational groups constituting the "education lobby," we wanted to know which issues were seen as producing division among the groups. Accordingly, state department legislative experts, legislators, and governor's personal staff members were all asked: "What issues tend to divide the major educational organizations the most?" The replies of all these respondents are summarized in Table 6-12. These replies identify a total of five issues--collective bargaining, tenure, salaries, school finance, and certification, probably in that order--as being the ones most dividing the educational organizations. Of course, these issues are far from mutually exclusive, which suggests an even more tightly-knit set of factors producing conflict.

Status of Educational Coalitions

The literature on state school policy making has ascribed great significance to educational coalitions.[5] The first question we asked relevant to this concern aimed at determining which states had coalitions. To provide a common frame of reference, the initial question was preceded by defining "coalition" as "a number of different organizations who have consciously worked together over a period of years to achieve some common purpose." With this definition in mind, the educational interest group leaders were asked:

TABLE 6-12

PERCEPTIONS OF SELECTED RESPONDENTS AS TO THE ISSUES MOST DIVIDING THE EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS

STATE	SDE-LE[a]	Legislators	GPS[b]
California	Cb,Crt,Ten	Cb,Ten	Crt,Ten,Cb
Colorado	INC	Ten,Cb	DNA
Florida	Cb,Sal	Fin,Cb	Cb
Georgia	Ten	Sal,Fin	Sal
Massachusetts	INC	Fin,Crt,Sal	Sal
Michigan	INC	Ten,Sal,Cb	Most
Minnesota	Sal,Cb	Cb,Ten,Sal	Cb,Ten
Nebraska	Cb	Cb,Ten	Fin,Ten,Sal
New York	Cb,Sal	Sal,Fin,Cb	DNA
Tennessee	Fin	Ten,Cb,Sal	None
Texas	Ten,Cb	Cb,Ten	Cb
Wisconsin	Ten	Sal,Ten,Cb	Sal,Fin

Where:

Cb = Collective bargaining

Crt = Certification

Ten = Tenure

INC = Inconclusive response

DNA = Data not available

Sal = Salaries

Fin = School finance, including the state aid formula

[a] State department of education legislative expert.

[b] Governor's personal staff.

"Are there any such enduring coalitions among the major state-level education organizations in this state?" The responses (see Table 6-13) indicate that in all of the states except Florida, Nebraska, and Wisconsin the educational interest group leaders believed that an enduring coalition existed. And it might be noted that Florida did report two coalitions of sorts.

TABLE 6-13

EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUP LEADER RESPONSES TO WHETHER AN "ENDURING COALITION" EXISTED IN THEIR STATE

State	Response	State	Response
California	Yes	Minnesota	Yes
Colorado	Yes	Nebraska	No
Florida	No	New York	Yes
Georgia	Yes	Tennessee	Yes
Massachusetts	Yes	Texas	Yes
Michigan	Yes	Wisconsin	No

Following the question on whether coalitions existed, the respondents giving "yes" answers were asked to indicate if these coalitions were formal or informal. Formality was determined by the presence or absence of: constitution/by-laws or other written governance structures; officers; and regular meetings. Nine states reported coalitions, seven also reported that these coalitions were formal in their establishment.

Beyond determining where coalitions existed and whether they were formal or informal, we tried to identify the coalition memberships and which organizations or persons, if any, were perceived as providing leadership. In this regard, the educational interest group leaders were questioned about member groups in the coalitions. The typical coalition, as can be seen from Table 6-14, included the major educational organizations and perhaps one or two

TABLE 6-14

EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUP DESCRIPTION OF COALITION MEMBERSHIP

	Coalitions include:									
STATE	TA	AA	SBA	TF	RSG	C/V	B/I	F	L	LWV
California	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Colorado	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Florida				(No Coalition)						
Georgia	Yes	Yes	Yes	NSO	No	No	No	No	No	No
Massachusetts	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Michigan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Minnesota	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Nebraska				(No Coalition)						
New York	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Tennessee	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Texas	Yes	Yes	Yes	NSO	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Wisconsin				(No Coalition)						

Where:

C/V = College/University representatives

B/i = Business/Industry representatives

F = Farm groups

L = Labor groups

RSG = Related school groups such as PTA, AAUW, Delta Kappa Gamma, etc.

LWV = League of Women Voters

NSO = No State organization

closely-related school groups like PTAs especially and less frequently AAUW chapters. In only two states--Tennessee and Colorado--was the coalition inclusive of a broad range of non-educational organizations. In Tennessee the coalition included such diverse groups as the American Legion, AAUW, Jaycees, Citizens Committee for Better Schools, Federation of Business and Professional Women. In Colorado, coalition membership was perhaps even more diverse, reaching to the Colorado Association of Commerce and Industry, cattlemen, mining interests, sheepmen, and other farm representation.

Educational interest group leaders were asked to identify the organizations providing coalition leadership to "keep things going." These responses are contained in Table 6-15.

TABLE 6-15

EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUP LEADER PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOURCE OF COALITION LEADERSHIP

State	Coalition Leadership	State	Coalition Leadership
California	Inconclusive	Minnesota	None
Colorado	SBA	Nebraska	--
Florida	--	New York	TA, SBA
Georgia	Inconclusive	Tennessee	TA
Massachusetts	PTA	Texas	None
Michigan	Inconclusive	Wisconsin	--

Table 6-15 indicates that in the two states with diverse membership--that is Colorado and Tennessee--the education groups were widely perceived as exercising coalition leadership. But the data also show that such leadership did not exist across states in any constant pattern.

In California, there appeared to be conflicting perceptions as to who was leading. The chairwoman (PTA) was least mentioned, while teacher associations, administrator, and school board groups along with the CSSO were favored, thus permitting California's Educational Congress to "enjoy" group leadership. In Massachusetts, legislators had difficulty recognizing the Educational Conference Board unless it was referred to as Charlotte Ryan's (PTA) group. In Michigan, Minnesota, and Texas, group leaders failed to see much leadership at all; rather, they viewed the coalition as a "hot air" group or "coffee klatch." New York's Educational Conference Board was looked upon as having passed its prime and, while still led by teacher and school board groups, as declining in influence and in its ability to hold groups together, particularly in view of the TA-TF merger.

The perceptions offered by the group leaders provide the basis for an assessment of coalition effectiveness. Table 6-16 presents our evaluation in light of observations in the literature about the importance of educational coalitions in determining state-level policy, notably in the school finance area. But we found that fully half the states studied had no coalition at all, or else a generally ineffective one, leaderless and meeting infrequently if at all. The Massachusetts and New York Educational Conference Boards were not found to be as viable as the literature has suggested. To the contrary, the generally non-urban states of Colorado and Tennessee had put together the most effective educational coalitions.

Review of Findings

In most states both educational interest group leaders and legislative respondents saw the "education lobby" as being fragmented and unable to agree on most legislative issues. It is revealing to summarize our findings in light of Iannaccone's typology of four basic descriptors of state educational policy systems: "locally-based disparate," characterized by localism in structures; "state-wide monolithic," characterized by state-level points of

TABLE 6-16

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
STATE EDUCATIONAL COALITIONS

States with:			
Highly Effective Coalitions	Moderately Effective Coalitions	Generally Ineffective Coalitions	No Coalitions
Colorado	California	Michigan	Florida
Tennessee	Georgia	Minnesota	Nebraska
	Massachusetts	Texas	Wisconsin
	New York		

tangency among government agencies and groups; "state-wide fragmented," characterized by fragmentation, disunity, and often conflict rather than consensus; and, finally, the "state-wide syndical" category for those states with a government sanctioned coalition or special commission.[6] No state we studied fell into the syndical category; hence that category is not shown below. Our findings suggest that the 12 states may be described in Iannaccone's categories as follows:

"locally-based disparate"	"state-wide monolithic"	"state-wide fragmented"
	Tennessee	California
	Texas	Massachusetts
		Michigan
		Minnesota
		Nebraska
		New York
		Wisconsin
Florida		Florida
Georgia	Georgia	
	Colorado	Colorado

These data are interesting in that they show the fragmentation which was evident in the Northern and/or more industrialized states of California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, and Wisconsin.

The Southern states of Tennessee and Texas were largely monolithic, primarily due to the clear dominance of the teacher association in each state, which lacked competition from a teacher federation and which retained the bulk of school administrators under its umbrella. Florida was somewhat unique and could be considered largely state-wide fragmented, but due to the disarray of the teacher association, some elements of a locally-based disparate model also existed. Georgia similarly showed some traits of the locally-based disparate, with relatively weak state interest groups all around. But the attempts at unity in Georgia suggest that it might also be considered somewhat monolithic. Colorado, on the other hand, would be clearly fragmented were it not for the balance of power among the groups channeled through a highly credible coalition.

Speaking of educational coalitions, nine of the 12 states included in our study reported the existence of an educational interest group coalition, with seven of these being relatively formal organizations. Typically, the interest groups saw the coalitions as mechanisms for reducing the potentially divided positions the groups might otherwise take on the matter of school finance. The coalitions were intended to be a channel for amelioration of conflict to the end that legislators and others would perceive a greater degree of unity among the "education lobby." In this regard, at least two coalitions--in Tennessee and Colorado--included a broad range of non-education groups which served to identify business and community interests with school finance problems.

In general, however, there were serious questions as to the value the interest groups placed on the coalitions. Florida, Nebraska, and Wisconsin reported no coalitions. And Michigan, Minnesota, and Texas may as well have declared the coalition dead. In other words, in half the states a coalition could not have had any effect on education legislation. In four states--California, Georgia, Massachusetts, and New York--coalitions have had some effect. The latter two states, typical of the Northeast, had longstanding Educational Conference Boards. But these were widely perceived as declining in effect on the policy system. In California, a newly-formed coalition had limited experience; in Georgia, the coalition probably constituted an amalgamation of rather weak groups in the first place. In short, only in Tennessee and Colorado were the coalitions seen as being highly effective. In Colorado, particularly, the coalition included many non-educational groups and spoke authoritatively on school finance issues.

Legislative Influence

Without discounting the importance of CSSOs, state boards, or governors, it can be safely assumed that state legislatures play the most vital role in the determination of educational policy. Decisions of major import, especially financial ones, are the substance of legislative activity and thereby attract interest group attention. To assess the pattern of relationships and influence between interest groups and legislatures, it is desirable to attempt to discover not only which groups are most influential, but also why they appear to be so.

Influence of the "Education Lobby"

Before considering which educational interest groups were perceived to be most influential in the legislature, it is appropriate, first, to look at an overall evaluation of the "education lobby." In other words, when the major state-level education groups were viewed as a whole, how were they evaluated as "stacking up" when compared with other lobbying groups. To ascertain the strength of the education lobby, as well as to compare interest group leader responses with those of legislators, both the group leaders and the legislative leaders were asked the same question: "How do the major education organizations stack up compared to other interest groups in the state? Would you say that, taken together, these organizations are: the top group, among the top groups, among the less important groups, or not at all influential?"

The responses of the interest group leaders to this question provide the basis for Table 6-17. This table indicates that most of these leaders believed the education lobby was at least "among the top groups." The weakest ratings appeared in Nebraska and Florida; the strongest ratings were offered in Texas and Tennessee. Other than these two lowest and two highest states, the balance of eight were rather uniformly described as having an education lobby "among the top groups" in their respective states.

The responses of the legislators to the question of education lobby influence constitute the data in Table 6-18. The legislators tended to agree with the interest group leaders that the education lobby was particularly weak in Nebraska and Florida. Surprisingly, however, New York legislators rated the education lobby as significantly less important than had New York interest group leaders. Also, Tennessee and Texas legislators did not find the education lobby quite as influential as the interest group leaders had. On the other hand, in Michigan and Minnesota the legislators rated the education lobby as more important than it was in the eyes of the interest group leaders. Yet it should be noted that these differences in perceptions of legislators and interest group leaders were small, given the breadth of the total rating scale. As a generalization, therefore, it can be said that the interest group leaders had a rather accurate sense of reality, if one assumes that legislators were in the best position to assess the total lobbying picture.

TABLE 6-17

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUP LEADER ASSESSMENTS OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE "EDUCATION LOBBY"

STATE	TOP GROUPS	AMONG TOP GROUPS	AMONG LESS IMPORTANT GROUPS	NOT AT ALL INFLUENTIAL	(N)
California	0	7	0	0	7
Colorado	0	6	0	0	6
Florida	1	1	2	0	4
Georgia	1	4	0	0	5
Massachusetts	0	4	0	0	4
Michigan	1	7	0	0	8
Minnesota	1	2	1	0	4
Nebraska	1	0	2	0	3
New York	2	1	1	0	4
Tennessee	4	2	0	0	6
Texas	5	1	0	0	6
Wisconsin	0	6	0	0	6

TABLE 6-18

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATOR ASSESSMENTS OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE "EDUCATION LOBBY"

STATE	TOP GROUPS	AMONG TOP GROUPS	AMONG LESS IMPORTANT GROUPS	NOT AT ALL INFLUENTIAL	(N)
California	4	10	3	0	17
Colorado	3	9	4	0	16
Florida	2	1	2	1	6
Georgia	5	6	1	1	13
Massachusetts	0	4	1	0	5
Michigan	7	5	3	0	15
Minnesota	6	6	3	0	15
Nebraska	1	4	2	0	7
New York	1	5	3	0	9
Tennessee	5	6	0	0	11
Texas	4	5	0	0	9
Wisconsin	2	10	3	0	15

Legislative Influence of the Individual Groups

While interest group leader responses were largely consistent with those of legislator interviewees on the previous question, the matter of which particular groups had the most legislative influence was also tested with both classes of respondents. The educational interest group leaders were asked: "Among just the educational organizations, which ones are usually the most influential when public policy is being decided by the legislature?" The replies are contained in Table 6-19. These data show that the interest group leaders differed somewhat in the rankings they provided.

Teacher leaders ranked the teacher association as most influential in nine of the 12 states. In Colorado, the strong educational coalition--COED--was ranked first by teachers. The Florida Association leaders were unsure of their response, and New York teacher respondents listed both administrator and school board groups first (in light of other data, one has to assume false modesty here).

Administrator group leaders agreed in seven cases that the teacher association was most influential. Agreement with the association respondent was also evident in Colorado (ranking the coalition first) and in Florida (where the administrator respondent did not provide any more conclusive data than did the association respondent). The school board groups seemed more reluctant to credit the teachers and much more disposed to rank themselves first. Because of inconclusive or evasive data, data not available, and the like it was not possible to identify a trend in teacher federation responses. Overall, then, the teacher associations ranked first, followed by either the administrator or school board groups, with federation groups ranking fourth.

To determine legislator perceptions of the most influential groups, the legislative leaders were asked: "Among just the educational groups, which

TABLE 6-19

EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUP LEADER PERCEPTIONS OF MOST INFLUENTIAL EDUCATION ORGANIZATIONS WHEN SCHOOL POLICY WAS BEING DECIDED BY THE LEGISLATURE

Responses of each group listed in order of perceived importance:

STATE	TA	AA	SBA	TF
California	TA,AA,SBA	AA,SBA,TA,TF	TA,SBA,AA,TF	TA,SBA,AA
Colorado	CO[a],TA,SBA,AA	CO,AA,SBA,TA	SBA,TA	SBA,TA,TF
Florida	INC[b]	INC	INC	DNA[c]
Georgia	TA,SBA	TA,SBA	SBA,AA,TA	NSO[d]
Massachusetts	TA	TA,SBA,AA	SBA,TA	INC
Michigan	TA,TF,AA,SBA	TA,SBA,AA	TA,AA,SBA,TF	INC
Minnesota	TA,SBA,TF	TA,SBA	SBA,TA,TF	TA,TF,AA,SBA
Nebraska	TA	AA,TA,SBA	SBA	NSO
New York	AA,SBA	CO[e]	AA	M[f]
Tennessee	TA,SBA	TA	TA,SBA	DNA
Texas	TA,SBA	TA,SBA	TA,SBA	NSO
Wisconsin	TA,SBA	TA,SBA	TA,SBA	DNA

[a] Indicates Colorado's education coalition - COED.

[b] Inconclusive or evasive response.

[c] Data not available.

[d] No state organization.

[e] Indicates New York's education coalition - New York Educational Conference Board.

[f] TF merged with TA, separate TF data not available.

ones are usually the most influential when education and school finance matters are being dealt with by the legislature?" Their responses (see Table 6-20) are extremely interesting both when taken by themselves and when compared to interest group leader perceptions in Table 6-19. The legislators, without exception, rated the teacher associations as most influential in the 12 states. To be sure, they believed the school board groups were equally effective in three of the states. Yet, in general, the school board groups tended to be ranked second. The administrator groups made a much poorer showing than might have been expected. In only one state--Michigan--were they ranked as high as second by the legislators; in four other states they were not even mentioned as being among the more effective groups. The teacher federations were rated as high as third in Minnesota and fourth in the rest of the states where they were mentioned. It is also interesting to note that in Colorado the educational coalition was ranked fourth, ahead of the federation which was not mentioned.

In comparing Tables 6-19 and 6-20 a number of similarities as well as discrepancies are quickly apparent. First, the interest group leaders who most closely approximated legislators in their answers were the teacher association leaders. However immodestly, their ranking of themselves as most influential was verified by legislators. The teacher association leaders were also like legislators in their tendency to rank school board associations as the second most influential interest groups. The responses of the administrator groups were similar to those of legislators, at least to the extent that the administrator respondents ranked the teacher association groups first in seven states. The administrator groups also tended to rank school board groups second in influence. The school board respondents ranked themselves ahead of the teacher groups in a third of the states, thereby departing from the legislator assessments.

TABLE 6-20

LEGISLATOR PERCEPTIONS OF MOST INFLUENTIAL EDUCATION ORGANIZATIONS WHEN SCHOOL POLICY WAS BEING DECIDED BY THE LEGISLATURE

	Rank order of influence for each group:			
STATE	TA	AA	SBA	TF
California	1	3	2	4
Colorado	1	3	1	-[a]
Florida	-[b]	-	-	-
Georgia	1	3	2	NSO[c]
Massachusetts	1	NM[d]	2	NM
Michigan	1	2	3	4
Minnesota	1	NM	2	3
Nebraska	1	3	1	NSO
New York	1	3	2	M[e]
Tennessee	1	NM	2	NM
Texas	1	NM	2	NSO
Wisconsin	1	3	1	4

[a] Coalition really should be ranked 4, see text explanation.

[b] No ranking in Florida, because of insufficient information.

[c] No state organization.

[d] Not mentioned by legislators.

[e] TF merged with TA, separate TF data not available.

In both Tables 6-19 and 6-20 there are insufficient data in the teacher federation categories to make adequate comparisons between federation leader and legislator rankings. The fact that inconclusive or evasive answers were given in two states, and a refusal to rate in one state, might indicate that the teacher federations realized their unfavorable position and preferred not to contribute to it.

Reasons for Group Influence

While it was important to determine which educational interest groups were perceived as most influential, from the standpoint of adequate analysis it was also of concern to ask legislators and interest group leaders to give reasons why they ranked the interest groups as they did. As might have been expected, a number of legislator respondents were unable or unwilling to cite specific reasons for what appeared to be intuitive judgments. Other respondents gave such generalized answers as to preclude analysis. But a third group of legislator respondents were able to give fairly specific reasons for their rankings. The analyses that follow are based upon these specifics.

Since the teacher associations were ranked as being most influential, it is not surprising that several specific reasons can be enumerated. In at least seven states (the exceptions were Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Texas), legislators emphasized what they perceived to be "well-heeled" teacher association operations. This perception appeared strongest in California and New York. One California legislator made the not atypical comment that "they (CTA) spend money all over the place," whereas a New York legislator fell back on the cliche of "spending money like a drunken sailor."

Paralleling the issue of large amounts of campaign money, the legislators similarly identified what they called "political power," "clout," and "votes." These terms were mentioned frequently enough by legislators to convey clearly a sensitivity to the "political action" orientation of the teacher associations. Perhaps also falling in this context was the frequent mention of sheer "numbers" as a reason for teacher influence. Other reasons were mentioned--information, expertise, status of members--but these were cited less frequently and largely confined to less industrialized states (Tennessee, Georgia, Nebraska, Texas).

With respect to the school board associations, perceived to rival the teacher association groups in a few states, an entirely different set of reasons was advanced. The most commonly mentioned had to do with "status of members." Legislators tended to view school board groups as representing "locally elected officials" and as having status in their communities. This perception is consistent with, and reinforced by, the school board groups which claim that only they among the education groups are truly representing an unselfish interest--the people.

Another very interesting explanation for school board legislative effectiveness had to do with group lobbyist or executive secretaries. In three states--Colorado, Nebraska, and Wisconsin--legislators made particular reference to the fact that the school boards had a "respected lobbyist" or "executive secretary of long experience." To be sure, in a number of other states legislators offered the generalization that the school boards association was "credible" and "respected." But it was in those three states where legislators made frequent and specific mention of a person. This would indicate that where school board groups were most effective, such success was attributable as much to an individual as to the group, and perhaps more so.

The fact that the administrator groups were ranked third in influence by legislators in some states, and were not ranked at all in some other states, produces a not altogether clear picture of the sources of administrator association strength. It appeared that the legislators were emphasizing some of the same kinds of reasons given for school boards. Recognition was given to the "credibility" and "respect" which administrators--predominantly superintendents--enjoy as a result of their positions. Other legislators apparently were describing closely related reasons when they included "status" on the list. No mention was made of money, political power, numbers, and votes, as had been the case with teacher associations. And it was by far the exception that a legislator would note "effective lobbying." And unlike the school board groups, the administrator groups were not mentioned because of particular persons on their staffs.

Review of Findings

With respect to state legislatures, the "education lobby" was perceived, both by legislators and group leaders, as generally being among the top interest groups in the respective states. In fact, legislators in a few cases tended to rank the education lobby as stronger than did the interest group leaders.

Teacher associations, administrator groups, and legislators were inclined to rank the teacher associations as being most influential in the legislature. School board groups often ranked themselves first, contrary to legislator perceptions. The school board groups did in fact rank second in influence in most states, and were even ranked as "too close to call" with teacher associations in Colorado, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. Administrator groups generally were ranked a distant third, and, in fact, were not even mentioned in four states as being influential in the eyes of legislators. The teacher federations in New York particularly, but also to some extent in Minnesota and Michigan, were considered rather influential.

Some Correlates of Education Lobby Influence

We presented in the preceding section the various reasons that legislators gave for the influence of the different state-level educational organizations, and the perceptions that organization leaders had of their sources of power also were discussed earlier (see Table 6-9). Beyond making comparisons among the four educational groups, we were interested in explaining why organized educators, taken together, were rated as having, when compared with other state-level interest groups, more legislative influence in some states than in others. Again, as in several prior chapters of this report, we thought that rank-order correlations (rho) would be appropriate--given the crudeness of the measures and the small sample--and helpful in trying to identify possible explanatory variables.[7]

To begin our correlational analysis we used legislator assessments (see Table 6-18) to construct a measure of the influence of the "education lobby" in state legislatures. Giving legislator responses in each state scores of 3 for "the top group," 2 for "among the top groups," and 1 for "less important group," then summing and averaging these scores, produces a score for each state and permits us to rank them. Using the same scoring procedures, we also constructed a measure of education lobby influence based on group leader (see Table 6-17) rather than legislator perceptions, and ranked the states on this variable. The two rank orders are shown below:

Rank Orders of the Education Lobby on Perceived Legislative Influence When Compared With Other Interest Groups

(Legislator Perceptions)		(Group Leader Perceptions)	
Tennessee	1	Texas	1
Texas	2	Tennessee	2
Michigan	3	New York	3
Minnesota	4	Georgia	4
Georgia	5	Michigan	5
California	6	Minnesota	6 (tie)
Colorado	7	California	6 (tie)
Wisconsin	8	Colorado	6 (tie)
Nebraska	9	Wisconsin	6 (tie)
Massachusetts	10	Massachusetts	6 (tie)
New York	11	Florida	11
Florida	12	Nebraska	12

As can be seen, the two rank orders, with the notable exception of New York's placement, are rather similar. (The correlation coefficient between the two is .63.) We used the one based on legislator perceptions for our analysis.

In Table 6-21 are reported the rho coefficients between an array of socioeconomic/political background indices and the measure of education lobby influence.[8] An inspection of these coefficients indicates that the relatively powerful lobbies tend to be found in the less urbanized, less industrialized, and less affluent states. Three of the four Southern states in our sample, it might be pointed out, are ranked in the top five: Tennessee

(1st), Texas (2nd), and Georgia (5th). The political background variables have only small correlations with our influence measure, the one exception (r_s of -.42) involving the "technical effectiveness" of the state legislature. Put simply, the less effective the legislature, as rated in 1971 by the Citizens Conference, the more likely legislative leader respondents were to rate the education lobby as influential.

TABLE 6-21

RELATIONSHIPS FOR EDUCATION LOBBIES BETWEEN THEIR PERCEIVED LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE (COMPARED WITH OTHER STATE-LEVEL INTEREST GROUPS) AND SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES

Socioeconomic/Political Variables	Rho Coefficients
Personal Income Per Capita, (1972 Census Data)	-.45
Population Size, (1970 Census Data)	-.06
Urban Population, (1970 Census Data)	-.50
Industrialization Index, (1960 Census Data)	-.31
Voter Turn-out, House of Representatives, 1972	-.13
Inter-party Competition, (Adapted Ranney Index), 1956-70	-.03
Political Culture, Elazar-Sharkansky Index, 1969	.02
Governor's Formal Power, Schlesinger Index, 1971	-.02
Legislature's "Technical Effectiveness," Citizens Conference Rating, 1971	-.42

We developed two measures of the cohesion of the education lobby, using data presented in Table 6-11 and Table 6-10: (1) legislator perceptions of the unity among educational interest groups when confronted by a legislative issue; (2) group leader, and other actor, perceptions of the unity among educational interest groups when confronted by a legislative issue. The first of these correlates .62 with the legislative influence of the education lobby; the second has a rank order correlation of .42. Yet whether cohesion has any independent effect on educator influence is difficult to determine, particularly since our measures of cohesion, like those of influence, were associated statistically with the socioeconomic background conditions of the states. For example, the census data figure for urbanization has a strong negative correlation (-.66) with legislator perceptions of education interest group unity, and the latter also correlates -.66 with per capita personal income of the states.

As for the other resource and power variables, the rho coefficients involving these and education lobby influence are shown in Table 6-22. These miniscule coefficients indicate that a state's ranking on the influence measure cannot be predicted from its standing in rank orders based on "hard" measures of educational group membership, money, and professional staff. This is not to say, of course, that these resources are unimportant; only that they do not override contextual factors to the extent that they determine a state's relative standing. Lobbying staff, it might be noted, does have a modest correlation (.36) with the legislative influence of educational interest groups.

TABLE 6-22

RELATIONSHIPS FOR EDUCATION LOBBIES BETWEEN THEIR PERCEIVED LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE (COMPARED WITH OTHER STATE-LEVEL INTEREST GROUPS) AND SELECTED RESOURCE/POWER VARIABLES

Resource/Power Variables	Rho Coefficients
Membership (summed for each state from Table 6-1)*	.17
Money (summed for each state from Table 6-3)*	-.03
Professional Staff (summed for each state from Table 6-5)*	-.07
Lobbying Staff (summed, full-time 1 point, part-time 1/3 point, from Table 6-6)*	.36

*Estimates were made for missing teacher federation data.

Concluding Observations

Our purpose in this chapter has been to examine the resources, power, unity, and legislative influence of the major state-level educational organizations. Since we have reviewed our main findings in each section, this chapter will close with some concluding observations about what these findings mean:

1. The teacher associations are generally most effective.

As a generalization, teachers are viewed as being most influential in the legislative arena. Yet school board groups in Colorado, Nebraska, and Wisconsin were near equals at least, and in Colorado may have eclipsed the teacher association. It would be difficult to exaggerate the tremendous resource advantage that the teacher associations have over competing groups. In terms of sheer numbers, dollars, staff, political action, and the like, these associations are giants by comparison. One might conclude, that, after all, these groups should be most effective. Or, one might conclude that it is tantamount to failure for a teacher association to be equalled in influence by another educational interest group. The fact remains, however, that the teacher associations are very powerful indeed.

2. Administrator and school board groups are generally most efficient.

One has to conclude that the cost per unit of influence escalates geometrically. If this is true, as we are concluding that it is, the administrator and school board groups operate more efficiently albeit less effectively in the state policy system. These organizations have done a good job of making dollars stretch, realizing full well that they are unable to even begin to compete with teacher association expenditures. Hence, the administrator and school board groups have turned more toward emphasizing the status of their members as "educational leaders" and "locally elected officials," respectively, and toward emphasizing the "common good" rather than a vested interest.

3. The teacher federations are inconsistent.

It may have been akin to an Achilles' heel for the teacher federations to have decided long ago that a strong state unit was not needed or desirable.

Such lack of emphasis at this level results in an inconsistent performance in state legislatures. In our sample, only in New York, and perhaps Minnesota and Michigan, did the federation show real strength, largely springing from urbanized, Democratic, labor affiliations. In California, Massachusetts and perhaps Wisconsin and Florida, the federation showed some evidence of potential. But in the balance of states virtually no organizational strength existed at the state level.

4. Labor-management issues dominate interest group relationships.

Labor-management issues in our 12 states dominated the relationships between interest groups and other actors in the policy system, as well as among the interest groups themselves. The press of teacher groups for more financial support for schools was, and continues to be, motivated at least in part by teacher welfare objectives. The interest groups tend to pair--teacher groups versus administrator and school board groups--and divide sharply on questions of collective bargaining legislation, tenure, accountability, certification, professional practices boards, severance pay, unlimited sick leave, and a host of other labor-management issues. As teacher activism is sustained or increased, the roles and relationships in education policy making will also increasingly become enmeshed in labor and management orientations.

5. Coalitions are crippled by labor-management splits.

It is notable that the most effective coalitions existed in Colorado and Tennessee--two non-urban states with relatively little history of labor-management strife. On the basis of all the data in our study, one must conclude that labor-management divisions among interest groups have hindered, if not crippled, most state coalitions. Further, it appears increasingly difficult for the interest groups to coalesce--even on the heretofore common ground of school finance--when less and less argreement can be found on a wide range of other issues.

6. Teacher organizations emphasize political pressure for political decisions.

It is highly significant that teacher organizations have recognized and are prepared to exert political pressure for political decision-making on educational issues. In fact, depending on uncertain future events--such as the state-level effect of Watergate--this is probably the most significant conclusion of this chapter.

It is extremely important to understand that so long as the four state-level interest groups compete on educational grounds, the school board and administrator groups can effectively use their "status of members" resource and educational logic to counter the dominance of the teacher associations. On the other hand, if the teacher associations are successful in shifting the "rules of the game" to political criteria their dominance may become more and more unilateral. It is clear that school board and administrator groups, because of their constituencies, are unable to mount political campaigns even if they have the money to do so.

It is possible, of course, that teacher activism may produce a strong counter-action working in favor of the "management" groups. The Florida Education Association, for example, is still trying to recover from its disastrous 1968 state-wide strike. The Colorado Education Association, as another example, at least temporarily fell from executive favor by censuring Governor Love. But these may be isolated cases. The political nature of education policy making seems certain to increase, and with that development the continued growth of "teacher power" is likely.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER VI

[1] Major studies dealing with state education policy making are cited in Chapter I, footnote 10. A recent review of the literature dealing with education politics generally is Paul E. Peterson, "The Politics of American Education" in Fred N. Kerlinger and John B. Carroll (eds.), Review of Research in Education (Itaska, Illinois: Peacock, 1974), pp. 348-389.

[2] The relationships between educational interest groups and state boards, CSSOs, and governors are treated in JAlan Aufderheide, "The Place of Educational Interest Groups in State Education Policy Systems" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1973).

[3] See, for example, James B. Conant, Shaping Educational Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 37.

[4] Michael D. Usdan, David W. Minar, and Emanuel Hurwitz, Jr., Education and State Politics (New York: Teachers College, Columbia, 1969), pp. 168-175.

[5] Michael D. Usdan, "The Role and Future of State Educational Coalitions," Educational Administration Quarterly, (Spring, 1969), pp. 26-42.

[6] Laurence Iannaccone, Politics in Education (New York: Center for Applied Research in Education, 1967), Chapter III and IV.

[7] Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw Hill, 1956), pp. 202-213.

[8] See Appendix B for Chapter II.

CHAPTER VII

THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM

Peggy M. Siegel

Introduction

Money may not grow on trees, but it is still the mother's milk of politics. Somewhere between these two worn cliches lies the topic of this chapter: The politics of school finance reform. Schools continue to thirst for fiscal nourishment at a time when the local taxpayer demands they be weaned, shifting more of the burden to the state aid formula. At this level, requests for education dollars enter the political process only to compete with an ever expanding public sector. As a result, decisions are normally based on political expediency (i.e., what can pass) rather than on "the best" educational arguments.

This chapter is concerned with the politics of school finance reform. More specifically, it asks: What demands bring pressure to bear? How are pressures translated into public policy? Who does what to whom? How are decisions made? Who makes a difference in the outcome? In answering these questions, this chapter analyzes the process of getting from point A to point B without discussing the contents, intricacies, or merits of either point, in this case, school aid programs.

Four states have been selected for comparison. Three of them (Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin) were studied extensively as part of the Educational Governance Project during 1973. The fourth served as this writer's employer in 1971-72, when she worked as a staff person in the Ohio General Assembly. All four states represent the same region of the country. Presumably, they share a somewhat common experience. All four states successfully enacted major school finance legislation between 1971 and 1973. Undoubtedly, the actual contents of each law reflects the particular blend of circumstances characteristic of each state. Yet close scrutiny of the process of passing school finance reform, irrespective of each state's distinct qualities, reveals a surprising degree of similarity. This, then, is the topic of concern.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first offers a bare bones outline describing the events leading to new legislation in each of the four states. Sources are noted for individuals desiring a fuller treatment of the synopses. References to the laws are also cited in the footnotes.[1] An interstate comparison on the ingredients, strategies, and individuals involved in adopting school finance reform is the topic of the second section. Finally, some concluding observations are set forth relative to the general process of enacting school finance reform legislation.

Individual State Reforms

Ohio*

In 1971, the Ohio General Assembly survived what has been called "the most hectic, confused and indecipherable session in legislative history"[2] to enact a state income tax. This feat was accomplished under newly-elected Democratic Governor, John Gilligan, who had campaigned on the dual issues of more state aid to the schools and tax reform. Once elected, Gilligan turned to an appointed citizens' task force for recommendations on the tax issues and a more informal, in-house group of experts for advice on school finance. The Governor then incorporated their proposals into the state's biennial budget, which he presented to a Republican-controlled Legislature. The GOP held a 54 to 45 margin in the House and a 20 to 13 margin in the Senate. Amid school closings and public pressure for property tax relief, the House passed the income tax and school aid program, although substantially reducing the original expenditure levels. Gilligan's greatest hurdle emerged in the Senate with organized labor refusing to support the income tax without heavier business taxes and holding half of the Democratic caucus to that position. Without a winning coalition for the income tax, the Senate Republicans were able to engineer passage of a smaller budget based on a sales tax. The two versions of the budget then went to a joint conference committee for final resolution, with the House income tax and the smaller Senate expenditure levels emerging from the compromise.

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*(A more complete version of this section is found in Peggy M. Siegel, "The Politics of School Finance Reform in Four Midwestern States, 1971-73," Ph.D. Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1974. For further details on the taxation issue, the reader is also directed to Frederick D. Stocker, "The Rough Road to Tax Reform: The Ohio Experience," prepared for the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, December, 1971.)

Impatience to finally pass a budget was perhaps best captured by the House Chaplain who opened the crucial floor session with the prayer: "Dear Lord, now that nine months have passed since we started expecting, may we be pregnant enough to be delivered. Amen."[3] After enduring nine months of grueling debate, eight interim budgets, and four conference committees, the General Assembly delivered. The budget then went to a relieved Governor who signed it on December 20.

Elation was to be relatively short-lived, however. The budget battle had ended, but the tax war was hardly over. Opponents of the income tax placed it before the voters who, somewhat surprisingly, upheld the tax by better than a two-to-one margin statewide, passing it in all eighty-eight counties. The final result represented the most significant reform of Ohio's tax structure in almost forty years.

While the fundamental issue in 1971 was taxes, the need for additional school funds became an important strategy in passing and retaining the state income tax. Working in concert helped all of the educational interests to achieve their major objectives--additional state funds to education and the income tax. The increased dollars, in turn, enabled all of the groups to obtain some of their specific program priorities. The availability of more revenues for all state services, including education, also permitted a revision of the foundation formula. However, because the major controversy was over taxes, the problems inherent in the existing formula were not resolved. Nor was the General Assembly completely satisfied with its revisions. In 1973, the legislators added numerous guarantees and save-harmless provisions, making Ohio's school aid program one of the most complex in the nation. In the 1974-75 school year, not one of the districts will even be on the regular formula, but on one of several existing guarantees. As a result, Ohio lawmakers are still searching in mid-1974 for the means with which to implement major school finance reform.

Minnesota*

Like Ohio, the lawmakers in Minnesota were also busy enacting major school finance/tax reform legislation in 1971. The "Minnesota miracle,"[4] as it has been called, altered the old school foundation formula and received considerable national attention for revising the state's tax structure.

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*This section is based entirely on the school finance issue written by Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr., in "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Minnesota," and prepared for the Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, April, 1974, pp. 43-76.

Against the backdrop of some disenchantment with the existing school aid formula and extreme unhappiness over rising property taxes during the late sixties, the combined issues of school finance reform and tax relief took shape during the 1970 campaign for Governor. Both candidates sought to embrace a politically attractive tax posture. School finance reform did not surface publicly as a concomitant issue until well into the race and then as the result of public attention being focused by an influential citizens' lobby (the Citizens League). Asked his position on increased state aid to education, Wendell Anderson, the Democratic-Farmer-Labor (DFL) party candidate, indicated a preference for the full state assumption of educational costs. Anderson also suggested that a statewide property tax--replacing, in full or in part, local millage--be used to fund his plan to more than double state school aid. The Republicans, assuming that Anderson's position was vulnerable, claimed that it would increase millage rates across the state and destroy local control. Public interest then focused on education as well as taxes. And out of the well-publicized exchanges between the two gubernatorial candidates, the school finance issue took on definition. Still, throughout the ensuing barrage of partisan charges and countercharges, it became evident that taxes remained the fundamental issue. This fact, perhaps more than any other, shaped the outcome of the 1971 legislative session and the Omnibus Tax Act.[5]

Wendell Anderson won the election in a convincing fashion with 54 per cent of the vote. The Governor-elect then assembled a handful of trusted advisors to provide him with educational and tax proposals. In January, 1971, Anderson offered the results in his "Fair School Finance Plan" as part of the state's biennial budget. The budget had to compete with at least five other bills dealing with the tax/school aid issue, many of them offered by

Conservative (Republican) legislators as less extensive alternatives to the Governor's. One measure passed the House; another, the Senate.

The Conservatives (Republicans) held a margin of one vote in the Senate (34 to 33) and five votes (70-65) in the House, although several key Conservative Senators shared Anderson's reformist philosophy. Spearheading the opposition to the Governor was the Conservative Caucus in the House, where the struggle encompassed both partisan and philosophically conservative grounds. Agreement could not be reached within the Legislature, where the issue even pitted Conservative members of one house against their party colleagues in the other. The lawmakers then went into special session which finally resulted in passage of a Conservative-sponsored House bill in late July. Governor Anderson vetoed the measure, castigating it in searing language for failing to grant tax relief or remedy gross inequities. The Conservatives had no possibility of overriding the veto. As public pressure for a settlement mounted, Anderson called another special session of the Legislature. A ten-member tax conference committee appointed at his request by the legislative leadership of both houses met in private non-stop sessions. The conferees hammered out an agreement in mid-October which had sufficient DFL and Conservative backing to win approval from the full legislature. The package contained multiple special programs, raised state taxes, provided property tax relief and uniform district levy limitations, and substantially increased state aid to the schools. It was then signed into law by Governor Anderson, who termed it a satisfactory compromise.

Like Ohio, however, the major thrust in Minnesota had been in providing tax reform and property tax relief rather than in significantly reducing expenditure disparities among local school districts. Therefore, in 1973, the question of school finance reform again confronted Minnesota lawmakers. This session exhibited little of the acrimony witnessed in 1971. The DFL was firmly in control of both the House and the Senate. The school aid bill was not treated, as it had been in the preceding biennium, as part of a larger tax/fiscal package. Major changes enacted by the Legislature, with Anderson's support, in 1973 extended the reforms accomplished two years earlier, but with greater emphasis on the equalization of local district expenditures and on a greater responsiveness to educational need. And in 1973, the Minnesota lawmakers, fulfilling the Governor's campaign proposals, appropriated for education an amount more than double the state support figure for the 1969-1971 biennium.[6]

Michigan*

The Michigan Legislature enacted a major school finance reform bill in 1973. To imply that this was an isolated event occurring during one year would be misleading, however. The Bursley Act, named for the Senate Education Committee Chairman, was more correctly the product of a process of trial and error spanning a number of years. The push for school finance reform began with serious study of education during the late sixties. It gained impetus from mounting fiscal shortcomings and tax inequities at the local level. There were also inherent problems in the old school foundation formula, the rising cost of education, a court case, the frequency with which Michigan voters were willing to defeat propertytax levies, and the near closing of the Detroit school system.

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*An expanded version of this section can be found in "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Michigan," prepared by the staff of the Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 1974. See also Gene Caesar, Robert N. McKerr, and Dr. James Phelps, "New Equity in Michigan School Finance: The Story of the Bursley Act," revised edition. The Senate Committee on Education, Lansing, Michigan, June 1, 1974.

A rallying point for reform emerged with a new Chief Executive, when liberal Republican William Milliken moved up from Lieutenant Governor to become Governor in 1969. As a former state senator and chairman of the Senate Education Committee, Milliken had displayed an interest and some expertise in educational issues. Assuming control of the Executive Office when his predecessor went to Washington, he publicly aligned himself on the side of school finance reform, making it a major goal of his Administration.[7] Since he was not yet equipped with specific educational proposals, the Governor appointed a small commission of non-educators with himself as chairman to develop legislative recommendations. During the next five years, the major task became devising both a program and a strategy which would result in passage of a new school aid formula.

In October, 1969, Governor Milliken called a special session of the Michigan Legislature in order to submit his commission's proposals, which one source termed "the most radical restructuring of school financing ever officially backed on the U.S. mainland."[8] Faced with these broad-based recommendations for change (which included full state funding of education with a statewide property tax and the elimination of the elected State Board of Education), the Michigan Legislature decided in 1969 to continue under the existing state foundation formula, albeit at increased expenditure levels. In 1970, school finance reform became intertwined with the parochiaid issue, which sidetracked the outcome. Despite a narrow electoral victory in November, 1970; despite the growing disaffection of conservative members from his own party over his liberal and pro-urban stances; and despite the worsening economic conditions in the state, Milliken continued to push for school finance reform during 1971. Modifying some of his 1969 recommendations, Milliken requested the legislators to reject the existing state aid program and to approve a constitutional amendment calling for the repeal of the local property tax for the schools, with an accompanying local enrichment tax to be equalized by the State. Because of the Legislature's unwillingness to support the constitutional amendment, the Governor switched tactics and took his case to the public in 1972. Milliken combined forces with the Michigan Education Association, which collected enough signatures to get the issue of property tax relief (and a provision to lift the prohibition against a graduated income tax) on the November ballot. For a number of economic, political, and racial reasons, both measures were convincingly trounced by the voters.

Still, by 1973, Governor Milliken had not given up. Instead he just shifted tactics again. This time the Governor advocated school finance reform and property tax relief that could be enacted by the Legislature without voter approval;that could overcome the traditional cleavages surrounding questions of property wealth and taxation; and that could satisfy a court challenge to the existing foundation formula. The November, 1972, elections had increased the Democratic control of the Michigan House (60 to 50). None of the 38 Senators had been up for re-election which sustained the 19 to 19 split, with the Republicans in leadership positions by virtue of a Republican Lieutenant Governor. Thus, Milliken had to come up with a proposal that would satisfy bipartisan scrutiny, without becoming submerged in the broader tax controversy.

Directed by their bosses, school finance advisors from the Administration, the Senate Education Committee, and the Michigan Department of Education pooled their ideas to design a workable state aid program which could survive legislative and political differences. The product of this collaboration was a modified power equalization measure, known in Michigan as an "Equal Yield" formula, which Senate Education Chairman Bursley introduced for the 1973 legislative session. The bill enjoyed relatively easy passage in the Senate but encountered its greatest challenge in the House, where the Democratic leadership offered several alternative, more costly proposals, during which the Speaker even considered resigning his post.[9] The House passed a greatly modified Bursley bill, which had the effect of sending the measure to a 6-member joint conference committee. The conferees eventually reached a consensus more in line with the House-passed bill. Following concurrence by both houses, on August 14, Governor Milliken signed the new school finance measure into law. Earlier during the same session, the Michigan Legislature had also provided, in separate bills, emergency special assistance to bail out Detroit's school system as well as property tax relief for all of Michigan's needy residents. In addition, the legislators had enacted two measures which provided the first state tax reduction in memory.[10] All these programs were made possible without increasing state taxes by a substantial state revenue surplus.

Thus, Michigan represents a case study in longitudinal politics. After nearly five years of proposals and political debate, Governor Milliken's determination paid off. He was finally able to achieve one of the major objectives of his Administration--the enactment of school finance reform and property tax relief.

Wisconsin*

In 1973, the Wisconsin Legislature approved a major change in the state's general school aid formula for the first time since it had been enacted twenty-four years earlier. Unlike the three other states, the most outstanding characteristic of Wisconsin's new revised formula is that it provides for eventual state recapture of school monies from property-wealthy districts.

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*An expanded version of this section is found in Peggy M. Siegel, "The Politics of School Finance Reform in Four Midwestern States, 1971-1973," Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1974.

When Democrat Patrick J. Lucey first became Governor in 1971, the state's economic conditions delayed a serious redress of school finance reform. However, looking ahead to the next biennium, Lucey appointed a broad-based citizens' task force to reexamine the entire method of funding lower education in Wisconsin and to recommend ways to relieve the fiscal burden on the property tax by shifting to other means of public support. After its one year existence, the task force recommended retaining the existing method of distributing state aid (a guaranteed valuation equalization formula) but with several significant revisions. As one educational source commented: "What was decided on was rhetoric around the candy bar--different wrapping but the same chocolate and nuts."[11] Still, the recommendations, particularly the power equalization/recapture provisions, generated intense opposition and became one of the key provisions in the Governor's budget in 1973.

Governor Lucey incorporated most of the task force recommendations in the state budget, which he intended to use as "the vehicle for implementing major policy changes."[12] By 1973, economic and political conditions had become ripe for increased state aid to education and property tax relief. An anticipated state surplus, bolstered by federal revenue sharing funds and projected growth from existing taxes, provided a comfortable cushion for school finance reform and property tax relief. And they could be accomplished without raising state taxes. Both issues were also widely popular and both were supported by the two political parties. The basic partisan difference developed over the way to achieve these ends. Emboldened by the pending Rodrigûez decision, Governor Lucey and the Democrats who controlled the Assembly (62 to 37) favored property tax relief through the school aid program, the largest part of the general purpose revenues in the state budget. The Republicans who controlled the Senate (18 to 15) wanted property tax relief in the form of direct payments or credits to the taxpayer. The Governor also felt personally committed to the concept of power equalization and bargained extensively for its enactment. While the scope and time period for the negative aid payments were compromised, power equalization became an important point in the budget process and was eventually retained.

Given the partisan margins in the Wisconsin Legislature, it was predictable at the outset that Lucey's budget would encounter its greatest hurdle in the Republican Senate, with final compromises resolved in a joint conference committee. The Governor introduced his budget on February 1, 1973. From here the entire package went to the Joint Finance Committee, where the Democrats enjoyed an 8 to 6 majority. After almost three months of public hearings and committee deliberations, the Finance Committee accepted many of the Governor's recommendations--but not before listening to numerous conflicting testimony and making significant revisions of its own. During this time, the U.S. Supreme Court also handed down its Rodriguez decision. The reversal of a lower court decision declaring the Texas school aid program unconstitutional prompted additional and intense opposition to Lucey's power equalization proposal. And while the Finance Committee kept the negative aid payment provision, it significantly extended the phase-in period.

After less than a week of floor debate and with several Democratic amendments, the Assembly passed the executive budget bill by a vote of 54 to 42. The Senate Republicans were in a less favorable position. The conservative Republican leaders generally opposed the budget but could not deliver the votes to pass an alternative. Less than a week after it had received the budget, the Senate, following a ten-hour Democratic filibuster, therefore voted to not concur with the Assembly version. This sent the budget to a six-member joint conference committee composed of three Assembly Democrats and three Senate Republicans. It was here that the political potential inherent in a comprehensive budget bill came into play. The Governor was able to bargain over non-educational items to assure passage of his school finance reforms. When the conferees appeared deadlocked, this strategy also included going to some of the major GOP business interests in the state with offers of favorable tax proposals. They, in turn, pressured the Republican conferees to compromise on power equalization. The Republicans finally accepted the negative aid payments, but pushed their implementation back until 1976.

On July 10, the conference committee recommended the budget for passage and sent it back to the Senate. Again, the ramifications of a program policy budget were crucial. It enabled the Governor to bargain with individual legislators to assure the needed voting majority in the Senate. Legislators were also aware that refusal to pass the budget endangered many of the programs within, programs which had little chance of enactment on their own. Three weeks of deliberations finally resulted in a 16 to 13 vote for the budget. Two days later, the Assembly easily concurred by a vote of 58 to 38. Perhaps the most powerful inducement for approving the budget was summed up by one Wisconsin Representative who stated: "any legislator can run on this budget and win."[13]

A satisfied Governor signed the budget bill on August 2, 1973. In doing so, Lucey had achieved his major objective for the legislative session--providing substantial property tax relief through reform of the school aid formula--as well as placing power equalization in the statutes. He also received an added bonus, credit for the tax reductions favorable to business, which put the Governor in a particularly good light for the 1974 elections. The school finance issue may not be completely settled, however. Because power equalization will not become effective until 1976, the major battles will undoubtedly be replayed.

The Four-State Comparison

Any analytical construct superimposed on reality is, by nature, arbitrary. Things are never quite that simple. Yet comparative analysis dictates that some order be extended to real phenomena. Accordingly, the process of enacting school finance reform in Ohio, Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin will be organized into four broad conceptual categories, different stages along a time continuum. Although these categories are inter-related and frequently overlap, they make comparative case study research possible.

In discussing the issue of school finance reform, slight modifications of the policy analysis framework set forth in Chapter I were felt to be useful. The four stages presented here are, briefly:

I. Pressures for Change - those demands, factors, and events culminating in a recognition that the existing school aid programs are no longer adequate.

II. Policy Initiation and Formulation - the point at which pressures for change are translated into actual policy proposals.

III. Legislative Response - the bargaining process during which alternatives are posed, political strategies employed, and support or opposition mobilized.

IV. Final Resolution - the last stage at which compromises are reached and the existing school aid programs altered.

The reader should keep in mind that the following comparisons are based on a four-state sample. Analysis is therefore qualitative rather than quantitative. And while conclusions are drawn, they do not necessarily extend to all states at all times and under all conditions.

Pressures for Change

The four states in this sample experienced several conditions which made school finance reform possible, if not inevitable. In general, the pressures for change materialized outside of the political system, but focused directly on the executive office and the legislature as the ultimate arbitrators. And these pressures transcended normal partisan differences, thereby increasing the base of support for reform.

Economic factors. The problems had their origin in the way that the schools were funded. By the mid-sixties, educational costs in most states were rising at a faster pace than real estate valuations. Heavy reliance on the local property tax to pay for education meant that school boards and voters were constantly increasing their tax liability to qualify for state aid or simply to keep up with spiraling costs. Property taxes for the schools in Minnesota, for example, escalated by 83 per cent between 1968 and 1971.[14]

As local property taxes skyrocketed, state dollars for education were also multiplying. Even so, allocations from state treasuries composed proportionately less of the total, magnifying the local property tax burden. In Ohio, the state's educational effort between 1968 and 1971 was greater than the total increases appropriated for the previous twelve years. But by 1970-71, the state's share of school costs had reached a low of 27.9 per cent, down from its 50 per cent contribution in the mid-1940s.[15]

The local share was correspondingly at a high of 65.8 per cent.[16] State legislatures were also hard-pressed to allocate more money for the schools while they were assuming fiscal responsibility for new and expanded public services, all competing for dollars from the same till.

State funds provided under the school aid formula were supposed to equalize the wealth disparities among property rich and property poor districts. Frequently, however, the existing programs also institutionalized the discrepancies. The per pupil dollar amounts set by the legislatures were often inadequate. Flat aids were extended to all districts, regardless of wealth. Richer school districts were therefore able to raise more money for their students, provide a smaller teacher/pupil ratio, and offer additional educational services, all with a lower tax effort.

These inter-related conditions--reliance on the regressive relatively inelastic property tax, the continued escalation of educational costs, competition for state dollars, and the structural inequities in the school aid programs--were built into the system of funding education. Together, they forged a demand that the method of financing be altered.

Concrete evidence of this pressure materialized in the frequency of taxpayer revolts and rumblings. Michigan voters defeated 42 per cent of the operating levies and 62 per cent of the bond issues from 1970 to March 1971.[17] Over a thousand irate citizens showed up at one school board meeting in Minnesota to insist that school expenditures be cut.[18] Local taxes for education were withheld in Wisconsin.[19] And some schools in Ohio were actually forced to close down because of a lack of operating funds. Disgruntled taxpayer demands for financing education from other revenue sources thus emanated primarily from strident cries for property tax relief. The result was that from the beginning the push for school finance reform became closely linked with property tax reform.

Judicial impact. Fiscal shortcomings of the present system were identified through another channel, the courts. Suits were filed in numerous states challenging the constitutionality of financially discriminatory school aid systems. The most celebrated examples were the premier Serrano case in California and the Rodriquez case in Texas which was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.*

In all four states, the courts played a role in publicizing the fiscal problem, if not in prompting immediate action. Plans for reform in Ohio and Minnesota were well under way when Serrano was decided in August, 1971. Even so, Governor Gilligan was apparently aware of the California Court's ruling. Following passage of the state budget, he admitted that a similar case filed by the Ohio Education Association might conceivably force a further restructuring of Ohio's school finance system and more taxes.[20] Minnesota had its own federal court suit challenging the school finance program in 1971. The court ruled against the state by refusing to dismiss the case and it upheld the Serrano principle of "fiscal neutrality." Yet Van Dusartz v. Hatfield came very late in the process and did not constitute a ruling on the facts, but rather a confirmation that rich districts may and do enjoy both lower tax rates and higher spending. While the judge's opinion may have served as an inducement to support Governor Anderson's omnibus school/tax bill, reform did not come from a direct judicial order, but rather from the operation of the political process.

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*Serrano v. Priest (96 Cal. Rp tr 601, 487 P. 2d 1241, 5 Cal. 3d 584) in which the California Supreme Court reversed a judgment of the lower federal district court on August 30, 1971. The Court ruled 5 to 1 that the existing school finance system violated both the state and federal Constitutions by denying the plaintiffs equal protection of the law because it based the quality of a child's education upon the resources of his school district and ultimately upon the pocketbooks of his parents. Because most states had school aid systems resembling California's, based primarily on the local property tax, this case received widespread attention. A similar case out of Texas, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez (No. 71-1332) was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. On March 21, 1973, the Justices ruled 5 to 4 that the existing school finance system in Texas did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution, in effect turning the responsibility for equalizing school expenditures back to the States.

The courts figured more prominently in Michigan and Wisconsin because of the time lapse between 1971 and 1973. By early 1973, similar suits had been filed in more states and the Rodriquez case had successfully made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. On December 29, 1972, the Michigan Supreme Court in a 4 to 3 decision declared the existing method of funding the public schools unconstitutional. Governor Milliken had filed the case, hoping to use it to persuade the Michigan Legislature to enact a new school aid formula. The Supreme Court's reversal of the Rodriquez decision came in the middle of the legislative debate. Observers in Michigan anticipated that their own State Supreme Court would reverse its original decision, with several newly-elected conservative justices holding the balance of power. This did occur, but only after passage of the new school aid bill.

In Wisconsin, both the Governor's Task Force and Governor Lucey had been counting on the pending Rodriquez decision to increase the support for power equalization. This hope dissipated with the Supreme Court ruling. Opposition forces, which had previously assumed a tentative wait-and-see attitude, coalesced and became activated. And while power equalization was eventually enacted, one of the major compromises occurred shortly after the Rodriquez decision.

Thus, the actions of the court in school finance cases were of varying relevance in the four states. In Ohio and Minnesota, legislation had been passed before the wave of school finance suits were filed. But such court decisions represented a potential impetus for future revisions. Individuals in Michigan and Wisconsin were more emboldened to push for reform in the face of the Michigan ruling and/or the pending Rodriguez decision. In both states, however, an "unfavorable" Supreme Court ruling did not squelch the push for reform. Consequently, it can be concluded that the judicial input, when combined with the more immediate impetus of taxpayer revolts and school closings, added to the growing demand for change. Yet, in and of themselves, the courts did not provide the most compelling reason for reform.*

Research and study. Various studies of each state's school finance and tax systems constituted another pressure for reform. The products differed widely in their scope, their sponsorship, and their authorship. National studies and the policies of other states provided an external source of information. The reports were funded by governmental or private sources and conducted by academicians, tax experts, professional consultants, and/or public officials and staff. Although such studies were generally not as salient nor as effective as tax revolts in galvanizing public support for reform, they had their primary effect on the policy makers themselves. The products offered evidence and a rationale for lawmakers intent on developing arguments in favor of reform.

In Michigan, a 1968 study sponsored by the State Department of Education outlined the strengths and weaknesses of four general school aid plans, which then set the parameters for future legislative consideration.[21] Two task forces reporting in the 1960s in Ohio pointed to the need for enactment of a state income tax. An influential citizens group in Minnesota produced several tax/revenue studies during 1969-70. The results enabled this group to extend a forum for the two gubernatorial candidates, strongly encouraging them to take public positions on school finance. In Wisconsin, several Governor-appointed task forces during the 1960s issued recommendations which were never enacted. Their failure helped to define the more successful positions adopted by Governor Lucey's task force in 1972.

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*The above conclusion is less true in other states, such as California and New Jersey where the school finance suits have been upheld on state (although different) grounds and where the courts have ordered the Legislatures to come up with acceptable plans.

At this stage, numerous individuals and groups were working independently to develop reform proposals and thus define the issue for eventual legislative enactment. Informal communications were often established among experts in the field, at the universities, and in state government. They helped to set the boundaries of the issue and ease the transition from pressures for reform to actual policy proposals. It is perhaps during this early stage that the outside "experts" (i.e., individuals with access to the policy makers by virtue of their professional credibility but without real political power) have their greatest impact.

Thus, economic, judicial, and analytical factors all demanded that the question of school finance reform be seriously considered. Such pressures were speeded to fruition by the broad-based nature of the issue itself. Financing schools and tax reform affect everyone. While wealthy districts are obviously better able to afford good schools than are poorer districts, the citizens of all communities notice and respond to great and lasting increases in their taxes--be they rich, poor, urban, rural, suburban, Democrat, or Republican. And while each group may articulate different remedies, the general movement for change is broad and convincing. Pressures for reform also invariably link the school aid issue with the tax issue--not only in increasing state revenues for equalization and additional programs, but also in providing relief from the property tax. And these pressures, once vocalized by such a broad segment of the population, can hardly be ignored by those in or seeking office.

Policy Initiation and Formulation

In all four states, the governors served as the rallying point for initiating school finance reform legislation. Where state departments of education, school finance experts, and/or educational interest groups may have been promoting change for years, the executive office contributed the political resources to accomplish this end. The governors therefore became the major factor in translating pressures for change into actual pieces of legislation.

Education as a campaign issue. In varying degrees, the governors of Ohio, Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin all capitalized on the need for educational reform in their election races. Both Gilligan and Anderson campaigned strongly on the school finance issue and, after their election, immediately set forth to enact such reforms during their first year in office. In Ohio and Minnesota, the nominees also firmly coupled their education proposals with programs to increase state taxes and offer property tax relief. Education thus became the most popular and broad-based defense for raising taxes. In contrast, Governor Lucey of Wisconsin waited until his second biennium in office, when economic conditions were more amenable, to propose school finance reforms. Here again, school aid programs became the major method of providing property tax relief, reportedly Lucey's foremost concern. Circumstances in Michigan created a slightly different situation. Because Milliken assumed office in 1969 upon the resignation of the former governor, he did not have to campaign for election until 1970. Before and during the race, however, the Michigan Chief Executive seized upon school finance reform as a major objective of his administration. And the education issue, in and of itself, appeared to be Milliken's fundamental concern.

Thus, allowing for different motives and situations, educational reform played a prominent role in all four gubernatorial elections. Acknowledging the mounting pressures for change, the candidates (with the possible exception of Patrick Lucey) adopted school finance reform as a major campaign theme. And in so doing, they further identified the problem, giving it publicity on a statewide basis. This stance, in turn, enabled the nominees to attract the support of some influential allies, not only during the campaign, but later on.

Task forces and advisors. Once elected, the chief executives proceeded to translate their campaign pledges into specific policies. One tactic was to appoint a task force. Such groups held the potential of accomplishing several objectives. Aside from developing recommendations for legislation, a task force helped to broadcast the issue through public hearings, dubbing it with a "citizen's" legitimacy. A task force could coalesce a wide range of special interests by offering a forum for conflicting views and an opportunity for early compromise. The discussion could also identify the likely points of contention, enabling reform proponents to plan a counter strategy. And by involving the major state interests in deliberations, a task force could mobilize support for the proposals once they reached the legislature.

Given these possibilities, the utilization of task forces differed in the four states. Governor Gilligan appointed a broad-based task force comprised of representatives from the major interests in Ohio. Charged with formulating proposals based on need (i.e., how to raise the revenues, but not how to spend them) the task force was then given its independent rein. Gilligan turned to a less formal, in-house group of key advisors and several university people to develop a school aid program. Governor Lucey allowed his citizens' task force a whole year to come up with both tax and school aid proposals. Membership included not only the important statewide interests, but also several legislators and members of his own administration, the latter providing strong direction to the task force. In both Ohio and Wisconsin, the governors incorporated many of the task force recommendations into their budget proposals.

When he inherited the Governor's Office in 1969, Milliken appointed a small commission of non-educators, with himself as chairman, to study a whole range of educational concerns. After six months, the Commission reported back and Governor Milliken called a special session of the Legislature to introduce a comprehensive package of bills. Most of these proposals were not enacted in 1969. By 1973, the Michigan Governor turned to key educational specialists from his office, the legislature, and the state department of education. These three individuals collaborated to write a new school aid program which the Senate Education Chairman introduced and Milliken supported. Like Gilligan and Milliken, Governor Anderson also relied upon a handful of selected advisors to formulate his school aid program, which he later offered as part of Minnesota's biennial budget. He did not appoint a task force, since the Citizens League had already performed these functions. Thus, in all four states, the chief executives were not equipped with ready-made legislative proposals when they assumed office. Instead, the governors turned to other sources for aid in formulating their school finance programs as well as in emphasizing the issues and in mobilizing extensive support.

Executive proposals. The format in which school finance proposals are presented has a significant impact on the bargaining process and the eventual outcome. In Ohio, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, the governors introduced their school aid revisions as part of the state biennial budget, which included other appropriations and the taxes to fund them. School finance reform legislation is usually comprehensive and controversial. And it requires enlarging the state's share of educational costs. Consequently, its inclusion in the budget enhances its chances of passage by enlarging the negotiating arena. School issues can be traded off against non-school issues, especially along dollar levels. "Extraneous" or politically sensitive issues can be expended or used as bargaining leverage to gain support for key items. Since each legislator has only one vote on the entire package, numerous considerations enter in. This enables the governor and his supporters to negotiate and compromise for individual votes. Governor Gilligan, for example, was committed to a per pupil distribution formula and Governor Lucey to power equalization. A comprehensive policy budget enabled both chief executives to bargain effectively over funding levels and other proposals in order to insure passage of their priorities. Thus, the budget can be used as a skillful instrument in enacting school finance reform, particularly since education is such a large chunk of most state appropriations.

Parallel issues. Because school finance reform involves a major change in the state/local funding of education, the question of taxes is invariably involved. More state aid to education enabled the lawmakers to provide substantial relief from the local property tax in all four states. The Governors of Ohio and Minnesota also incorporated new state taxes as part of the mix. A more favorable economic situation in Michigan and Wisconsin, based on surpluses from existing taxes and on federal revenue sharing funds, enabled the chief executives to propose school finance/property tax reform without raising taxes. In addition, emphasis on the local property tax often precipitated an improvement of assessment procedures or an equalizing of the burden among different classes of real property. The impetus came from the courts, as in Ohio, or from the governor's budget, as in Wisconson.

Other, more tangential policies were caught up in the attempt to build a winning coalition. These smaller interests, like the large urban school districts, vocational education, special education, or school building assistance proponents, vied for inclusion of their programs in the educational package in return for their overall support. School finance legislation can be defined as much by what programs were excluded as by which were retained. Parochiaid represents an interesting case in point. Several governors--Gilligan and Milliken--labored to provide state assistance to the nonpublic schools, as part of the larger educational package. Wisconsin has a strong tradition against parochiaid, which successfully worked to deflect the issue away from the larger concern of school finance reform. Legislation enacted in Ohio allocated some assistance to the nonpublic schools, but was subsequently ruled unconstitutional and the issue has been in and out of the courts ever since. Parochiaid remains salient at the state level, periodically stirred up by certain vocal segments of the population. And it occasionally bubbles to the surface, particularly when additional school aid is being considered.

Accountability is an issue which has recently sprung to the foreground of state educational politics, frequently in conjunction with school finance reform. The pressure for "better" education comes from at least two sources--the taxpayers and the legislators. Both want to insure an efficient and an effective use of their tax dollars, particularly the lawmaker who climbs out on a political limb to increase taxes for education. The end product is often some type of assessment legislation, to afford proof that the additional expenditures constitute a wise investment. In Ohio, an accountability provision was inserted in the budget during the last conference committee. This was done at the insistence of several Republican House members, much to the chagrin and exasperation of the statewide educational interests. In contrast, the assessment program in Michigan was initiated by the State Department of Education.

An additional push for accountability emanated from within the executive branch. It presents a fundamental challenge to the existing structure of educational decision making. The general trend was apparent in all four states: Governors want more direct control over education policy making. On the one hand, all four chief executives were building up their own research capabilities and expertise by hiring personal staff responsible for education. The governors were then able to seize the initiative for policy formulation from departments of education, especially in school finance legislation. On the other hand, governors were also searching for more direct control over the state educational apparatus. The Governor in Wisconsin, which has no state board of education, wanted to appoint one. The Governor of Michigan, which has an elected state board, wished to appoint it, if he could not abolish it altogether. The Governor of Ohio, claiming that no one bothered to listen to the elected board of education, rhetorically asked, "What need of thee have we?"[22] And the Governor of Minnesota, who already appoints the board members, strongly suggested that agency officials coordinate their legislative proposals through his office. Each illustration indicates that governors who are willing to risk the political consequences of providing more state aid to education also want more direct control over the outcomes.

Thus, formulating school finance proposals is by no means a simple task. Other issues, like taxes, parochiaid, and accountability, become crucial in the bargaining process and are capable of shaping the final product.

Legislative Response

Given the diverse and heterogeneous nature of legislative bodies and the interests they represent, the response stage is where interstate comparisons become most strained. So much depends upon individual personalities, inclinations, and idiosyncrasies, that qualitative analysis is essential in trying to explain outcomes. For this reason, more space will be devoted to the actual occurrences on a state-by-state basis.

"The governor proposes and the legislature disposes" is a commonly heard phrase in government, particularly within executive offices. The first part of the sentence is true, at least for school finance reform, as demonstrated in Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. The second part is a value judgment, where one's reply depends on one's politics. In any case, as reactors, the legislatures of these four states determined the fate of the school aid measures. While it would be impossible to capture all of the political nuances once school finance reform entered the legislative domain, some comparable features across the states will be highlighted.

A house divided. The process of adopting school finance reform confirms that major legislation can be enacted by a governor of one party and a legislature of another. In all four states, no single party controlled both the executive and legislative branches. In Ohio and Minnesota, Democratic governors played politics with Republican-led legislatures in 1971. Each political party controlled one house in Michigan and Wisconsin in 1973. The following table presents the Republican-Democratic margins in all four states during the year in which school finance reform was passed:

	Governor	House or Assembly	Senate
Ohio	D	R: 54-45	R: 20-13
Minnesota	D (DFL)	R: 70-65	R: 34-33
Michigan	R	D: 60-50	R: 19-19
Wisconsin	D	D: 62-37	R: 18-15

The chief executives had much in common. Anderson, Gilligan, and Lucey were Democrats. Milliken was a Republican; although he frequently relied upon House Democrats in passing his programs. The four governors had liberal-reformist leanings in the context of their particular states. All were freshman governors, if one includes Governor Milliken, who was in his first elected term. Yet none of the governors were political novices. Collectively, they brought with them a wide range of political experiences which came in handy, since each was the head of a highly competitive two-party state. All the governors sympathized with the needs of urban areas. And all were prone to educational reform without necessarily having been professional educators themselves. (Gilligan once taught literature on the college level.) Most importantly, all four governors had to formulate school finance proposals capable of surviving the legislative scrutiny of the opposing party.

Actually, the governors' strategy needed to encompass more than just education. As previously mentioned, the issue was larger in all four states. Lucey, Anderson, and Gilligan introduced their school aid provisions as part of the biennial budget, which also contained the other state appropriations and property tax relief. In Minnesota and Ohio, education was also coupled with comprehensive tax revisions and increases. The school finance bill in Michigan was passed as separate legislation. However, the Michigan lawmakers concurrently enacted property tax relief, a variety of tax reductions, and enabling legislation to bail out the Detroit school system. In drumming up support for all of these programs, whatever their latitude, key legislative decisions proved crucial.

The impact of legislative structure. Given the partisan divisions in the legislatures, it was predictable at the outset that the school aid measures would eventually wind up in a joint conference committee for final resolution. The political strategies were also predictable. Each party hoped to gain maximum political mileage for itself while embarrassing the opposition. Yet the nature of the tactics differed, molded by particular legislative structures.

In Ohio, the Republican House leadership decided to divide up the Governor's budget proposals into three separate bills. The school aid package was assigned to the education committee while the other appropriations and the tax sections each went to other committees. The fiscal committee's deliberations over dollar levels certainly affected what the education committee could do. But the key policy decisions on the school aid package were made by the educational interests, the members of the education committee and administrative spokespersons, without having to go to the fiscal committee for review. The education/appropriations sections of the budget were even passed separately from the tax proposals in the House. Deliberations over the school finance measures in the Senate were also made within the education committee, apart from the rest of the budget--although all three portions of the budget were eventually combined for a floor vote and for the ensuing votes. Leadership decisions superimposed on structure in Ohio therefore enhanced the roles of key legislators on both education committees and the state's major educational interests, with the real battles coming over the tax proposals.

Governor Anderson also introduced his education proposals as part of the budget in Minnesota. Yet here the school aid measure was never assigned to the education committees. Instead, it was deliberately combined with the other state appropriations and sent to the fiscal committees. The Senate Majority Leader, a Conservative (Republican), was a close personal friend of the Governor and a proponent of his reform measures. He was influential in engineering the circumvention of the education committee which seemed likely to bottle up Anderson's proposals. As a result, the House Education Committee, which had traditionally made revisions in the school finance formula, in conjunction with the State Department of Education and the educational interest groups, especially the Minnesota School Boards Association, was effectively bypassed. The short-circuiting of this committee reduced the influence of the Conservative education chairman, the dominant school finance influence in previous sessions. It also lessened the input of the education lobby which had enjoyed direct access to the education committee. Other educational concerns, such as collective bargaining and professional standards bills, also consumed the attention of the education groups, effectively competing for their effort on the school finance issue. Moreover, because the education proposals went to the same committee as the other appropriations, the bargaining arena was widened. The members of the more prestigious and powerful fiscal committees were directly involved in education decisions. Since the main issue was taxes, the Minnesota Farmers Union and the state AFL-CIO, the traditional mainstays of the DFL and of Anderson, were also crucial in the negotiations.

The budget process was even more centralized in Wisconsin. The legislature has a Joint Finance Committee, which is the only committee to examine the budget before it is voted on in either house. The scope of the bargaining is therefore expanded to include all of the programs in the budget.

While the members of the Joint Finance Committee specialized in various areas, where their input certainly held added weight, the committee's overall impact was magnified with the same legislators making the initial decisions on all the proposals. The structure also meant that key compromises were made right away in the Joint Finance Committee, in the hopes of solidifying the support of the Democrats and minimizing the need for major revisions at the hands of the Republicans during future legislative action.

Prior efforts to combine the school aid and tax revision issues had failed in Michigan, both in the Legislature and at the polls. Governor Milliken and the Senate Education Committee Chairman therefore collaborated on a school aid bill which was introduced as separate legislation. The education and fiscal committees in both houses were involved in the bargaining process.

Thus, once school finance bills were introduced, where they were sent deeply affected the deliberations. In Ohio, the two education committees made the crucial school finance decisions. This function was performed by the two fiscal committees in Minnesota and by the joint committee in Wisconsin. Finally, the education and finance committees shared the responsibility in Michigan. Committee assignments could, therefore, determine the scope and context of the bargaining, the nature of the compromises, and the identity of the important decision makers.

The impact of internal alliances and conflicts. One assumes that partisan politics, being what it is, enables governors to count on their own party for support and the loyal opposition for the headaches. This proved valid in Wisconsin, where Governor Lucey relied heavily on the Democratically-controlled Assembly and experienced his major altercations with the Republican-led Senate. However, school finance reform in Minnesota, Michigan, and Ohio did not proceed according to the rules.

Some governors received support from unexpected corners. Governor Milliken's liberal pro-urban positions frequently attracted the backing of the Democrats who controlled the Michigan House. Enthusiasm over having elected Wendell Anderson Governor of Minnesota, the involvement of key DFL legislators in the formulation of the budget, and the close party margins in both houses all helped to mold party solidarity in the Governor's favor during the protracted legislative struggles. Yet, Anderson also gained the support of many Conservative caucus members in the Senate who shared his reformist leanings. The Senate Majority Leader in particular was crucial in guiding the Governor's (and his own) priorities through the Legislature. For this he was vilified by members of his own party, capping off an intra-party squabble between House and Senate Conservatives. Opposition to Anderson's proposals was based on partisan, philosophical, and fiscal grounds and centered around the House Conservative Caucus. And for a time, the Conservatives were effectively able to thwart the DFL and the Governor from passing their tax/school finance reforms.

Having the governor and the legislators from the same party does not always guarantee unity or even great affection, however. Conservative Republican legislators in Michigan were beside themselves over some of Governor Milliken's proposals. A schism in the Senate minority caucus between the Democrats loyal to the Ohio AFL-CIO and those loyal to Governor Gilligan temporarily impeded passage of the entire budget, including the school finance proposals. At the same time, Gilligan could take advantage of the situation in the House, where the moderate Republican leadership favored some form of an income tax. Amid the pressure of school closings, the GOP leaders finally capitulated and supported Gilligan's tax proposals, thereby providing the needed number of votes. This action also brought down the wrath of conservative House Republicans who saved their special condemnation for the House Speaker. Unlike Minnesota, however, GOP cooperation was not induced from any great love for the Governor and his programs, but from economic and political necessity.

Thus, the unique dynamics of any legislature can place its personal stamp on state policies. Aside from the normal partisan differences, other factors can affect the outcome of school finance reform--anywhere from rivalries among members of the same party, competition between the two legislative houses, and executive versus legislative prerogative to long-standing traditions and interpersonal relationships.

A legislator's vote on school finance measures is also conditioned by the response of the people back home. Most lawmakers are primarily concerned about the effects of school aid bills on their own districts. Will their schools win or lose money? What do they hear from local educators and taxpayers? Interest groups which are developing political action arms are also starting to figure heavily in legislative decisions. All of these circumstances may mean that legislative leadership will no longer be able to demand party allegiance where school finance bills are involved. One must be cautious in generalizing about school aid votes, however, particularly when they are combined with larger tax/appropriation measures.

The posing of alternatives. One strategy used to challenge the Governor's prerogative in initiating policies is to offer counter proposals. The opposition can seek to amend the governor's proposals, obstruct their progress, or substitute successful alternatives of its own. The choice is often determined by the powers at the opposition's disposal and is illuminated through the nature of its responses.

In Wisconsin, the Republican leadership in the Senate wanted to submit its own tax/school aid alternatives; but it did not have the votes. Instead, the GOP leaders chose to not concur with the Assembly passed budget, immediately sending it to a conference committee. Because the conferees were evenly divided along party lines, the Senate Republicans hoped to elicit enough compromises to make Governor Lucey's package more palatable.

In Michigan and Ohio, one house managed to pass its own version of the Governor's proposals. In Michigan, the House Democrats limited the school aid bill from three years to one year, hoping to enact a different formula later on. They also increased the price tag. In Ohio, and aided by the split in the Democratic caucus, the Senate Republicans substituted a less expensive sales tax package with a teacher unit school aid formula for the House-passed income tax and per pupil formula. The result was the same in both states. The two versions were sent to a joint conference committee to iron out the differences.

The opposition in Minnesota had the most success in obstructing the Governor's proposals, at least in the short run. Faced with numerous school aid and tax alternatives in both houses, the legislators were unable to reach a consensus during the regular legislative session. While Anderson's "Fair School Financing Plan" languished, a Conservative-sponsored bill which had the Governor's approval, passed the Senate during the first special session. The House passed a different bill. A conference committee then endorsed the House version, which was wearily accepted by the Legislature. This measure, however, was unacceptable to Governor Anderson who vetoed the school aid and tax sections. He then called the legislators back into a second special session.

Thus, the passage of major school finance/tax reform necessitated compromises in all four states. The tactics may have differed, depending on various conditions operative in each state. Yet the conference committee becomes an almost inevitable tool in reconciling the differences.

Final Resolution

Once the school aid bills reached a joint conference committee, the final bargaining stages involved relatively few individuals. The actual decisions were usually made in executive session. Even so, the governors could bring much pressure to bear by focusing on the issues. They could work through sympathetic members of the conference committee. They could also focus public opinion on the legislature in order to prompt a speedy and favorable resolution. For example, following Governor Anderson's veto of the school aid/tax package in Minnesota, a conference committee convened in the Governor's mansion sequestered from public view. Meeting in non-stop marathon sessions, the conferees and the Governor's chief aides proceeded to hammer out a compromise. Given the close partisan margins in both legislative houses, the option of overriding Anderson's veto was never seriously considered. Anderson also played to the press by castigating the Conservative-passed tax bill for failing to grant tax relief or to remedy gross inequities. Public opinion polls indicated that the veto had popular support. A Minnesota court opinion subscribing to Serrano-type principles, coming at this time, also weakened the Conservative position. Finally, the State Auditor, a Republican, warned that the state would soon run out of money. Similarly, Governor Gilligan's bargaining position was enhanced by a fiscal crisis for Ohio's schools and the necessity to cut back on existing state expenditures. Moreover, in both states, key Republican leaders played a crucial role in the conference committee deliberations. As a conferee, the Senate Majority Leader in Minnesota assumed the function of mediator during the final negotiations. His role was particularly crucial when tempers became frayed and compromises seemed impossible. In Ohio, the House Republican leaders had already gone on record in favor of an income tax. They begrudgingly coalesced with the Democrats to insure its retention in the fourth and final conference committee report.

In Michigan, the conferees had to resolve twenty-three different points of contention. The conference committee eventually retained the original form of the school aid package as it had passed the Senate. However, it granted substantial aid to the urban areas which helped to gain the concurrence of many Democrats from the cities.

Governor Lucey added a creative touch to the conference committee deliberations in Wisconsin. Unable to reach a consensus over the school aid proposals with the Republican Senate conferees, the Governor went behind their backs to offer property tax relief to some of the major business interests in the state. The industrialists, in turn, pressured the Republicans to reach a speedy compromise over the budget.

Unique situations had their effect in all four states. The scope of the legislation, however, was wide enough to allow for leeway and bargaining. Each governor had to attract votes from the opposite party, yet retain the united support of his own party. This necessitated compromise. In the final stages--where a deadlock could easily emerge and where the two sides were most evenly matched--saving face became an important factor. The strategy became one of maximizing gains and minimizing losses for all parties involved so that everyone who desired could take credit for the final package. More importantly, the final package had to be capable of attracting enough votes for passage in both houses since the conference committee report was not amendable. Thus, in the end, the process of trade-offs had to encompass the entire legislature with the governor and his allies keeping a running tally of their votes.

After waiting out this arduous process, the legislatures in all the states responded and four relieved governors could call it a victory.

Concluding Observations

Legislatures have the ultimate responsibility for providing state aid to the schools. This situation dictates that lawmakers at the state level will be active in educational decision making. More recently, it also seems to signify that governors--at least in these four states--will assert their own prerogatives in formulating and advocating school finance reform.

Assuming their willingness to take a stand, governors in these four states had numerous resources at their disposal with which to initiate school finance reform. They could publicize the issues through election campaigns, while also attracting important political allies. They could appoint a citizens' task force to help define the issues, simultaneously giving them more attention and enlarging the pool of potential proponents. And these governors had ready access to the news media or to traveling around their states, thereby highlighting the issues and orchestrating indirect pressure on the legislators for action.

The chief executives also had extensive information and research capabilities within their departments and easy access to outside expertise, frequently overwhelming legislators in this capacity. The governors could define the issues by utilizing their resources to determine which programs to embrace and which to omit. They could therefore construct workable coalitions, organizing and maximizing support and neutralizing or isolating the opposition. And the use of a policy budget enhanced such bargaining strengths.

Once their proposals entered the legislature, the governors seemed to step back, delegating the actual legwork to key administration staff and advisors. The latter were transformed from education or finance experts to political mediators and tacticians. When it appeared that the legislators needed prodding, the governors assumed a more public posture, appealing for citizen pressure to be directed at the lawmakers. Going directly to the public can have problematic results, however. When opponents of the income tax placed it on the ballot, Ohio citizens overwhelmingly upheld the tax. Yet Michigan voters trounced a similar referendum.

The ultimate power in the governor's arsenal is, of course, the veto. But this was used sparingly because it had the potential to arouse the public wrath and turn the legislature against the chief executive. In Governor Anderson's case, the use of the veto was a wise gamble It turned out to be publicly popular and it gave the Governor a second chance to achieve his tax and school finance reforms.

One qualifying comment needs to be made in interpreting the role of governors, however. The chief executives studied in this chapter ranked first (Wisconsin), second (Minnesota), and third (Michigan) in their involvement in educational policy making among the twelve governors analyzed by the Educational Governance Project and reported in Chapter V. (Ohio was not part of the comparative research.) Consequently, this study of school finance reform is biased in favor of educationally active governors. At the same time, it is no coincidence that the three top ranked governors presided over states where major school finance and/or tax reform was enacted, thus helping to account for their high rankings.

These same four governors could also be considered liberal and reformist. This political bent may have led them to initiate new school finance/tax policies rather than patch up existing programs. They set the pace, which cast the legislators in a reactive role.

What all of this comes down to is the centralizing powers potentially inherent in the executive branch. These powers appear especially potent when matched against a heterogeneous, decentralized legislative body which, by its nature, represents multitudinous interests.

At the same time, legislatures are developing countervailing capacities by building up their own independent resources in the form of increased professional staffing and research capabilities. These resources serve as a buffer against the executive branch and various interest groups and as an autonomous evaluator of their proposals. Perhaps this independence will enable more legislatures to initiate school finance reforms, as they have done in Michigan and seem to be gearing up to do in Ohio.

Whoever initiates changes, it is important that governors and legislators be willing to join together to enact something as comprehensive and expensive as school finance/tax reform. Bills which provide more state aid to education, equalization of funds, revision or replacement of the school aid programs, property tax relief, and/or new state taxes require the concerted efforts of both legislators and governors, plus all the power they can bring to bear.

The process of passing school finance reform is instructive as much for who is not involved as who is. It also pinpoints the types of functions performed. In all four states, the fact that the governors assumed a more direct role in formulating policies for school finance had important consequences for other sectors of the policy system. State departments of education and interest groups may have been advocating school aid reform for years. But the executive office provided the political clout necessary to provoke serious legislative consideration. In the process, the governors challenged the traditional role of the education department which, except for providing raw data, may be omitted from the crucial formulation stages.

State boards of education appeared to play a minimal role in the actual passing of school finance reform. In an earlier stage, they could attract attention to the issue by sponsoring studies and by supporting legislative resolutions calling for change. However, in Ohio, Michigan, and Minnesota (Wisconsin has no state board) they did not have substantial input into the governor's or legislators' offices. This was especially true when the governor intentionally chose to work with a few close advisors, many of whom were not from the educational community.

Similarly, the state superintendents (or commissioners) and state departments of education performed a secondary function in the actual passage of school finance reform. Their strength came from being able to provide the raw data showing the effects of each legislative proposal on the local school districts. Yet such data may have to be reinterpreted by sources in the legislature in order to be utilized. And this input can be challenged by other, competing sources of information; the Ohio Education Association, for example, had its own computer sources which it readily utilized during the budget skirmishes. Departments of education may have influence through their legislative liaisons who provide information and can simultaneously promote the department's priorities. But such input was often based on the personal relationships between legislators, governors, and department representatives. The political style and credibility of the state superintendent and the reputation of the department were also important. In any case, the policy making influence allowed the state education agency is becoming more dependent on the lawmakers themselves. Governors in these four states were moving to gain more direct control over the state educational apparatus. They were independently initiating and formulating their own education policies. With no direct constituency and devoid of political clout, the state educational agency appears susceptible to being closed out of important legislative decisions as well. If school finance reform is indicative of a future trend in educational policy making, then the state education agency may be becoming structurally removed from the important fiscal deliberations.

Some educational interest groups faced a similar fate vis-a-vis the governor. Organizations, like the NEA affiliates in Wisconsin and Ohio, that supported a governor during his campaign, however, were in a better position to forestall this trend. For different reasons, both governors and teachers have a stake in altering the present system. Teachers may advocate change which would also maximize their own power relationships with educational management. Consequently, they could easily align with governors also concerned with change, which placed administrator and school board groups on the defensive, upholding the status quo. In some cases, the teacher associations therefore had a ready made entree into the governor's office. They helped to shape his educational policies. They also circumvented formal bureaucratic channels and enjoyed direct access to the governor. Other, less politically active groups were not able to capitalize on such circumstances.

Once the school finance proposals were introduced into the legislatures, the role of interest groups presented a mixed bag. Their activity in Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Minnesota ranged from working together for similar goals, to relative inactivity, to working against each other. In 1971, the state educational interest groups in Ohio were still talking to each other and could coalesce to promote increased state aid to education and the income tax. Their united effort was enhanced politically by the absence of an organized opposition to education. The real fight came over taxes and expenditure levels. The organizations could also afford to work together because the additional money for education enabled all of them to achieve some smaller program objectives. The overall school aid package did not specifically pit rich districts against poor ones, since practically all districts stood to benefit from the increased state assistance. Once the education package was locked in, however, only the Ohio Education Association joined a short-term coalition of major non-educational interests in Ohio to push for the income tax.

In Minnesota, the impact of the education groups in the bargaining process appeared to be minimal. Many of the statewide groups had aligned with Governor Anderson, but some expressed reservations over his school finance proposals. In addition, the educational interests were concurrently devoting their political resources to other issues, such as collective bargaining and a professional standards board. Because the school aid issue was combined with taxes, the organizations contributing the most political weight to the Governor's side were not the educational groups, but the traditional DFL power bases: the Minnesota AFL-CIO and the Farmers Union. During the final negotiations, however, the Minneapolis school district's legislative liaison was able to interject relevant figures in the bargaining process which bolstered the Governor's case for providing more school aid to the cities. This, in turn, prompted another revision in favor of the agricultural areas.

In Wisconsin, the two major statewide education groups were on opposite sides of many school issues. The Wisconsin Education Association worked closely with Governor Lucey and the Democrats in favor of power equalization. The Wisconsin Association of School Boards aligned with the Senate Republicans in opposition to the local negative aid payments to the state.

The nature of the Michigan education proposals carefully avoided the traditional rich/poor alignments, mobilizing the local districts according to their school tax effort. This break from tradition also caught many educational interest groups off guard and unable to mount an effective opposition.

As long as rich school districts are save-harmlessed and almost all districts receive more state aid, the education groups should be able to take positions reflecting their respective memberships. Or, as in Michigan, some school aid proposals may force a realignment of traditional education coalitions. Proposals which would help the poor districts at the expense of the rich ones, however, may immobilize the statewide education groups whose constituencies contain all types of districts. As a result, the state groups may be forced to work on more narrow, self-interested issues, leaving the school finance issue to local educators.

An additional factor affecting the interest group role is the developing schism among educators. In the past, the groups could get together with key legislators on the education and appropriations committees to periodically increase the existing state aid formula. Yet the old alliances are breaking apart, at the same time that governors have either included school finance reform as part of their budgets or initiated revisions on their own. The split is enhanced by the education groups themselves which are not the slightest bit shy about airing their labor/management squabbles in public and before the legislators. In these four states, the more active groups in the school finance issue were those that worked with the governors from the beginning and that were involved in political campaigns, contributing endorsements, volunteers, and money to friendly candidates.

Because school finance proposals must run the gamut of the political system, a program which minimizes the losses to local school districts has the most chance of igniting widespread support and, therefore, of success. If true equalization of funds is to be provided, politics therefore dictates that the total pot be substantially sweetened, necessitating a massive dose of more state funds. The use of the state budget seems to be a good strategy in accomplishing major changes because it can provide the additional funds and because it enlarges the bargaining potential. Yet if Ohio and Minnesota are indicative, true equalization of educational funds may be preempted by the need to get the tax package enacted.* The most promising set of circumstances exists when the additional funds are already there as a surplus, as in the case of Wisconsin and Michigan.

Despite the socioeconomic, cultural, political, and structural distinctions of each state, the similarities in passing school finance reform are abundant. Perhaps this is due to the nature of the education finance issue itself. Just like other political issues, school aid reform touches upon many other programs; scarce resources dictate intense competition among those who set the priorities; and there are both winners and losers. Yet school finance is not necessarily partisan. It transcends Democratic-Republican splits because educational finance affects all communities. Every legislator either has kids or constituents with kids in school. Education is also one of the most costly public services so that governors and legislators have to pay attention. School finance reform is therefore broad-based and the pressures for reform general. Yet paradoxically, school finance legislation is highly technical. Information and expertise constitute power and they usually belong only to a select group. Relatively few individuals actually hammer out the mechanics of a school aid bill. The majority of legislators are less concerned with the whole school finance picture, but rather with how their district will fare or what the people back home will say (and vote). Thus, while financing education is among the most salient of public concerns, it is also so specialized that only a few individuals make the key decisions. Advocates of change must therefore be prepared with convincing arguments on both levels.

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*Interestingly, comprehensive tax revision did not turn out to be a political liability for either Anderson or Gilligan. The DFL took control of both legislative houses in 1972 and the Democrats in Ohio assumed control of the House and came within one vote of taking over the Senate. The Governor of Minnesota was then able to fulfill his initial objectives of school finance reform during the 1973 session. Ohio has yet to take a similar action but seems on the brink of doing so.

Inasmuch as school finance reform is accompanied by other "non-educational" issues, the bargaining process expands to take in non-educational arguments. So-called school people's reasons for advocating reform must therefore compete with economic realities and political strategies. The quantitative substance of school and tax proposals is also conditioned by the qualitative nature of decision making. Consequently, whether or not school finance reform emerges as a gubernatorial priority, it faces an even more complex set of inter-relationships within the legislative quarters. The final test therefore becomes simply: who has the votes.

This chapter has concentrated on the process of enacting school aid proposals. It has purposely shied away from discussing the nature, merits, and shortcomings of specific reform programs; the contents and eventual impact of court cases; and the implementation of various educational statutes. Such issues, of course, need to be addressed. But before they can be effectively answered, it is necessary to study the process that such changes must survive in order to become reality. Certainly, no single answer exists for all times and in all places. Yet it has been the purpose of this chapter to notify the reader interested in actualizing school finance reform of some of the likely things to expect.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER VII

[1] The school finance reform statutes referred to in this chapter are known in each state as follows:

Ohio - Amended Substitute House Bill 475, 1971, the 109th General Assembly, Chapter 3317 of the Ohio Revised Code (The 1973 revisions are contained in Amended Substitute House Bill 86, 1973, the 110th General Assembly.)

Minnesota - Laws of 1971, extra session, Chapter 31 - H.F. No. 262 (The 1973 revisions are found in Laws of 1973, Chapter 683 - S.F. No. 1626.)

Michigan - Enrolled Senate Bill No. 110, (The "Bursley Act"), Act No. 101, P.A. of 1973.

Wisconsin - 1973 Assembly Bill 300; Chapter 90; Laws of 1973.

[2] Ohio Education Association, Ohio Schools, September 24, 1971, p. 9.

[3] Gongwer News Service, Inc., Ohio Report, December 10, 1971, p. 2.

[4] ACIR, as reprinted in Minnesota State Department of Education, Update, March, 1972, p. 5.

[5] Anthony Morley, "Minnesota," A Legislator's Guide to School Finance, The Education Commission of the States, August, 1972, p. 37.

[6] Speech by Gerald W. Christenson, Minnesota State Planning Director, to a Statewide Conference on "Education--Changing Perspectives," League of Women Voters. Seattle, Washington, (unpublished manuscript, December 8, 1973, p. 5).

[7] Frank A. Pinner, John N. Collins, and William A. Sederburg, "Decision Making on the Reform of Educational Finances in Michigan," A Report to the Urban Institute, November 1, 1971, pp. 12-13.

[8] Neal R. Peirce, The Megastates of America (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.) 1972, p. 426.

[9] Gongwer News Service, Inc., Michigan Report, Lansing, Michigan, June 28, 1973, p. 2.

[10] Gongwer, May 2, 1973, pp. 1-2.

[11] Interview with Archie Buchmiller, Then-Deputy Superintendent of Public Instruction, The Educational Governance Project, May 4, 1974.

[12] Governor Patrick J. Lucey, "Governor's Budget Message," 1971-1973, Part 1, The Fiscal Problem, pp. 1-2.

[13] Gongwer News Service Inc., Wisconsin Report, Madison, Wisconsin, July 26, 1973, p. 2.

[14] Gerald F. Weiszhaas, "The 1971 Omnibus Tax Act," Staff Progress Report: A Collection of Staff Work Papers (unpublished report by the Minnesota Tax Study Commission, January, 1973) p. 31.

[15] The Ohio Legislative Service Commission, "Ohio School Foundation Program," Report No. 94, January, 1969. Ohio Public Expenditure Council, "Information Bulletin," 71-78, p. 6.

[16] Research Division, National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1972, Washington, D.C., p. 51.

[17] Michigan Department of Education, "Full State Funding of K-12 Education," Lansing, Michigan, October 25, 1971, pp. 3-4.

[18] Gerald A. Christenson, "Planning for Human Resource Development for Minnesota in the 1970's," Financing Special Education in Minnesota (Division of Educational Administration, University of Minnesota, Fall, 1972) p. 83.

[19] Correspondence, Archie Buchmiller, Assistant Superintendent, Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, May 21, 1974.

[20] Gongwer News Service, Inc., Ohio Legislative Report, December 14, 1971, p. 2.

[21] J. Alan Thomas, School Finance and Educational Opportunity, (Michigan Department of Education, Lansing, Michigan, 1968) pp. 332-335.

[22] Columbus Dispatch, October 26, 1972, p. 8A.

CHAPTER VIII

STATE EDUCATION POLICY SYSTEMS

Raphael O. Nystrand

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide commentary about the ways in which actors in the respective states interrelate to produce policy decisions. In contrast to the preceding chapters which focused upon the policy-making role of a particular actor or agency across the various states, the emphasis in the following pages will be upon patterns of interaction which may exist among these persons and agencies in the states. Stated somewhat differently, our goal here is to describe policy-making systems.

A general theory of political systems has guided the conceptualization and conduct of the Educational Governance Project. This theory which is explicated in Chapter I suggests that factors in the policy-making system include general environmental aspects, immediate environmental features, a governmental structure comprised of policy actors, and policy outputs. It is the interaction among elements within and across these categories which concerns us as we address the question of state educational policy making in a systems context. We wish we could present a single model which explains how the system works. We find, however, that the situation is much too complex and the variables too numerous to allow such an explanation. On the other hand, our research does permit some generalizations which at least begin to suggest some ways of viewing the educational policy process across the states.

The Iannaccone Typology

A useful baseline for comparative statements about state educational policy making is the work of Laurence Iannaccone.[1] Writing in 1967, Iannaccone reviewed studies conducted of educational policy-making processes in several states and developed a series of comparative propositions about these processes. It seems important to note that this work was entirely post factum analysis. Iannaccone did not have the opportunity to write on the basis of data gathered in relation to any single framework, much less one of his own design. It is nevertheless the most comprehensive and systematic analysis for state educational policy making to date. Because the Iannaccone conclusions represent such a widely accepted synthesis, we will use them as a benchmark for our analysis.

The central proposition offered by Iannaccone was that the most critical feature of a state education policy system is the linkage between organized state education interest groups and the state legislature. His principal concern was with the "organized profession as it actually goes about influencing legislation,"[2] although he acknowledged that other actors could be involved in decision making. Focusing upon this linkage, Iannaccone identified four structural types which he referred to as locally-based disparate, state-wide monolithic, state-wide fragmented, and state-wide syndical.

The locally-based disparate structure (Type I) was characterized by emphasis on local contacts and relationships in the legislature. The most important interaction regarding policy formation was between legislators and schoolmen from their respective districts. In contrast the state-wide monolithic structure (Type II) was characterized by unanimity or coalitions among statewide interest groups (e.g., teachers, administrators, and schools boards), which spoke with a single voice to the legislature. By resolving their differences within the coalition, the monolith could represent statewide interests to the legislature. The state-wide fragmented type (Type III) was characterized by the presence of statewide organizations to represent the interests of various education groups but the inability of these groups to agree among themselves about a legislative program. The state-wide syndical type (Type IV) was characterized by a statewide organization under government sponsorship serving as a broker among educational interests and presenting them to the legislature. Only a single state, Illinois, with its School Problems Commission, fit this category.

Iannaccone suggested that policy processes and the success of education interests within them would vary among the four structural types. For example, he suggested that differences regarding educational legislation would probably be resolved inside the legislature in disparate and fragmented states, within the monolith in monolithic states, and within the syndical operations of states of this type. He also observed that the four types could be considered a developmental construct in that states would pass through each of them in stages. More specifically, he argued that states began as locally-based disparate (Type I) types, would become statewide monolithic (Type II) as education interests came together for common purposes, would move to statewide fragmented (Type III) as these interests diverged, and finally would become statewide syndical (Type IV) as participants including legislators wearied of conflict over educational issues.

Interpretation of the Educational Governance Project Findings

As we begin to compare the foregoing propositions with findings from the Educational Governance Project, it is important to identify some differences in the methodology of the two efforts. The EGP was designed as a twelve state comparative case study with similar questions asked of comparable actors and about comparable issues in the respective states. As noted above, Iannaccone depended upon post factum analysis of work done by others. Second, the EGP was guided by a systems framework which took into account a relatively broad range of potential actors in the policy system. Iannaccone, on the other hand, wrote primarily from an interest group perspective. Third, several years have elapsed since Iannaccone wrote (even more since the authors he relied upon collected their data), and substantial changes could have occurred in the interim. At best, then, we are in a position of being able to compare two snapshots of the same phenomena (state education policy making) taken at different times with somewhat different cameras at slightly different angles.

Iannaccone omits state boards of education in his analysis of policy making, preferring to focus upon education interest group relationships with the legislature. There is an historical and traditional point of view which would suggest that this is a serious oversight. According to this perspective, education has long been given considerable policy-making autonomy from general government. On the other hand, there is more recent evidence which suggests that state boards lack policy influence.[3] Findings from the EGP provide some support for both positions but particularly the latter.

While state boards appear to lack the influence many of them and their advocates desire, they were found to be important in some states on some issues. The most notable examples were New York where the Regents have long been regarded as influential, Texas where the state board assumed the initiative regarding school finance reform, and Minnesota where the board took the lead in pressing for school desegregation. Constitutional provisions and legislative actions provide important parameters for state boards of education. In every state (except Wisconsin where there is no board) these factors establish some jurisdiction for the boards. For example, every state board which was studied had policy-making authority regarding curriculum standards. Similarly all had authority regarding teacher certification, although this was shared in two states (California and Minnesota). Surely decisions in such areas are of sufficient importance to state education systems that a comprehensive attempt to explain policy-making processes should take them into account. However, the EGP data did not render much strong evidence that many boards themselves initiate proposals or mobilize support in these or other areas.

Taking account of exceptions such as those previously mentioned, the general finding of the EGP research was that state boards primarily gave legitimation to the proposals presented them by chief state school officers. Even this statement requires qualification, however. It may well be that chiefs were guided by the "rule of anticipated consequences"[4] in making proposals to their respective boards, thus tending to present only those proposals which they were confident would receive approval. At any rate, it can be said that all state boards do possess some policy-making authority and that they exercise it in varying degrees.

There is another arena in which to consider state board action which is as a contributor to policy decisions enacted by the state legislature. Viewed in this context, Iannaccone's lack of attention to state boards is plausible in light of the EGP data. Findings of this study indicated little direct role for state boards in this arena. Again, however, a version of the "anticipated consequences" phenomenon may have been operative. As will be discussed subsequently, several chief state school officers did participate in legislative decision making. There may be some rationale (but little data) for arguing that the initiatives of the chiefs in this arena were influenced by what they understood to be the preferences of their respective boards. This argument is given some credence by the finding reported in Chapter II that boards which appointed their chief state school officers were perceived to be more influential than those which did not.

The preceding paragraph foreshadows a major difference in the findings of the EGP and the Iannaccone propositions. Whereas Iannaccone was virtually silent about the policy-making roles of individuals in state systems, the EGP data revealed that both chief state school officers (CSSOs) and governors were often active. While this difference may be attributable to changes over time and/or variations in research focus, the more recent findings emphasize the need to include at least these two actors in an up-to-date conceptualization of policy systems.

We have already noted the finding that chiefs are perceived as highly influential in state agency policy making by state board of education members. Observers of the board-chief relationship concurred with this judgment in most instances. Moreover, most chiefs perceived that they themselves should be active participants in the policy making process, not only with the state board but with the legislature and the governor as well. The data in Chapter III indicate that variation was found from state to state when legislators, governors, and interest group leaders were asked about the success which chiefs enjoyed in influencing legislative programs. The significant point in light of Iannaccone's theory, however, is that virtually all chiefs were seen as having some influence in this arena and some were thought to be highly influential.

Interestingly, the EGP data indicated no correspondence between the perceived influence of chiefs in legislative and state agency arenas. Elected CSSOs appeared to have slightly more influence in the legislative arena than did their appointed counterparts. However, of the four chiefs rated most influential in this arena, two were elected and two were appointed. Other factors moderately related to the influence of the CSSO in the legislative arena were size of the SDE staff, a populous state, and formal power of office.

Correlates of perceived influence of the CSSO in the state agency arena included having a large and well-qualified staff, residing in an industrialized state, and working with a state board which was perceived to have relatively strong policy influence.

Accepting the fact that chiefs have great influence in the agency arena and some influence in the legislative arena, it seems important to ask in whose behalf such influence is exercised. While the EGP data are not definitive on this point, they do suggest some possible answers. In the case where the governor appoints the chief, he may advocate the governor's program. Where he is elected, he may espouse his own program which he has presented as a platform to the public. Where he is appointed by the state board, he may advocate board positions in the legislature. In the latter two cases especially, his positions will probably reflect the contributions of his staff and their assessment of public interests. Where differences of opinion exist among education interests in a state, the EGP case studies suggest that the chief's position will more likely reflect the interests of management (i.e., administrators and school boards) than that of teachers. This may be partly because most chiefs and their top staff members have been experienced as administrators and likely have come to have particular appreciation for this perspective. In this regard, it seems that chiefs may sometimes serve as points of access to the policy system for administrator groups who lack the resources which teacher groups and, to some extent, school boards have come to employ successfully with legislators. Because of the power which the chiefs possess, this is an important point of access.

The activity of governors in education policy making was discussed in Chapter V. Three fourths of the governors studied included education as a campaign issue in 1970, and most were active on behalf of some kind of education proposal with the legislature. While some advocated curriculum changes (e.g., statewide kindergarten), those who were most actively involved with educational matters seemed oriented primarily toward the fiscal aspects of education. For some, this meant advocating fiscal equalization and reform; for others, it meant accountability and/or cost reduction programs. To be sure, governors experienced varying degrees of success with their proposals in the education arena, but their position as chief executives gave them powerful leverage in negotiating with legislatures over policy outcomes. Moreover, the fact that they often employed their own staffs with perspectives different than those of the state agency staffs often insured that differing views would be incorporated in education policy proposals.

Important from a systems perspective is the fact that the governor's office serves as another point of access for persons and groups concerned about education issues. For example, a close relationship appeared to exist between the governor and the teacher associations in Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. In some states (e.g., Florida and New York) governors appointed citizen task forces on education to formulate program recommendations.

Returning to Iannaccone's propositions, the EGP data indicate that he was essentially correct in arguing that states would shift from Type II to Type III in his typology. The EGP data show relatively little evidence of statewide monolithic behavior. While several states continue to have coalitions of interest groups associated with education, these coalitions appeared to be most effective in Tennessee and Colorado. Special cases also exist in Texas and Georgia where the state teachers associations continue to be umbrellas for professional educator groups, although formal coalitions are less prominent. In other states, such coalitions either do not exist or their effectiveness has been vitiated by conflict over labor-management issues. Fragmented or not, however, the data indicated that in most states the "education lobby" was perceived as being among the most influential in the state. In cases where fragmentation did exist, teacher associations were ranked as the most influential of the education groups (although tied with school boards in three instances) followed by school boards, administrator groups, and teacher federations where they existed. This diminished stature of administrator groups contrasts markedly to the position dominance ascribed for them by Iannaccone in the statewide monolithic type.

While the EGP data suggest Iannaccone was correct in perceiving the shift from Type II to Type III politics in his terms, they also suggest that these categories oversimplify reality. As already shown above, governors, chief state school officers, and state boards of education influence policy as well as legislatures and interest groups. Moreover, the typology may even oversimplify legislature-group relationships. The recent data indicate that even when states have moved to what Iannaccone describes as Type II or Type III status, contacts between legislators and local constituents including school boards and superintendents continue to be influential with legislators. For example, much of the impetus for change in the Florida foundation formula could be attributed to the efforts of urban legislators who responded to their constituents. Similarly, the tradition of localism remains particularly strong in Massachusetts, and legislators were divided by big city-outstate issues when considering school tax reform in Minnesota. The EGP study suggests that the basis on which an education issue is resolved in the legislature may depend upon the issue, a point to which we will return.

Iannaccone's further prediction that Type III would move to a syndical structure has not come to pass. Indeed, the only state of this type at the time of his writing (Illinois) has since modified its syndical structure in favor of a more traditional state board of education. At the time Iannaccone wrote, it appeared that state officials might establish formal mechanisms similar to the Illinois School Problems Commission to avoid having to deal with the conflict generated by fragmented education interest groups. What appears to have happened instead is that educators, and more importantly, governors, legislators, and the general public have come to see that they can live with conflict about educational issues.

At one time, it was widely believed that education was above or at least outside the realm of politics. Local as well as state boards of education were generally viewed as apolitical as well as nonpartisan agencies. Educators sought to maintain this set of beliefs among both government authorities and the general public in the hope that the special status of schools would command generous attention when public resources were allocated. An important corollary to this position was the emphasis educators placed upon a united profession and the avoidance of conflict about school issues.

In recent years, several developments have shattered the apolitical and nonconflict illusions associated with education. Foremost among these has been the fragmentation of professional interests over labor-management issues. The increasing militance of teachers, the secession of administrator groups from the NEA umbrella, and the willingness of school boards, administrators, and teachers to confront one another at local bargaining tables and in the legislatures have given encouragement to others who might become combative about educational issues. Almost simultaneously, schools manifested shortcomings in meeting the expectations which many citizens, particularly those in urban areas, had for them. The resulting tide of public criticism placed education on the defensive and intensified conflict regarding education. More recently, questions have been raised about the accountability or cost-effectiveness of education with the same result. Such questions have been particularly visible in light of the spiraling costs of education, accompanying increases in other public service costs, and mounting tax burdens.

Not to be lost in such an assessment is that the differences of opinion which emerged over schooling were often associated with very fundamental value questions in the broader society such as economic mobility, racial equality, and equity in taxation. In such a context, it probably became impossible for many public figures to avoid taking positions on educational questions. Thus it is not surprising to find that a majority of the governors studied in the EGP campaigned on educational issues or that such questions were often prominent among legislative concerns. We would argue that gubernatorial and legislative interest in such matters often reflected the concerns of their constituents throughout their states. Chiefs and other formal actors appeared to respond similarly at times. In short, the EGP data suggested that actors' sense of public preferences influenced policy proposals and outcomes.

As conflict about education has increased and the interests of education groups have fragmented, governors and legislators have perhaps become less inclined to accept the advice and policy wishes of educators at face value. Nevertheless the EGP data indicated that many education interest groups lobby vigorously and that they are often ranked among the most influential lobbies in a state. Particularly adept in this regard were teacher associations whose resources enabled them to assemble research and lobbying staffs and, in most instances, to make local campaign contributions through a political action arm. The historic sources of power attributed to education interest groups have been grass roots ties with particular legislators and information about the desirability and consequences of various policy alternatives. While these continue to be important, it is also significant to note that money, participation in campaigns, and the voting power of the membership have also become prominent sources of lobbying strength. The development of such resources is further evidence that educators have entered the political arena in traditional ways. The EGP data contain little indication that educators who have become political activists or legislators and other public officials find such participation and the conflict accompanying it intolerable or dysfunctional. In the absence of public demand to the contrary, we think it unlikely that efforts will be made to change this relatively open system by adapting syndical structures in the respective states.

Concluding Observations

The general impact of the EGP data upon the Iannaccone typology is to suggest a more complex system of state educational policy making. To be sure, the relationship between interest groups and the legislature is important and the developmental aspects of the typology have led to important understandings. However, an adequate portrayal of state policy systems at the present time must take into account the fact that there are multiple authoritative policy arenas. The EGP focused upon two of special importance to education, the legislature and the state board, and viewed others such as the courts only indirectly. It must also be noted that for each arena there are multiple actors and points of access.

It would appear that the impact of fragmenting the education interests in the respective states has been to create a more open or pluralistic system. The process through which policies are proposed, considered, and authorized in such a system will vary according to the issue. When issues are of relatively narrow professional concern (e.g., changes in teacher certification patterns) they are likely to be resolved in the interface between the profession and the state agency or the legislature. However, if the proposed change is such that the professional interests disagree upon it (as with certification in Texas) the arena in which the issue is considered will probably be broader. If the issue is sufficiently broad that the public disagrees about it (e.g., school finance reform) it is likely that its resolution will attract still more participants. In summary, the most important finding of the EGP with regard to policy-making systems for education is that these systems are considerably more open than previous researchers have suggested. While educational interest groups and/or chief state school officers continue to hold a preponderance of power regarding some issues in some states, the more general finding was that parties interested in affecting educational policy making usually had multiple opportunities to do so. Grass roots contacts with legislators, interest groups in and out of education, chiefs, legislators, and state boards all represent viable points of access to the system on different issues. The pragmatic question is determining which is most important for which issues.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER VIII

[1] Laurence Iannaccone, Politics in Education (New York: The Center for Applied Research in Education, 1967), Chapters III and IV.

[2] Ibid., p. 39.

[3] For example, see Gerald R. Sroufe, "State School Board Members and the State Education-Policy System," Planning and Changing II (April, 1971).

[4] The concept is discussed by Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1941), pp. 589-591.

CHAPTER IX

RECOMMENDATIONS

Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr.

Introduction

The involvement and influence of the different actors who become participants in state policy making for the public schools have been the main concerns of the preceding chapters. This has been examined for state boards of education, chief state school officers, governors' offices, educational interest groups, and state legislatures, at least for school finance reform. In this, the concluding chapter of our report, we set forth recommendations pertaining to state education policy making. In doing so we have confined our discussion to the state education agency--that is, the state board, CSSO, and state department of education--and its relationship to other policy actors. We decided upon this focus for three reasons. First, there are limitations in our data. For example, the inner workings of state legislatures could not receive much attention given our research resources. Second, there already exist several major studies and a host of recommendations relevant to the general governance institutions.[1] A third reason for emphasizing the SEA and its relationships is that these components of education policy systems are, we think, most amenable to change.

Our recommendations are presented, first as general concerns reflecting our values and then as specifics, under four headings: (1) the state board of education, (2) the chief state school officer, (3) the state department of education, and (4) education agency relationships.

The State Board of Education

Attributing influence to the participants in complex decision processes is always a hazardous task. The fact that actor influence in state education policy making varies significantly both by state and by issue area makes generalization all the more problematic. Still, our data clearly reveal that some actors--for example, governors and CSSOs--are influential in many policy systems, at least on issues of saliency to them. And our data also point unmistakably to the weakness of state boards of education as policy-making participants. The typical state board we studied was widely assessed by legislative leaders, governors' offices, and educational interest group spokesmen, as well as by EGP researchers, as being only a minor participant in education legislation. While the state board was much more influential in state agency policy making, even in that arena the dominant figure was the CSSO, with the board being cast largely in a legitimating role.

To be sure, our findings with respect to the policy-making influence of state boards are not surprising. These bodies operate under some obvious constraints. State board members, like others who sit on lay governing boards, serve on a part-time basis, may lack expertise, and often have limited data sources. Moreover, unlike most local school boards, state boards of education have no independent access to tax revenues. They depend on legislative action to obtain funds forthe SEA and for the schools of state. Finally, the role the state board can play in education policy making is contingent to a large measure on the power and interest of another governmental institution--namely, the state legislature. Yet even in light of these constraints, we found state boards of education to be weaker policy participants than we had expected.

Certainly a reading of the impressive legal powers delegated to state boards of education indicates that these bodies are intended by constitution or statute to undertake policy-making functions along with other governing responsibilities. We would agree with Commissioner Nyquist of New York that "the consideration of policy issues and the making of policy are the prime reasons for the existence of state boards of education."[2] Holding such an expectation, we find our negative evidence on the actual policy-making influence of state boards to be cause for concern.

A second concern that we have about state boards has to do with their representativeness. As we have mentioned in this report--and more fully described in our companion volume, State Governance Models for the Public Schools--the demographic composition of state boards does not come close to mirroring that of their constituencies. Specifically, board officials are much more male, white, and middle-aged; much better educated, more affluent, and management-professional in occupation than the average citizen. Nearly half of these "lay" officials, it should be noted, have had experience as professional educators.

Of course, the mere membership of a public official in a social class or group does not mean that this official will automatically be an advocate of its values. But it is hard to believe that such affiliations do not count at all; that state board members are not more sympathetic and accessible to those of similar social background than to those of vastly different life experiences. Sroufe's question remains a fair one, "How," he asks, "can the board hope to represent Mexican-Americans, immigrants, blacks, parochial schools, students, and urban systems when its membership includes few of these persons, and, more important, when the experiences of these persons are foreign to the background of the state board [officials] ?"[3]

If most state boards, as our research suggests, are neither very influential nor representative, then what should be done? One alternative is to do away entirely with these institutions and to integrate fully educational governance with general governance at the state level. This approach is attractive to proponents of a centralized executive model. They argue that such a structure, where the CSSO is appointed by and directly responsible to the governor, is most conducive to such values as effective political accountability, efficiency in planning and decision making, and articulation among related state services.

Though we subscribe to the values noted above, there are other values associated with the existence of lay governing boards that we find to be compelling. Four of the most basic have been well stated by Cook and his colleagues:

> In the first place, they have continuity that gives a perpetual life to a governing organization, a continuity that exists before and after the terms of office of secretaries or executive officers, the attendance of any student, or the tenure of any employee...
>
> Second, they have the vital although negative function of insulating education from day-to-day politics and politically motivated interference. This is a deterrent force, essential even if never used.
>
> Third, a lay board provides many useful links to the broader public community and provides a means for involving many competent people who possess skills that would otherwise be unavailable. The board can interweave the educational establishment with the rest of society. If it is a good board, it is not solely the servant of its staff, of students, of taxpayers, or of any group; it is an arena where all interests can be weighed and valued.
>
> Fourth, a board can mobilize support, lead public opinion, protect education from bureaucratic in-fighting and lend intangible prestige to the institutions governed...[4]

The problem is not in the values which are sought. Rather it is the failure of state boards, as presently constituted, to realize adequately these values, especially those referred to in points three and four above. For us, this means that state boards of education must be more than simply preserved as a kind of institutional ornament; they must be deliberately strengthened in terms of both power and representation.

Strengthening state boards requires, we think, that changes take place in the kinds of members that are recruited; the resources (e.g., legal authority, time, information and expertise) available to these members; and their willingness to employ these resources to exert policy leadership with lawmakers and CSSOs. Thus, we recommend the following:

1. It is recommended that in establishing electoral districts for board members, or in appointing persons to serve on the state board, particular attention be given to making this body broadly representative of the different interests and backgrounds of the state's citizens.

2. It is recommended that besides the customary reimbursement for expenses, board members be compensated for their part-time service at a level sufficient to allow persons with modest incomes to serve on state boards.

3. It is recommended that provisions be made for pre-service and in-service training of state board members, especially regarding their policy-making relationships with legislators, governors, CSSOs, and interest groups. This training could involve organizations like the National Association of State Boards of Education (NASBE) and the Education Commission of the States (ECS), as well as state departments of education.

4. It is recommended that state boards be constitutionally established, delegated broad discretionary powers for education policy making (including control over teacher preparation and certification), and be able to appoint and to remove the CSSO. To

encourage systematic evaluation of the chief's performance, as well as time for this official to develop and implement programs, the CSSO should serve on a 4-year (renewable) contract. We recognize that the implementation of this recommendation will require constitutional and statutory changes in a number of states, a course of action we find desirable.

5. It is recommended that the policy role expectations that state board members hold for themselves, and for CSSOs, should be carefully examined by these officials with the intent being to establish an appropriate balance between public control and professional expertise in education policy making.

6. It is recommended that along with using institutional mechanisms and department administrators, state board members should develop channels of personal access to state lawmakers and be willing to use these channels actively in seeking to influence education legislation in accordance with board policy.

7. It is recommended that state board members be provided with staff assistance for help in problem identification and data analysis. In some states persons from the office of the CSSO might have sufficient independence to serve this function. In at least a few states, we recommend that staff assistants independent of the office of the CSSO be employed so that experience with this kind of arrangement may be acquired. In no case, should these assistants assume any administrative functions for the state agency.

8. It is recommended that board officials and the CSSO seek to enhance public awareness of the state board and its governing functions.

Clearly, this has implications for the time, location, physical setting, and media coverage of board meetings. But public awareness is most likely to be fostered if the state board focuses its energies on important policy issues and actively as well as openly seeks to deal with them.

The Chief State School Officer

As we now reflect on the office of the CSSO and the behavior of incumbents in that office, particularly as perceived by the other actors in the various state education policy systems, we are convinced that the office is a most crucial one. No single person in the state, unless it be the governor, can do more to affect the status and well being of public education. This conviction came as something of a surprise since, until recently, many persons in and out of education would not have accorded such potential influence to the CSSO. Clearly, state boards of education see the CSSO as most important to their understanding of state policy issues. Governors and legislators, while not as dependent on the CSSO as state board members, still attach considerable importance to the office. Interest group leaders have some penchant to work directly with legislative leaders but in the end that relationship is often mediated by the position of the CSSO.

Despite the overall importance of the office there is considerable variability among the states. In some states the chief is selected by the state board of education, in others by the governor, and in still others he is publicly elected. We find much to suggest that selection should be made by the state board. Almost always the chief is male, frequently he has a rural background, and often he is an instate product. We would not impose these constraints upon his selection. Only in some states does the chief have the freedom to set up his own team, a condition we would espouse for all states. Some states provide the office with great formal powers such as constitutional status, the official designation of the chief as the executive officer of the state board, and the requirement that the chief report to the governor and the legislature; in other states some of these matters are not mentioned in the constitution or the statutes. By way of salary for the CSSO, states vary widely and in many states salaries are probably too low to attract outstanding persons. In short, some states match with specific provisions the importance attached to the office, other states do not.

In terms of the influence of CSSOs we have two concerns. In some states, the influence of the chief overshadows that of the state board; we think, and our data offer some support for this belief, that both chiefs and boards can and should be strong. In other states the chief appears to have too little influence, particularly with the governor and the legislature. Our preference is a CSSO with considerable influence, but not domination, in both the state agency and the legislative arenas. Such a condition is entirely possible as we found in some of the states we studied.

Given the concerns expressed above, we now make a series of explicit recommendations which we think would strengthen the office of the chief state school officer in many states:

9. It is recommended that the formal powers of the office of the chief state school officer be enhanced by way of constitutional or statutory provision. At the very least, this would mean that the chief be designated the executive officer of the state board of education, and that the chief or the board or both be required to report to the governor and the legislature at least annually on the state of the public schools and ways by which these institutions can be improved.

10. It is recommended that in the selection of a CSSO the state board seek a person with demonstrated political, organizational, and technical skills. Political skills seem essential if the chief is to influence the governor and the legislature. Organizational skills are required as the chief determines the structure for and the operation of the department of education. Technical understandings of education seem necessary if the chief is to make wise decisions relative to the purposes and processes of education. In the states where CSSOs are still elected, these criteria should be used by political actors as they seek to influence the nomination of candidates for the office of CSSO.

11. It is recommended that recruitment to the office of CSSO be open and wherever possible nationwide in scope. By open we mean not constrained by requirements of residence, experience, or specific patterns of training. This does not mean the absence of criteria. Actually, as noted above, we recommend that persons with demonstrated political, organizational, and technical skills should be considered. Unless prohibited by the law, we think the search should be nationwide in scope and candidates both in and out of professional education should be considered.

12. It is recommended that the salaries of CSSOs be comparable to those paid other top educational leaders in the state. Useful comparisons would be with salaries paid superintendents of the larger school districts in the state and those paid presidents of state universities.

13. It is recommended that each CSSO have the freedom to establish his own administrative team. At least at the level of deputy, associate, and assistant superintendent the CSSO should be able to select his staff. These nominations might be subject to confirmation by the state board of education but none of these assistants should be named by board action alone. In some states this will require a revision of civil service requirements so that top assistants are exempt from such coverage. Only when the CSSO can name his own team can he be held responsible for his administration.

14. It is recommended that the CSSO and the SBE find ways of enhancing their partnership. Without diminishing the initiating role of the chief, this seems to mean that the chief more frequently begin the development of his proposals from the expressed concerns of board members, that board members more frequently offer constructive criticism to the chief on his proposals, and that board members participate more frequently by way of state agency advocacy in relationships with the governor and the legislature.

15. It is recommended that CSSOs encourage the organization of their state boards to permit consideration of policy questions. This may require, at least with large boards, some kind of committee structure; an adequate allocation of time for board meetings; the establishment of agenda which focus largely on policy questions and less on the implementation minutia; and the provision of pertinent background data.

The State Department of Education

The state department of education is the technical and managerial arm of the state education agency. To facilitate policy making, the state board and the CSSO must depend on the department for information and for the development of proposed courses of action. In recent years the staffs of state departments have doubled or tripled in numbers, but the composition of department personnel looks much as it did some thirty years ago. Frequently, staff additions have rural backgrounds, have been teachers and administrators in rural or small town schools, and are instate residents. Seldom are staff members sought from business, law, universities, or other agencies of government. Moreover, staff members are predominately male and white, a condition we think must be modified. In short, the department staff seems to be too homogeneous to represent many of the viewpoints and technical skills now needed in an education agency.

These conditions lead to our concern about recruitment practices followed in selecting personnel for state departments of education. We are also concerned that in the procurement of personnel that budget provisions involve extensive assistance from the U. S. Office of Education. We do not object to federal aid being made available to the state departments. Our uneasiness stems from the fact that such aid, often half of the state department budget, makes such agencies too dependent upon a federal agency and sometimes too willing to accept a federal program even when it does not meet the needs of the state. Moreover, federal budget decisions are often made late in the fiscal year and support of certain programs is uncertain from one year to the next. Under these conditions state departments are not only overly dependent on federal action but such support is erratic in terms of amount and even continuation.

These concerns are heightened by our conviction that state education agencies will have a more critical role to perform in the future than they have had in the past. Pluralistic decision making is upon us; no single agency or actor can dominate the scene as may have been possible in a simpler time. The state education agency through its lay board (even though many former educators serve on such boards) and its professional staff will have an enlarged role to play if education is to be appropriately represented to governors, legislators, interest group leaders, and other major actors. Areas demanding increased attention include planning, research, development, and evaluation. Each of these areas will require an expertise which is not often found in the personnel ordinarily recruited to state departments in the past. As we focus on ways the department might help in policy making, not on management concerns, our recommendations are as follows:

16. It is recommended that a wide range of expertise be sought in staffing state departments of education. In addition to seeking competent personnel for the staffing of the long-standing regulatory functions such as allocating state aid, certifying professional personnel, and checking on instructional standards, persons with expertise in planning, research, development, and evaluation should be sought also. Such an organization should encourage an assessment of what is being done, a look to the future as to what ought to be done, as well as the maintenance of day-by-day operations.

17. It is recommended that state departments pursue an affirmative action employment policy with respect to sex and race. We do not suggest quotas for women or for members of minority groups but clearly competent women and minority persons should be encouraged to apply and seriously considered when positions are being filled. This matter needs particular attention over the next few years.

18. It is recommended that the recruitment program for departmental staff be augmented by way of selection techniques and made

more extensive in terms of sources of personnel. While informal recruitment by means of personal contact should be continued, more formal measures of advertising positions and screening candidates should also be established. In addition to looking toward teachers and administrators in the smaller schools of the state as a source of candidates, other sources such as urban schools, business, law, other agencies of government, and universities should be included. Particularly, do these latter sources, both in and out of state, need to be used in seeking expertise for some of the new functions such as planning and evaluation.

19. It is recommended that state departments strive to increase state support and become less dependent upon federal support for their functions. We further suggest that policy makers at the state level exert their influence at the federal level toward allocating federal funds into two categories: those for sustaining programs and those for experimental programs. Such a division would permit state departments to integrate federal money with state money more realistically than is now the case.

Education Agency Relationships

The milieu in which the typical SEA functions, as was described in the preceding chapter, has become increasingly politicized and pluralistic. The broadening of participation, intensification of group conflict, and eruptions of public controversy--all are manifestations of the politicalization of state education policy systems. True, "politics" in a basic sense has always been present. But the emergence of systems that are participative, conflictual, and visible makes their political nature unmistakable. Politicians, such as governors and legislators, have taken more assertive roles and some educational issues, such as school finance, often become matters of party division. The teacher associations have abandoned their traditional apolitical stance and seek to exercise "clout" through the application of members, money, and grassroots organization in campaign activity.

Despite centralizing tendencies arising from the mounting costs and contentiousness of education, pluralism is a characteristic of education policy systems. Indeed, in most such systems that characteristic, as pointed out earlier, has become the dominant one. The education lobby has long since split into warring factions in many states. More fundamentally, each issue area--for example, school finance, racial desegregation, teacher certification, and educational program improvement--tends to attract its own distinctive cluster of policy actors especially interested in the decisions enacted in that area.[5] While these issue clusters do overlap, particularly in states like Georgia and Texas, the influential participants in one do not necessarily hold the key positions in the others. This pluralistic pattern, or "fragmentation" as some call it, is equally if not more evident in the lack of coordination between education and other state services.

The politicalization of state school policy making is distressing to those who hold that education decisions should rest on the "neutral" competence of professionals, instead of the influence-based accommodations of contending groups.[6] From the standpoint of comprehensive planning and rational decision making, a pluralistic system has some obvious drawbacks. Yet there are positive aspects of this development--the increased visibility of decision making, the expansion of participation and debate, the formulation of new alternatives, and the opportunity afforded for each cluster of policy participants to push ahead on the problems it deems important. Indeed, we view the opening up of the relatively closed, consensual systems that once marked much state-level education policy making as being, on balance, a healthy change. There are, however, serious problems of communication and coordination that have implications for SEAs as well as for other actors.

The various educational organizations are so badly disunited in some states that areas of common interest are not searched for, much less are they found. Educators and politicians often talk past each other, a condition that has contributed on both sides to widespread mistrust of motive and performance. And state administrators in the different agencies, this probably being nowhere more true than in education, operate in a semi-autonomous fashion as if the social problems of a state had little or no relation to one another. In recognition of these concerns, we recommend a number of linkage devices:

20. It is recommended that the SEA actively encourage the various educational organizations to identify their common interests, interests that could serve as the basis for issue-oriented coalitions among these groups in pursuit of improved education. Such activity on the part of agency officials is likely to be successful only if undertaken in an even-handed fashion--that is, where the SEA is looked upon as being fair and receptive to all groups, not just to those with a management orientation. Efforts should be made to broaden the basis of these working arrangements or ad hoc coalitions by the inclusion of non-educator groups.

21. It is recommended that there be created a forum--it might be called the Governor's Advisory Council on Education--where the governor, legislative leaders, state board president, CSSO, and higher education spokesmen could meet on a continuing basis to consider state education needs and priorities.

22. It is recommended that arrangements be established for regular interaction between the CSSO and other state department heads, and for liaison between the SEA and other departments of government, particularly the state planning agency.

Concluding Comment

The above constitute our recommendations. We have deliberately refrained from drawing upon these recommendations to propose an "ideal" structure for state educational governance. We do not believe that there is any such model, one that is suitable for all times and all states. States vary too much in their educational and political needs and stages of development for any single structural prescription to be appropriate. Even the recommendations that have been presented should be selected and adapted in the light of state-specific conditions. And those persons who are thoroughly familiar with these conditions and who have to work with them are in the best position to make these choices. In closing we would note, however, that in our companion report State Governance Models for the Public Schools explicit attention is given to the values, structures, and evidence pertaining to a number of alternative governance models. Citizens interested in improving their state-level arrangements for governing the public schools might find the companion report, along with the analysis and recommendations presented in this volume, to be helpful as a point of departure in their deliberations.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER IX

[1] See, for example, Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, The Sometime Governments: A Critical Study of the 50 American Legislatures, 2nd ed. (Kansas City, Missouri: The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, 1972).

[2] Ewald B. Nyquist, "A State Board Gets the Agenda It Deserves" (Unpublished remarks made at Northeast Area Conference, National Association of State Boards of Education, May 15, 1072), p. 2.

[3] Gerald R. Sroufe, "State School Board Members and the State Education Policy System," Planning and Changing (April, 1971), p. 21.

[4] P. Cook et al."The Job of the Secretary for Educational Affairs" (A Report Prepared for the Massachusetts Educational Conference Board, September, 1970), VII-3.

[5] An insightful discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of pluralism is in Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: Sage, 1960), Chapter XIX.

[6] On the growing politicalization of education policy making, generally, see Frederick Wirt and Michael Kirst, The Political Web of American Schools (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1972), pp. 241-248.

APPENDIX A (CHAPTER II)

CONSTRUCTING THE STATE BOARD VARIABLES

Policy-Making Influence

Our index of state board policy-making influence incorporates the general assessments of different groups of actors and supplements their assessments with case study data on specific decision processes. The scoring procedures for these various components, and the weights assigned to them in constructing the final index. are subjective, and represent our judgments as to the importance and validity of each response and each variable.

Influence in the Legislative Arena

The legislative influence index is based on the responses to three interview questions and on EGP findings on the school finance issue in each of the 10 states.

Questions and Scoring. Legislative leaders (N = 112) were asked, "How would you assess the importance of the State Board in actually formulating and working for education legislation?" Points were given to each respondent as follows:

"Single most important participant"	5 points
"One of the most important participants"	3 points
"Participant of minor importance"	1 point
"Not important at all as a participant"	0 points

Points for legislative leader respondents in each state were then summed and averaged. This gave each state board a raw score on the variable, ranging from 2.2 (Texas) to .33 (Nebraska). The raw scores for each state board, and the score we assigned on a 1-5 point scale, are shown below:

State Board	Raw Score	Scale Score
Texas	2.20	5
Georgia	1.92	4

State Board	Raw Score	Scale Score
Colorado	1.62	3
New York	1.55	3
Michigan	1.50	3
Tennessee	1.10	2
Massachusetts	1.00	2
Minnesota	.93	2
California	.93	2
Nebraska	.33	1

Educational interest group leaders (N = 36) were asked, "Does the State Board ever take the lead in promoting education legislation?" Here we assigned points directly to each state board as follows:

Three or more respondents said "yes"	5 points
Two respondents said "yes"	3 points
One respondent said "yes"	2 points
If one educational interest group respondent, other than main spokesman, said "yes"	1 point
No respondent said "yes"	0 points

The score we assigned on a 1-5 point scale for each state board are shown below:

State Board	Scale Score
New York	5
Texas	3
Minnesota	3
Michigan	3
Colorado	2
Massachusetts	2
Georgia	1
Tennessee	1
California	0
Nebraska	0

Respondents in the governor's office (N = 29) were asked, "Compared to other individuals, how important are board members as a source of ideas and advice for the Governor's Office?" Points were given to each response as follows:

"Single most important source"	5 points
"An important source"	3 points
"A minor source"	1 point
"Not at all important as a source"	0 points

Points for the governor's office respondents in each state were then summed and averaged. This gave each state board a raw score on the variable, ranging from 3.0 (Minnesota) to .50 (New York). The raw score for each state board and the score we then assigned on a 1-5 scale, are shown below:

State Board	Raw Score	Scale Score
Minnesota	3.0	5
Texas	2.3	4
Tennessee	2.3	4
Colorado	2.3	4
Nebraska	1.3	3
Michigan	1.2	2
Massachusetts	1.2	2
California	1.0	2
Georgia	.7	1
New York	.5	1

After examining a school finance issue (1971 to 1973) in each state, we assigned points directly to state boards as follows:

Visible leadership attempts	5 points
Took policy position; tried to mobilize support	4 points
Took policy position on issue; did little else as a board	2 points
Discussion, no policy position	1 point
Did not take policy position or discussion	0 points

The score we assigned on a 1-5 point scale for each state board is shown below:

State Board	Scale Score
Texas	5
New York	4
Michigan	2
Colorado	2
Massachusetts	2
Minnesota	2
Georgia	2
Tennessee	2
California	2
Nebraska	1

Constructing the Legislative Index. In using the above scale scores to form the index of state board legislative influence, we weighted each variable as follows:

Variable	Weight
Legislative leader assessment	3
School finance findings	2
Educational interest group assessment	1
Governor's office assessment	1

The weighted variables were then combined as shown to create the legislative influence index.

State Boards	Score on Weighted Variables Legislators	Case Study	Educational Groups	Governor's Office	Final Adjusted Score (Total ÷ 7)	Ranking
Texas	15	10	3	4	4.6	1
New York	9	8	5	1	3.3	2
Colorado	9	4	2	4	2.7	3
Michigan	9	4	3	2	2.6	4(tie)
Minnesota	6	4	3	5	2.6	4(tie)
Georgia	12	4	1	1	2.6	4(tie)
Tennessee	6	4	1	4	2.1	7
Massachusetts	6	4	2	2	2.0	8
California	6	4	0	2	1.7	9
Nebraska	3	2	1	3	1.1	10

Influence in the State Education Agency Arena

The state education agency index is based on the responses to two interview questions and on the EGP findings on the desegregation, certification, and educational program improvement issues in each of the 10 states.

Questions and Scoring. State board members (N = 68) were asked how frequently the CSSO's approach consisted of the following: "Takes ideas or suggestions from board members and develops these into a policy proposal?" Points were given to each response as follows:

"Often"	5 points
"Sometimes"	3 points
"Rarely"	1 point
"Never"	0 points

Points for state board respondents in each state were then summed and averaged. This gave each state board a raw score on the variable, ranging from 4.2

(Nebraska) to 2.0 (California). The raw score for each state board, and the score we assigned on a 1-5 point scale, are shown below:

State Board	Raw Score	Scale Score
Nebraska	4.2	5
Minnesota	4.0	4
Michigan	4.0	4
New York	3.9	4
Colorado	3.5	3
Tennessee	3.2	2
Massachusetts	3.2	2
Texas	3.0	2
Georgia	3.0	2
California	2.0	1

Educational interest group leaders (N = 36) were asked, "On matters where it is the final authority, does the State Board give real direction to the State Superintendent or does it just formalize his recommendations?" Here we assigned points directly to each state board as follows:

Three or more respondents said "real direction"	5 points
Two respondents said "real direction"	3 points
One respondent said "real direction"	2 points
One education interest group respondent, other than main spokesman, said "real direction"	1 point
No respondent said "real direction"	0 points

The score we assigned on a 1-5 scale for each state board are shown below:

State Board	Scale Score
Texas	5
Minnesota	3
New York	3
Nebraska	3
Colorado	2
Michigan	1
Tennessee	1
California	1
Georgia	0
Massachusetts	0

After examining the desegregation, certification, and educational program issue in each state, we assigned points directly to state boards as follows:

Much board leadership on one or more issues	5 points
Some board leadership on one or more issues	4 points
Some shared leadership with CSSO on one or more issues	3 points
Some shared leadership with CSSO on one issue	1 point

The score we assigned on a 1-5 point scale for each state board is shown below:

State Board	Scale Score
Minnesota	5
New York	4
California	4
Massachusetts	4
Nebraska	3
Michigan	3
Massachusetts	3
California	3
Tennessee	3
Georgia	3

Constructing the Agency Index. In using the above scale scores to form the index of state board policy-making influence in the agency arena, we weighted each variable as follows:

Variable	Weight
Educational issues findings	2
Educational interest group assessment	2
State board member assessment	1

The weighted variables were then combined as shown to create the agency influence index:

	Scores on Weighted Variables				
State Boards	Case Study	Educational Groups	Board Members	Final Adjusted Score (Total ÷ by 5)	Ranking
Minnesota	10	6	4	4.0	1
Texas	6	10	2	3.6	2(tie)
New York	8	6	4	3.6	2(tie)
Nebraska	6	6	5	3.4	4
Colorado	6	4	3	2.6	5
Michigan	6	2	4	2.4	6
California	8	2	1	2.2	7
Tennessee	6	2	2	2.0	8(tie)
Massachusetts	8	0	2	2.0	8(tie)
Georgia	6	0	2	1.8	10

Overall Policy Making Index

Our composite measure of state board policy making influence is constructed by combining the legislative index with the agency index as shown:

State Board	Influence in the Legislative Arena (Adjusted Score)	Influence in the SEA Arena (Adjusted Score)	Overall Policy Making Influence Score
Texas	4.6	3.6	8.2
New York	3.3	3.6	6.9
Minnesota	2.6	4.0	6.6
Colorado	2.7	2.6	5.3
Michigan	2.6	2.4	5.0
Nebraska	1.1	3.4	4.5
Georgia	2.6	1.8	4.4
Tennessee	2.1	2.0	4.1
Massachusetts	2.0	2.0	4.0
California	1.7	2.2	3.9

Policy-Making Resources

Six policy-making resource variables were constructed: (1) legal authority, (2) time devoted, (3) policy emphasis, (4) information utility, (5) cohesion, and (6) prestige.

Legal Authority

The components and scoring procedures used in developing the legal authority index are discussed in Chapter II of the text (Table 2-12).

Time Devoted

This variable is based on board member responses to the question: "In general, how much time are you able to devote, formally and informally, to the work of being a board member?" Points were given to each response as follows:

"Week or more per month"	4 points
"Four to six days per month"	3 points
"Two or three days per month"	2 points
"Day or so per month"	1 point
"Less than day per month"	0 points

Points for board member respondents in each state were then summed and averaged. This gave each state board a score on the variable, ranging from 4.0 (Michigan) to 1.8 (Tennessee). These scores and the rank order on this variable are shown below:

Michigan	4.0
Georgia	3.6
New York	3.6
Colorado	3.5
California	3.4
Texas	3.2
Minnesota	3.0
Massachusetts	2.7
Nebraska	2.6
Tennessee	1.8

Policy Emphasis

This variable is based on board member responses to the question, "What portion of its meeting time does your board devote to what might be called the legal approval of routine items?" Points were given to each response as follows:

"About three-quarters"	4 points
"About half"	3 points
"About one-quarter"	2 points
"Almost none"	1 point

Points for board member respondents in each state were then summed and averaged. This gave each state board a score on the variable, ranging from 2.7 (California) to 1.2 (New York.) These scores and the rank order (based on lowest scores) on the variable are shown below:

New York	1.2
Texas	2.1
Georgia	2.2
Minnesota	2.3
Michigan	2.3
Massachusetts	2.4
Colorado	2.5
Tennessee	2.5
Nebraska	2.6
California	2.7

Information Utility

This variable is based on board member responses to the question, "In terms of meeting your needs in deciding upon education policies how would you rate the information provided for the board by the state department?" Points were given to each response as follows:

"Almost always meets needs"	5 points
"Usually meets needs"	3 points
"Sometimes meets needs"	1 point
"Almost never meets needs"	0 points

Points for board member respondents in each state were then summed and averaged. This gave each state board a score on the variable ranging from 4.11 (New York) to 2.20 (Nebraska). These scores and the rank order on the variables are shown below:

New York	4.11
Georgia	3.86
Colorado	3.67
Texas	3.36
Michigan	3.33
Minnesota	3.33
California	3.10
Massachusetts	2.71
Tennessee	2.50
Nebraska	2.20

Cohesion

This variable is based on board member responses to the question, "Which one of these statements comes closest to describing the agreement on your board when it must decide a major policy issue?" Points were given to each response as follows:

"harmonious...little disagreement"	1 point
"usually in agreement...sometimes dissent"	2 points
"often divided...on the issue"	3 points
"rival factions...but clear majority"	4 points
"rival factions...equal strength"	5 points

Points for board member respondents in each state were then summed and averaged. This gave each state board a score on the variable, ranging from 3.6

(Nebraska) to 1.6 (Massachusetts). These scores and the rank order (based on lowest score) on the variable are shown below:

Massachusetts	1.60
Minnesota	2.00
Colorado	2.00
Tennessee	2.25
Texas	2.27
Georgia	2.29
New York	2.30
Michigan	2.80
California	3.20
Nebraska	3.60

Prestige

This variable is based on the descriptive language used by different policy actors to characterize the state board in their state. Based on the language, see the text discussion in Chapter II, we ranked the 10 state boards as follows:

Very High Prestige	New York	1
High Prestige	Texas, Georgia, Minnesota, & Massachusetts	2(tie)
Mixed Prestige	Michigan, California, Tennessee, Colorado	6(tie)
Low Prestige	Nebraska	10

Policy-Making Expectations

Three variables were constructed pertaining to policy-making expectations: (1) sense of policy-making efficacy, (2) state board self-role expectations, and (3) state board expectations for the CSSO's role.

Sense of Efficacy

The three questionnaire items and the replies indicating a sense of policy-making efficacy are all reported in Table 2-20. The average percentage of agreement by board member respondents and the rank order on this variable are shown below.

Colorado	92% (tie)
Michigan	92% (tie)
Tennessee	91%
Minnesota	89%
Massachusetts	83%
New York	80%
Nebraska	78%
California	73%
Texas	63%
Georgia	27%

Self-Role Expectations

The five questionnaire items and the replies indicating a board policy role are all reported in Table 2-21. The average percentage agreement by board respondents with such a role and the rank order on this variable are shown below:

Colorado	95%
New York	91%
Nebraska	88%
Texas	88%
California	84%
Massachusetts	83%
Minnesota	82%
Tennessee	80%
Michigan	78%
Georgia	76%

Expectations for the CSSO's Role

The eight questionnaire items and the replies indicating a CSSO policy role are all reported in Table 2-22. The average percentage agreement by board respondents with such a role and the rank order on this variable are shown below:

Tennessee	91%
Michigan	83%
Massachusetts	82%
Nebraska	80%
California	74%

Minnesota	73%
New York	73%
Georgia	66%
Colorado	63%
Texas	54%

Concluding Comment

In this appendix, we have tried to set forth both the data and the judgmental procedures used in constructing the state board variables and rank orders. Obviously, other variables and different rank orders can be derived from our study. And we hope that readers who are dissatisfied with out efforts can find enough data here, in the text, and in the related case studies so that they can develop, if so inclined, their own rankings.

APPENDIX B (CHAPTER II)

The nature of the variables and their data sources for the socioeconomic and political correlations (with state board policy-making influence) shown in Table 2-27 are the following:

Socioeconomic Measures	Data Sources
1. Population Size, 1970.	Census data reported in U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population, 1970 General Social and Economic Characteristics*, Final Report, United States Summary (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972) p. 468
2. Rate of Population Growth, 1960-1970.	Census data reported in National Education Association *Rankings of the States, 1972* Research Report 1972 R-1 (Washington, D.C.; National Education Association, 1972), p. 8.
3. Per Capita Income, 1972.	Census data reported in U.S. Bureau of Census, *op. cit.*, p. 541
4. Population 4 or More Years of High School, 1970.	Census data reported in U.S. Bureau of Census, *op. cit.*, p. 493.
5. Urbanism - People in Towns of 2500 or Less, 1970	Census data reported in *Ibid.*, p. 420.

Political Measures	Data Sources
1. Party Competition, 1956-1970. Index developed by Austin Ranney. The various Ranney scores (measures of Democratic Party strength) were subtracted from the mid-point (.50) of his scale to generate state scores on an inter-party competition variable.	Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), p. 87.
2. Voter Turnout, 1970 House Elections	U.S. Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 366.

3. Political Culture, Elazar-Sharkansky Scale, 1969. The scale ranges from 1.0 (most traditionalist culture) to 9.0 (most moralistic); intermediate scores are given to individualist culture and various cultural synthesis	Ira Sharkansky, "The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture, A Research Note," *Polity* 2(1969).
4. Legislature "Effectiveness," 1971. Composite index developed by the Citizens Conference based on five dimensions: (1) functionality, (2) accountability, (3) informedness, (4) independence, and (5) representativeness	John Burns, *The Sometime Governments* (New York: Bantam, 1971), p. 52.
5. Formal Powers of the Governor, 1970. Composite index developed by Joseph Schlesinger based on four dimensions: (1) tenure, (2) appointment, (3) budget, and (4) veto.	Joseph Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," Jacob and Vines (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 222-232.
6. Localism, % Revenue to K-12 Schools from Local Sources.	National Education Association, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

APPENDIX C (CHAPTER IV)

TABLE I

STATE RANKS ON SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES

Socio-economic Variables	STATE SCORES AND TWELVE STATE RANKING											
	California	Florida	Georgia	Wisconsin	Colorado	Massachusetts	Michigan	Minnesota	Nebraska	New York	Tennessee	Texas
1 Personal Income Per Capita - 1972 (Hundreds)	46 (2)	39 (8)	36 (11)	39 (8)	42 (5)	45 (3)	44 (4)	41 (6)	40 (7)	50 (1)	33 (12)	37 (10)
2 Population, 1970 (Hundred, thousands)	204 (1)	72 (5)	47 (7)	45 (8)	23 (11)	57 (6)	90 (4)	38 (10)	15 (12)	183 (2)	40 (9)	110 (3)
3 Per Cent Urban Population, 1970	91 (1)	81 (4)	61 (11)	66 (9)	79 (6)	85 (3)	74 (7)	67 (8)	62 (10)	86 (2)	60 (12)	80 (5)
4 Population Age 25 and Older with 4 Years of High School or More - 1970 (%)	62.6 (2)	52.5 (9)	40.6 (12)	54.5 (6)	63.9 (1)	58.5 (4)	52.8 (7)	57.6 (5)	59.3 (3)	52.7 (8)	42.8 (11)	47.4 (10)
5 Rate of Population Growth 1960-70	27 (2)	37 (1)	16 (5)	12 (7)	26 (3)	11 (9)	13 (6)	12 (7)	05 (12)	08 (11)	10 (10)	17 (4)
6 Industrialization Index (National Rank	6 (3)	15 (6)	26 (10)	14 (5)	24 (12)	4 (1)	10 (4)	21 (8)	31 (11)	5 (2)	23 (9)	19 (7)
7 Regional South (1) Non-South (2)	2 -	1 -	1 -	2 -	2 -	2 -	2 -	2 -	2 -	2 -	1 -	1 -

APPENDIX C (continued)

TABLE II

STATE RANKS ON SELECTED STRUCTURAL VARIABLES

SEA Variables	STATE SCORES AND TWELVE STATE RANKING											
	California	Florida	Georgia	Wisconsin	Colorado	Massachusetts	Michigan	Minnesota	Nebraska	New York	Tennessee	Texas
8 Size SDE Professional Staff	375 (4)	401 (3)	345 (5)	204 (10)	94 (12)	303 (6)	242 (8)	213 (9)	125 (11)	972 (1)	278 (7)	466 (2)
9 Method of Selecting CSSO	3 -	3 -	3 -	3 -	2 -	2 -	2 -	2 -	2 -	2 -	1 -	2 -
10 CSSO Ind. from Gen. Gov.	6 (2)	5 (4)	6 (2)	7 (1)	4 (5)	3 (9)	4 (5)	2 (10)	4 (5)	4 (5)	1 (12)	2 (10)
11 Method of Selecting SDE	2 -	1 -	2 -	1 -	3 -	2 -	3 -	2 -	3 -	3 -	2 -	3 -
12 SDE/LEA Ratio	2.28 (12)	6.11 (3)	7.25 (2)	5.89 (5)	3.19 (10)	5.28 (6)	2.29 (11)	4.47 (7)	6.11 (3)	4.41 (8)	10.5 (1)	3.72 (9)
13 State Support in SDE Budget	65.0 (5)	63.6 (6)	67.2 (2)	47.2 (8)	41.9 (9)	64.2 (4)	60.0 (7)	38.1 (11)	38.5 (10)	78.5 (1)	65.9 (3)	30.4 (12)
14 Per Cent Rev. for Pub. Elem. Sec. Edu. from Local Government	59.1 (5)	36.0 (12)	36.5 (11)	65.3 (3)	63.2 (4)	73.6 (2)	51.7 (6)	41.1 (10)	76.3 (1)	47.2 (7)	41.3 (9)	43.4 (8)
15 Civil Service	74 (4)	12 (7)	60 (5)	84 (2)	00 (9)	05 (8)	87 (1)	79 (3)	00 (9)	35 (6)	00 (9)	00 (9)

APPENDIX C (continued)

TABLE III

STATE RANKS ON SELECTED POLITICAL VARIABLES

SEA Variables	STATE SCORES AND TWELVE STATE RANKING											
	California	Florida	Georgia	Wisconsin	Colorado	Massachusetts	Michigan	Minnesota	Nebraska	New York	Tennessee	Texas
16 Inter-Party Competition	115 (6)	305 (10)	408 (11)	100 (4)	28 (1)	143 (8)	38 (2)	91 (3)	107 (5)	117 (7)	294 (9)	413 (12)
17 Per Cent of Voting Age Population Voting for U.S. Representative 1970	52.9 (2)	29.5 (11)	30.8 (10)	50.3 (4)	49.3 (6)	51.0 (3)	49.1 (7)	58.9 (1)	50.0 (5)	47.4 (8)	41.3 (9)	28.3 (12)
18 State Legislature Biennial Salaries 1970 (thousands)	48.9 (1)	33.0 (4)	10.7 (9)	21.0 (6)	9.6 (10)	23.0 (5)	36.0 (2)	12.9 (7)	9.6 (10)	36.0 (2)	8.1 (12)	11 (8)
19 Political Culture	3.55 (5)	7.80 (10)	8.80 (12)	2.00 (3)	1.80 (2)	3.66 (7)	2.00 (3)	1.00 (1)	3.66 (7)	3.62 (6)	8.50 (11)	7.11 (9)
20 Legislature Effectiveness Score - National Rank	01 (1)	04 (3)	45 (12)	05 (4)	28 (9)	29 (10)	08 (5)	10 (7)	09 (6)	02 (2)	26 (8)	38 (11)

APPENDIX D (CHAPTER V)

Scoring for governors' involvement in issue definition was based on the perceptual data contained in Tables 5-3 and 5-5. According to the extent of governors' involvement, scoring was: great involvement, 5 points; considerable involvement, 4 points; moderate involvement, 3 points; a little involvement, 2 points; and no involvement, 1 point.

Scoring for governors' involvement in proposal formulation was based on case study data according to the extent of their involvement as a key initiator of policy proposals in education. Scoring was: great involvement, 5 points; considerable involvement, 4 points; moderate involvement, 3 points; a little involvement, 2 points; and only reactive involvement, 1 point.

Scoring for governors' involvement in support mobilization was based on case study data according to the extent to which governors were involved in mobilizing the support of the state education agency (primarily the CSSO), educational interest groups, and legislative leaders. Scoring for mobilizing the SEA was: 1 point for governors involved in getting the support of the SEA, and 0 points for no gubernatorial involvement in mobilizing the SEA. Scoring for mobilizing EIGs was: considerable involvement, 2 points; some involvement, 1 point; and no involvement, 0 points. Scoring for mobilizing legislative leaders was: great involvement, 3 points; considerable involvement, 2 points; and some involvement, 1 point. This scoring procedure thus weighted governors' involvement giving the least weight to governors' mobilizing SEAs and the most weight to governors who mobilized legislative leadership. Scoring for governors' involvement in support mobilization may be seen below:

	Mob. SEA	Mob. EIGs	Mob. Legis. Leaders	Total
California	1	0	3	4
Colorado	1	0	1	2
Florida	1	0	2	3
Georgia	0	0	1	1
Massachusetts	0	1	1	2
Michigan	1	1	2	4
Minnesota	0	1	3	4
Nebraska	0	1	1	2
New York	0	0	3	3
Tennessee	0	0	1	1
Texas	1	2	1	4
Wisconsin	0	2	3	5

Scoring for governor's involvement in decision enactment was based on case study data according to the extent to which governors were involved in the final enactment of the legislative fiscal decision affecting school finance and tax reform. Scoring was: great involvement, 5 points; considerable involvement, 4 points; moderate involvement, 3 points; a little involvement, 2 points; and no involvement, 1 point.

By a simple addition of the scores assigned to governors according to the extent of their involvement in each policy-making stage, a total score was obtained. By ranking governors on this dimension of policy-making involvement, an index showing the extent of gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making was derived.

APPENDIX E (CHAPTER V)

Scoring for governors' access to legislative party influence, as a resource variable, was based upon several assumptions. First, governors were assumed to have greater access to political party resources in state legislatures in the more politically competitive states characterized as two-party, rather than modified one-party or one-party in inter-party competition. Second, governors were assumed to have greater access to political party resources in state legislatures in states where they had political party majorities in the legislature, rather than a majority in one house or minorities in both houses. By considering combinations of political competitiveness with governors' political party line-ups in legislatures, we constructed the scale shown below where the New York Governor ranked first in having the greatest access to legislative party resources. By assessment of case study data regarding governors' legislative party influence as a tie-breaking procedure, we were able to arrive at an eleven-state ranking for governors. Because of the non-partisan nature of the Nebraska legislature, it was excluded from consideration.

GOVERNORS' ACCESS TO LEGISLATIVE PARTY INFLUENCE

State	Degree of Political Party Competitiveness	Governors' Political Party Line-up	Ranking
California	Competitive	Split[a]	6
Colorado	Competitive	Majority	2
Florida	Semi-competitive	Majority	8
Georgia	Non-competitive	Majority	9
Massachusetts	Competitive	Minority	7
Michigan	Competitive	Split	5
Minnesota	Competitive	Majority	3
New York	Competitive	Majority	1
Tennessee	Non-competitive	Minority	11
Texas	Non-competitive	Majority	10
Wisconsin	Competitive	Split	4

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[a] A split political party line-up is defined as governors having less than majorities in both houses but more than minorities in both houses. Thus, a majority in one house and a minority in the other house would be considered as "split." Either a majority or a minority in one house and an evenly divided line-up in the other house would also be considered as "split."